NAVAL AVIATION IN SOVIET ANTISHIP ATTACK PLANNING

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0003230237
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: September 1, 1979

National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
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Naval Aviation in Soviet
Antiship Attack Planning
An Intelligence Assessment
AR 70-14
To ecret
SR 79-10116JX
September 1979
Copy
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National Security
Information
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Naval Aviation in Soviet
Antiship Attack Planning
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 1 July 1979
has been used in the preparation of this report.
The author of this assessment is
Soviet Strategic Forces Division, Office of Strategic
Research. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to \
This paper has been coordinated with the Office of
Weapons Intelligence, the Office of Scientific Intel-
ligence, and the National Intelligence Officer for
Conventional Forces.
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September 1979
Preface
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Soviet wartime naval strategy places heavy emphasis on attacking Western
aircraft carriers and other important surface ships. This report focuses on
the naval air forces for antiship attack. It describes those forces, discusses
the concepts which guide Soviet planning for antiship attacks by them, and
examines the capability of Naval Aviation to carry out such attacks in
various operational situations. Special emphasis is placed on antiship attacks
during a theater war with NATO because Soviet antiship strategy is keyed
to such a war.
The evidence for the judgments in this paper comes primarily from classified
Soviet military writings
iii T ecret
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Key Judgments
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Naval Aviation in Soviet
Antiship Attack Planning
Naval Aviation is one of the two principal Soviet forces for attacking enemy
surface ships; the other consists of attack submarines. Naval Aviation has
aircraft for antiship attacksP7inedium bombers?including
Backfires?armed with air-to-surface missiles, medium bombers,
fighter-bombers, and vertical takeoff and landing fighters, which carry only
bombs or short-range tactical missiles, and reconnaissance, electronic
countermeasures, and tanker aircraft which normally do not carry offensive
weapons. The VTOL fighters, which operate from Kiev-class antisubmarine
aircraft carriers, probably do not figure prominently in Soviet antiship
attack planning because of the range limitation of these aircraft and their
inability to carry large standoff missiles.
Soviet antiship strategy singles out the aircraft carrier as the highest priority
target for attack because it would be the backbone of Western naval sea
control and power-projection forces in conventional or theater nuclear war.
Western amphibious ships probably rank close behind carriers in attack
priorityLjlll
Naval strike aircraft?especially the Backfire?have sufficient range to
conduct antiship attacks in those areas where Warsaw Pact naval strategy
calls for establishing initial sea control in a war with NATO and in some
areas where Pact planning calls for denying NATO free use of the sea. Sea
denial operations beyond the operational range of naval strike aircraft would
be limited primarily to submarines
In the Atlantic theater, antiship attacks by naval aircraft would be a major
part of the Pact sea control mission in the Norwegian Sea. Naval aircraft
might also perform some attacks in support of Pact sea denial operations in
the Greenland?Iceland--United Kingdom gap, the North Sea, and possibly
the English Channel
The Soviets plan to use naval aircraft for antiship attacks in the
Mediterranean Sea to augment sea denial operations there by submarines
and surface ships. From bases in the USSR, the Backfire can cover most of
the Mediterranean. Badger attacks probably would be limited to the eastern
Mediterranean.
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Toperf
TouSret
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Antiship attacks by naval aircraft in the Pacific theater probably would be
keyed to Soviet sea control operations in the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk,
and in an area east of the Kamchatka Peninsula. Backfire and some Badger
strikes might also be part of Soviet sea denial operations in the Philippine
Sea, in an area east of the Kuril Islands, and in other selected areas within
the operational range limits of the aircraft
Antiship attacks by naval aircraft beyond these areas would depend on the
nature of the conflict, and?except for the Arabian Sea?would require use
of airfields outside the Warsaw Pact, which apparently are not currently
available to Soviet strike aircraft
Soviet doctrine for antiship attacks by naval aircraft is flexible because each
attack situation could present different operational requirements. Certain
operational concepts, however, appear repeatedly in Soviet military writ.ngs
? Whenever possible, antiship attacks by Naval Aviation would be
coordinated with attacks by other antiship forces, especially submarines and
surface ships. It is unlikely, however, that all the various forces would strike
simultaneously.
? Soviet planners would organize massive attacks by large numbers of
aircraft against important targets such as aircraft carriers. During
conventional war they probably would hold in reserve up to one-third of their
strike aircraft for escalation to nuclear war.
Large-scale antiship attacks by Naval Aviation alone or in conjunction with
other antiship forces would be highly complex operations. The degree of
success the Soviets might expect against well-defended Western task groups
is uncertain. It would depend on various factors, the most critical of which
are how well the Soviet surveillance system located intended targets, the
ability of strike crews to identify at long ranges the highest priority targets
among a group of targets, and the extent to which strike aircraft survived
encounters with Western air defenses prior to launching their weapons.
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Once enemy surface forces were detected, the Soviets still would be faced
with the difficult task of identifying the various ships so that attacks could
be directed at the highest priority targets. Such identification would be hard
to obtain in wartime. The lack of accurate identification could result in
attacks that are indecisive, particularly in a conventional war.
Western land-based and fleet air defenses are the primary obstacle to
antiship attacks by Naval Aviation. Obsolescent Badger bombers probably
would suffer heavy losses in attacks against well-defended Western task
groups. The Backfire bombers of which probably will be in
Naval Aviation by the mid-1980s?are less vulnerable to air defenses
because of their supersonic speed and low-altitude flight capabilities.
Nevertheless, in a NATO?Warsaw Pact war Backfires also would probably
suffer significant losses, depending on how well NATO air defenses were
coordinated.
Soviet planners probably expect heavy aircraft losses in a war with NATO.
The emphasis the Soviets place on seizing the initiative through massive
strikes at the outset of a war probably reflects their concern that the overall
capabilities for antiship attack by Naval Aviation would be reduced quickly
through aircraft attrition.
vii To cret
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Contents
Page
Preface iii
Key Judgments
Soviet Antiship Strategy
1
Evolution
1
Attack Priorities
1
Competing Missions
2
The Antiship Posture of Naval Aviation 2
Force Composition
Theaters of Operation 12
Aircraft Range Constraints 12
Atlantic 18
Mediterranean 18
European Continental Theaters 19
Pacific 19
Other Theaters 20
Antiship Attack 21
Reconnaissance 21
The Attack 24
Followup Attacks 31
Appendix
Other Forces for Antiship Attack
33
Figures
1
2.
3.
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4. Characteristics of Naval Aviation Reconnaissance and Strike 9
Support Aircraft
5. Western Theaters: Estimated Operational Ranges of Backfire 15
Bomber in Antiship Attacks
6. Pacific Ocean: Estimated Operational Ranges of Backfire Bomber 16
in Antiship Attacks
7. Indian Ocean: Estimated Operational Range of Backfire Bomber 17
in Antiship Attacks
8. Representative Surveillance Coverage of the Atlantic and Indian 22
Oceans by Naval Aircraft From Overseas Airfields
Toa..2fcret
Table
3
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Naval Aviation in Soviet
Antiship Attack Planning (u)
Soviet Antiship Strategy
Soviet antiship strategy is shaped by wartime require-
ments to deny enemy surface naval forces the use of
certain seas and to assert Soviet use of other selected
maritime areas. It is designed primarily to forestall
attacks by Western surface forces on Warsaw Pact
territory and Pact air, ground, and naval forces. Soviet
The primary Soviet forces for conducting antiship
attacks are land-based naval aircraft and attack
submarines. Aircraft of Long Range Aviation (LRA)
and surface warships play a lesser antiship role in
Soviet naval strategy, but these forces would partici-
pate in some antiship attacks. Soviet Frontal Aviation,
the Coastal Defense Missile Forces of the Soviet Navy,
the Rocket and Artillery Troops of the Soviet Ground
Forces, and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces also would
conduct antiship attacks under some conditions.
Antiship forces other than Naval Aviation are de-
scribed in the appendix.77
Evolution
The development of modern Soviet antiship strategy
began in the early 1950s, largely in response to a
perceived threat to the USSR from Western aircraft
carriers. Carrier aircraft armed with nuclear weapons
could attack the Soviet mainland from distances up to
1,000 nautical miles (nm). Having little capability at
that time to deny aircraft carriers the use of the sea at
such ranges, the Soviets embarked on a program to
develop forces for attacking carriers well out to sea,
before they could launch their aircraft. The program
hinged on the development of antiship cruise missiles
and the aircraft, submarines, and surface ships for
launching them
1
The Soviets realized that antiship forces would have to
include aircraft because of their flexibility and
capability for rapid reaction. Several Soviet military
authors have written that, in some cases, the Soviets
might have to rely primarily on aircraft for antiship
attacks early in a war because of the time required to
mass submarines in the combat areas. Soviet writings
also indicate that the Soviets believed that subma-
rines?and to a lesser degree surface ships?would be
needed to expand their strike capability and to
compensate for the range, endurance, and weather
limitations of aircraft.
Through the early 1960s Soviet naval strategy as-
sumed that a war with NATO would be brief and
decided quickly by the early, massive use of nuclear
weapons. By the mid-1960s, however, Soviet naval
strategy began to adjust to shifts in Western strategy,
especially the shift to the principle of "flexible
response."
Soviet naval strategists still expect a theater war with
NATO to be brief, but one which could develop
progressively through periods of rising tensions, con-
ventional warfare, limited nuclear warfare, and
theaterwide nuclear warfareEAccordingly, Soviet
antiship forces today are prepared to conduct both
conventional and nuclear antiship attacks in a
NATO?Warsaw Pact war.
Attack Priorities
Aircraft Carriers. The Soviets accord the aircraft
carrier the highest priority in antiship attacks because
they view it as the cornerstone of Western naval sea
control and power-projection forces in conventional or
theater nuclear war. NATO naval forces currently
include 13 US and two French carriers that operate
fighter, attack, and antisubmarine aircraft, and a
British carrier that operates only antisubmarine
helicopters.
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The Soviets see the aircraft carrier as capable of
influencing greatly the conduct of war in both conti-
nental and ocean theaters:
? Carrier aircraft can attack Warsaw Pact ground and
air forces both in coastal areas and deep in the interior
of continental theaters with conventional or nuclear
weapons. The Soviets believe they must neutralize
aircraft carriers to destroy NATO's nuclear delivery
systems.
? In ocean theaters carrier task groups can disrupt
Soviet sea control or sea denial operations. They can
search for and attack Soviet ballistic missile and attack
submarines and impede their movements to patrol
areas. They can attack Soviet antisubmarine forces
that are attempting to counter Western submarines.
Carrier task groups also can destroy Warsaw Pact
warships, amphibious forces, merchant shipping, and
logistics forces.
Other Ship Targets. After aircraft carriers, other
potential targets assume varying degrees of importance
in Soviet antiship strategy. Western amphibious forces
probably rank close behind aircraft carriers.2
Western warships in antisubmarine barriers in choke
points such as the Greenland?Iceland?United King-
dom (G-I-UK) gap would be important targets, as
would warships providing naval gunfire support to
Western ground forces. Aircraft carriers in company
with these ships would be attacked first. Selected
noncombatant ships in a theater of military operations,
such as troop transports or fleet replenishment ships,
also would be candidates for attack.I
To S et
/
The large-scale interdiction of merchant shipping
evidently does not assume high priority in Soviet
antiship strategy?at least not in the early stages of a
conflictPln a protracted war, the attack priority
assigned to Western merchant shipping could increase
as a major seaborne reinforcement of NATO forces
became effective. Naval strike aircraft have limited
ranges, however, which would rule out their use?if
operating from Soviet bases?over most of the sea
lanes to Great Britain and France.F7
Competing Missions
In addition to their primary task of antiship attack,
Naval Aviation strike and reconnaissance forces have a
lesser role in operations against land objectives. We do
not know the full extent of this role, but such
operations most likely would be against naval-related
targets. They probably would include air attacks and
reconnaissance in support of Soviet amphibious oper-
ations, and air attacks against enemy naval bases and
ports as well as ocean surveillance and air defense
installations. Such attacks would be coordinated with
those of LRA and Frontal Aviation. Naval strike
aircraft also have a minelaying role
The Antiship Posture of
Naval Aviation
Force Composition
Soviet Naval Aviation has
able for the antiship task
aircraft avail-
including:
Missile-carrying medium bombers com-
prising the main antiship strike arm.
? conventional bombers, VTOL (vertical
takeoff and landing) fighters, and fighter-bombers
that also could perform some antiship attacks, al-
though their effectiveness would be limited by a lack of
long-range missiles.
? aircraft of various types that perform
reconnaissance or strike support functions such as
electronic countermeasures and aerial refueling.
2
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The size of the Naval Aviation antiship force has
remained virtually constant over the last 10 years.
Qualitative improvements have been made, however,
with the introduction of new air-to-surface missiles
and the TU-22M Backfire bomber.
Naval aircraft normally operate from bases in the
coastal regions of the USSR. They are organized into
divisions, regiments, and squadrons which are incorpo-
rated into the four Soviet fleets
Strike Aircraft. The strike aircraft of Naval Aviation
and LRA Since the late
1950s, the mainstay of the Naval Aviation strike arm
has been the subsonic medium-range TU-16 Badger
carrying air-to-surface missiles. The badger was pro-
3
duced in the 1950s and is obsolescent. It is a relatively
large, slow-moving target by current standards, and it
is highly vulnerable to modern air defenses
The TU-22M Backfire bomber was first introduced
into Naval Aviation in late 1974, and 3f these
aircraft now are operational with the Baltic and Black
Sea Fleets. The Backfire eventually will replace the
Badger as the primary aircraft for antiship attacks; we
estimate that Backfires will be in service
with Naval Aviation by the mid-1980s. The Backfire
has greater range than the Badger, and it is less
vulnerable to air defenses because of its high speed and
low-altitude flight capabilities.
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4
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The capability of the free-fall bombers to attack ships
at sea with conventional bombs would be poor because
of the difficulty of hitting a moving target without
guided weapons. Therefore, these aircraft probably
would be used primarily to bomb naval-related land
targets and ships in port. Free-fall bombers also could
be used for reconnaissance in support of antiship
attacks./
The Fitter C/D, which is probably intended for a
variety of missions, would be well suited for antiship
attacks in the Baltic Sea where distances are short and
where potential targets include small, fast patrol boats
of the West German and Danish Navies. The Fitter
C/D has inherent advantages of speed and maneuver
ability over the Badger that give it a better capability
for attacking such targets. Use of the Fitter C/D for
antiship attacks in the Baltic also would free the
Backfires and Badgers for missions outside the Baltic
area. Fitters evidently would not have sufficient range
for such missions
The YAK-38 Forger VTOL fighters that operate from
Kiev antisubmarine aircraft carriers have some
capability for strikes against surface ships. They also
have capabilities for air defense and reconnaissance.
Forger strikes against surface ships would be con-
strained by their inherent range limitations and their
inability to carry large standoff missiles. Thus, Forgers
by themselves would have little capability to success-
fully counter well-defended Western naval task
7
groups. The Soviets probably plan to use Forgers on a
contingency basis for small-scale attacks on weakly
defended ships, as well as for air defense and recon-
naissance.
Reconnaissance and Strike Support Aircraft. Recon-
naissance and strike support aircraft of Naval Aviation
perform various tasks which are essential to the
conduct of antiship attacks. These tasks include:
? Locating and identifying potential targets.
? Providing electronic countermeasures support to
aircraft conducting antiship attacks.
? Providing targeting information to cruise missile
firing submarines and surface ships.
? Providing aerial refueling services.
? Assessing the results of antiship attacks.
Naval reconnaissance and strike aircraft are described
in figure 4. Some support missions also could be
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Characteristics of Naval Aviation Reconnaissance and Strike Support Aircraft
TU-95 Bear D
TU-16 Badger A Tanker
TU-16 Badger F
Bear D
Badger A
Tanker
Badger D/K
Badger E/F
Primary missions
Long-range reconnaissance
and cruise missile targeting
Aerial refueling
Electronic intelli-
gence collection
Photo-
reconnaissance
Gross weight
(kilograms)
161,930
75,750
75,750
75,750
Average cruise speed
at high altitude (knots)
440
445
445
445
Combat radiusl
(nautical miles)
Unrefueled
With refueling
4,050
5,200
See footnote 2
N/A
1,650
2,300
1,650
2,300
'These radii are for maximum-distance missions. They allow for only a
minimum fuel reserve, and they do not allow for such variables as loitering,
indirect routing, low-altitude flight, or combat maneuvering. Allowances for
such variables would reduce combat radius. For many missions, these
aircraft would be required to loiter while conducting their operations.
The radius of the Badger tanker is limited by the fuel transfer requirements.
For example, at 1,000 nm from base, it would be able to transfer less than
one half of a full fuel load to a Badger strike aircraft. At 1,600 nm from base,
il would have no fuel available for transfer.
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Badger H/.1
Blinder C
Cub B
Hormone B
Electronic
cou ntermeasures
Photoreconnaissance
Communications and
electronic intelligence collection
General reconnaissance and
cruise missile targeting
75,750 82,460
N
0
n 5
0
56,000
5,960
1 N 50
2 200
a)
520
1,740
2,350
320
1,300
N/A
70
110
N/A
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performed by strike and antisubmarine aircraft of
Naval Aviation, bombers and reconnaissance aircraft
of LRA, and aircraft of Frontal Aviation. In most
cases, however, these aircraft would be reserved for
their primary tasks.
The TU-95 Bear D?a reconnaissance version of the
TU-95 bomber?is the mainstay of the Naval Aviation
open-ocean reconnaissance force. From bases in the
USSR, Bear Ds can monitor surface ship movements
and provide target information over most likely areas
of hostile naval operations in the North Atlantic and
North Pacific Oceans. The Bear D has an operating
radius of more than 4,000 nm, but it normally operates
at shorter ranges to increase time on station. At a
distance of 3,000 nm from base, for example, it can
spend some four hours on station. Naval Aviation
11
The Soviets have developed a version of the KA-25
Hormone helicopter for shipborne maritime reconnais-
sance and for targeting shipborne and coastal defense
cruise missiles. Helicopters of this type are assigned to
some ships and bases in each fleet to provide radar
coverage of surface targets beyond the coverage of
shipborne or land-based radars
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Theaters of Operation
Soviet planners evidently have defined specific mari-
time and continental theaters for the command and
control of wartime military operations. We do not
know exactly how these theaters are delimited, but
apparently maritime theaters include the coastal areas
of some continents, and continental theaters include
some seas adjacent to continent
Aircraft Range Constraints
The distance at which aircraft can perform combat
missions is highly variable. It depends not only on the
technical characteristics of the aircraft, but also on
essential mission-planning trade-offs between range
and factors affecting aircraft survivability. Such
factors typically include fuel allowances for combat
maneuvering, indirect routing, and low-altitude flight
to avoid or penetrate air defenses. Allowances for these
factors reduce?usually significantly?the combat
range of strike aircraft. For example,
I under optimum conditions a
Backfire bomber armed with a single AS-4 missile can
fly 1,750 to 2,075 nm before returning to its base. If,
however, the aircraft were to approach its target at a
Toj..Scret 12
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low altitude for 200 nm, climb to a high altitude to
launch its missile, and escape at a low altitude for
200 nm, the maximum range at which it could conduct
an attack and return to its base would be reduced to
1,250 to 1,550 nm. Furthermore, if the Backfire were
to use supersonic speeds during portions of its mission,
or an indirect flight route, the distance at which it
could conduct attacks would be reduced even more.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show representative operational
ranges for antiship attacks by Backfire bombers?the
most capable naval strike aircraft. These ranges are
based on the technical characteristics of the Backfire
and on reasonable mission-planning trade-offs between
range and aircraft survivability. Some attacks by
Badgers would be possible near these limits, but only if
the Badgers were refueled, or were subject to fewer
range-limiting trade-offs.
We believe these ranges represent prudent planning
norms beyond which antiship attacks by naval aircraft
would not be practical, at least in the initial phase of a
NATO?Warsaw Pact war. In fact, the Soviets prob-
ably plan for most antiship attacks by both Backfires
and Badgers to occur well within the range approxima-
tions shown on the maps as they do in exercises. The
ranges on the maps are keyed to the fairly rigid flight
profiles /s,/lissions at shorter
distances would allow Soviet planners more flexibility
in programing attacks. They also would allow strike
aircraft a margin of freedom to deal with contingencies
that could occur during their flight; for example,
Backfires could use their supersonic ca abil'
evade unexpected enemy air defenses.
The operational ranges shown on the maps cover all
likely places from which Western aircraft carriers and
amphibious forces could project power ashore in a
NATO?Warsaw Pact war, with the possible exception
of the Bay of Biscay. They also include those areas
where Pact naval strategy calls for establishing initial
sea control in a war with NATO. Furthermore, they
include virtually all geographic choke points where
Western surface forces might operate to prevent Soviet
surface ships and submarines from reaching the open
ocean.
13
One of the factors that limit the combat radius of the
Badger force is the relative dearth of tanker aircraft
and their small fuel transfer capacity.
The range advantage gained by refueling depends not
only on the fuel transfer capacity of the tanker aircraft,
but also on where and how many times refueling takes
place.
The Backfire can conduct strikes beyond the range of
Badgers, even when the Badgers are refueled. The
Backfire strike range could be improved further with
aerial refueling, but Naval Aviation currently does not
have an adequate tanker force to support Backfire
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To,-ret
Assumptions
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Operational Ranges for Backfire
Bombers Conducting Antiship Attacks'
? Ranges are based on the performance of the Backfire
armed with a single radar- or antiradar-homing AS-4.
The Backfire possibly can carry as many as three
AS-4s, but only with substantial range penalties.
? Aircraft fly from forward naval airfields in the
USSR, and they return to these airfields along
reciprocal routes.'
? Flight routes are selected to avoid or minimize
overflying Western land-based air defenses.
? Missions are based on the following flight profile,
except in the Baltic and Mediterranean areas, where
the aircraft might encounter more extensive air
defenses:
'Intelligence assessments of the Backfire's performance differ. The
performance characteristics used here are based on CIA's appraisal
of the Backfire. If the DIA and Air Force estimate of Backfire
performance were used, the range limits would be extended in all
areas. In the Pacific and Indian Oceans, it could be increased by as
much as 850 nm. In the Atlantic the range could be extended only
about 450 nm, since the aircraft would have to fly a greater distance
at a low altitude because of the concentration of NATO air defenses
in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. In the Baltic the
range could be extended by some 200 nm, and in the Mediterranean
by about 300 nm.
'The range in the Mediterranean could be increased by some
300 nm if the aircraft used airfields in Hungary or Romania. The
range in the Baltic could be increased by about 100 nm if the aircraft
staged from airfields in Poland or East Germany.
_Top.cret
? The aircraft initially flies at its most efficient cruise
altitude and speed.
? As the aircraft approaches the intended target, it
descends to a low altitude for 200 nm to avoid
detection.
? When the aircraft is about 250 nm from the target,
it climbs to a high altitude for missile launch. The
AS-4 is launched at its maximum range of about
200 nm.
? After missile launch the aircraft reverses course,
descends to a low altitude, and returns to its base.
? In the Baltic and Mediterranean areas, the aircraft
flies longer distances at a low altitude.
? The Backfire does not fly at supersonic speed, which
would further reduce operational range.
? The Backfire does not refuel in flight.
? The Backfire aerodynamic design is assumed to be
optimized for subsonic flight. A design compromised
for both subsonic and supersonic performance would
reduce range by some 15 percent.
? The ranges include the 200-nm antiship range of the
AS-4 missile.
? The Backfire lands with 5 percent of its fuel
remaining.
14
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Western Theaters:
Estimated Operational Ranges of Backfire Bomber in Antiship Attacks
Greenland
Figure 5
Barents
North
Atlantic
Ocean
Iceland
Norwegian
:
\?
Maryavr)
e--
Kaliningrad
rela
*Moscow
U. S. S. R.
fr',A
Slack Sea
Popi6gal
4";
Spain
Alediterranean
Sea
625593 8-79 CIA
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Turkey
High-altitude flight
Low-altitude flight
------ Missile flight
0 500 kilometers
I
nautical
0 56O it?les
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Pacific Ocean:
Estimated Operational Ranges of Backfire Bomber in Antiship Attacks
Figure 6
o 590 kilometers
I r' nautical
0 cuu elfin
6 Z5594 8-79 CIA
High-altitude flight
400,110 Low-altitude flight
--- Missile flight
To ecret J 6
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Indian Ocean:
Estimated Operational Range of Backfire Bomber in Antiship Attacks
Figure 7
Saudi Arabia
Persian
'ouif
Golf of Oman
Arabian
Sea
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- High-altitude flight
.0,040. Low-altitude flight
Missile flight
0 500 kilometerl
500 neitical miles
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Atlantic
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that the Soviets have defined a
wartime theater of military operations north of the
G-I-UK gap, which possibly includes part of the
Barents Sea.
Antiship attacks by Naval Aviation in the Norwegian
Sea and G-I-UK gap would be conducted from air-
fields in the Northern Fleet, and to a lesser extent from
airfields in the Baltic Sea Fleet. Attacks in the North
Sea might originate from airfields in either the
Northern or Baltic Sea Fleets, or both. Attacks in the
English Channel would have to originate from Baltic
bases.
If the Soviets deploy a tanker force to support Backfire
operations, the Backfire range limits could be extended
several hundred miles into the North Atlantic.
Attacks by naval aircraft in the Bay of Biscay
theoretically could be conducted from Baltic Fleet or
non-Soviet Warsaw Pact airfields. As a rule such
attacks would be unrealistic, however, because the
aircraft would have to fly through the bulk of NATO
air defenses in West Germany and France. Some
Backfire strikes in the Bay of Biscay might be possible
during a Pact bombing offensive in Europe if the
aircraft staged from an airfield in East Germany and if
safe flight corridors were established across West
Germany. Most likely, antiship attacks in this area, if
necessary, would be left to submarines or in some cases
to heavy bombers of LRA.
Mediterranean
Warsaw Pact naval strategy in the Mediterranean
calls for wartime sea denial operations there, primarily
to prevent NATO naval forces from projecting power
ashore. Although Soviet aircraft do not have direct
access to the Mediterranean without confronting land-
based air defenses in the NATO littoral countries, the
Soviets plan for antiship air attacks there to au ment
those of surface ships and submarines.
The Backfire bomber has improved significantly Na-
val Aviation's strike capability in the Mediterranean
because of its ability to penetrate air defenses.
Effective Badger strikes in the Mediterranean in the
face of strong land-based air defenses probably would
require local air superiority along the flight route.
Naval Aviation's antiship strike capability in the
Mediterranean would be enhanced to the extent that
Pact plans to establish at least partial air superiority
over Greece and Turkey early in a war with NATO
were successful.
To simplify their antiship attack problem in the
Mediterranean, the Soviets almost certainly would
desire basing rights for naval aircraft in a friendly
littoral country, such as Libya. They appear to have
little prospect, however, of obtaining such rights in the
near term. In 1968 the Soviets established a naval air
contingent of about 30 aircraft in Egypt for recon-
naissance and antisubmarine support to the Mediterra-
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nean Squadron. They apparently planned to develop a
strike capability there also. The air contingent was
withdrawn in 1972 when Soviet military units were
expelled from Egypt.
Soviet submarines and surface ships routinely operate
in the Mediterranean, and they would be available for
antiship attacks at the outset of hostilities.
Antiship attacks by naval aircraft in the Mediterra-
nean would be the responsibility primarily of the Black
Sea Fleet Air Force. Strikes by Black Sea Fleet
Badgers would be limited to the eastern Mediterra-
nean, unless the aircraft staged from a Warsaw Pact
country such as Hungary or Bulgaria. Backfire bomb-
ers could reach most of the western Mediterranean
from Black Sea airfields. For attacks in the extreme
western Mediterranean, however, the Backfires would
have to stage from or recover in a forward Warsaw
Pact country.
19
European Continental Theaters
The maritime areas that the Soviets consider to be in
the European continental theaters are the Baltic and
Black Seas, and probably much of the Barents Sea. In
wartime the Soviets would attempt to establish total
control over these seas. Antiship attacks in these seas
could be more intense than in more distant areas
because the Soviets could bring to bear all Warsaw
Pact antiship forces, including coastal patrol craft,
short-range tactical aircraft, and coastal defense
missiles.
Antiship attacks by Naval Aviation in the Barents,
Baltic, and Black Seas would be the responsibility of
the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets, respec-
tively. Initially, these areas would not be likely
operating areas for Western aircraft carriers and other
high-value ships. The targets for antiship attacks
would include primarily destroyers and smaller ships.
Most naval strike aircraft, therefore, probably would
be reserved initially for attacks against the more
important targets at greater distances
Pacific
Initial Soviet wartime aims in the Pacific probably
would be similar to those in the Atlantic?sea control
in areas near the USSR and sea denial in more distant
areas. In a NATO?Warsaw Pact war, Soviet naval
operations in the Pacific would depend on the nature of
the conflict in Europe and the actions taken by
Western forces in the Pacific. It is unlikely that
antiship attacks would be a significant part of a
conflict between the Soviets and Chinesel
Never-
theless, they almost certainly would want to control the
Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and an area east of
the Kamchatka Peninsula. They probably would seek
to disrupt Western naval operations in an area east of
the Kuril Islands, in the Philippine Sea, and in various
other areas throughout the Pacific.r
Intensive antiship attacks by naval aircraft would be
fundamental to the Soviet sea control mission in the
Pacific. In addition, Naval Aviation forces for antiship
attack almost certainly would participate in sea denial
operations out to aircraft operational limits.
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As in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, naval strike and
reconnaissance aircraft in the Pacific Fleet would have
to contend with formidable air defenses. Aircraft
staging from airfields near Vladivostok would have to
skirt or overfly the air defense network centered in
Japan in order to reach the open ocean. Only the
airfields at Petropavlovsk and Alekseyevka have direct
access to the northwest Pacific.
The Pacific Fleet 7
It is also
the most remote fleet?more than 3,000 nm from the
nearest naval airfield in the western USSR. Whereas
naval aircraft can deploy rapidly among the western
fleets, deploymelds to and from the Pacific Fleet would
be more difficult.
Other Theaters
Antiship attacks by naval aircraft in other theaters
would depend on the nature of the conflict, and?
except for the northern Arabian Sea?would be
predicated on the use of airfields outside the USSR.
No Soviet naval strike aircraft are stationed outside
the USSR, although some strike aircraft occasionally
make temporary deployments to other Warsaw Pact
countries. Deployment bases for strike aircraft are
potentially available in such countries as Cuba,
Angola, and South Yemen, where the Soviets regularly
send reconnaissance or antisubmarine aircraft
If the Soviets were engaged in a local war involving a
maritime area distant from the USSR, and if bases
were available, they might deploy some naval aircraft
to take part in the conflict. The bulk of the naval strike
and reconnaissance aircraft, however, almost certainly
would be kept in the USSR as a hedge against a
possible NATO?Warsaw Pact war.
Strikes in the Indian Ocean. From bases in the USSR,
naval aircraft could conduct antiship attacks over
much of the Arabian Sea. Nonnaval airfields such as
Mary in the southern USSR would have to be used for
staging the attacks. The range of such attacks could be
extended to the entire Arabian Sea and some areas
beyond if the aircraft landed in one of the littoral
countries instead of returning to the USSR
The Soviets recently began using the airfield in Aden,
South Yemen,1
If this airfield
were available in wartime, they might use it for staging
or recovering strike and reconnaissance aircraft. Prior
to their ouster from Somalia in 1977, the Soviets built
a large airfield and missile-handling and storage
facility near Berbera./
Reconnaissance. Naval Aviation Bear D reconnais-
sance aircraft deploy regularly to Cuba and Angola for
in a NATO?Warsaw Pact war, the Soviets almost
certainly would keep most of their naval strike and
reconnaissance aircraft in the USSR to engage the
immediate threats to the homeland. Some reconnais-
sance aircraft?and possibly some strike aircraft?
probably would be deployed to overseas bases, if
available, to support Soviet surface ships and subma-
rines, ncLtp monitor the movements of Western naval
forces
Top.$Zret
1L-38 May antisubmarine aircraft deploy periodically
to South Yemen.6 The purposes of such deployments
are diverse:
? As an important element of Soviet ocean surveil-
lance, naval aircraft deployed in peacetime can moni-
tor the disposition of Western naval surface forces in
distant areas. Such information would be important to
Soviet planners in the early stages of a crisis or conflict.
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? In wartime, deployed naval aircraft could provide
intelligence on Western naval movements. In addition,
As shown in figure 8, Bear Ds flying from Cuba and
Angola could, if unopposed, cover much of the Atlantic
Ocean, and Mays flying from South Yemen could
cover an important portion of the Indian Ocean. I
Antiship Attack'
Antiship attack has two phases: reconnaissance and
the attack itself.
Reconnaissance
of such reconnaissance
include not only the detection of potential targets, but
also the determination of their identity, precise loca-
tion, and direction of movement?information that
would be critical for cruise missile targeting. Further-
more, antiship reconnaissance must provide assess-
ments of the results of attacks.
This section deals primarily with antiship attacks by land-based
aircraft in maritime theaters. Most of the basic concepts discussed
here would apply to attacks by these aircraft in both maritime and
continental theaters. Attacks in continental theaters, however, would
not necessarily follow the pattern of ocean attacks because of
different tactical requirements
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Representative Surveillance Coverage of the Atlantic and
Indian Oceans by Naval Aircraft From Overseas Airfields
Figure 8
:Barents :50a
Canada
Unt
Ec
North Atlantic Ocean biter
-
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3,000 rim
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ir.an
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11-38 May
radius :with
aiia 4?hour
loiter
5e9heiiea
Luanda
Angola
&mit!
Pacific
Ocean
South Atlantic Ocean
Walvis
ibbluub
Indian Ocean
Ch
iSi9t
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The Role of Reconnaissance Aircraft. The primary role
of reconnaissance aircraft in antiship attacks is to
provide strike platforms with precise, up-to-date infor-
mation on the location and identit of the tar ? ets.
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Post-Strike Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance of the
combat area after antiship attacks would be necessary
for assessing the results of the attacks. Battle damage
assessments would be required for Soviet planners to
determine whether the intended targets were hit, the
degree to which the damage was controlled, and
whether subsequent strikes would be necessary. At-
tacks on aircraft carriers in World War II and major
aircraft carrier accidents during the Vietnam war have
demonstrated that carriers can sustain considerable
damage without sinking. Soviet planners would want
to know if a damaged aircraft carrier could still
conduct flight operations.
Because of the long ranges at which air-to-surface
missiles are launched and the requirements for combat
maneuvering, strike aircraft in most cases would be
unable to assess comprehensively the battle damage to
the target. Naval reconnaissance aircraft could be used
for this purpose, although they would be highly
vulnerable to survivin? fleet air
-I -
The Attack
planning and execution of specific antiship attacks by
naval aircraft would depend on the nature and course
of the conflict, the forces available, the intended target
and its location, and the perception of the situation by
Soviet commanders.
Organizing the Attack. Antiship attacks by Naval
Aviation would be organized by operational planners
who would tailor general antiship attack plans and
models to specific situations.
Top,S?.a
Despite the general plans and guidelines available to
them, Soviet planners could be faced with many hard
decisions in organizing antiship attacks. Each oper-
ational situation would present different problems.
Decisions would have to be made in each case on which
forces would be allocated to the attacks, which targets
would be attacked and by whom, where the attacks
would take place, and the time and sequence of the
attacks. F,
Force Coordination. Soviet antiship doctrine calls for
attacks by Naval Aviation against important targets to
be conducted in conjunction with attacks by other
antiship forces when the operational situation permits.
Such coordinated attacks reflect the Soviet desire to
seize the initiative by decisive strikes in which the
maximum amount of force can be brought to bear.
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Western Air Defenses. The Soviets perceive Western
air defenses as the major obstacle to antiship attacks
by Naval Aviation. In general, Soviet strike aircraft
would have to penetrate a series of Western air
defenses?which some Soviet writers call "break-
through"?including land-based interceptors and sur-
face-to-air missile systems as well as shipborne
defenses: interceptors, long-range surface-to-air mis-
sile systems, and point defense surface-to-air missile
and gun systems.
Land-Based Air Defenses. The approaches to most
potential areas for antiship attacks by naval aircraft
are guarded by Western land-based air defense
systems:
? NATO radars and land-based interceptors or sur-
face-to-air missile systems can cover virtually all
approaches to the Norwegian and North Seas, the
G-I-UK gap, and the Bay of Biscay, except possibly for
flights around the North Cape of Norway to the
northern and central Norwegian Sea. The deployment
of E-3A early warning aircraft to Iceland has greatly
complicated the Soviet antiship attack problem.
Depending on how these aircraft are used, they could
substantially reduce the Soviet capability to operate
aircraft undetected in the northern and central Norwe-
gian Sea.
? Similarly, NATO air defenses can cover virtually all
approaches from airfields in the USSR_ to the
Mediterranean.
? Western air defenses based in Korea and Japan can
cover the Sea of Japan and the approaches to the
northern Pacific near or across Japan.
Fleet Air Defense. The capabilities of Western fleet air
defenses depend on the types and numbers of ships that
are tied together in common air defense networks.
Major ship groupings usually include aircraft carriers
and are well defended. Western fleet air defenses are
based on a multizone concept and are designed to
progressively weaken and defeat an air attack:
- The first line of defense is an outer zone defended by
carrier-based early warning aircraft and interceptors.
It could extend out to 500 nm. The number of
interceptors that could be mustered for combat in this
zone would depend on the range at which the incoming
27
attack is detected, the time it takes to respond to the
detection, the speed of the attacking aircraft, the speed
of the interceptors, and the rate at which the carrier
can launch the interceptors.
? A middle zone is defended by area defense surface-
to-air missile systems. The extent of this zone depends
on the positioning of the ships and the range of the
missile systems. A few US ships have surface-to-air
missile systems with ranges of about 100 nm.
? The final line of defense is an inner zone protected by
shipborne point defense surface-to-air missile systems
and antiaircraft guns.
The weapon systems in each of these zones are
complemented by electronic countermeasures systems
for confusing, decoying, or disrupting the sensors of
attacking aircraft and cruise missiles.
Composition of Attack Force. Whenever possible,
Soviet planners would opt for massive air attacks
against important targets?allowing for a nuclear
reserve of perhaps as many as one-third of all available
strike aircraft during a conventional war.
Attacks by a large number of aircraft could overwhelm
air defenses, ensuring that at least some antiship
missiles would find their intended targets
Soviet strategists evidently have concluded that a large
number of missile hits would be necessary to put out of
action or destroy ships such as aircraft carriers. One
writer, for example, in a 1968 classified article stated
that six to 10 hits by air-to-surface missiles with
conventional warheads would be necessary to put a
carrier out of action. He further stated that at least two
strike regiments?some 48 strike aircraft?would be
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necessary to ensure six to 10 hits. Two other classified
articles written in 1960 and 1966 state that a salvo of
six air-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads
would be required to ensure destruction of an aircraft
carrier and several of its escorts. The author of the
1966 article also stated that two aircraft regiments
would be necessary for the strike. The 1960 article
implied that 12 aircraft could do the job if none were
destroyed en route to the strike. He also implied that
30 to 36 missiles with conventional warheads could
achieve the same results. The three authors evidently
were writing about the Badger C aircraft and the AS-2
missile.
Not all aircraft in large attacks necessarily would
launch their missiles at the same time.
Soviet antiship doctrine evidently
calls for a large attack force as a rule to be a loose
assemblage of smaller groups which fly to the target
separately and attack in sequential waves. A simulta-
neous missile launch by all aircraft in a large attack
force would create the greatest problem for the
defenses, and the Soviets would prefer to use this tactic
if the circumstances allowed it. The Soviets apparently
feel, however, that such an operation would be too
difficult to coordinate effectively in most situations
involving large numbers of aircraft. They probably
consider that an attack force composed of waves of
smaller groups striking sequentially is a more flexible
and manageable scheme. Such a scheme is similar to
that recommended by authoritative naval writers for
coordinating the antiship strikes of different types of
forces?one based on the principle of "no one waits for
anybody." With such a scheme the first several waves
might occupy and exhaust enemy air defenses, thus
facilitating strikes by subsequent waves. Also, subse-
quent waves could adjust their strikes according to
updated targeting information from the first waves.
Furthermore, the use of this tactic would reduce the
likelihood of electromagnetic interference among So-
viet missile seekers, acquisition radars, and ECM
equipment
The Approach. The tactics used in the flight from
staging airfields to the target area would be designed
primarily to enhance surprise and to avoid or break
through air defenses. Where possible, operational
planners would select flight routes to minimize aircraft
exposure to Western air defenses. In a NATO?
Naval aircraft?especially the Backfire?probably
would fly at low altitudes during at least a portion of
their flight to the target to avoid detection by air
defense radars. The Soviets are well aware of the
potential of low-altitude flight to reduce aircraft
vulnerability,
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The Backfire has the capability to fly at supersonic
speeds at high altitudes, but at the expense of range.
This tactic probably would be used by Backfires during
portions of their flight?as an alternative to low-
altitude flight?especially to penetrate air defenses
which include interceptors
Electronic Countermeasures. The use of ECM in
penetrating Western air defenses is fundamental to
Soviet planning
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A mixture of active radar and antiradiation homing
missiles might be launched in most antiship attacks to
complicate the defensive problem.
A critical problem which faces Soviet strike aircraft is
identifying the highest priority targets among a group
of targets prior to missile launch. Soviet doctrine calls
for concentrating firepower on highest priority targets
such as aircraft carriers.
he Soviet strike leader would be
faced with a dilemma:
? If he chose to direct all missiles at a single ship
identified solely by radar or other electronic informa-
tion, the missiles might impact on a decoy or a target of
lesser importance.
? If he chose to apportion some missiles to all or several
targets, the total firepower of the strike would be
divided, and the attack might not be decisive.
One Soviet military writer has recommended the
second of the above options in those cases in which
target identity has not been firmly established. Other
writers, however, do not address the problem specifi-
cally, except to emphasize the crucial importance of
accurate reconnaissance for antiship attacks. One
reason the Soviets plan for large-scale strikes against
important targets may be to ensure that sufficient
antiship missiles would be available to apportion some
to each ship in a group of ships.
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Followup Attacks
Followup antiship attacks by Naval Aviation would be
conducted on a basis of battle damage assessments or
as dictated by the course of the war. The Soviets hope
that initial antiship attacks would be decisive, and that
followup attacks would be necessary only to maintain
the advantage gained in the first strikes.
The Soviets probably expect heavy losses in aircraft in
the initial antiship attacks in a NATO?Warsaw Pact
war. The emphasis Soviet writers place on seizing the
initiative at the outset of war probably reflects, among
other things, their concern that the overall capabilities
for antiship attacks by Naval Aviation would be
reduced quickly through aircraft attrition. Continuous
combat operations could strain the Naval Aviation
logistics and maintenance system and further reduce
aircraft availabilit
Followup antiship attacks would be similar to initial
attacks, except that a progressive reduction in avail-
able aircraft probably would dictate attacks by smaller
numbers of aircraft.
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Representative Surveillance Coverage of the Atlantic and
Indian Oceans by Naval Aircraft From Overseas Airfields
Figure 8
Barents Saa
C
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Canada
United
States.-
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North Atlantic Ocean
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ZimhAborm
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waiois
Boy t
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,1,4othe
Indian Ocean ?
Chile
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Appendix
Other Forces for Antiship Attack
Attack Submarines
The Soviet Navy has bperational attack
submarines with varying capabilities for antiship
attack:
? The main antiship force consists of=iuclear-
powered anct, diesel-powered submarines equipped
with a total of antiship missiles.
? obsolescent diesel-powered submarines are
equipped with an older, inertially guided cruise missile
for attacking large-area targets. These submarines
technically could be used for nuclear antiship attacks.
? nuclear-powered attack submarines have
a primary mission of antisubmarine warfare but also
could conduct torpedo attacks on ships.
? E diesel-powered attack submarines could
conduct torpedo attacks on ships; however, only about
P of these are newer long-range submarines. The
remainder are obsolete by today's standards, have low
endurance, and are exceptionally noisy.
Over the last 10 years, the number of attack subma-
rines in the Soviet inventory has declined with the
retirement of obsolescent units._
Surface Ships
All Soviet surface combatant ships have some
capability for antiship attacks, but relatively few are
equipped with antiship cruise missiles:
? major surface combatants carr antishi
cruise missiles.
oastal patrol vessels are equipped with
hort- and medium-range antiship missiles.
The current overall emphasis in the construction of
Soviet surface ships is on antisubmarine and air
defense weapon systems. Most major and some minor
surface combatant ships are equipped with surface-to-
air missiles which have some capability against surface
ships at short ranges. In additionnruisers and
frigates carry an antisubmarine missile which might be
used against surface ships under some conditions.
Long Range Aviation
Antiship attack always has been a secondary mission
of the LRA. .\
heavy bomber ould perform antiship
attacks with air-to-surface missiles. Missile attacks
would be limited to nuclear strikes, since the missiles
on these aircraft were designed for use against large-
area targets and are not sufficiently accurate for
conventional attacks on ships. LRA heavy bombers
could be used to strike targets beyond the range of
Naval Aviation medium bombers
medium bombers in the LRA are
equipped with air-to-surface missiles that could be
used in conventional or nuclear attacks on ships.
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The availability of LRA aircraft for antiship attacks
would depend on whether they could be spared from
their primary missions. In a theater war with NATO,
only some heavy bombers might be available for
antiship attacks and attacks against land targets in
Europe. The remaining heavy bombers probably would
be held in reserve for intercontinental war. Virtually
all medium bombers?except for a nuclear reserve?
probably would be committed initially to the Pact
bombing offensive in Central Europe, aimed at secur-
ing air superiority and destroying NATO nuclear
delivery systems. \
Frontal Aviation
Soviet Frontal Aviation would have some antiship
attack role, but only to the extent that it would directly
support Warsaw Pact ground operations. During the
early stages of a NATO?Warsaw Pact theater war,
practically all of Frontal Aviation?except for a
nuclear reserve?would be involved in the bombing
offensive in Central Europe. After the bombing
offensive, tactical air units would be tasked to support
ground force operations and amphibious landings. In
this role they could be assigned antiship attack
missions near the coast, especially missions involving
attacks on amphibious ships or warships providing
naval gunfire support to enemy forces.
Land-Based Missile Forces
In some instances Soviet land-based cruise and ballis-
tic missiles could be used for antiship attacks:
? The Coastal Missile and Artillery Force's cruise
missiles provide an antiship capability out to some
200 nm from launch sites in the USSR.
Coastal defense cruise missiles defend the major naval
bases in each fleet area and the approaches to the Sea
of Japan through the La Perouse Strait.
? The Rocket and Artillery Troops of the Soviet
Ground Forces could conduct antiship attacks with
tactical nuclear missiles in support of ground force?
operations in coastal areas. Such attacks would be
limited to large-area targets such as an amphibious
task group in a landing area.
? There has been some discussion in Soviet writings of
the use of land-based ballistic missiles of the Strategic
Rocket Forces against ships at sea
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Forces
The role of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Forces in antiship
attacks would be similar to that of Soviet forces but on
a smaller scale. Operations would be limited to the
Baltic and Black Seas and would be conducted in
concert with Soviet antiship operations in these areas.
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