CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: DNI
• Keywords: SPUTNIK
• Collection: Intelligence Warning of the 1957 Launch of Sputnik
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0003186010
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: September 22, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2017-00012
• Publication Date: April 21, 1955

Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Nise .8rasof
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 12
OCI NO. 3624/55
21 April 1955
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: (50)
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1
AUTH LIR 70-2 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
WW1 REVIEWErs:i 1
eA4D
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CWIDENT-tAr
iriererRE-T
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
ONA AiIlk
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
S'Elefttal
Amo0
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
FORMOSA STRAITS Page 1
The military situation was quiet in the Formosa
Straits last week. Logistic activity continues.
AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
The outstanding events thus far at the Afro-Asian
conference have been the vigorous anti-Communist speeches
delivered by several chief delegates of pro-Western
countries. Chou En-lai until now has refrained from
trying to maneuver the conference into end iping's
claims to all Nationalist-held territory.
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Page 2
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
USSR APPARENTLY PREPARED
TO SIGN AUSTRIAN TREATY Page 2
The Soviet note of 19 April calling for a confer-
ence on Austria adds to the evidence that the USSR is
prepared to sign a treaty promptly, although difficul-
ties may still arise over a four-power guarantee of
Austrian neutrality. In its propaganda, Moscow is
parading the Austrian treaty before the West Germans,
who are interested but will be really impressed only
by concessions on Germany. The Austrians are so eager
now for a treaty, that they are not likely to give firm
support to any Western attempts to influence the terms,
of a neutrality guarantee.
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
-EAST GERMANY MAINTAINS
PRESSURE ON WEST,BERLIN Page 4
The East German government
pressure against West Berlin in
strate the city's vulnerability
West, and particularly the West
consequences that ma
rearmed under NATO.
continues to build up
an effort to demon-
and to convince the
Germans, of the serious
the Federal Republic is
. CONFIDENTIAL
9felefTsb
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
MAI 1N.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
NO POLITICAL SOLUTION INSIGHT
AS SAIGON "TRUCE" ENDS
Saigon's third "truce" ended on 20 April with
skirmishes between the Binh Kuyen and government troops.
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
AVOIDING NEW INCIDENTS
There were no new incidents between Afghanistan
and Pakistan during the past week. The next move by
the Afghans--possibly removal of Prime Minister Daud
by senior members of the royal family--will determine
whether tensions are likely to abate.
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 5
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Page 6
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
The Soviet Communiqud on the Near East: The Soviet
Foreign Ministry's commun1quCZY-16 April was
issued primarily to influence the Bandung con-
ference. The Communists' efforts to exploit
disputes in the Near and Middle East are hampered
by Moscow's immediate objective of encouraging
Indian neutralism and its longer-t m of
economic penetration of the area. paE0 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Japan's Relations With the Sino-Soviet Bloc: The
Soviet Union's acceptance of Japan's suggestion
to conduct negotiations either in London or
Geneva appears designed to sustain domestic pres-
sure in Japan for closer relations with the Sino-
Soviet bloc. Interest in such relations had been
noticeably subsiding as a result of earlier Soviet
stalling.
Peiping Hints at Reprisals Against Hong Kong: Since the
crash of an Air India plane on 11 April in which
eight members of Peiping's delegation to the Bandung
conference were killed, Chinese Communist spokesmen
have been hinting at reprisals against the British
colony of Hong Kong. Peiping may believe that such
tactics will help to dissuade Britain from supporting
the American position on Formosa.
Approved for for Release:-20-1-7/5-6-Alff-a03186010
Page 2 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
SECRET
,1100
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
Soviet Research on Earth Satellite: The scientific emi-
nence of the six men who on 16 April were listed
as members of the USSR's Permanent Interdepartmental
Commission for Interplanetary Communications suggests
a co-ordinated survey of the theoretical problems
in the establishment of a space station.
South Korea Renews Efforts to Isolate Japan: South
Korea is renewing its efforts to undermine the
United States' faith in Japan as a reliable ally,
and to supplant Japan in American strategic plan-
ning with a group of small Asian nations led by
South Korea. The more immediate objective, how-
ever, is to attract the major part of long-term
American aid allocated to the Far East.
Negotiations in Laos: The arrival in Vientiane of
some 30 Pathet Lao representatives opens another
phase in the long-drawn-out negotiations between
the royal government and the Communists for a
political settlempnt. The Laotian government
still appears in no hurry to conclude the talks
and is hopeful that its recent memorandum to the
International Control Commission may result in
favorable action.
REO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
? ? PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Hungarian Leaders Ousted: The ouster of two top lead-
ers of the Hungarian Workers' Party--Premier Imre
Nagy and Mihaly Farkas--may be only the beginning
of a widespread removal of anti-Rakosi elements in
the party.
Genoa Port Strike Becoming More Serious: The walkout
of some 1,600 Communist-dominated ship repair
workers in Genoa is now in its thirteenth week
with no end in sight. Twice this month, sympathy
strikes have stopped cargo loadings and unloadings
and have led to numerous clashes between strikers
and police.
Iraqi-Syrian Relations: Syria's cabinet capitulated
last week to army pressure for negotiating a de-
fense pact with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. An army
coup and a concomitant threat of Iraqi military
iaterventionJiave been averted for the time
being.
swftET
MTV1-3 TirrI1IT7 V.S.T TrfIrTnIn
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
SECRET Nor
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE KHRUSHCHEV APPROACH IN INTERNAL POLICY Page 1
Party Secretary Khrushchev's propensity for using
spectacular methods for rapidly solving specific organ-
izational and production problems in the Soviet agri-
cultural program may provide some insight into his ap-
proach to other problems.
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA Page 2
The growing importance of the African as a force
in international politics in pointed up by the attend-
ance of official delegates from Ethiopia, Liberia, and
the Gold Coast at the Bandung conference. The major
factors affecting the future of Africa south of the
Sahara are racialism, colonialism and the influence of
India, the United Nations, and Communism. Numerous
areas, however, are at present largely untouched by
these forces eitl of their isolation or lack
of development.
SECRET
iv
Approved forTerea;:7017097675.3186010
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
4110 4mr
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
FORMOSA STRAITS
The lull in combat opera-
tions in the Formosa Straits
area continued throughout the
past week, and there were no
indications that the Chinese
Communists were about to
initiate major attacks against
theNationalists.
For the first time since
last September, when the Com-
munists began to intensify
pressure on the offshore
islands, there was no artillery
fire against the Quemoys for
an entirp wprik
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3 3(b)(1)>25Yrs
PART I
RET
nr TITUVTITATV 71crwon-vcm
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Page 1 of 7
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Now SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE
The outstanding events
thus far at the Afro-Asian
conference have been the vig-
orous anti-Communist speeches
delivered by several chief
delegates of pro-Western
countries.
The anti-Communists, who
heavily outnumber the Commu-
nists and neutralists, have
strongly influenced the organ-
ization of the conference.
While they agreed to confer-
ence unanimity for approval
of any resolution, they suc-
cessfully demanded that the
working committees be per-
mitted to issue communiques
discussing disagreements and
tabulating any votes that are
taken.
Thailand's Prince Wan--a
leading advocate of Asian co-
operation with the West--has
been elected rapporteur of the
extremely important political
committee, which is composed of
all chief delegates. It ap-
pears that the anti-Communist
delegates are seeking to have
the deliberations of the confer-
ence follow the principles of
the United Nations rather than
that of "peaceful coexistence"
or the "five principles" of Mao
Tse-tung,
Chou En-lai has until now
refrained from trying to maneu-
ver the conference into endors-
ing Peipings's claims to all
USSR APPARENTLY PREPARED
TO SIGN AUSTRIAN TREATY
The propaganda line from
Moscow tends to confirm that
the immediate Soviet purpose
in moving rapidly toward an
PART I
Nationalist-held territory.
Evidently believing that any
such effort would be defeated,
Chou publicly stated that the
question of Formosa would only
enmesh the conference in "dis-
putes...without any solution."
Chou seems to be going
ahead at Bandung with conver-
sations aimed at assessing the
attitudes of other Far Eastern
states toward possible Com-
munist Courses nf ar1-inn
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Most of those approached
by Chou are expected to argue
against the use of force by
the Chinese Communists and to
support the idea of an early
Formosa conference.
Prime Minister Nehru, who
was expected to be a dominant
figure, has kept almost com-
pletely out of the limelight.
On the opening day, visibly
irritated at the way things
were developing, he stalked
out of the auditorium during
an anti-Communist speech. He
may be expected, however, to
continue efforts to keep the
conference general and friendly
rather than specific and
bitter, and to seek some common
ground upon whieh it can be
concluded.
Austrian settlement is to re-
vive West European .interest in
big-power negotiations before
West German rearmament is car-
ried out.
SECRET
TlinNTYRYAM17, .rwrrriTelm
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Page 2 of 7
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
SECRET
Nor vp,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
In particular, the USSR
wants to show the Germans the
advantages of dealing directly
with Moscow and to dangle before
them the possibility of unity
on the Austrian neutrality model.
The Soviet note of 19 April
proposed that the foreign minis-
ters of the four great powers
and Austria meet soon in Vienna
to consider and sign the Austrian
treaty.
The rapidity and manner
in which the USSR is moving in-
dicates that Moscow probably
will not insist on a discussion
of any issues other than Austria.
The Soviet Union apparently is
prepared to sign the treaty un-
less some Western objection
gives it a chance to blame the
West for the delay.
The only issue the USSR
deliberately has left obscure
is what kind of four-power
guarantees it wants for Austrian
neutrality. A clue as to what
the USSR has in mind was Mob-
toy's reference to the guarantees
of perpetual neutrality, inde-
pendence, and territorial in-
violability of Switzerland
which emerged from the 1815
Congress of Vienna.
If the Soviet negotiators
meet resistance from the Western
powers on this issue, it seems
likely that they are prepared to
issue a strong unilateral guaran-
tee rather than stall the con-
ference.
Under the Hungarian and
Rumanian peace treaties, the
withdrawal of Soviet occupation
troops from Austria is supposed
to result in the return of the
PART I
line of communication troops
in Hungary and Rumania to
Soviet territory. It is ex-
pected, however, that Moscow
will use the Soviet bloc se-
curity system which is being
formed as an excuse for making
arrangements with these coun-
tries to keep troops there.
Most West Germans will
welcome the encouraging re-
sults of the Moscow meeting.
They are not likely to see
progress on Austria as cause
for abandoning the Western
alliance, but they will hope
that it means a fundamental
change in Soviet policy. From
nearly all quarters, there will
probably be insistence that
talks on Germany be held as
soon as possible.
The deputy leader of the
Christian Democratic faction
in the Bundestag told Ameri-
can officials in Bonn on 14
April that he is greatly con-
cerned over the probable im-
pact of Austrian developments.
He feels the Bonn government
will be faced with a strong
popular trend to accept a
neutral position for Germans.
Nevertheless, it will be
Soviet proposals directly on
Germany, not actions on
Austria, which will determine
the German government's at-
titude.
The results of the meet-
ing in Moscow have been greet-
ed with almost universal popu-
lar enthusiasm in Austria, and
any attempt to delay the four-
power meetings will almost
certainly meet with popular
opposition there.
SECRET
rt.n.
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Page 3 of 7
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
The West may also find it
difficult to obtain Austrian
co-operation in any negotiations
for neutrality guarantees ac-
ceptable to the West. Austria
may already have agreed to ac-
cept a unilateral Soviet guaran-
tee if necessary.
Carried along by popular
enthusiasm, Chancellor Raab
is not likely to engage in
cautious contemplation of the
dangers of Soviet influence
to which his country might be
EAST GERMANY MAINTAINS
PRESSURE ON WEST BERLIN
The East German government
has continued in the past week
to build up its pressure against
West Berlin and to attempt
to force West German agreement
to negotiate the truck tax
question at the ministerial
level.
Behind the East German pol-
icy is the desire to demonstrate
the vulnerability of West Berlin
to Communist pressures and to
convince West Europeans, partic-
ularly West Germans, that rearm-
ing the Federal Republic under
NATO may have serious conse-
quences.
The Communists, moreover,
have been contrasting West
Germany's difficulties--
alleged to result from its
alignment with the West--
with the advantages Austria is
gaining through its policy of
neutrality.
PART I
subjected under the proposed
conditions of the treaty.
The Western powers prob-
ably cannot now depend on the
usual sobering influence of
Socialist leaders on Austrian
dealings with the USSR, since
Vice Chancellor Schaerf and
Foreign State Secretary Kreisky
were on the delegation to Mos-
cow, and their party can ill
afford to battle the tide of en-
thusiasm by pulling apart the
that have been made.
EO 13526 3.3(b)(8)>25Yrs
Following the East German
charge on 12 April that West
Berlin is the Allies' main spy
center and a threat to the GDR,
an editorial in the leading
East German Communist daily
stated on 16 April that the
"consequences" of Bonn's re-
fusal to negotiate the truck
tax question on a ministerial
level "will have to be borne
by West Berlin."
The East Berlin authorities
on 19 April cut off the flow of
electricity to West Berlin.
Because of West Berlin's self-
sufficiency in electric power,
however, the effect of the ban
is largely psychological.
According to the West
Berlin Land Labor Office, 3,000
West Berliners working in East
Berlin have been fired in the
past two months and West Berlin
officials fear that the remain-
ing 12,500 will soon be dismissed.
SECRET
AV TiummenTemr TXTMVDVQM
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Page 4 of 7
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
'1111? SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
There have also been a num-
ber of unconfirmed reports that
the East Germans are preparing
plans for other restrictive meas-
ures including sealing off West
Berlin from East Germany.
These plans are alleged to
include the creation of a no
man's land security strip around
Berlin, cutting East German com-
munication lines running through
West Berlin and strengthening
the border police units prepara-
tory to restricting the move-
ment of persons into and out
of Berlin.
East Germany probably al-
so desires to isolate West
Berlin for internal security
reasons. The city serves as a
haven for East Germans fleeing
military conscription, as a
base for Western intelligence
agencies operating in East
Germany, and as a show window
for the West which undoubtedly
exacerbates the uneasy internal
situation in the German Demo-
cratic Republic.
The increasing belligerency
of the East German government,
and its refusal to negotiate
the truck tax question on the
technical level as desired by
NO POLITICAL SOLUTION IN SIGHT
AS SAIGON "TRUCE" ENDS
Saigon's third "truce"
ended on 20 April to the sound
of hand-grenade explosions
and machine-gun fire.
The rebel Binh Kuyen en-
gaged in several provocative
acts including the kidnaping
and shooting of government
PART I
Bonn,have moved the Federal
Republic to slow shipments to
East Germany of goods already
scheduled for delivery and to
place an embargo on future
shipments.
On 14 April, Chancellor
Adenauer and West Berlin mayor
Buhr reportedly agreed that dis-
cussion of the road tolls with
the "illegitimate regime of the
Soviet zone" is out of the ques-
tion. Both Adenauer and Suhr
are urging Allied intervention
with Moscow, since road access
to Berlin .is a quadripartite
responsibility.
The Western powers intend
to run additional military con-
voys and to begin practice
flights into Berlin to impress
the USSR. Their protest notes
to Pushkin, however, have been
ignored.
Bonn and West Berlin offi-
cials are inclined to believe
that either too strong or too
weak a reaction will provoke
new harassments. Allied offi-
cials, however, point out that
by interfering in German inter-
zonal trade the West has the
best means of forcing East Ger-
many to terms, since East Ger-
many heavily de ends n West
German steel. (Con- EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
curred in by ORR
troops in several parts of
the city. The most sensa-
tional act of violence was
fire from a passing truck
directed at the sidewalk caf6
of the Hotel Majestic on the
main street of Saigon.
SECRET
Approvedf;le-a-se.: .2-0-17/-0-670770 86010
Page 5 of
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
,SE,CRET
Now Nor
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
Under continued pressure
from the French not to act
against the Binh Xuyen--pres-
sure backed up by the Expedi-
tionary Corns--the government
has refrained from taking more
than localized action against
Binh Xuyen raids.
Cemet
'T
, '???
dr
,...
PreSident'S ..-
Palace .Surete 0
-,/--j
P r
French
ignWssy
<
,
,
, -- -_ __
/-' "-.Iefnam
_
se Arm
Army HOSr

?
, ? ower Plant ?-
HQ
/
...--
Var. ? :
_ _
----- inh HQ area
1-,
SAIGON - CI-10 LON
10?46'N 106?40'E
R.dorm.
1.1,,,,,,w. wrw
2 3 Miles
..?. ?
1 A
0 1 2 3 4 Kilometers
14696 4-55
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
AVOIDING NEW INCIDENTS
There were no new incidents
between Afghanistan and Paki-
stan during the past week. The
next move by the Afghans--
possibly the removal of Prime
Minister Daud by senior mem-
bers of the royal family--
will determine whether ten-
sions are likely to abate.
PART I
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
The political
situation remains at
an impasse. Diem
has proposed that a
state council be set
up pending elections
of an assembly three
months hence.
To date Viet-
namese politicians,
aside from those
who remain loyal
to Diem, have been
unable to bring
forth a compromise
formula that any
two of them can
agree on. EO 13526 3.3(b)(8)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(8)>25Yrs
No further incidents have
occurred in either country since
the 1 April reprisal attack
against the Afghan consulate in
Peshawar, and no further tribal
unrest has been reported.
Pakistan's evacuation of
dependents from its posts in
SECRET
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 of 7
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
SECRET No,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
Afghanistan, which seems de-
signed to impress Kabul with
the "seriousness" of the
situation, proceeded without
any incidents. Both govern-
ments are impressed with the
seriousness of the situation
and for the present at least
will avoid creating new in-
cidents.
Reports of Soviet in-
volvement have not been con-
firmed. Some press and radio
releases by the USSR on the
situation generally favor
Afghanistan. Only direct
interference by Pakistan, or
chaos arising from major
tribal disturbances, appears
likely to result in active
Soviet intervention.
There are no indications
that a tribal uprising is
imminent, and Ambassador
Hildreth reports that Karachi's
policy now excludes the pos-
sibility of trying to unseat
the Afghan royal family.
The resolution of the
crisis now appears to rest
with Afghanistan. The major-
ity of recent reports suggests
that Prince Daud will be
"disciplined" to permit the
Afghan government to make
face-Saving concessions,partic-
ularly in the light of the
strong Western and Near East-
ern diplomatic representations
over the March incidents.
What will actually be
done in reference to Daud
PART I
depends on whether his two
uncles--who lead the opposi-
tion to him within the oli-
garctor--can command greater
popular support than Daud and
whether they can influence the
king.
Action against Daud would
consist either of his removal
from office or his retention
on a pledge of good behavior.
If he is removed, the situa-
tion is likely to return to
normal.
Even should Daud remain
as prime minister, either on
sufferance or as a victor in
the struggle for power, the
outlook for the near future is
not necessarily alarming. He
has been somewhat cowed by the
strong diplomatic protests and
is probably worried by the
fact that tribal movements
after the late March demonstra-
tions were directed against
Afghanistan rather than Paki-
stan.
The longer-range outlook
is less promising. Eventually
Daud is likely to indulge in
some headstrong action inimical
to Western interests in Afghan-
istan, despite promises he may
give to the royal family. More-
over, in the next few years,
death or incapacitation of the
aging royal uncles may remove
the last restraining elements
on Daud and may enable him to
control the government
domInati1n the king.
SECRET
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EU 1352b 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Page 7 of 7
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Nmie SECRET Nor
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Soviet Communique
On the Near East
The Soviet Foreign Minis-
try's communique of 16 April
on developments in, the Near
and Middle East was released
primarily to influence the
Bandung conference.
The communique emphasized
that Western-sponsored regional
defense arrangements are colo-
nialism in a new form and
contrasted what it called
Western imperialism with the
exemplary conduct of the Soviet
Union in encouraging the in-
dependence of new nations in
the area.
While this line is "old
hat" in Soviet propaganda,
Moscow is putting it out now
in official form to emphasize
that it is concerned over the
development of military blocs
such as the "northern tier,"
and to encourage anti-Western
elements in countries such as
Syria to count on Soviet
support.
To give greater weight to
such sentiments, the communique
warned that any continued
"policy of pressure and threat
in relation to countries of the
Near and Middle East" would
"have to be considered by the
UN."
Actually, the USSR's
freedom of action in the Near
and Middle East is hampered by
its immediate objective of
encouraging Indian neutralism
y? FAEROE IS.
NORWAY
SHETLAND 15.1. 1
%ORKNEY IS
K _ 1
INCDOM DEN
1 i 7
N.mu
MLAND
E 1 GERMANY POLAND
LUX.
HAN LIS
FRANCE A I
S IT GARY
1 RUMANIA
FRIES E
YUGOSLAVI
DEFENSE PACTS IN EUROPE
AND THE MIDDLE EAST
1 NATO 4 TURKISH-PAKISTANI
5 TURKISH-IRAQI
2 BALKAN
6 ANGLO-EGYPTIAN
3 ARAB LEAGUE 7 ANGLO-IRAQI
8 POSSIBLE "NORTHERN TIER"
-
.0 sic
RTUCiAL
BULOAR
SPAIN
1 Sardin
GM: CE T LIRKEY
i 1 2 4 58
iy
TANGI Iiilait3 e,c'CYPR7 SYRIA
-- , - -- Y- --
, ? ----- -- -- -
TI 3 IRAN ARJI IANISTAN
IRAQ
MOROCCO
11-
?\IT
ALGERIA LIBYA
5 78 8
I ROAN
3
'AKISTAN
EGYPT 48
1 3
N
A !SU
3 6 SAUDI P.? ,
SAMARA
4.1.- .,- ?
50
ARABIA
'''''',...?....?.....
3 MUSCA
AND
'OMA
T
,
FRENCH WEST AFRICAANGLO-
o.
" .
YEMEN
(EGYPTIAN 11.;'" _-
SUDAN SQM Ai--
,
21 APRIL 1955
PART II
50419
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 1 of 8
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
and its longer-term program of
economic penetration in the
area.
In order to further these
policies, the Soviet leaders
have been careful to avoid
using coercion or subversion
which would appear as gross
interference in the eyes of the
Indian and other South Asian
peoples.
Japan's Relations
With the Sino-Soviet Bloc
The latest Soviet note
concerning Soviet-Japanese
negotiatiOns expresses a will-
ingness to meet at London or
Geneva, sites which Japan had
previously mentioned as pos-
sibilities. The Soviet reply
appears designed to sustain
domestic pressure in Japan for
closer relations with the Sino-
Soviet bloc, which was notice-
ably subsiding as a result of
earlier Soviet stalling.
The Soviet leaders may
have felt that their short-
term interests were best served
by a gesture of "reasonableness"
which would help Prime Minister
Hatoyama through the forth-
coming Diet session. Hatoyama's
position has become shaky as
a result of inept diplomacy,
and, if he fell, he would
probably be, succeeded by a
premier less willing to com-
promise with the bloc.
The note will probably
prove acceptable to Japan.
Shunichi Matsumoto, a former
ambassador to London, has
already been picked to head
the Japanese delegation. Mat-
sumoto is able, pro-West and
reported on good terms with
both Prime Minister Hatoyama
and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu.
It also is likely that
the USSR looks on the area as a
point of conflict among Ameri-
can, British and French
policies, and would therefore
desist from any threats or
interference which might force
these governmen ?-sOat
common policy.
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
The differences between
Japan and Communist China cen-
ter around Chinese attempts to
maneuver the Japanese govern-
ment into de facto relations
prematurely.
In Tokyo, Japanese of
have refused to assume
official responsibility for
the execution of a private
trade agreement. The govern-
ment is also under pressure
to participate in the en-
forcement of a private fish-
eries pact signed on 15 Anvil
in Peiping.
SECRET
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
PART II NOTES Awn rnitimpArTs
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Page 2 of 8
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
gifts. Nee
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
Peiping Hints at Reprisals
Against Hong Kong
Since the crash of an Air
India plane on 11 April in
which eight members of Peiping's
delegation to the Bandung con-
ference were killed, Chinese
Communist spokesmen have been
hinting at reprisals against
the British colony of Hong
Kong.
The Chinese Communists
have been asserting that the
British were responsible for
failing to deter American and
Chinese Nationalist "agents"
in the colony. One spokesman
has publicly stated that if the
Soviet Research -
On Earth Satellite
Moscow radio on 16 April
announced the names of six of
the members of the Permanent
Interdepartmental Commission
for Interplanetary Communi-
cation of the Academy of
Science.
These six--P. Kapitsa,
A. Karpenko, L. Sedov, V.
Ambartsumyan, P. Parenago,
and B. Kukharkin--are among
the leading scientists in the
USSR, and have internationally
recognized competence in such
fields as astrophysics, and
cosmic ray and nuclear energy
research.
The broadcast also car-
ried a short interview with
the secretary of the com-
mission, who said that "one of
the first tasks of the com-
mission lies in organizing
work for the creation of an
automatic labo tory of
scientific research in cosmic
space."
PART II
British continue to "indulge"
such agents, "this state of
affairs will become a serious
threat to China."
The Chinese Communists in
the past have avoided threats
against Hong Kong. Peiping
may intend to use till= air-
liner incident, however, to.
create apprehension over Hong
Kong's future. The Chinese
Communists may believe that
such tactics will help to
dissuade the British from
supporting the Amel1i nnci-
tion on Formosa. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Inclusion in the Soviet
group of top-notch people in
a field where competent per-
sonnel are scarce suggests a
co-ordinated survey of the
theoretical problems involved
in the establishment of a
space station.
To date, the work was
probably not advanced beyond
the theoretical stages, since
the commission is subordinate
to the Academy of Sciences
and four of the six men listed
have dealt almost exclusively
with highly theoretical prob-
lems.
Construction of the pro-
pulsion device required to
place a small object into an
orbit around the earth is
considered scientifically pos-
sible.
Enlargement of such a
satellite into a usable space
laboratory is beyond present-
day scientific knowledge. This
step would depend on the
SECRET
?trams Awn OilmMtnam
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Page 3 of 8
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
.4101/
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
solution of many of the prob-
lems now facing the guided
missile field, particularly in
the research and development
of the intercontinental
ballistic missile.
South Korea Renews
Efforts to Isolate Japan
Recent North Korean over-
tures toward Japan, abetted by
Prime Minister Hatoyama's
initial favorable response,
have given South Korea an op-
portunity to renew its efforts
to isolate Japan.
This is fundamentally an
effort to undermine America's
faith in Japan as a reliable
ally, and to supplant Japan in
American strategic planning with
a group of small Asian nations
led by South Korea. The more
immediate objective, however,
is to create a basis for at-
tracting the major part of
long-term, large-scale Ameri-
can aid allocated to the Far
East.
[thee
has set his sights on obtaining
90 percent of all American aid
allocated to the Far East. He
has recently requested, through
his aid officials, a total of
$350,000,000 in economic aid,
and $620,000,000 in military
aid for fiscal 1956--an in-
crease of $270,000,000 over
the current year.
Rhee's official press has
warned that if Japan enters
into negotiations with North
Korea, South Korea should
withdraw diplomatic relations
and regard Japan as an enemy.
The demand has also been
PART II
Such a space platform
could not only serve scientific
research, but also could be an
invaluable aid to military
operations and intelligence
collection activities. E0135263.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
(Prepared by OSI)
raised that South Korea
should claim reparations from
Japan to cover the 40 years
of Japanese rule.
In late March, Rhee de-
clared that other Asian
nations must be made aware
that Japan is moving toward
Communism and could not be
trusted. All of these nations,
he asserted, must attempt to
make the United States aware
of the Japanese trend.
Rhee's "fact-finding"
mission to Southeast Asia has
issued statements warning
free Asian nations to unite
for protection against what it
describes as a reviving, re-
arming Japan,which is mo-"--
E0 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
toward collaboration wit
Communists,
South Korea has also
attempted to convince the
United States that free Asian
nations fear a resurgent Japan
even more than Communism and,
if confronted with a choice,
would prefer the latter to the
former.
The South Korea govern-
ment has continued attempts to
maneuver the United States in-
to intervening with Japan on
behalf of Korean objectives,
and has called on the United
States to force Japan to end
its differences with ?nthpr
free Asian nations." E0 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 8
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
5t.CHE I 414."
very
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
Negotiations in Laos
The unheralded descent
on Vientiane oL some 30 Pathet
Lao negotiators, just prior to
the departure of Laotian
officials for Bandung, was
apparently timed carefully to
soften any statements by the
government of Laos at the Afro-
Asian conference regarding Com-
munist intransigence.
The Communists' volte-face,
after arguments on the flimsiest
of grounds against carrying on
the talks in Vientiane, may al-
so have been motivated in part
by Viet Minh foreign minister
Pham Van Dong's recent con-
versations with Nehru in New
Delhi.
Nhouy Abhay, the govern-
ment's chief negotiator, has
stated that he plans to submit
to the Pathet Lao a "reasonable
proposal." He described this
only in vague terms but it will
apparently include an offer to
"reintegrate" those Pathet Lao
who at some former time held
civil or military positions
with the royal government.
Nhouy, although in no hurry
to conclude the negotiations,
believes his proposal will be
accepted without difficulty if
the Pathet Lao are "true Lao-
tians"; if not, he asserts, they
will be told frankly they are
"Viets" and packed off home.
The government's continued
lack of a sense of urgency in
dealing with the Pathet Lao--
reflected even by able officials
such as Nhouy--was demonstrated
again by Premier Katay in a
13 April talk with Ambassador
Peurifoy in Bangkok.
PART II
Katay maintained that nego-
tiations must not be broken off
until it was apparent to all
Laotians that the Pathet Lao
was unreasonable and Communist-
dominated. He insisted that
the degree of Communist domina-
tion over the Pathet Lao organi-
zation was not firmly established.
The Pathet Lao has taken
every advantage of the govern-
ment's indecision. The Com-
munists' immediate goal is to
gain time in which to consoli-
date their hold and build up
their organization in the north-
ern provinces. However, their
actions and propaganda attacks
on the royal government have
resulted in increasing dis-
illusion on the government's
part.
On 13 April the government
sent to the International Con-
trol Commission a strongly
worded memorandum on Pathet Lao
violations of the truce and on
Viet Minh collusion in the
northern provinces. The efficacy
of this tactic in solving the
dispute with the Communists is
highly doubtful, but the propa-
ganda effect may prove helpful.
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Page 5 of 8
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
EO 13526 3.3(b)(
Hungarian Leaders Ousted
The ouster of two top
leaders of the Hungarian
Workers' Party--Premier Imre
Nagy and Mihaly Farkas--may
be only the beginning of a
wholesale weeding out of anti-
Rakosi elements in the party
on grounds of "rightist de-
viation."
Since Farkas has long been
closely associated with party
leader Matyas Rakosi, his re-
moval on the charge that he
had supported Nagy's "anti-
party, anti-Marxist" views in-
dicates that the split in the
leadership extends beyond a
simple struggle for power be-
tween Rakosi and Nagy.
Publication in the official
party newspaper in early April
of articles sharply critical of
right-wing deviationism indi-
cates widespreadopposition
among local party officials to
the central committee resolution
modifying new course policies.
While Nagy is not believed
to have been a powerful force in
the Hungarian party before his
elevation to the premiership in
July 1953, he has since then,
as the spokesman for new course
liberal policies, apparently
built up an extensive following
both within the central com-
mittee and at lower levels of
the party hierarchy.
Farkas has been one of the most
important party leaders and
was minister of defense until
July 1953.
In recent months both men
had displayed unusual independ-
ence in their relations with
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
r
)>25Yrs
EO
13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
A reliable source of the
American legation in Budapest
has reported that Rakosi flew
to Moscow on 14 April, appar-
ently immediately after the
central committee met to ex-
pel Nagy and Farkas from their
party posts. If true, this
suggests that Rakosi met again
with strong opposition in the
central committee and felt it
SECRET
PART II NOTES nun Onummimmo
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Page 6 of 8
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Noir '4?101
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
necessary to gain Kremlin
approval before announcing
action against Nagy and his
"right-wing" supporters which
he knew would be unpopular.
The elevation of Andras
Hegedus to the premiership
indicates that the regime
remains concerned over the
"near stagnation" of agricul-
ture, Hegedus, who has been
first deputy premier since
July 1953 and acting premier
in recent weeks, has been
closely connected with agricul-
ture since 1951 and has co-
ordinated the regime's agri-
cultural policies since October
1954.
Hehgedus is only 32 years
old and first attained prom-
inence in 1945 when he was
elected secretary of the youth
movement. He presumably does
not have a significant personal
party following.
Genoa Port Strike
Becoming More Serious
The strike situation in
the Italian port of Genoa is
becoming increasingly serious.
The walkout of some 1,600
ship repair workers is now in
its thirteenth week with no end
in sight. Twice this month
sympathy strikes have complete-
ly disrupted cargo loadings and
unloadings and resulted in
numerous clashes between
strikers and the police.
The Genoa strike began
in January in protest against
new hiring regulations which
threatened to eliminate the
virtual monopoly hitherto en-
joyed among ship repair workers
by the Communist-dominated
General Labor Confederation
(CGIL). Thus far there has been
PART II
In his maiden speech to
the National Assembly on 18
April, he parroted the March
central committee resolutions.
Despite the harsh action
against Nagy and Farkas and
the possibility of further
ousters, Rakosi, backed by
the Kremlin, is apparently
still trying to follow a mid-
dle course and to avoid al-
ienating any larger segments
Of the party membership than
necessary.
Istvan Kovacs, whose
recent speeches have appeared
to reflect a moderate viewpoint,
was promoted to the politburo,
and Erno Gero, a representative
of the extreme left wing of the
party, reappeared in an im-
portant role at several Libera-
tion Day celebrations after a
long absence due to illness.
no sign of wavering on the part
of management, the union, or
the government.
A 48-hour sympathy strike
on 12 and 13 April by some
4,000 stevedores tied up more
than 50 cargo ships. When the
port authority warned that sym-
pathy strikers would be fined
if they walked out again, the
stevedores called another
24-hour strike.
*Me observers believe
the strikers cannot hold out
much longer. The leaders of
both CGIL and the Italian Com-
munist Party, however, may be
expected to use every resource
in pressing the strike. They
are especially anxious for a
victory in Genoa now to offset
SECRET
.:NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 8
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
low NECHET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
the heavy defeats suffered by
CGIL in recent shop steward
elections in industrial plants,
Iraqi-Syrian Relations
Syria's cabinet capitu-
lated last week to army pres-
sure for negotiating a defense
pact with Egypt and Saudi Ara-
bia. An army coup and a con-
comitant threat of Iraqi mili-
tary intervention have been
averted for the time being.
The Syrian cabinet author-
ized Foreign Minister Azm on
13 April to negotiate a pact
with Egypt and Saudi Arabia on
the basis of his elimination of
the anti-Iraqi provisions in
Cairo's original draft.
Azm's proposals would make
the treaty an Arab defense pact
aimed at Israel. Even in this
form, the projected pact, be-
cause of its anti-Iraqi and
anti-Turkish inspiration, will
probably be opposed by Baghdad
and Ankara.
Azm is now at the Afro-
Asian conference, where he
will carry on negotiations with
Egyptian and Saudi officials.
PART II
particularly the Fiat fantnrieac
in Turin and Milan. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 1352
6 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
The cabinet's endorsement
of Azm's policy resulted large-
ly from pressure by pro-
Egyptian elements in the army
who are in league with the
anti-Western and extremist
Arab Socialist-Resurrectionist
Party.
These elements had threat-
ened a coup if the endorsement
were'not forthcoming. They are
likely to renew their efforts
If Azm runs into difficulty
when he refers the matter to
the cabinet after his return
from Bandung.
In the meantime, Iraq,
under pressure from the West,
has apparently given up the
idea of sending troops into
Syria in the event anti-Iraqi
elements stage a coup.
Iraq and Turkey remain 01E0
posed to the Syrian government
and its pro-Egyptian policy.
However, they evidence less de-
termination than formerly to
prevent the signing of any
new Arab pact. E0 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 8
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Nur JtA.;KL,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE KHRUSHCHEV APPROACH IN INTERNAL POLICY
Soviet party secretary
Khruschev's propensity for
taking large-scale, spectac-
ular gambles for quick results
in agriculture suggests that
he may use similar methods in
tackling other internal policy
matters.
A typical exampleof
Khrushchev's approach was his
abortive "agrogorod" plan to
consolidate collective farm
villages into "agricultural
cities" which, as a member of
the politburo and secretariat,
he advocated in 1950 and early
1951. The plan called for
centralizing the peasants on
each large amalgamated farm
by housing them in a single,
urban-type village, or
"agrogorod."
Khrushchev's scheme would
have tightened political
control over the peasantry.
Indeed, it would have provided
the basis for the transforma-
tion of the collective farms
into completely government-
operated state farms, and the
eventual transfer of all land
from the peasants to the state.
Had such a policy been
pursued on a large scale, it
would have diverted vast
amounts of labor from agri-
cultural production to building
construction and caused a
dangerous degree of apathy and
even of resistance among the
peasantry. Khrushchev's plan
was so outweighed by more
immediate considerations that
the "agrogorod" scheme was
quietly shelved.
During the same period,
Khrushchev also advocated the
merger of small collective
farms, and this was carried
out, with a reduction of the
total number by two thirds.
PART III
One of the chief reasons
behind this consolidation was
that it made possible the
dismissal of thousands of in-
efficient, uneducated and dis-
honest farm chairmen, and the
assumption of their posts by
specialists with secondary and
higher agricultural training.
The improvement of farm
management apparently fell
short of the plan, however, and
now Khrushchev is sponsoring a
new scheme of dispatching some
30,000 capable urban workers
to the countryside to be col-
lective farm chairmen. Under
this scheme, approximately one
third of all the collective
farm leaders would be replaced
by July 1955. This appears to
be another desperate attempt
to improve the quality of farm
management and will certainly
cause serious organizational
confusion for a considerable
period of time.
Khrushchev has long been
prone to try such wholesale rem-
edies,.40Owever.. In 1946, for
instance, as Ukrainian party
boss, he reported to the Ukrain-
ian central committee that he
had masterminded a "mass re-
placement" of half the top
officials in the Ukrainian party
and government in the preceding
18 months.
In 1953 Khrushchev insti-
tuted a program under which up
to 7,000 mechanical engineers
were supposedly being sent to
the machine tractor stations
and up to 100,000 agronomists
and other technicians assigned
to them and the collective
farms.
He also radically re-
organized party work in the
rural areas, providing each of
the 9,000 tractor stations
SECRET
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 7
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Nur .)LA...KC I Nole
.CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
with a group of party instruc,
torsheaded by a district party
committee secretary. To help
accomplish the party's work in
the rural areas, he recommended
that at least 50,000 party
workers be transferred to the
countryside.
Last year, over 100,000
komsomols "volunteered" for
settlement on the new lands,
and this year, Khrushchev is
urging another 100,000 to make
a similar move. He has also
commissioned a group of special
Hcentral committee representa-
tives to investigate the state
farms in the "new lands" area.
The mass transfer approach
to personnel problems apparently
appeals to Khrushchev, but his
plans do not always seem to be
well thought out.
For instance, his call in
1953-1954 for urban workers to
return to the farm in many
cases merely permitted factory
managers to cull out their
poorest workers.
Khrushchev generally seems
so preoccupied with the produc-
tion side of planning that he
neglects the many mundane but
vital housekeeping problems
that accompany a quick transfer
of thousands of people.
Khrushchev also is prone
to take long chances. In
championing the new lands
program he put his hopes on
expanding grain acreage in an
area approximately three fourths
of which is situated on the
periphery of the dry steppe-
lands and deserts of the Kazakh
plateau with an average of no
more than 10 to 15 inches of
precipitation annually. The
program is further complicated
by organizational and invest-
ment difficulties.
Planting corn in marginal
areas, Khrushchev's latest
panacea for solving the live-
stock feed problem, and in-
directly for solving the agri-
cultural problem as a whole,
is another daring innovation.
Even more than in the "new
lands" plan, mistakes in the
corn program can be particularly
costly from the standpoint
both of investment and of fail-
ure to fulfill the country's
needs for grain.
With only a very small
area in the Soviet Union suited
for corn, a grandiose corn-
planting scheme would seem to
have a small chance of achiev-
ing full success. Yet Khru-
shchev again seems prepared to
take the big chance when he can
envision prQsn or immediate
results. (Concurred E0 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
in by ORR)
POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA
The growing importance of
the African as a force in inter-
national politics is pointed up
by the attendance of official
delegates from Ethiopia, Liberia,
and the Gold Coast at the Ban-
dung conference.
The major factors affecting
the future of Africa south of
the Sahara are racialism,
colonialism, and the influence
of India, the United Nations,
and Communism. Numerous areas,
however, are at present largely
untouched by these forces
either because of their iso-
lation or lack of development.
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Page 2 of 7
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
SECRET Nfte
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
Portuguese Africa's eco-
nomic development has been
very slow, and because of the
colony's relative isolation
and the regime's tight rule,
native unrest has not mani-
fested itself.
In the French areas, ;the
pace of economic development
has been somewhat faster. The
granting of suffrage to the
Africans has spurred political
consciousness, but outbursts
of nationalism are quickly
Suppressed.
Under a paternalistic
system, the Belgian Congo is
experiencing rapid economic
growth accompanied by social
development of the African.
So far, it has escaped most of
the nationalism and racialism
of surrounding areas.
Areas of British Africa--
Gambia, Sierra Leone and
Tanganyika--are generally
stable, although economic dif-
ficulties, strikes or consti-
tutional problems demand at-
tention from time to time.
The independent nations
of Ethiopia and Liberia, while
stable politically, are con-
fronted by the need for eco-
nomic development, for closer
control by the central
.,,MAEMOONS
SPANISH, (Ili 04
MTKAPE
W,WWW0
AFRICA
APRIL 1955
1- Important airfield
Colonies
or
Protectorates
U.N.
Trust
Territories
U.K.
France
Belgium
Portugal (=el N)
Spain
Italy
Union
(Yandate) Africa
Independent
PART III
MADAGASCAR
UNION swAn,
rouk
SOUTH AFRICA
SECRET
1Vmmimmmm...mgr
1. --
50414 -3
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 7
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
?JC.L.IVE,.
%Or Nor
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
government over the outlying
areas, and for the growth of an
educated and politically trained
population.
Areas of Racial Unrest
On the high plateau of
eastern and southern Africa the
white man has established a
permanent home. Here, espe-
cially in Kenya, the Rhodesias
and the Union of South Africa,
a small white minority has
control. The whites, fearful
of inundation by the overwhelm-
ing black majority, and scorn-
ful of the primitive African
culture, are determined to
retain control of their own
destinies.
In this area the color bar
rules, and the emerging African,
shedding his own tribal society
and yet not accepted in the
industrially superior Western
culture, is subjected to bitter
discrimination. Hatred of the
white and loss of understanding
between races are replacing the
former friendly relations.
Kenya: A rapid increase
of the native population around
the European centers in Kenya,
population pressure on the
land, and racial discrimination
have all contributed to the Mau
Mau terrorism. In the three
years of the movement's exist-
ence, the terrorists have killed
about 8,000 Africans and 30
Europeans, have tied down about
8,000 troops from Britain and
thousands of Kenya whites, and
have cost Kenya directly some
$75,000,000.
The military campaign in
which 8,000 terrorists have
been killed and over 50,000
Africans detained in camps has
put the Mau Mau on the defensive,
but it still retains much
influence over the 1,300,000
Kikuyus.
Meanwhile, a revolutionary
social change is being accom-
plished by the settling of
PART III
some of the Kikuyus in villages.
Without greater reforms, how-
ever, such as the granting of
additional land and of broader
political rights, and the
ending of racial discrimination,
Kikuyu loyalty is improbable
and future terrorist outbreaks
are almost a certainty.
White settler criticism
of concessions to Africans and
of a soft government policy
toward terrorists suggests
that the local whites are not
yet prepared to give construc-
tive leadership to the Africans
in the development of a multi-
racial society in Kenya.
South Africa: The election
of Strijdom as prime minister
of South Africa last November
has accelerated the trend toward
racial disturbance. He is less
willing than former premier
Malan to compromise with the
English minority element and
is equally determined to
maintain white supremacy.
Strijdom is taking a tough
attitude toward non-European
organizations, mixed labor
unions, constitutional barriers
to Nationalist Party racial
legislation, and to any criti-
cism of South Africa's racial
policy. Racial separation--
such as the removal of 70,000
Africans from Johannesburg--
will be implemented when pos-
sible, but apartheid will
probably not be pushed where
it conflicts with economic
development.
The non-European organ-
izations are undergoing internal
changes which may permit the
Communists to expand their in-
fluence. These movements are
rather ineffective at present
but are joining with the white
Communist-front organization,
the Congress of Democrats, to
sponsor a large-scale "Congress
of the People" in June. The
government is alert to the
danger and probably will act
forcefully.
SECRET
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 7
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Now JEA...11L1 vv."
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
Rhodesia: The Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
trying to establish political
unity and foster economic de-
velopment, faces a serious
racial problem. The official
policy is partnership of the
races; however, daily operation
of government and society is
somewhat similar to South
Africa.
An approach to multiracial-
ism is apparent in African
parliamentary membership and
in the new interracial univer-
sity. On the other hand, the
continued white supremacy poli-
cy of the European copper
miners is more reminiscent of
South Africa.
The recently demonstrated
strength of the African Mine
Workers Union and its co-
operation with the African
political movement in Northern
Rhodesia suggest that African
unionized labor will be an
increasingly important force.
Areas of Anticolonialism
Rising resentment against
colonialism is responsible for
nationalist agitation by
politically conscious Africans
in areas where the white man
is not a settler.
The arbitrary political
boundaries of European colonies
cut across tribal areas to such
an extent that any modern
African state contains segments
of various tribal grouns. These
groups are frequently antago-
nistic, culturally distinct,
and wholly lack a common loyalty
or a national concept. The
effects of this situation are
apparent in the Gold Coast.
The Gold Coast: As the
first tropical African colony
to approach independence, the
Gold Coast now appears to be
bogging down in internal
dissension. Strong regional
and tribal animosities aroused
by a rapidly growing opposition
PART III
group--the National Liberation
Movement--may force Britain
and Prime Minister Nkrumah to
make constitutional revisions
and reconsider their timetable
for complete Gold Coast inde-
pendence, now scheduled for
1956.
The Liberation Movement,
started by the African cocoa
farmers last September as a
protest against low prices, has
become the vehicle of protest
for all anti-Nkrumah groups.
It refuses to compromise on its
demand for a change to a
federal system of government.
While Nkrumah maintains
overwhelming control of the
legislature, the clashes
between contending forces and
the growing strength of the
movement, which is even causing
high-level defections from
Nkrumah's party, will force the
prime minister to find a solution.
Failure to resolve these
differences would be a severe
setback to Africans throughout
the continent who look to the
Gold Coast as a model for the
development of future native
African states.
Nigeria: Britain's other
major West African colony,
Nigeria, is faced with similar
problems. The Moslem north,
backward and governed by rulers
dependent on Britain for support,
fears domination by the more
politically sophisticated
southern regions which are
joined with it in a federation.
The south is pressing for
self-government in 1956, and
Britain has offered to discuss
the problem at that time.
In view of the strong
tribal loyalties and the absence
historically of any Nigerian
state, this colony may break
up into various weak and antago-
nistic tribal states unless
Britain can prolong the existence
of the present federation and
constitutionally strengthen the
central government.
SECRET
PATTERNS Awn DRPRDRIITTUPq
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Page 5 of 7
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
law .)Lcift;1- Nair
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
Uganda: Tribal and pro-
vincial rivalry is responsible
for political unrest in Uganda
which has prevailed since the
deposition in 1953 of the king
of Buganda Province. He and
the Buganda nationalists, who
were proud of the province's
economic and political leader-
ship, wanted separate develop-
ment as well as a pledge of no
federation with white-controlled
Kenya.
The influence of the Bu-
ganda nationalists grew until
Britain, late in 1954, agreed
to permit the king to return if
a constitutional monarchy were
accepted in Buganda and if that
province would participate in
the Uganda legislature. The
issue is still unsettled, but
the unrest has clearly shown
that now there is little
sentiment for a Uganda state.
External Factors
Powerful influences are
exerted in Africa by India,
the United Nations and world
Communism.
The Role of the Indian:
In eastern and southern Africa
the million Indians play an
important role. Long a factor
in commerce as traders and
middlemen, the Indians have
now become a political force as
agitators and befrienders of
African nationalism. They are
afraid of expulsion when African
states are established, and by
giving financial aid and leader-
ship to some of these movements,
they apparently hope to ingra-
tiate themselves with the future
rulers of the continent.
The Indian is not likely
to obtain the Africans' trust,
but his agitation causes the
present governments additional
difficulties and exacerbates
racial relations. In West
Africa and Ethiopia, Indian
influence is limited more to
promoting cultural relations.
PART III
The Role of the United
Nations: UN activities in
Ziiiii=ion with African af-
fairs are constantly increasing,
but the ruling powers are jeal-
ous of their sovereignty and
resent alleged meddling in in-
ternal affairs. This was
brought home by South African
and Belgian withdrawal from
some UN agencies.
Trusteeship Council reports
are generally critical of
conditions in African areas.
The flood of petitions to the
UN from Africans usually magnify
minor incidents into major
catastrophes. The verbatim
texts of UN meetings, distrib-
uted by UN agencies and
containing propaganda state-
ments by Communist delegates,
have encouraged discontent
with colonialism and Western
culture.
The Togoland trusteeship
problem must be faced soon by
the United Nations because
Britain has announced its in-
tention to terminate its trus-
teeship when the Gold Coast
achieves independence. The UN
solution will have an important
effect in West Africa as well
as create a precedent for the
termination of such agreements.
The Role of Communism:
The third external force,
Communism, is still relatively
unimportant in Africa, although
there are Communist activities
in a few widely dispersed areas.
The urbanized native,
having lost his tribal ties and
now facing a baffling industrial
culture, is an easy target for
political agitators. This is
especially true in the cities
of South Africa, the mining
camps of Rhodesia, the crowded
slums of Nairobi and in the
ports of West Africa.
In the rural areas, where
the mass of the Africans live,
isolation and political apathy
have impeded the growth of
Communism.
SECRET
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of 7
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
,lefererarP`I'mw Nrse
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 April 1955
Africa is the scene of
increasing ferment as the na-
tives become more critical of
colonial rule and the European
color bar.
Unless the present trend
is reversed and African faith
in Western civilization re-
stored, the continent's
valuable manpower and military
staging areas, strategic re-
sources, and the friendship
of 200,000,000 people may be
lost.
COVIDDIIIAL
stermr
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
Page 7 of 7