CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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0003186010
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September 22, 2017
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October 4, 2017
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SC-2017-00012
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April 21, 1955
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Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Nise .8rasof CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY COPY NO. 12 OCI NO. 3624/55 21 April 1955 DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0 0 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: (50) NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1 AUTH LIR 70-2 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs WW1 REVIEWErs:i 1 eA4D CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CWIDENT-tAr iriererRE-T Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 ONA AiIlk THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 S'Elefttal Amo0 CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 THE WEEK IN BRIEF PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST FORMOSA STRAITS Page 1 The military situation was quiet in the Formosa Straits last week. Logistic activity continues. AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE The outstanding events thus far at the Afro-Asian conference have been the vigorous anti-Communist speeches delivered by several chief delegates of pro-Western countries. Chou En-lai until now has refrained from trying to maneuver the conference into end iping's claims to all Nationalist-held territory. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Page 2 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs USSR APPARENTLY PREPARED TO SIGN AUSTRIAN TREATY Page 2 The Soviet note of 19 April calling for a confer- ence on Austria adds to the evidence that the USSR is prepared to sign a treaty promptly, although difficul- ties may still arise over a four-power guarantee of Austrian neutrality. In its propaganda, Moscow is parading the Austrian treaty before the West Germans, who are interested but will be really impressed only by concessions on Germany. The Austrians are so eager now for a treaty, that they are not likely to give firm support to any Western attempts to influence the terms, of a neutrality guarantee. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs -EAST GERMANY MAINTAINS PRESSURE ON WEST,BERLIN Page 4 The East German government pressure against West Berlin in strate the city's vulnerability West, and particularly the West consequences that ma rearmed under NATO. continues to build up an effort to demon- and to convince the Germans, of the serious the Federal Republic is . CONFIDENTIAL 9felefTsb Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 MAI 1N. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 NO POLITICAL SOLUTION INSIGHT AS SAIGON "TRUCE" ENDS Saigon's third "truce" ended on 20 April with skirmishes between the Binh Kuyen and government troops. AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AVOIDING NEW INCIDENTS There were no new incidents between Afghanistan and Pakistan during the past week. The next move by the Afghans--possibly removal of Prime Minister Daud by senior members of the royal family--will determine whether tensions are likely to abate. PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Page 6 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs The Soviet Communiqud on the Near East: The Soviet Foreign Ministry's commun1quCZY-16 April was issued primarily to influence the Bandung con- ference. The Communists' efforts to exploit disputes in the Near and Middle East are hampered by Moscow's immediate objective of encouraging Indian neutralism and its longer-t m of economic penetration of the area. paE0 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Japan's Relations With the Sino-Soviet Bloc: The Soviet Union's acceptance of Japan's suggestion to conduct negotiations either in London or Geneva appears designed to sustain domestic pres- sure in Japan for closer relations with the Sino- Soviet bloc. Interest in such relations had been noticeably subsiding as a result of earlier Soviet stalling. Peiping Hints at Reprisals Against Hong Kong: Since the crash of an Air India plane on 11 April in which eight members of Peiping's delegation to the Bandung conference were killed, Chinese Communist spokesmen have been hinting at reprisals against the British colony of Hong Kong. Peiping may believe that such tactics will help to dissuade Britain from supporting the American position on Formosa. Approved for for Release:-20-1-7/5-6-Alff-a03186010 Page 2 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 SECRET ,1100 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 Soviet Research on Earth Satellite: The scientific emi- nence of the six men who on 16 April were listed as members of the USSR's Permanent Interdepartmental Commission for Interplanetary Communications suggests a co-ordinated survey of the theoretical problems in the establishment of a space station. South Korea Renews Efforts to Isolate Japan: South Korea is renewing its efforts to undermine the United States' faith in Japan as a reliable ally, and to supplant Japan in American strategic plan- ning with a group of small Asian nations led by South Korea. The more immediate objective, how- ever, is to attract the major part of long-term American aid allocated to the Far East. Negotiations in Laos: The arrival in Vientiane of some 30 Pathet Lao representatives opens another phase in the long-drawn-out negotiations between the royal government and the Communists for a political settlempnt. The Laotian government still appears in no hurry to conclude the talks and is hopeful that its recent memorandum to the International Control Commission may result in favorable action. REO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs ? ? PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Hungarian Leaders Ousted: The ouster of two top lead- ers of the Hungarian Workers' Party--Premier Imre Nagy and Mihaly Farkas--may be only the beginning of a widespread removal of anti-Rakosi elements in the party. Genoa Port Strike Becoming More Serious: The walkout of some 1,600 Communist-dominated ship repair workers in Genoa is now in its thirteenth week with no end in sight. Twice this month, sympathy strikes have stopped cargo loadings and unloadings and have led to numerous clashes between strikers and police. Iraqi-Syrian Relations: Syria's cabinet capitulated last week to army pressure for negotiating a de- fense pact with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. An army coup and a concomitant threat of Iraqi military iaterventionJiave been averted for the time being. swftET MTV1-3 TirrI1IT7 V.S.T TrfIrTnIn Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs PEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 SECRET Nor CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES THE KHRUSHCHEV APPROACH IN INTERNAL POLICY Page 1 Party Secretary Khrushchev's propensity for using spectacular methods for rapidly solving specific organ- izational and production problems in the Soviet agri- cultural program may provide some insight into his ap- proach to other problems. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA Page 2 The growing importance of the African as a force in international politics in pointed up by the attend- ance of official delegates from Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Gold Coast at the Bandung conference. The major factors affecting the future of Africa south of the Sahara are racialism, colonialism and the influence of India, the United Nations, and Communism. Numerous areas, however, are at present largely untouched by these forces eitl of their isolation or lack of development. SECRET iv Approved forTerea;:7017097675.3186010 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 4110 4mr CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST FORMOSA STRAITS The lull in combat opera- tions in the Formosa Straits area continued throughout the past week, and there were no indications that the Chinese Communists were about to initiate major attacks against theNationalists. For the first time since last September, when the Com- munists began to intensify pressure on the offshore islands, there was no artillery fire against the Quemoys for an entirp wprik EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3 3(b)(1)>25Yrs PART I RET nr TITUVTITATV 71crwon-vcm Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Page 1 of 7 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Now SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE The outstanding events thus far at the Afro-Asian conference have been the vig- orous anti-Communist speeches delivered by several chief delegates of pro-Western countries. The anti-Communists, who heavily outnumber the Commu- nists and neutralists, have strongly influenced the organ- ization of the conference. While they agreed to confer- ence unanimity for approval of any resolution, they suc- cessfully demanded that the working committees be per- mitted to issue communiques discussing disagreements and tabulating any votes that are taken. Thailand's Prince Wan--a leading advocate of Asian co- operation with the West--has been elected rapporteur of the extremely important political committee, which is composed of all chief delegates. It ap- pears that the anti-Communist delegates are seeking to have the deliberations of the confer- ence follow the principles of the United Nations rather than that of "peaceful coexistence" or the "five principles" of Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai has until now refrained from trying to maneu- ver the conference into endors- ing Peipings's claims to all USSR APPARENTLY PREPARED TO SIGN AUSTRIAN TREATY The propaganda line from Moscow tends to confirm that the immediate Soviet purpose in moving rapidly toward an PART I Nationalist-held territory. Evidently believing that any such effort would be defeated, Chou publicly stated that the question of Formosa would only enmesh the conference in "dis- putes...without any solution." Chou seems to be going ahead at Bandung with conver- sations aimed at assessing the attitudes of other Far Eastern states toward possible Com- munist Courses nf ar1-inn EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Most of those approached by Chou are expected to argue against the use of force by the Chinese Communists and to support the idea of an early Formosa conference. Prime Minister Nehru, who was expected to be a dominant figure, has kept almost com- pletely out of the limelight. On the opening day, visibly irritated at the way things were developing, he stalked out of the auditorium during an anti-Communist speech. He may be expected, however, to continue efforts to keep the conference general and friendly rather than specific and bitter, and to seek some common ground upon whieh it can be concluded. Austrian settlement is to re- vive West European .interest in big-power negotiations before West German rearmament is car- ried out. SECRET TlinNTYRYAM17, .rwrrriTelm Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Page 2 of 7 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 SECRET Nor vp, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 In particular, the USSR wants to show the Germans the advantages of dealing directly with Moscow and to dangle before them the possibility of unity on the Austrian neutrality model. The Soviet note of 19 April proposed that the foreign minis- ters of the four great powers and Austria meet soon in Vienna to consider and sign the Austrian treaty. The rapidity and manner in which the USSR is moving in- dicates that Moscow probably will not insist on a discussion of any issues other than Austria. The Soviet Union apparently is prepared to sign the treaty un- less some Western objection gives it a chance to blame the West for the delay. The only issue the USSR deliberately has left obscure is what kind of four-power guarantees it wants for Austrian neutrality. A clue as to what the USSR has in mind was Mob- toy's reference to the guarantees of perpetual neutrality, inde- pendence, and territorial in- violability of Switzerland which emerged from the 1815 Congress of Vienna. If the Soviet negotiators meet resistance from the Western powers on this issue, it seems likely that they are prepared to issue a strong unilateral guaran- tee rather than stall the con- ference. Under the Hungarian and Rumanian peace treaties, the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops from Austria is supposed to result in the return of the PART I line of communication troops in Hungary and Rumania to Soviet territory. It is ex- pected, however, that Moscow will use the Soviet bloc se- curity system which is being formed as an excuse for making arrangements with these coun- tries to keep troops there. Most West Germans will welcome the encouraging re- sults of the Moscow meeting. They are not likely to see progress on Austria as cause for abandoning the Western alliance, but they will hope that it means a fundamental change in Soviet policy. From nearly all quarters, there will probably be insistence that talks on Germany be held as soon as possible. The deputy leader of the Christian Democratic faction in the Bundestag told Ameri- can officials in Bonn on 14 April that he is greatly con- cerned over the probable im- pact of Austrian developments. He feels the Bonn government will be faced with a strong popular trend to accept a neutral position for Germans. Nevertheless, it will be Soviet proposals directly on Germany, not actions on Austria, which will determine the German government's at- titude. The results of the meet- ing in Moscow have been greet- ed with almost universal popu- lar enthusiasm in Austria, and any attempt to delay the four- power meetings will almost certainly meet with popular opposition there. SECRET rt.n. Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Page 3 of 7 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 The West may also find it difficult to obtain Austrian co-operation in any negotiations for neutrality guarantees ac- ceptable to the West. Austria may already have agreed to ac- cept a unilateral Soviet guaran- tee if necessary. Carried along by popular enthusiasm, Chancellor Raab is not likely to engage in cautious contemplation of the dangers of Soviet influence to which his country might be EAST GERMANY MAINTAINS PRESSURE ON WEST BERLIN The East German government has continued in the past week to build up its pressure against West Berlin and to attempt to force West German agreement to negotiate the truck tax question at the ministerial level. Behind the East German pol- icy is the desire to demonstrate the vulnerability of West Berlin to Communist pressures and to convince West Europeans, partic- ularly West Germans, that rearm- ing the Federal Republic under NATO may have serious conse- quences. The Communists, moreover, have been contrasting West Germany's difficulties-- alleged to result from its alignment with the West-- with the advantages Austria is gaining through its policy of neutrality. PART I subjected under the proposed conditions of the treaty. The Western powers prob- ably cannot now depend on the usual sobering influence of Socialist leaders on Austrian dealings with the USSR, since Vice Chancellor Schaerf and Foreign State Secretary Kreisky were on the delegation to Mos- cow, and their party can ill afford to battle the tide of en- thusiasm by pulling apart the that have been made. EO 13526 3.3(b)(8)>25Yrs Following the East German charge on 12 April that West Berlin is the Allies' main spy center and a threat to the GDR, an editorial in the leading East German Communist daily stated on 16 April that the "consequences" of Bonn's re- fusal to negotiate the truck tax question on a ministerial level "will have to be borne by West Berlin." The East Berlin authorities on 19 April cut off the flow of electricity to West Berlin. Because of West Berlin's self- sufficiency in electric power, however, the effect of the ban is largely psychological. According to the West Berlin Land Labor Office, 3,000 West Berliners working in East Berlin have been fired in the past two months and West Berlin officials fear that the remain- ing 12,500 will soon be dismissed. SECRET AV TiummenTemr TXTMVDVQM Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Page 4 of 7 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 '1111? SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 There have also been a num- ber of unconfirmed reports that the East Germans are preparing plans for other restrictive meas- ures including sealing off West Berlin from East Germany. These plans are alleged to include the creation of a no man's land security strip around Berlin, cutting East German com- munication lines running through West Berlin and strengthening the border police units prepara- tory to restricting the move- ment of persons into and out of Berlin. East Germany probably al- so desires to isolate West Berlin for internal security reasons. The city serves as a haven for East Germans fleeing military conscription, as a base for Western intelligence agencies operating in East Germany, and as a show window for the West which undoubtedly exacerbates the uneasy internal situation in the German Demo- cratic Republic. The increasing belligerency of the East German government, and its refusal to negotiate the truck tax question on the technical level as desired by NO POLITICAL SOLUTION IN SIGHT AS SAIGON "TRUCE" ENDS Saigon's third "truce" ended on 20 April to the sound of hand-grenade explosions and machine-gun fire. The rebel Binh Kuyen en- gaged in several provocative acts including the kidnaping and shooting of government PART I Bonn,have moved the Federal Republic to slow shipments to East Germany of goods already scheduled for delivery and to place an embargo on future shipments. On 14 April, Chancellor Adenauer and West Berlin mayor Buhr reportedly agreed that dis- cussion of the road tolls with the "illegitimate regime of the Soviet zone" is out of the ques- tion. Both Adenauer and Suhr are urging Allied intervention with Moscow, since road access to Berlin .is a quadripartite responsibility. The Western powers intend to run additional military con- voys and to begin practice flights into Berlin to impress the USSR. Their protest notes to Pushkin, however, have been ignored. Bonn and West Berlin offi- cials are inclined to believe that either too strong or too weak a reaction will provoke new harassments. Allied offi- cials, however, point out that by interfering in German inter- zonal trade the West has the best means of forcing East Ger- many to terms, since East Ger- many heavily de ends n West German steel. (Con- EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs curred in by ORR troops in several parts of the city. The most sensa- tional act of violence was fire from a passing truck directed at the sidewalk caf6 of the Hotel Majestic on the main street of Saigon. SECRET Approvedf;le-a-se.: .2-0-17/-0-670770 86010 Page 5 of Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 ,SE,CRET Now Nor CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 Under continued pressure from the French not to act against the Binh Xuyen--pres- sure backed up by the Expedi- tionary Corns--the government has refrained from taking more than localized action against Binh Xuyen raids. Cemet 'T , '??? dr ,... PreSident'S ..- Palace .Surete 0 -,/--j P r French ignWssy < , , , -- -_ __ /-' "-.Iefnam _ se Arm Army HOSr ? , ? ower Plant ?- HQ / ...-- Var. ? : _ _ ----- inh HQ area 1-, SAIGON - CI-10 LON 10?46'N 106?40'E R.dorm. 1.1,,,,,,w. wrw 2 3 Miles ..?. ? 1 A 0 1 2 3 4 Kilometers 14696 4-55 AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AVOIDING NEW INCIDENTS There were no new incidents between Afghanistan and Paki- stan during the past week. The next move by the Afghans-- possibly the removal of Prime Minister Daud by senior mem- bers of the royal family-- will determine whether ten- sions are likely to abate. PART I EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs The political situation remains at an impasse. Diem has proposed that a state council be set up pending elections of an assembly three months hence. To date Viet- namese politicians, aside from those who remain loyal to Diem, have been unable to bring forth a compromise formula that any two of them can agree on. EO 13526 3.3(b)(8)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(8)>25Yrs No further incidents have occurred in either country since the 1 April reprisal attack against the Afghan consulate in Peshawar, and no further tribal unrest has been reported. Pakistan's evacuation of dependents from its posts in SECRET OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 of 7 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 SECRET No, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 Afghanistan, which seems de- signed to impress Kabul with the "seriousness" of the situation, proceeded without any incidents. Both govern- ments are impressed with the seriousness of the situation and for the present at least will avoid creating new in- cidents. Reports of Soviet in- volvement have not been con- firmed. Some press and radio releases by the USSR on the situation generally favor Afghanistan. Only direct interference by Pakistan, or chaos arising from major tribal disturbances, appears likely to result in active Soviet intervention. There are no indications that a tribal uprising is imminent, and Ambassador Hildreth reports that Karachi's policy now excludes the pos- sibility of trying to unseat the Afghan royal family. The resolution of the crisis now appears to rest with Afghanistan. The major- ity of recent reports suggests that Prince Daud will be "disciplined" to permit the Afghan government to make face-Saving concessions,partic- ularly in the light of the strong Western and Near East- ern diplomatic representations over the March incidents. What will actually be done in reference to Daud PART I depends on whether his two uncles--who lead the opposi- tion to him within the oli- garctor--can command greater popular support than Daud and whether they can influence the king. Action against Daud would consist either of his removal from office or his retention on a pledge of good behavior. If he is removed, the situa- tion is likely to return to normal. Even should Daud remain as prime minister, either on sufferance or as a victor in the struggle for power, the outlook for the near future is not necessarily alarming. He has been somewhat cowed by the strong diplomatic protests and is probably worried by the fact that tribal movements after the late March demonstra- tions were directed against Afghanistan rather than Paki- stan. The longer-range outlook is less promising. Eventually Daud is likely to indulge in some headstrong action inimical to Western interests in Afghan- istan, despite promises he may give to the royal family. More- over, in the next few years, death or incapacitation of the aging royal uncles may remove the last restraining elements on Daud and may enable him to control the government domInati1n the king. SECRET EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EU 1352b 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Page 7 of 7 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Nmie SECRET Nor CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS The Soviet Communique On the Near East The Soviet Foreign Minis- try's communique of 16 April on developments in, the Near and Middle East was released primarily to influence the Bandung conference. The communique emphasized that Western-sponsored regional defense arrangements are colo- nialism in a new form and contrasted what it called Western imperialism with the exemplary conduct of the Soviet Union in encouraging the in- dependence of new nations in the area. While this line is "old hat" in Soviet propaganda, Moscow is putting it out now in official form to emphasize that it is concerned over the development of military blocs such as the "northern tier," and to encourage anti-Western elements in countries such as Syria to count on Soviet support. To give greater weight to such sentiments, the communique warned that any continued "policy of pressure and threat in relation to countries of the Near and Middle East" would "have to be considered by the UN." Actually, the USSR's freedom of action in the Near and Middle East is hampered by its immediate objective of encouraging Indian neutralism y? FAEROE IS. NORWAY SHETLAND 15.1. 1 %ORKNEY IS K _ 1 INCDOM DEN 1 i 7 N.mu MLAND E 1 GERMANY POLAND LUX. HAN LIS FRANCE A I S IT GARY 1 RUMANIA FRIES E YUGOSLAVI DEFENSE PACTS IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1 NATO 4 TURKISH-PAKISTANI 5 TURKISH-IRAQI 2 BALKAN 6 ANGLO-EGYPTIAN 3 ARAB LEAGUE 7 ANGLO-IRAQI 8 POSSIBLE "NORTHERN TIER" - .0 sic RTUCiAL BULOAR SPAIN 1 Sardin GM: CE T LIRKEY i 1 2 4 58 iy TANGI Iiilait3 e,c'CYPR7 SYRIA -- , - -- Y- -- , ? ----- -- -- - TI 3 IRAN ARJI IANISTAN IRAQ MOROCCO 11- ?\IT ALGERIA LIBYA 5 78 8 I ROAN 3 'AKISTAN EGYPT 48 1 3 N A !SU 3 6 SAUDI P.? , SAMARA 4.1.- .,- ? 50 ARABIA '''''',...?....?..... 3 MUSCA AND 'OMA T , FRENCH WEST AFRICAANGLO- o. " . YEMEN (EGYPTIAN 11.;'" _- SUDAN SQM Ai-- , 21 APRIL 1955 PART II 50419 SECRET NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 1 of 8 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 and its longer-term program of economic penetration in the area. In order to further these policies, the Soviet leaders have been careful to avoid using coercion or subversion which would appear as gross interference in the eyes of the Indian and other South Asian peoples. Japan's Relations With the Sino-Soviet Bloc The latest Soviet note concerning Soviet-Japanese negotiatiOns expresses a will- ingness to meet at London or Geneva, sites which Japan had previously mentioned as pos- sibilities. The Soviet reply appears designed to sustain domestic pressure in Japan for closer relations with the Sino- Soviet bloc, which was notice- ably subsiding as a result of earlier Soviet stalling. The Soviet leaders may have felt that their short- term interests were best served by a gesture of "reasonableness" which would help Prime Minister Hatoyama through the forth- coming Diet session. Hatoyama's position has become shaky as a result of inept diplomacy, and, if he fell, he would probably be, succeeded by a premier less willing to com- promise with the bloc. The note will probably prove acceptable to Japan. Shunichi Matsumoto, a former ambassador to London, has already been picked to head the Japanese delegation. Mat- sumoto is able, pro-West and reported on good terms with both Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu. It also is likely that the USSR looks on the area as a point of conflict among Ameri- can, British and French policies, and would therefore desist from any threats or interference which might force these governmen ?-sOat common policy. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs The differences between Japan and Communist China cen- ter around Chinese attempts to maneuver the Japanese govern- ment into de facto relations prematurely. In Tokyo, Japanese of have refused to assume official responsibility for the execution of a private trade agreement. The govern- ment is also under pressure to participate in the en- forcement of a private fish- eries pact signed on 15 Anvil in Peiping. SECRET EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs PART II NOTES Awn rnitimpArTs Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Page 2 of 8 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 gifts. Nee SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 Peiping Hints at Reprisals Against Hong Kong Since the crash of an Air India plane on 11 April in which eight members of Peiping's delegation to the Bandung con- ference were killed, Chinese Communist spokesmen have been hinting at reprisals against the British colony of Hong Kong. The Chinese Communists have been asserting that the British were responsible for failing to deter American and Chinese Nationalist "agents" in the colony. One spokesman has publicly stated that if the Soviet Research - On Earth Satellite Moscow radio on 16 April announced the names of six of the members of the Permanent Interdepartmental Commission for Interplanetary Communi- cation of the Academy of Science. These six--P. Kapitsa, A. Karpenko, L. Sedov, V. Ambartsumyan, P. Parenago, and B. Kukharkin--are among the leading scientists in the USSR, and have internationally recognized competence in such fields as astrophysics, and cosmic ray and nuclear energy research. The broadcast also car- ried a short interview with the secretary of the com- mission, who said that "one of the first tasks of the com- mission lies in organizing work for the creation of an automatic labo tory of scientific research in cosmic space." PART II British continue to "indulge" such agents, "this state of affairs will become a serious threat to China." The Chinese Communists in the past have avoided threats against Hong Kong. Peiping may intend to use till= air- liner incident, however, to. create apprehension over Hong Kong's future. The Chinese Communists may believe that such tactics will help to dissuade the British from supporting the Amel1i nnci- tion on Formosa. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Inclusion in the Soviet group of top-notch people in a field where competent per- sonnel are scarce suggests a co-ordinated survey of the theoretical problems involved in the establishment of a space station. To date, the work was probably not advanced beyond the theoretical stages, since the commission is subordinate to the Academy of Sciences and four of the six men listed have dealt almost exclusively with highly theoretical prob- lems. Construction of the pro- pulsion device required to place a small object into an orbit around the earth is considered scientifically pos- sible. Enlargement of such a satellite into a usable space laboratory is beyond present- day scientific knowledge. This step would depend on the SECRET ?trams Awn OilmMtnam Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Page 3 of 8 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 .4101/ SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 solution of many of the prob- lems now facing the guided missile field, particularly in the research and development of the intercontinental ballistic missile. South Korea Renews Efforts to Isolate Japan Recent North Korean over- tures toward Japan, abetted by Prime Minister Hatoyama's initial favorable response, have given South Korea an op- portunity to renew its efforts to isolate Japan. This is fundamentally an effort to undermine America's faith in Japan as a reliable ally, and to supplant Japan in American strategic planning with a group of small Asian nations led by South Korea. The more immediate objective, however, is to create a basis for at- tracting the major part of long-term, large-scale Ameri- can aid allocated to the Far East. [thee has set his sights on obtaining 90 percent of all American aid allocated to the Far East. He has recently requested, through his aid officials, a total of $350,000,000 in economic aid, and $620,000,000 in military aid for fiscal 1956--an in- crease of $270,000,000 over the current year. Rhee's official press has warned that if Japan enters into negotiations with North Korea, South Korea should withdraw diplomatic relations and regard Japan as an enemy. The demand has also been PART II Such a space platform could not only serve scientific research, but also could be an invaluable aid to military operations and intelligence collection activities. E0135263.3(b)(1)>25Yrs (Prepared by OSI) raised that South Korea should claim reparations from Japan to cover the 40 years of Japanese rule. In late March, Rhee de- clared that other Asian nations must be made aware that Japan is moving toward Communism and could not be trusted. All of these nations, he asserted, must attempt to make the United States aware of the Japanese trend. Rhee's "fact-finding" mission to Southeast Asia has issued statements warning free Asian nations to unite for protection against what it describes as a reviving, re- arming Japan,which is mo-"-- E0 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs toward collaboration wit Communists, South Korea has also attempted to convince the United States that free Asian nations fear a resurgent Japan even more than Communism and, if confronted with a choice, would prefer the latter to the former. The South Korea govern- ment has continued attempts to maneuver the United States in- to intervening with Japan on behalf of Korean objectives, and has called on the United States to force Japan to end its differences with ?nthpr free Asian nations." E0 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs SECRET NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 8 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 5t.CHE I 414." very CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 Negotiations in Laos The unheralded descent on Vientiane oL some 30 Pathet Lao negotiators, just prior to the departure of Laotian officials for Bandung, was apparently timed carefully to soften any statements by the government of Laos at the Afro- Asian conference regarding Com- munist intransigence. The Communists' volte-face, after arguments on the flimsiest of grounds against carrying on the talks in Vientiane, may al- so have been motivated in part by Viet Minh foreign minister Pham Van Dong's recent con- versations with Nehru in New Delhi. Nhouy Abhay, the govern- ment's chief negotiator, has stated that he plans to submit to the Pathet Lao a "reasonable proposal." He described this only in vague terms but it will apparently include an offer to "reintegrate" those Pathet Lao who at some former time held civil or military positions with the royal government. Nhouy, although in no hurry to conclude the negotiations, believes his proposal will be accepted without difficulty if the Pathet Lao are "true Lao- tians"; if not, he asserts, they will be told frankly they are "Viets" and packed off home. The government's continued lack of a sense of urgency in dealing with the Pathet Lao-- reflected even by able officials such as Nhouy--was demonstrated again by Premier Katay in a 13 April talk with Ambassador Peurifoy in Bangkok. PART II Katay maintained that nego- tiations must not be broken off until it was apparent to all Laotians that the Pathet Lao was unreasonable and Communist- dominated. He insisted that the degree of Communist domina- tion over the Pathet Lao organi- zation was not firmly established. The Pathet Lao has taken every advantage of the govern- ment's indecision. The Com- munists' immediate goal is to gain time in which to consoli- date their hold and build up their organization in the north- ern provinces. However, their actions and propaganda attacks on the royal government have resulted in increasing dis- illusion on the government's part. On 13 April the government sent to the International Con- trol Commission a strongly worded memorandum on Pathet Lao violations of the truce and on Viet Minh collusion in the northern provinces. The efficacy of this tactic in solving the dispute with the Communists is highly doubtful, but the propa- ganda effect may prove helpful. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs SECRET NOTES AND COMMENTS Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Page 5 of 8 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 EO 13526 3.3(b)( Hungarian Leaders Ousted The ouster of two top leaders of the Hungarian Workers' Party--Premier Imre Nagy and Mihaly Farkas--may be only the beginning of a wholesale weeding out of anti- Rakosi elements in the party on grounds of "rightist de- viation." Since Farkas has long been closely associated with party leader Matyas Rakosi, his re- moval on the charge that he had supported Nagy's "anti- party, anti-Marxist" views in- dicates that the split in the leadership extends beyond a simple struggle for power be- tween Rakosi and Nagy. Publication in the official party newspaper in early April of articles sharply critical of right-wing deviationism indi- cates widespreadopposition among local party officials to the central committee resolution modifying new course policies. While Nagy is not believed to have been a powerful force in the Hungarian party before his elevation to the premiership in July 1953, he has since then, as the spokesman for new course liberal policies, apparently built up an extensive following both within the central com- mittee and at lower levels of the party hierarchy. Farkas has been one of the most important party leaders and was minister of defense until July 1953. In recent months both men had displayed unusual independ- ence in their relations with EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs r )>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs A reliable source of the American legation in Budapest has reported that Rakosi flew to Moscow on 14 April, appar- ently immediately after the central committee met to ex- pel Nagy and Farkas from their party posts. If true, this suggests that Rakosi met again with strong opposition in the central committee and felt it SECRET PART II NOTES nun Onummimmo Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Page 6 of 8 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Noir '4?101 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 necessary to gain Kremlin approval before announcing action against Nagy and his "right-wing" supporters which he knew would be unpopular. The elevation of Andras Hegedus to the premiership indicates that the regime remains concerned over the "near stagnation" of agricul- ture, Hegedus, who has been first deputy premier since July 1953 and acting premier in recent weeks, has been closely connected with agricul- ture since 1951 and has co- ordinated the regime's agri- cultural policies since October 1954. Hehgedus is only 32 years old and first attained prom- inence in 1945 when he was elected secretary of the youth movement. He presumably does not have a significant personal party following. Genoa Port Strike Becoming More Serious The strike situation in the Italian port of Genoa is becoming increasingly serious. The walkout of some 1,600 ship repair workers is now in its thirteenth week with no end in sight. Twice this month sympathy strikes have complete- ly disrupted cargo loadings and unloadings and resulted in numerous clashes between strikers and the police. The Genoa strike began in January in protest against new hiring regulations which threatened to eliminate the virtual monopoly hitherto en- joyed among ship repair workers by the Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation (CGIL). Thus far there has been PART II In his maiden speech to the National Assembly on 18 April, he parroted the March central committee resolutions. Despite the harsh action against Nagy and Farkas and the possibility of further ousters, Rakosi, backed by the Kremlin, is apparently still trying to follow a mid- dle course and to avoid al- ienating any larger segments Of the party membership than necessary. Istvan Kovacs, whose recent speeches have appeared to reflect a moderate viewpoint, was promoted to the politburo, and Erno Gero, a representative of the extreme left wing of the party, reappeared in an im- portant role at several Libera- tion Day celebrations after a long absence due to illness. no sign of wavering on the part of management, the union, or the government. A 48-hour sympathy strike on 12 and 13 April by some 4,000 stevedores tied up more than 50 cargo ships. When the port authority warned that sym- pathy strikers would be fined if they walked out again, the stevedores called another 24-hour strike. *Me observers believe the strikers cannot hold out much longer. The leaders of both CGIL and the Italian Com- munist Party, however, may be expected to use every resource in pressing the strike. They are especially anxious for a victory in Genoa now to offset SECRET .:NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 8 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 low NECHET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 the heavy defeats suffered by CGIL in recent shop steward elections in industrial plants, Iraqi-Syrian Relations Syria's cabinet capitu- lated last week to army pres- sure for negotiating a defense pact with Egypt and Saudi Ara- bia. An army coup and a con- comitant threat of Iraqi mili- tary intervention have been averted for the time being. The Syrian cabinet author- ized Foreign Minister Azm on 13 April to negotiate a pact with Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the basis of his elimination of the anti-Iraqi provisions in Cairo's original draft. Azm's proposals would make the treaty an Arab defense pact aimed at Israel. Even in this form, the projected pact, be- cause of its anti-Iraqi and anti-Turkish inspiration, will probably be opposed by Baghdad and Ankara. Azm is now at the Afro- Asian conference, where he will carry on negotiations with Egyptian and Saudi officials. PART II particularly the Fiat fantnrieac in Turin and Milan. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 1352 6 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs The cabinet's endorsement of Azm's policy resulted large- ly from pressure by pro- Egyptian elements in the army who are in league with the anti-Western and extremist Arab Socialist-Resurrectionist Party. These elements had threat- ened a coup if the endorsement were'not forthcoming. They are likely to renew their efforts If Azm runs into difficulty when he refers the matter to the cabinet after his return from Bandung. In the meantime, Iraq, under pressure from the West, has apparently given up the idea of sending troops into Syria in the event anti-Iraqi elements stage a coup. Iraq and Turkey remain 01E0 posed to the Syrian government and its pro-Egyptian policy. However, they evidence less de- termination than formerly to prevent the signing of any new Arab pact. E0 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs SECRET NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 8 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Nur JtA.;KL, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES THE KHRUSHCHEV APPROACH IN INTERNAL POLICY Soviet party secretary Khruschev's propensity for taking large-scale, spectac- ular gambles for quick results in agriculture suggests that he may use similar methods in tackling other internal policy matters. A typical exampleof Khrushchev's approach was his abortive "agrogorod" plan to consolidate collective farm villages into "agricultural cities" which, as a member of the politburo and secretariat, he advocated in 1950 and early 1951. The plan called for centralizing the peasants on each large amalgamated farm by housing them in a single, urban-type village, or "agrogorod." Khrushchev's scheme would have tightened political control over the peasantry. Indeed, it would have provided the basis for the transforma- tion of the collective farms into completely government- operated state farms, and the eventual transfer of all land from the peasants to the state. Had such a policy been pursued on a large scale, it would have diverted vast amounts of labor from agri- cultural production to building construction and caused a dangerous degree of apathy and even of resistance among the peasantry. Khrushchev's plan was so outweighed by more immediate considerations that the "agrogorod" scheme was quietly shelved. During the same period, Khrushchev also advocated the merger of small collective farms, and this was carried out, with a reduction of the total number by two thirds. PART III One of the chief reasons behind this consolidation was that it made possible the dismissal of thousands of in- efficient, uneducated and dis- honest farm chairmen, and the assumption of their posts by specialists with secondary and higher agricultural training. The improvement of farm management apparently fell short of the plan, however, and now Khrushchev is sponsoring a new scheme of dispatching some 30,000 capable urban workers to the countryside to be col- lective farm chairmen. Under this scheme, approximately one third of all the collective farm leaders would be replaced by July 1955. This appears to be another desperate attempt to improve the quality of farm management and will certainly cause serious organizational confusion for a considerable period of time. Khrushchev has long been prone to try such wholesale rem- edies,.40Owever.. In 1946, for instance, as Ukrainian party boss, he reported to the Ukrain- ian central committee that he had masterminded a "mass re- placement" of half the top officials in the Ukrainian party and government in the preceding 18 months. In 1953 Khrushchev insti- tuted a program under which up to 7,000 mechanical engineers were supposedly being sent to the machine tractor stations and up to 100,000 agronomists and other technicians assigned to them and the collective farms. He also radically re- organized party work in the rural areas, providing each of the 9,000 tractor stations SECRET PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 7 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Nur .)LA...KC I Nole .CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 with a group of party instruc, torsheaded by a district party committee secretary. To help accomplish the party's work in the rural areas, he recommended that at least 50,000 party workers be transferred to the countryside. Last year, over 100,000 komsomols "volunteered" for settlement on the new lands, and this year, Khrushchev is urging another 100,000 to make a similar move. He has also commissioned a group of special Hcentral committee representa- tives to investigate the state farms in the "new lands" area. The mass transfer approach to personnel problems apparently appeals to Khrushchev, but his plans do not always seem to be well thought out. For instance, his call in 1953-1954 for urban workers to return to the farm in many cases merely permitted factory managers to cull out their poorest workers. Khrushchev generally seems so preoccupied with the produc- tion side of planning that he neglects the many mundane but vital housekeeping problems that accompany a quick transfer of thousands of people. Khrushchev also is prone to take long chances. In championing the new lands program he put his hopes on expanding grain acreage in an area approximately three fourths of which is situated on the periphery of the dry steppe- lands and deserts of the Kazakh plateau with an average of no more than 10 to 15 inches of precipitation annually. The program is further complicated by organizational and invest- ment difficulties. Planting corn in marginal areas, Khrushchev's latest panacea for solving the live- stock feed problem, and in- directly for solving the agri- cultural problem as a whole, is another daring innovation. Even more than in the "new lands" plan, mistakes in the corn program can be particularly costly from the standpoint both of investment and of fail- ure to fulfill the country's needs for grain. With only a very small area in the Soviet Union suited for corn, a grandiose corn- planting scheme would seem to have a small chance of achiev- ing full success. Yet Khru- shchev again seems prepared to take the big chance when he can envision prQsn or immediate results. (Concurred E0 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs in by ORR) POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA The growing importance of the African as a force in inter- national politics is pointed up by the attendance of official delegates from Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Gold Coast at the Ban- dung conference. The major factors affecting the future of Africa south of the Sahara are racialism, colonialism, and the influence of India, the United Nations, and Communism. Numerous areas, however, are at present largely untouched by these forces either because of their iso- lation or lack of development. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Page 2 of 7 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 SECRET Nfte CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 Portuguese Africa's eco- nomic development has been very slow, and because of the colony's relative isolation and the regime's tight rule, native unrest has not mani- fested itself. In the French areas, ;the pace of economic development has been somewhat faster. The granting of suffrage to the Africans has spurred political consciousness, but outbursts of nationalism are quickly Suppressed. Under a paternalistic system, the Belgian Congo is experiencing rapid economic growth accompanied by social development of the African. So far, it has escaped most of the nationalism and racialism of surrounding areas. Areas of British Africa-- Gambia, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika--are generally stable, although economic dif- ficulties, strikes or consti- tutional problems demand at- tention from time to time. The independent nations of Ethiopia and Liberia, while stable politically, are con- fronted by the need for eco- nomic development, for closer control by the central .,,MAEMOONS SPANISH, (Ili 04 MTKAPE W,WWW0 AFRICA APRIL 1955 1- Important airfield Colonies or Protectorates U.N. Trust Territories U.K. France Belgium Portugal (=el N) Spain Italy Union (Yandate) Africa Independent PART III MADAGASCAR UNION swAn, rouk SOUTH AFRICA SECRET 1Vmmimmmm...mgr 1. -- 50414 -3 PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 7 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 ?JC.L.IVE,. %Or Nor CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 government over the outlying areas, and for the growth of an educated and politically trained population. Areas of Racial Unrest On the high plateau of eastern and southern Africa the white man has established a permanent home. Here, espe- cially in Kenya, the Rhodesias and the Union of South Africa, a small white minority has control. The whites, fearful of inundation by the overwhelm- ing black majority, and scorn- ful of the primitive African culture, are determined to retain control of their own destinies. In this area the color bar rules, and the emerging African, shedding his own tribal society and yet not accepted in the industrially superior Western culture, is subjected to bitter discrimination. Hatred of the white and loss of understanding between races are replacing the former friendly relations. Kenya: A rapid increase of the native population around the European centers in Kenya, population pressure on the land, and racial discrimination have all contributed to the Mau Mau terrorism. In the three years of the movement's exist- ence, the terrorists have killed about 8,000 Africans and 30 Europeans, have tied down about 8,000 troops from Britain and thousands of Kenya whites, and have cost Kenya directly some $75,000,000. The military campaign in which 8,000 terrorists have been killed and over 50,000 Africans detained in camps has put the Mau Mau on the defensive, but it still retains much influence over the 1,300,000 Kikuyus. Meanwhile, a revolutionary social change is being accom- plished by the settling of PART III some of the Kikuyus in villages. Without greater reforms, how- ever, such as the granting of additional land and of broader political rights, and the ending of racial discrimination, Kikuyu loyalty is improbable and future terrorist outbreaks are almost a certainty. White settler criticism of concessions to Africans and of a soft government policy toward terrorists suggests that the local whites are not yet prepared to give construc- tive leadership to the Africans in the development of a multi- racial society in Kenya. South Africa: The election of Strijdom as prime minister of South Africa last November has accelerated the trend toward racial disturbance. He is less willing than former premier Malan to compromise with the English minority element and is equally determined to maintain white supremacy. Strijdom is taking a tough attitude toward non-European organizations, mixed labor unions, constitutional barriers to Nationalist Party racial legislation, and to any criti- cism of South Africa's racial policy. Racial separation-- such as the removal of 70,000 Africans from Johannesburg-- will be implemented when pos- sible, but apartheid will probably not be pushed where it conflicts with economic development. The non-European organ- izations are undergoing internal changes which may permit the Communists to expand their in- fluence. These movements are rather ineffective at present but are joining with the white Communist-front organization, the Congress of Democrats, to sponsor a large-scale "Congress of the People" in June. The government is alert to the danger and probably will act forcefully. SECRET PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 7 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Now JEA...11L1 vv." CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 Rhodesia: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, trying to establish political unity and foster economic de- velopment, faces a serious racial problem. The official policy is partnership of the races; however, daily operation of government and society is somewhat similar to South Africa. An approach to multiracial- ism is apparent in African parliamentary membership and in the new interracial univer- sity. On the other hand, the continued white supremacy poli- cy of the European copper miners is more reminiscent of South Africa. The recently demonstrated strength of the African Mine Workers Union and its co- operation with the African political movement in Northern Rhodesia suggest that African unionized labor will be an increasingly important force. Areas of Anticolonialism Rising resentment against colonialism is responsible for nationalist agitation by politically conscious Africans in areas where the white man is not a settler. The arbitrary political boundaries of European colonies cut across tribal areas to such an extent that any modern African state contains segments of various tribal grouns. These groups are frequently antago- nistic, culturally distinct, and wholly lack a common loyalty or a national concept. The effects of this situation are apparent in the Gold Coast. The Gold Coast: As the first tropical African colony to approach independence, the Gold Coast now appears to be bogging down in internal dissension. Strong regional and tribal animosities aroused by a rapidly growing opposition PART III group--the National Liberation Movement--may force Britain and Prime Minister Nkrumah to make constitutional revisions and reconsider their timetable for complete Gold Coast inde- pendence, now scheduled for 1956. The Liberation Movement, started by the African cocoa farmers last September as a protest against low prices, has become the vehicle of protest for all anti-Nkrumah groups. It refuses to compromise on its demand for a change to a federal system of government. While Nkrumah maintains overwhelming control of the legislature, the clashes between contending forces and the growing strength of the movement, which is even causing high-level defections from Nkrumah's party, will force the prime minister to find a solution. Failure to resolve these differences would be a severe setback to Africans throughout the continent who look to the Gold Coast as a model for the development of future native African states. Nigeria: Britain's other major West African colony, Nigeria, is faced with similar problems. The Moslem north, backward and governed by rulers dependent on Britain for support, fears domination by the more politically sophisticated southern regions which are joined with it in a federation. The south is pressing for self-government in 1956, and Britain has offered to discuss the problem at that time. In view of the strong tribal loyalties and the absence historically of any Nigerian state, this colony may break up into various weak and antago- nistic tribal states unless Britain can prolong the existence of the present federation and constitutionally strengthen the central government. SECRET PATTERNS Awn DRPRDRIITTUPq Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Page 5 of 7 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 law .)Lcift;1- Nair CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 Uganda: Tribal and pro- vincial rivalry is responsible for political unrest in Uganda which has prevailed since the deposition in 1953 of the king of Buganda Province. He and the Buganda nationalists, who were proud of the province's economic and political leader- ship, wanted separate develop- ment as well as a pledge of no federation with white-controlled Kenya. The influence of the Bu- ganda nationalists grew until Britain, late in 1954, agreed to permit the king to return if a constitutional monarchy were accepted in Buganda and if that province would participate in the Uganda legislature. The issue is still unsettled, but the unrest has clearly shown that now there is little sentiment for a Uganda state. External Factors Powerful influences are exerted in Africa by India, the United Nations and world Communism. The Role of the Indian: In eastern and southern Africa the million Indians play an important role. Long a factor in commerce as traders and middlemen, the Indians have now become a political force as agitators and befrienders of African nationalism. They are afraid of expulsion when African states are established, and by giving financial aid and leader- ship to some of these movements, they apparently hope to ingra- tiate themselves with the future rulers of the continent. The Indian is not likely to obtain the Africans' trust, but his agitation causes the present governments additional difficulties and exacerbates racial relations. In West Africa and Ethiopia, Indian influence is limited more to promoting cultural relations. PART III The Role of the United Nations: UN activities in Ziiiii=ion with African af- fairs are constantly increasing, but the ruling powers are jeal- ous of their sovereignty and resent alleged meddling in in- ternal affairs. This was brought home by South African and Belgian withdrawal from some UN agencies. Trusteeship Council reports are generally critical of conditions in African areas. The flood of petitions to the UN from Africans usually magnify minor incidents into major catastrophes. The verbatim texts of UN meetings, distrib- uted by UN agencies and containing propaganda state- ments by Communist delegates, have encouraged discontent with colonialism and Western culture. The Togoland trusteeship problem must be faced soon by the United Nations because Britain has announced its in- tention to terminate its trus- teeship when the Gold Coast achieves independence. The UN solution will have an important effect in West Africa as well as create a precedent for the termination of such agreements. The Role of Communism: The third external force, Communism, is still relatively unimportant in Africa, although there are Communist activities in a few widely dispersed areas. The urbanized native, having lost his tribal ties and now facing a baffling industrial culture, is an easy target for political agitators. This is especially true in the cities of South Africa, the mining camps of Rhodesia, the crowded slums of Nairobi and in the ports of West Africa. In the rural areas, where the mass of the Africans live, isolation and political apathy have impeded the growth of Communism. SECRET PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of 7 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 ,lefererarP`I'mw Nrse CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 April 1955 Africa is the scene of increasing ferment as the na- tives become more critical of colonial rule and the European color bar. Unless the present trend is reversed and African faith in Western civilization re- stored, the continent's valuable manpower and military staging areas, strategic re- sources, and the friendship of 200,000,000 people may be lost. COVIDDIIIAL stermr PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 003186010 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Page 7 of 7