ANOTHER CAMBODIAN WAR

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0002985514
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-01023
• Publication Date: December 15, 1978

APPROVED FOR RELEASES
DATE: 06-01-2011
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
15 December 1978
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Another Cambodian War
Key judgments
(W(1) ollor
(b)(3) jrilig
307
The pace of military activity in eastern Kampuchea
is increasing and a major commitment of Vietnamese forces
could occur at any time. Given Kampuchea's military and
political weaknesses, the constraints on Chinese ability
to deter Vietnam and Hanoi's overwhelming military advan-
tages, the prognosis for the Pal Pot regime is not good.
Hanoi, with a much better informed reading of the
situation in Kampuchea than our own, appears hopeful that
its impending military campaign in eastern Kampuchea will
lead to a quick unraveling of Phnom Penh's military re-
sistance, large-scale defections to its newly created
Khmer National Front, and conditions of genuine civil
war -- in short, circumstances that would not require a
highly visible, expensive and protracted Vietnamese
military involvement in Kampuchea.
If the next several months do not produce such a
scenario, we are not convinced that Hanoi necessarily
will opt for an all-out military drive on Phnom Penh
and the transparent imposition of a puppet government.
RPM 78-10490
Under such circumstances Hanoi could find itself involved
in an indefinite occupation of Kampuchea in support of a
puppet government encircled by anti-Vietnamese guerrillas
possibly still supported by China Vietnam
retains the option of a less exposed strategy -- the gradual
development of Khmer insurgent operations stiffened by
limited Vietnamese military support and this could extend
the conflict well beyond the dry season fighting period that
ends in the late spring.
We doubt that Vietnam has committed itself to any
absolute course of action or binding timetable at this
point. If past performance is any guide, Hanoi will be
ready to exploit to the hilt any opportunities. But,
Hanoi also will be constantly reassessing Kampuchean mili-
tary and political resiliency, the risk of Chinese counter-
action, and the development of their Khmer insurgent
organization in deciding how far and how fast to push its
campaign.
The Chinese hope that a sudden collapse of the Pol
Pot government can be averted, but they clearly are attempt-
ing to position themselves for a major setback in Phnom
Penh. We believe that the Chinese recognize their ex-
tremely limited capacity to deter Vietnam and that they
currently are concentrating on reactive options that will
limit the damage to their prestige and credibility.
Peking's fortunes in Kampuchea are not tied exclus-
ively to Pol Pot. The Chinese apparently are considering
supporting an anti-Vietnamese insurgency in Kampuchea
whether or not Phnom Penh falls. Although we believe
China is determined to avoid open conflict with Vietnam,
it will take steps to demonstrate its determination to
resist further Vietnamese expansion in the region. A
propaganda offensive against Hanoi and its "hegemonistic"
ally, the USSR, is already developing, but we may also
see more tangible demonstrations such as stepped-up Chinese
military presence on the Sino-Vietnamese border, or more
aggressive patrolling in the South China Sea.
The manner in which deep-seated racial hatred, high
emotion, and very real considerations of national interest
and prestige intersect in the Kampuchean situation also
argues for caution in attempting to precisely chart future
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S CRE
developments. Heightened Sino-Vietnamese tension over
Kampuchea could lead to miscalculation, outright con-
flict and larger consequences outside the realm of
Southeast Asia that both sides would prefer to avoid.
Our basic ignorance of internal political dynamics in
Kampuchea and the resiliency of the Pol Pot regime also
detracts from our confidence. We cannot rule out the
possibility of sudden political change in Phnom Penh --
the reemergence of Sihanouk or a descent into total
anarchy and confusion -- that could substantially alter
our view and possibly cause a readjustment in Vietnamese
strategy.
Hanoi's Perspective
Unsuccessful in its efforts to attain a position
of influence in Kampuchea through its involvement in
the war against the former Lon Nol regime, Hanoi sub-
sequently has even found it impossible to live alongside
the successor Communist regime in Phnom Penh. Even
before the war against Lon Nol ended, the Khmer Communist
leadership was ruthlessly purging Vietnamese-trained
and influenced Kampucheans and continued to develop ties
with China, as Vietnam's own relationship with Peking
deteriorated. The Pol Pot regime has been both intransi-
gent and Provocative in pursuing the border dispute with
Vietnam. The resulting conflict has cost many Vietnamese
lives while draining away resources badly needed for
Hanoi's economic reconstruction efforts.
It has been clear for some time now that Hanoi
last spring abandoned any hope of reaching a modus
vivendi with the present regime in Phnom Penh. Large-
scale Vietnamese military preparations, Vietnamese-
sponsored Khmer resistance activity in eastern Kampuchea,
and Hanoi's new treaty with Moscow all point to this con-
clusion. Any lingering doubts on this score -- if
any existed -- have been removed by Hanoi's announcement
on 3 December 1978 of a "Kampuchean National United Front
for National Salvation." By establishing and recognizing
their own rival Khmer political alternative to the Phnom
Penh regime, the Vietnamese, in effect, have inaugurated
another Cambodian war.
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Are the Vietnamese prepared to commit whatever level
of overt military force may be necessary to install and
maintain a friendly government in Phnom Penh? On paper
the military solution, at first glance, seems simple;
Vietnamese forces could easily be in Phnom Penh in a
matter of days, if not hours. But in practice, the
situation is not so simple. When political risks and
larger strategic considerations are taken into account,
the Vietnamese face a complex and potentially dangerous
problem. Hanoi, well-experienced in the difficulties
of maintaining military and insurgent operations in
Cambodia, certainly understands the difficulty of
imposing a "final solution." We believe thi6 recognition
will greatly influence the decisions Vietnam will make
as their campaign against Phnom Penh unfolds.
A United Offensive
Initial Vietnamese objectives will be largely
limited to gaining the upper hand militarily in the
region of Kampuchea east of the Mekong. In expanding
and linking their existing enclaves, the Vietnamese
will be attempting to preempt retaliatory Kampuchean
strikes into Vietnamese territory and to secure and
expand a base area for the development of a credible
Khmer resistance force. We, as yet, do not have a
clear idea as to existing insurgent capabilities. We
do not have reports that some Khmer Communist troops
have defected to the Vietnamese side. We doubt, however,
that Hanoi's Khmer forces will be able to operate as
more than an auxiliary force during this dry season.
The Vietnamese, of course, will be passing off the fighting
in Kampuchea as the work of anti-regime insurgents; for
the record. Hanoi denies that its own forces are in the
country.
As in last year's dry season campaign, Hanoi's
principal objective east of the Mekong will be the
destruction of as much of the Kampuchean army as possi-
ble. Hanoi will be attempting to draw the Kampucheans
into set-piece battles such as the one at Snuol in
mid-November where the Vietnamese inflicted heavy losses
on one of Phnom Penh's divisions. The Vietnamese probably
hope that a series of similar defeats will lead to a
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CECRBT
general collapse of Kampuchean resistance east of the
Mekong and wholesale defection of Kampuchean units --
developments that would indeed allow the struggle in
Kampuchea to take on the characteristic of a genuine
civil war and allow the Vietnamese to remain militarily
in the background in subsequent fighting.
Or A Drive on Phnom Penh?
Hanoi, of course, cannot count on conclusive and
optimum results from the initial round of dry season
fighting, especially if the Kampucheans can continue
to avoid the trap of set-piece battles and rely on the
guerrilla tactics which have served them well in the
past. Less conclusive results will confront Hanoi
with a difficult choice: on the one hand, the swift
imposition of a Vietnamese client regime in Phnom
Penh -- a course of action that will require a bald
Vietnamese military drive against the capital and
possible protracted fighting against Khmer Communist
forces throughout the country -- and, on the other,
a more patient struggle based on limited Vietnamese
military action and a long-term nurturing and expansion
of allied Khmer insurgent forces -- essentially the
strategy adopted by Hanoi durinc the first Cambodian
war against Lon Nol.
Hanoi clearly would prefer a quick end to the con-
flict in Kampuchea.
indicate
that service in Kampuchea is highly unpopular. More
importantly, a protracted conflict could delay by years
the planned economic reconstruction and integration of
southern Vietnam.
Hanoi, however, will find no guarantee that the
results of an all-out military drive on Phnom Penh will
prove more conclusive or less expensive than a more
patient and protracted strategy. Although the Pol Pot
regime would not survive such a Vietnamese coup de main,
there would be substantial resistance to a swift and
blatant imposition of a Vietnamese puppet government
in Phnom Penh. Hanoi's Khmer force at this state would
be in no position to provide the military underpinning
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for such an embattled regime. Under such circumstances
Hanoi could find itself involved in an indefinite occupa-
tion of Kampuchea in support of a puppet government en-
circled by anti-Vietnamese guerrillas possibly still
supported by China
Hanoi must also factor the Chinese reaction into any
decision to proceed with an all-out military effort,
although they may now believe that the treaty with Moscow,
the chance of Chinese retaliation or intervention has been
substantially reduced. In any event, we believe that
the specter of a Kampuchean morass now is acting as a
greater constraint on Vietnamese action against the Pol
Pot regime than has the threat of Chinese counteraction.
The Chinese View
More, of course, is at stake than the continued
existence of a Khmer government. China's credibility
in playing a great power role in Southeast Asia, and
the future course of Sino-Vietnamese and, by extension,
Sino-Soviet rivalry could be affected by the outcome
of Kampuchea. For at least two decades the cultivation
of an independent Cambodia, responsive to Chinese
influence, has been a central feature of Peking's policy
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CEC RET
in Southeast Asia. The imposition of a Vietnamese client
regime there would be seen by the Chinese as a sharp
Vietnamese and Soviet rebuff to Peking's security and
regional interests.
China's geographic separation, its lack of ade-
quate transport, and the xenophobic nature of its
Khmer clients, however, sharply limit Peking's ability
to influence events on the ground. In the past Peking
has seen little recourse but to depend on a weak and
discouragingly eccentric regime to protect China's
interests in Kampuchea.
The Chinese still hope that the Pol Pot government
can avoid a quick collapse and the resultant damage
to Chinese prestige and interests. If the Pol Pot
regime does not hold on during the course of this dry
season, Peking's policies in the region would remain
essentially as they are today. The Chinese would con-
tinue sea and air supply to the Kampucheans, perhaps
increasing it at whatever rate the regime could absorb.
Peking's recognition that a major setback may now
be at hand, however, is reflected by the increasingly
pessimistic tone of private Chinese comments on the
prospects in Kampuchea. The signing last month of a
Soviet-Vietnam friendship treaty, while probably not
significantly adding to the considerations that already
had limited China's options, almost certainly reinforced
Peking's judgment that the Vietnamese were prepared to
pursue a confrontation with Phnom Penh that China could
do little to deter.
Accordingly, Peking now is trying to make the point
that Chinese credibility and long-term influence in
Kampuchea and Southeast Asia in general are by no means
tied exclusively to Pol Pot. China's media reaction to
events in Kampuchea has avoided enthusiastic support for
Pol Pot or any direct threat to Hanoi.
Chinere officials, in fact, now are authoritatively
ruling out the sending of combat troops to Kampuchea.
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main force units to the region, stepping up air activity
over the border, or provoking armed border incidents.
Similarly, Peking could beef up its military presence
on Hainan Island, on the Paracel Islands, and in the
South China Sea generally. From these strengthened
positions, the Chinese could attempt to harass Vietnamese
shipping and naval activity, in or near the Tonkin Gulf.
Peking could also strengthen its military presence in
northern Laos or explore the possibility of supporting
anti-Vietnamese forces there in a bid to harass the
Vietnamese on a new front.
In pursuing this kind of activity, we believe China's
deep commitment to economic modernization at home,
diplomatic outreach abroad, and concern about possible
Soviet reactions will cause Peking to stop short of
prompting outright conflict with Hanoi. On the other hand,
we cannot rule out the possiblity that China, in seeking
some psychological compensation for a defeat in Kampuchea,
will pursue "punitive" operations against Vietnam that
ultimately will have more far-reaching repercussions.
There are always possibilities for miscalculation and
over-reaction in a situation as emotion-laden as the
current Sino-Vietnamese relationship. If the situation
on China's southern flank deteriorates to anything
resembling war between the two countries, Peking would
find it extremely difficult to withdraw without suffering
even greater damage to its credibility than it would
over the loss of Kampuchea. The USSR, under the terms
of its friendship pact with Hanoi, might then be driven
to attempt to divert Peking's attention from Indochina,
most likely by provoking some form of military con-
frontation on the Sino-Soviet border.
The Soviet Option
The Soviets for their part see the Kampuchean
conflict as an opportunity to inflict a significant
setback to Chinese interests in Southeast Asia at
a relatively low cost and risk to themselves. Moscow
probably believes that,as the situation evolves over
the next few months, it will be required to do little
more than continue providing political support and
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