NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 7 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005104622
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00460
• Publication Date: April 7, 1980

Central
Intelligence
APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 01-20-2010
National Intelligence Daily (b)(1)
(b)(6)
Monday
7 April 1980
Top Secret-
 the Israelis, all five terrorists were killed.
successful infiltration since April 1979. According to
Israeli troops stormed a building at Misgiv Amm
kibbutz, roughly one mile from the Lebanese border in
the Golan Heights, that had been seized last night by
an Arab guerrilla group. The pro-Iraqi Arab Liberation
Front claimed responsibility for the attack, the first
7 April 1980
 USSR-Afghanistan
Briefs and Comments
India: Government Crackdown in Assam . . . . . . . . . .
4
Chad: Possible Cease-Fir
e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
Argentina-USSR: Soviet Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
Mexico-USSR: Russian Lan
guage Training . . . . . . . . .
6
Special Analysis
Egypt: Foreign and Domestic Perspectives . . . . . . . .
7
7 April 1980
 o 200
Kilometers
Boundary representation le
not necessarily authoritative
2
 The Revolutionary Council's announcement that it will refer
the hostage transfer issue to Ayatollah Khomeini reflects the
Council's internal divisions.
Although Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh said the Coun-
cil has made its own decision, it is more likely that it
has simply resolved to give Khomeini responsibility for
handling the problem. The hardliners on the Council led
by Ayatollah Beheshti's Islamic Republic Party this week-
end announced their opposition to any transfer of the
hostages from the militants' control. One senior IRP
official met with Khomeini and said no transfer is likely.
President Bani-Sadr on Saturday reiterated that the
hostage crisis is diverting Iran's attention from its
enormous domestic and international problems.
Bani-Sadr has endorsed former Irish Foreign Minister
MacBride's proposal to try the Shah in absentia and prob-
ably is also backing the efforts of Archbishop Capucci,
who met with the militants yesterday to urge them to hand
the hostages over to the government. Neither alternative
appears to enjoy much support from the hardliners in the
Revolutionary Council, the militants, or Ayatollah
Khomeini.
Relations With Iraq
Relations between Baghdad and Tehran continue to
deteriorate. Baghdad radio indicated yesterday that the
Iraqi Foreign Minister has urged Tehran to withdraw
immediately its forces from several small islands in
the Strait of Hormuz occupied by the Shah in 1971. The
1 P
7 April 1980
 islands--Abu Musa and the Tunbs--have long been disputed
by Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Bani-Sadr recently
aroused Arab opposition by reiterating Tehran's determi-
nation to hold onto them. The Iraqis doubtless hope to
rally Arab support in their struggle with Iran by focus-
ing attention on the islands.
Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh attacked the Iraqi Gov-
ernment on television last night and indicated that he
has told Iranian diplomats to leave Iraq immediately.
He also stated that the Iranian and Iraqi peoples would
overthrow the Iraqi Government.
2
7 April 1980
 Soviet and Afghan media announced Friday the ratification of
an agreement setting conditions for stationing Soviet troops in
Afghanistan.
during Afghan Foreign Minister Dost's visit to Moscow.
The agreement, details of which have not been made
public, was signed--but not announced--three weeks ago
the Soviets usually
licity.
give far more publicity to the signing of a treaty than
to its ratification. the
Soviets may have taken the opposite course in an effort
to have the treaty publicly on record with minimum pub-
Pyongyang has not endorsed the invasion.
the Soviets are
dictating what Afghan newspapers can publish. Items to
be given prominent treatment include the traditional and
unshakeable Soviet-Afghan friendship, the involvement
and heroism of the Afghan Army, comparison of Soviet aid
with that of other countries, the limited size of the
Soviet contingent in Afghanistan, and Islam in the USSR.
The Afghan press has been expressly prohibited from pub-
lishing anything about North Korea, presumably because
Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca arrived in Kabul
yesterday, apparently to continue the mission he under-
took last month to mediate differences between Afghani-
stan and Pakistan. Malmierca's earlier talks with Afghan
President Babrak and Pakistani President Zia ended incon-
clusively. Kabul Radio said Malmierca's mission was
linked to the region's "complicated political situation."
7 April 1980
 Afghanistan
KABUL_
China
sea
IF t,...?
ISLAMABAD , iNi Arl~u r;
I
LACCADIVE
ISLANDS
(INDIA)
Sri Lanka
COLOMBO
ANDAMAN
ISLANDS
(INDIA)
NICOBAR
ISLANDS
(INDIA)
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
 The Indian Government on Saturday declared the
northeast state of Assam a "disturbed area," permitting
the governor of the state to use military force to sup-
press disorder, and yesterday banned any strikes that
would affect essential services. The moves came after
more than six months of demonstrations and strikes over
the issue of illegal aliens. The government's decision
to resort to force if necessary, following a deadlock
in negotiations, demonstrates Mrs. Gandhi's resolve to
deal firmly with the first challenge to her authority.
The agitation in Assam, which has crippled the economy
of the oil- and tea-producing state, and unrest in five
other neighboring states of northeast India are the most
serious internal security problems facing Mrs. Gandhi,
but they present no immediate threat to the stability of
her government.
7 April 1980
 A cease-fire was agreed upon in Ndjamena yesterday
between President Goukouni and Defense Minister Habre,
leaders of the two northern factions battling for con-
trol of Chad. The cease-fire, made possible by the medi-
ation efforts of Togolese President Eyadema--who arrived
in Ndjamena on Saturday--is officially scheduled for
Tuesday. An observer team composed of representatives
from Cameroon, Nigeria, Liberia, and Togo will supervise
the cease-fire until a larger organization of African
Unity force is established. Although Goukouni and Habre
have agreed to a truce in principle, their personal ani-
mosities could be rekindled and lead to renewed fighting.
ARGENTINA-USSR: Soviet Delegation
A Soviet commercial delegation scheduled to arrive
in Buenos Aires this week will include Victor Pershin,
currently head of the Soviet grain-buying agency. The
president of the Argentine grain board has speculated that
Moscow may request an upward adjustment of a previously
agreed corn sales limit or the negotiation of a long-
term grain agreement. Pershin recently has been given
broader responsibility in Soviet trade matters.
 MEXICO-USSR: Russian Language Training
Mexican Secretary of Defense Galvan has called for
Army officers to volunteer for Russian language study,
which indicates that some may be sent to the USSR for
military training. Mexico has long been considering ad-
ditional ways to improve Army training methods. The
Mexican officer corps, however, generally is opposed to
a significant relationship with the Soviets, and any
training in the USSR is likely to be limited to a small
number of officers.
7 April 1980
 EGYPT: Foreign and Domestic Perspectives
As the target date of 26 May for conclusion of the West Bank -
Gaza autonomy talks approaches, President Sadat seems Zess optimistic
about a successful outcome.
Sadat is under increasing strain as a result of the
problems in the negotiations and his protracted isolation
from the Arab world. Other Egyptian officials, who are
discouraged and frustrated, are examining alternate
courses of action. These officials probably have not
developed a firm political strategy, however, for dealing
with the difficult period ahead. They also must contend
with festering domestic problems.
Egypt has little ability to force the kinds of con-
cessions from Israel that it believes are necessary for
a West Bank - Gaza agreement acceptable to the Pales-
tinians and other Arabs. Sadat so far has ignored the
counsel of some of his advisers to use the normalization
process as a lever to induce Israeli flexibility.
Sadat could resort to some dramatic and unexpected
policy shifts, but probably not before the results of his
talks in Washington are clear and until he becomes con-
vinced that the negotiations are stalled. Despite recent
tough statements, Egyptian officials still appear willing
to continue the negotiating process beyond the target
date in May if real progress is made or appears imminent.
The officials realize that a radical change in
direction--such as freezing or abandoning the autonomy
talks at this stage--would be an admission that Egypt had
chosen the wrong course and would jeopardize Sadat's
7 7 April 1980
 standing with the US and other friendly states. Addi-
tionally, Sadat's critics at home and abroad would hold
up such a development as proof that his peace policy
For the immediate future, therefore, Sadat is likely
to pursue less dramatic diplomatic tactics. He may,'for
example, look increasingly to West European countries
for assistance in obtaining greater Israeli flexibility,
and over time collaborate more closely with them in the
search for possible alternative moves through UN channels.
The US, however, is still Egypt's primary hope for
breaking the diplomatic impasse. While in Washington,
Sadat is likely to appeal for an even more active US role
in the negotiating process by stressing the regional and
international risks of allowing the autonomy talks to
One of the Egyptian leader's goals probably is to
elicit US statements supporting Egypt's position on key
issues such as Jewish settlements. These would provide
Sadat with the further public evidence he needs to
justify his alliance with the US, and could be presented
by him as an indication of US willingness to press Israel.
8 P
 Domestic Problems
Sadat continues to face a number of potentially
serious economic and political problems, but we have
noted no significant deterioration in his domestic posi-
tion over the past months. The opposition remains dis-
organized and so far has been unable to exploit popular
frustrations over inflation, inadequate housing and serv-
ices, and corruption in government.
the domestic political situation.
Nonetheless, these and other problems could become
more troublesome for Sadat if the autonomy talks fail.
Egyptian acceptance of a partial agreement that contained
few tangible gains for the Palestinians and resulted in
further economic sanctions against Egypt by the other
Arabs would be especially likely to stimulate and perhaps
unify Sadat's opponents, as well as risk generating sig-
nificant public discontent. The arrival of the Shah of
Iran, moreover, has added another unsettling element to
7 April 1980
 To,sceret