CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0003029876
• Release Decision: IPPUB U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-00098
• Publication Date: July 25, 1959

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C:P 4j-2
25 July 1959
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Copy No. C 65
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 July 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: The strong bloc reaction to President Eisenhower's
proclamation of "Captive Nations Week" reflects Moscow's ex-
treme sensitivity to any official Western reference to the sub-
jugation of the peoples of the Communist nations. The Soviet
leaders are apparently particularly piqued at the timing of the
proclamation to coincide with Vice President Nixon's visit to the
Soviet Union, during which they probably planned to probe for
flexibilities in the US position on the Geneva negotiations and on
the possibility of an early summit conference. Khrushchev's 23
July speech on his return from Poland condemned the US procla-
mation as "infamous slander" aimed at the socialist caipp;, and
invited the vice president to "have a look at these 'enslaved peo-
ples." A further reference to the US action sparked an exchange
between the vice president and Khrushchev:at a 24 July pre-
opening tour of the American exhibition in Moscow. Reaction
from other bloc countries was highlighted by an official Czech
protest.
Communist China - Morocco: ommunist China reportedl
has asked Morocco for permission to open consulates in Fez,
Marrakech, and Tangier, indicating a major effort to expand
tivities in that country.
the Moroccan Government is considering the request.
Since Rabat recognized Peiping last October, the Chinese have
moved quickly to develop propaganda outlets in Morocco, where
there is popular interest in the economic progress made by Com-
munist China
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Tunisia-Algeria: Relations between President Bourguiba
and the Algerian rebels appear to be deteriorating further in the
wake of attacks on 19-20 and 22-23 July against Tunisian out-
posts and personnel in the Algerian-Tunisian border area. Rebel
leaders, and especially their troops operating in the border re-
gion, have long been dissatisfied with the support they receive
from Tunis, and Bourguiba's public admonition to them on 23 July
to avoid further breaches of Tunisian sovereignty could provoke
some raw' elPments to attemnt maw anti-Tim-Wan artivitv
V?,c
Iran: e Shah is again showing discouragement over the
rate of Iranian military progress and over what he regards as
lack of moral and material support in this current trouble with
,A the USSR. He feels that the Baghdad Pact does not offer Iran ad-
equate protection and says he may have "to reconsider Iran's
riadPct commitment?5
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Dalai Lama: be Dalai Lama has decided to press for sub-
mission of the Tibet case to the UN General Assembly, althoug
It is not clear how he expects the question will be raised. The
ny\ Tibetan leader is ready to make a personal appearance at the UN A
if necessary, and is preparing documentary evidence to suppu_47
25 July 59
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this case. He still hopes to travel abroad to publicize the
Tibetan question, and intends soon to send out two high-
level delegations, one to Southeast Asia and the other to
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, with the same aim.
The Dalai Lama reportedly is also preparing a message for
cirbulation in Tibet encouraging resistance. Sporadic rebel
activity continues in some Tibetan areas3
Page 4)
III. THE WEST
Greece: e Greek Government is expressing fears
of severe internal political and economic repercussions if
its application for association with the European Common
Market (EEC) is not approved at the EEC meeting schedule
for 25 July. While members of the Common Market general
favor Greek association, affirmative action on the application
may be delayed for some time. There is concern that accept-
ance of the special Greek terms for membership would set an
undesirable precedent, and a belief that acceptance of Greece
at this time might hinder development of An PVPIMIA1 -
opean economic association')
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LATE ITEM
25 July 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE COMMUNIST BLOC Nor
Strong Bloc Reaction to "Captive Nations Week"
The Congressional resolution and the President's proclamation on
"Captive Nations Week"--a week of prayer for the enslaved peoples of
Eastern Europe--was condemned throughout the Communist bloc as
"foul slander" against Soviet policy and "blatant and arrogant inter-
ference" in the internal affairs of free and sovereign states. The bloc
reaction reflects Moscow's extreme sensitivity to any official Western
reference to the subjugation of the peoples of the Communist nations.
Khrushchev set the tone for this reaction in his speech on his re-
turn from Poland in which he termed the US action "direct interference"
in Soviet internal affairs and an "infamous slander." Khrushchev then
questioned why "the Americans are sending us US governors and vice
presidents opening exhibitions and at the same time are talking about
enslaved nations." His description of the US action--during a 24 June
pre-opening tour of the US exhibit?as a "black cat that Congress let
run across the road" sparked a sharp exchange between the vice presi-
dent and the Soviet premier in which Khrushchev declared that the USSR
would not "budgeone inbh" at Geneva. The Soviet leaders may view the
US action at this time as an indication of a firm stand to be taken by the
vice president during his visit--which they had hoped would reveal weak-
nesses in the US position at Geneva and open the way for an early summit
conference.
.the Czech Government has officially protested this "new American
provocation" and expressed "amazement" that the US President had
approved and announcedthis "hostile act." The Czech deputy foreign
minister said he would not comment on the numerous historical, geo
graphical, and ethnographical inaccuracies and misrepresentations in
the resolution, but that Czechoslovakia found it strange to be listed with
Cossakia and Idel-Ural, "whatever that was." He added he was at a loss
to understand how the United States could hope to continue to recognize
and maintain official relations with socialist governments while officially
characterizing them as captiz?
The Polish press expressed regret that circles attempting to
sharpen the cold war have drawn the President into this affair.I
25 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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25 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Shah of Iran FOnews Bid for Isicreased Western Support
[The Shah of Iran, in a recent lengthy criticism of what
he views as a lack of Western moral and military support,
warned that he may have to reconsider Iran's Baghdad Pact
commitments. Discouraged by what he regards as the slow
rate of Iranian military progress, he charged that the pact
does not offer Iran adequate protection against either direct
attack or small local wars. He urged that military thinking
concerning Iran should focus on the problems of possible
conflict with Iraq or Afghanistan and the need for a delaying
capability in the event of a Soviet ground attack,. His demands,
which far exceed Iran's ability to absorb, include the develop-
ment of a limited bombing capability and the use of such
modern weapons as antiaircraft guided missiles and Honest
John rockets)
/Despite the Shah's depression and criticism of the lack
of Allied support in the Iranian-Soviet propaganda struggle,
he firmly asserted that Iran should make no conciliatory
gesture to the USSR. Contrary to his expressed opinion that
Soviet propaganda attacks are unproductive, however, there
are continuing indications of their effectiveness. The Shah is
also overoptimistiO in his evaluation of the internal situation
in Iran, where the anticorruption program is showing little
impact and where dissatisfaction with the regime is resulting
in n onspiracy.
25 July 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Dalai Lama to Expand International Campaign to Publicize Tibet
The Dalay Lama has decided to press for submission of the
Tibet question to the UN General Assembly this fall. The Tibetan
leader is prepared to deliver an appeal to the UN in person if
necessary, and is compiling evidence of Chinese atrocities in
Tibet to substantiate his case.
(Any UN discussion of the Dalai Lama's claim would have the
support of many Latin American and Western European members
who view the question in terms of human rights. Any of those
member countries might sponsor the introduction of the issue in
the General Assembly. The Indian Government would be likely
to take the position that a hearing would serve no useful purpose
and would only heighten tensions. Prime Minister Nehru, in fact,
has stated that UN consideration of Tibet would be difficult since
Communist China is not represented. However, New Delhi prob-
ably would not go to extreme lengths to try to block consideration
of Tibet or to prevent the Dalai Lama from traveling to New York,
despite its refusal t9 recognize his claim to leadership of a Tibetan
government-in-exile.
the Dalai Lama had received no official invitation as of 17
July [6-visit any other country, but he still wishes to travel abroad
to promote the Tibetan cause. Thailand's King Phumiphon has pri-
vately expressed the view that a visit by the Tibetan Buddhist
leader might prejudice the King's position in Thailand as "defend-
er of the fait_10
tile Dalai Lama intends to send two high-level delegations on
interalional tours, one to Southeast Asia, and the other to Europe,
Africa, and the Middle East, to publicize the Tibetan plight and to
sound out probable reaction to his own projected tour?
The Dalai Lama reportedly is also preparing a message for
circulation in Tibet encouraging resistance. The Tibetans remain
loyal to their religious leader, and his message will hearten them
in their resistance to the Chinese. While most of the dissidence
in Tibet has been suppressed, sporadic guerrilla activity is ex-
pected to continue for a long time
25 July 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
CONFIDENTIAL
III. THE WEST
Greece Fears TWJepLLUII ui ivienmegtsmp 111 LffUll mon Market
LGTeek Government leaders have expressed anxiety over
reports that Greece's application for association in the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC)--the Common Market?is
facing new obstacles. Following its confidential application
in June for special association with EEC, the Greek Govern-
ment leaked information to the press regarding the advantages
that would accrue to Greece from this association. This has
been followed by nationwide speculation regarding the issue,
and the general assumption has emerged that the Greek appli-
cation would be accepted. Failure of the EEC to take favor-
able action on the application, at a meeting tentatively sched-
uled for 25 July, would give opposition politicians another op-
portunity to discredit the government's political and economic
policiesaj
Cm addition, important segments of the Greek business corn-
munitY are complaining that Greece, plagued with agricultural
surpluses and hard hit by the world shipping slump, can ill af-
ford its present "free trade" policy. Continued nonparticipa-
tion in the Common Market will place Greek exports at an even
greater competitive disadvantagf3
Despite a generally favorable reaction to Greek membership,
the Ci
ommon Market may delay taking definitive action for some
time. Athens has requested extensive tariff concessions and ac-
cess to the development funds of the European Investment Bank.
Some Common Market officials fear that acceptance of these
terms could not be justified under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and are reluctant to establish a prec-
edent for other lesser developed countrie
Moreover, the Greek application comes at a time when
the C?i?mon Market is divided over the future course of its
relations with other countries of Western Europe. Leaders
like West German Vice Chancellor Erhard, who advocates a
broader multilateral European economic association, probably
fear that bilateral Greek association with the Common Market
would complicate its achievement
25 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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