NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 25 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005148747
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00460
• Publication Date: April 25, 1980

Director of
Central
Intelligence
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^
DATE: 01-20-2010
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 IRAN-US: Reactions to Rescue Attempt
Press reports indicate that the Iranian Government
has ordered an immediate probe into the aborted US ef-
fort to rescue the hostages, but does not intend to make
a statement until later today. The militants occupying
the US Embassy stated they would issue a communique--if
the news were confirmed--specifying what action they
would take. In other foreign press reaction, TASS re-
ported without comment Washington's announcement of the
reasons for the cancellation of the mission. Moscow
Radio, however, has described the rescue attempt as a
"provocation." (U)
25 April 1980
 Situation Report
USSR-Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Briefs and Comments
West Germany - USSR: Possible Visit by Schmidt . . . . . 2
Syria: Tension Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Yugoslavia: Seeking Western Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Liberia: Government Excesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Zambia: Kaunda and His Critics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Vietnam: Economic Status Report . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
USSR - South Yemen: Reaction to Leadership Change . . . 9
China-Italy: Berlinguer's Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Colombia: Possible Release of Hostages . . . . . . . . . 10
Algeria: Berber Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Uruguay: Threat to Normalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Tunisia: Government Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
25 April 1980
 Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
 Soviet Media Coverage
Soviet media have still not acknowledged that Soviet
troops are fighting and dying in Afghanistan. The
closest Moscow has come to indicating that its troops
have been in combat was a Literary Gazette article in mid-
March that described infantrymen clearing roads with
bulldozers under occasional fire from "bandits."
Western broadcasts about Soviet casualties have
reached Soviet audiences, but much of the popular image
of the occupation is based on rumor. To counter this,
censors have lifted the ban on all references to the
Soviet military presence. The media are still limited,
however, to stories that show Soviet troops providing
essentially civilian services for the Afghans.
 WEST GERMANY - USSR: Possible Visit by Schmidt
Chancellor Schmidt wants to go to Moscow, possibly in June,
but he would prefer to go with the blessing of the Atlantic
Last week, Bonn confirmed that exchanges had resumed
recently with the Soviets on the possibility of a visit.
Schmidt is worried about a breakdown in communications
between Moscow and the West but wants to avoid any steps
the Allies might construe as attempts to deal separately
with Moscow. He also hopes to avoid giving his domestic
opponents grounds for charging he is appeasing the So-
The Chancellor views the Soviet invitation as an
attempt to drive a wedge between Bonn and its NATO allies.
He is, therefore, firmly committed to coordinating his
trip within the Alliance. He believes the meeting should
be carefully prepared and should result in some progress
toward alleviating current international tension.
Without such a result, the political risks of a
visit would be too great, especially with a federal elec-
tion set for October. Further soundings, both in Moscow
and in the West, will be required before Schmidt can ac-
cept the early summer timing proposed by the Soviets.
2
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 President Assad's crackdown in central and northern Syria
has ended most of the civil r the moment, but the security
situation remains volatile.
The prevailing popular mood in Hamah and Aleppo,
where massive force was employed, is said to be one of
fear mixed with a desire for revenge. Aleppo University
and most secondary schools in both cities remain closed.
A similar crackdown may begin soon in Latakia and
Dayr az Zawr. Most dissidents there probably have
taken their weapons and gone into hiding until search
and seizure operations end.
Isolated acts of terrorism, presumably the work of
Sunni Muslim extremists, are continuing. Earlier this
week terrorists ambushed a Syrian military officer in
Hims, killing two bodyguards.
The regular armed forces have for the most part re-
mained loyal to the regime in the face of the disturb-
ances. Some desertions, however, occurred in the 3rd
Armored Diis' hich was used in the crackdown.
The officer corps is said to be satisfied that
Assad remains committed to protecting the institutional
integrity of the military. Sunni Muslim officers also
believe that their troops are in any event outgunned by
the heavily armed Alawite Defense Companies commanded
by the President's brother.
Nonetheless, repeated use of the regular Army to
repress civilian Sunnis will severely strain the co-
hesion of the military and increase the likelihood of
Sunni troops deserting with their arms to join the op-
position.
3
25 April 1980
 YUGOSLAVIA: Seeking Western Arms
Yugoslavia is intensifying its efforts to modernize and
diversify, its wea7)ons inventory by seeking arms from the West.
With Yugoslav-Soviet relations undergoing some of
their worst strains since the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
Belgrade is anxious to develop stronger military and
economic
ties
to
the
West.
Nevertheless, the bulk of Yugoslavia's modern
weapon systems--particularly air defense aircraft and
missiles--still comes from the USSR. The Soviets re-
cently delivered a Koni-class frigate and may deliver
two more. The Yugoslav Army has begun deploying Soviet-
built 122-mm QP1f-nrnn'l1ed howitzers in its tank
brigades.
Yugoslavia's ambitious modernization program is
designed to overcome deficiencies in its antitank and
air defense capabilities. Its present inventory is
largely stocked with a mixture of unsophisticated
weapons. In addition to seeking newer and more effective
weapons, the Yugoslavs are striving to improve domestic
production of aircraft and naval vessels.
TOP 9eA-LVt
5
25 April 1980
 Civilian cabinet members and civil servants are shaken by the
military government's e. .ce_sses and by its Zack of response to
moderate counsel.
The military People's Redemption Council still de-
fers to civilian expertise on some matters but refuses
to acknowledge that its decisions make it difficult for
the civilians to maintain popular confidence in the
government.
the ap-
proximately 4,000 US citizens in Liberia, while safe
for the moment, could quickly become endangered if the
unsophisticated military leaders determine that official
US actions do not support their interests.
Rice shipments received this week have alleviated
ortages, at least for the moment.
Ter secret
6
25 April 1980
 Zambian President Kaunda, reacting to extensive criticism of
his government and the coup in Liberia, has Zaunched an unprece-
dented attack on his critics.
At a press conference on Tuesday, Kaunda charged
that recent editorials on the Liberian coup in the
Times of Zambia were intended to incite the population
against him. Kaunda also cited the names of a number of
prominent Zambians who he said were plotting his assassi-
nation.
Kaunda praised the Zambian military for its loyalty
and urged it not to become involved in any antigovernment
activity.
Kaunda also said that he soon will introduce new
measures to improve the economy and called a meeting of
the ruling political party's Central Committee for next
week to approve them. The new measures may take some
pressure off him temporarily, but sources of discontent
are likely to grow as long as the economy continues to
deteriorate and fears of hostilities with South Africa
remain high.
Kaunda did not mention the Zambian-sponsored UN
Security Council resolution passed last week condemning
military operations by South African troops in south-
western Zambia against South-West Africa People's Or-
ganization guerrillas. The government's inability to
defend its borders has been another source of discontent.
7
25 April 1980
 VIETNAM: Economic Status Report
Five years after North Vietnam's defeat of South Vietnam, the
unified Vietnamese economy is little better than the shambles in-
herited by Hanoi in April 1975.
The economy has stagnated despite a work force of
53 million, substantial resources, a natural complemen-
tarity between the industrial north and the agricultural
south, and large amounts of foreign aid. Agricultural
failures have prevented any comeback in food production
and in living standards from their abysmal wartime levels,
increasing Vietnam's dependence on the USSR for the bulk
of its annual food imports of 1.5 to 2.5 million tons.
Policymakers in Hanoi have shown little talent for
managing a centrally planned economy, and their inability
to socialize southern agricultural production has alien-
ated farmers and thwarted development. Additionally,
output has suffered because of the expulsion of over
500,000 skilled and entrepreneurial Chinese, as well as
over 400,000 Vietnamese. Vietnam also has lost out on
trade and aid relations as a result of its increasing
isolation from the world economy.
The invasion of Kampuchea has cost Vietnam's economy
several years of post-1975 economic development. War
mobilization efforts have diverted the Army from its
peacetime task of land clearing and infrastructure de-
velopment, while civilian manpower needed for agriculture
and industry has been absorbed by the draft and defense
training. The critical transport sector also has been
focused on military needs.
Faced with such poor conditions, Vietnamese policy-
makers have slightly loosened the tight socialist reins
on the economy. We doubt, however, that the small free-
doms given the private sector can revive the economy's
fortunes or that economic considerations will force a
change in Vietnam's policies toward Kampuchea.
Top se=
8
25 April 1980
 USSR - SOUTH YEMEN: Reaction to Leadership Change
The cautious Soviet reaction to the change in leader-
ship in South Yemen probably reflects some concern that
factional infighting will weaken the central government.
A TASS report Monday on President Ismail's resignation
and his replacement by Prime Minister Hasani was factual
and noted that Hasani's appointment was temporary. Pres-
ident Brezhnev's congratulatory telegram to Hasani was
cool in tone and stressed the continuity of bilateral
relations, conveying a strong desire that the status quo
be maintained. In responding to Brezhnev, Hasani has
endorsed the friendship treaty concluded last year with
the Soviets and expressed a desire to see party and gov-
ernment ties grow.
CHINA-ITALY: Berlinguer's Visit
The recent visit to China by Italian Communist Party
head Berlinguer has resulted in the reestablishment of
official relations between the two Communist parties
after an 18-year hiatus and an apparent agreement on ad-
ditional visits. Berlinguer received head-of-state treat-
ment and talked at length with Party Chairman Hua Guofeng,
Party Vice Chairman Dena Xiaoping, and Party General Sec-
retary Hu Yaobang.
The Chinese, in their lavish media coverage, have
emphasized opposition the two parties share against one-
party primacy in the international Communist movement
and their support for the theory of different paths to
socialism. Relations have been enhanced by Italian Com-
munist Party denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan and by its refusal to attend the Moscow-spon-
sored Paris conference of European Communist parties.
The Chinese, however, indicated opposition to continued
Italian Communist Party support for detente.
25 April 1980
 COLOMBIA: Possible Release of Hostages
The hostages being held at the Dominican Embassy
in Bogota could be freed as early as tomorrow under an
arrangement that the M-19 terrorists appear to have
approved in principle. Although Colombian negotiators
apparently are still trying to work out final details,
the arrangement appears to call for the terrorists to
fly to Havana aboard a Cuban commercial aircraft
accompanied by the Cuban Ambassador.
10
25 April 1980
 Atlantic
Ocean
Berber-speaking population
0 Kilometers 300
TRIPOL
 ALGERIA: Berber Unrest
Heightened nationalist feelings among Algeria's
minority Berber population have led to violent clashes
this week between demonstrating students and government
security forces in the region of Kabyle. The Berber-
speaking population--favored under French colonial policy
and still overrepresented in Algeria's military security
and civil services--is reacting primarily to the regime's
efforts to "Arabize" Algeria's educational system. The
unrest has led to the closing of the university at Tizi-
Ouzou, a general strike in the region, and a ban on move-
ment in or out of the area. The ethnic tension will
further complicate President Bendjedid's efforts to
solidify his position but in itself does not threaten
his hold on power. The senior Berber in the government
is Colonel Merbah Kasdi, de facto Minister o
and a principal supporter of the President.
URUGUAY: Threat to Normalization
President Mendez's resistance to a new draft con-
stitution is threatening the military's timetable for
returning Uruguay to full civilian rule and may result
in his ouster. The President's legalistic objections
to the constitution are similar to those he has used to
try to impede the general elections scheduled for next
year. The high command previously has bowed to the Pres-
ident because it feared that he would resign and thus
destroy the legitimacy of the military-backed civilian
government.
11
25 April 1980
 TUNISIA: Government Changes
President Bourguiba's selection of Mohamed Mzali as
prime minister and the replacement of eight other cabinet
members clarifies Bourguiba's intention regarding a suc-
cessor. Bourguiba chose the new Prime Minister after
Mzali served a two-month trial period as "coordinator of
governmental affairs." Mzali's appointment, however,
does not necessarily mean that Bourguiba is ready to
allow him to build a strong political base of his own,
which he will need if he becomes president.
The chief losers in the changes of the past two
weeks are the supporters of former Prime Minister Nouira,
who suffered a stroke in February. The new ministers
belong to the Destourian Party, which Bourguiba is de-
termined will remain the sole legal party. A few are
known as reformers, but their appointment will not pla-
cate critics of Bourguiba's authoritarianism.
12
25 April 1980