NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 26 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005148751
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00460
• Publication Date: April 26, 1980

Director of
Central
Intelligence
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^
DATE: 01-20-2010
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
CI) 7VTn RA-nOO LY '
p
 Situation Report
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Briefs and Comments
Cuba: The Refugee Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Cuba: Afghan Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
EC: Summit Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Nicaragua: Sandinistas' Hard Line . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Pakistan-Afghanistan: Calls for Accommodation . . . . . . 10
USSR - West Germany: Reaction to Olympic Boycott. . . . . 11
Indonesia: Reaction to US Aid Reduction . . . . . . . . . 12
OAU : Economic Summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Special Analysis
Southeast Asia: The Kampuchean Issue. . . . . . . . . . . 13
26 April 1980
 As the full impact on Iran of the aborted US rescue mission
sinks in, we expect a sharp increase in the ZeveZ of threats to
are-r*o tha hostages if any additional military action is taken.
The militants' statement yesterday implied that
they do not plan on taking any action against the hos-
tages immediately. Nonetheless, we believe they will
take several steps.
-- Visits by the Red Cross and families of
the hostages will almost certainly be
refused for the foreseeable future.
-- Living conditions for the hostages will
probably deteriorate. The hostages
are likely to face more solitary con-
finement, cancellation of the already
minimal exercise periods outdoors, and
more armed guards.
-- Some of the hostages may be moved to other
locations as "insurance" against the pos-
sibility of another attack.
-- We doubt, in any case, that all of the
hostages will be moved because the mili-
tants probably are unwilling to
relinquish completely control of them.
Ayatollah Khomeini's statement yesterday repeated
familiar themes. He accused President Carter of being
prepared to "commit any crime . . . in order to be re-
elected" and warned that any attack on Iran will lead to
violence throughout the Muslim world. Khomeini also
charged the US with responsibility for the unrest in the
Kurdish region and at Iran's universities.
26 April 1980
 West European Reactions
EC governments are limiting their public criticism
of the rescue mission in order to maintain Allied
solidarity, but most of them are clearly unhappy over
the timing and outcome. Although most EC governments
agreed to economic sanctions in the hope that the US
would not undertake military action, they are unlikely
to endorse a Danish suggestion that sanctions be re-
assessed when the EC heads of government meet tomorrow
in Luxembourg. They will, however, voice concern about
the US failure to consult them.
Although West German Chancellor Schmidt has voiced
his understanding of the US need for action because of
building public pressure, he had repeatedly cautioned
against military action. In fact, the West Germans took
the lead in the EC decision on sanctions to forestall
the need for a US military role.
France has not yet reacted publicly to the rescue
attempt. The Thatcher government has reaffirmed its
support for the US, noting that the unsuccessful mission
has not lessened the need for Allied unity. London
anticipates that the passage of enabling legislation for
Iranian sanctions, agreed to by the EC last Tuesday, will
now be more difficult in some countries, but not in the
Arab Reactions
There have been no reports of anti-US demonstrations
in any Arab country. (U)
Algerian, Libyan, and Syrian media are likely to
exploit the theme of US "aggression" against Muslims and
make renewed calls for sanctions against the US, includ-
ing an oil cutoff. The radicals, with the probable ex-
ception of Iraq, also may offer token assistance to Iran
to ward off possible further actions by the US.
Of more immediate concern, Arab extremists friendly
to Iran--particularly some radical Palestinians--could
attempt to retaliate by mounting terrorist operations
against US facilities or personnel abroad.
~Wv
2 1
26 April 1980
 There has been no public reaction from Iraq yet.
Tehran radio reported some new skirmishes along the
border yesterday but did not link them to the US
operation.
The failure of the mission is likely to dismay Arab
moderates and cause some to question further the ability
of the US to help defend the region from threats posed
by the Soviets and the radical Arabs. They will compare
the operation unfavorably to the successful Israeli
operation in Uganda in 1976.
Over the short term, the moderates will be under
increasing pressure to play down their ties to the US,
and the abortive mission may cause further reluctance
to cooperate militarily with the US. Those Arab coun-
tries publicly alleged to have supported the operation--
particularly Egypt--will be targets of radical Arab
criticism, and perhaps terrorist attacks. As the closest
US ally in the region, Israel also could be the target
Pakistan
An official Pakistani spokesman last night termed
the aborted US rescue effort a "serious violation" of
Iran's sovereignty that could have far-reaching conse-
quences for regional security. He denied foreign press
reports that Pakistani bases had been used by the US
aircraft, and praised Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh's
"statesmanlike" reaction in counseling restraint. (U)
Soviet commentary on the rescue mission has been
harsh, but there has been nothing in the Soviet reaction
linking the US move to Soviet security interests, nor
any indication that Moscow plans a direct response.
The Soviets dismissed the President's statement that the
mission was a humanitarian action and accused the US of
"reckless actions." A TASS report reiterated Soviet
3
26 April 1980
 claims that the US is using the hostage issue as a
pretext to pressure Iran and to strengthen the American
military presence in the area. In Paris, Foreign
Minister Gromyko said the USSR was resolutely opposed
to any military measures against Iran.
The Soviet reaction appears to reflect Moscow's
apprehension and uncertainty about US intentions toward
Iran as well as its interest in exploiting the US move
to further its ties with Tehran. Soviet comment has
sought to use the mission to inflame Iranian opinion
against the US. One TASS dispatch, for example, reported
Iranian claims that the US forces resorted to violence
against Iranians at the landing area and implied they
had killed an oil tank truck driver.
A Soviet Persian-language broadcast charged that
the President was guided solely by political considera-
tions. TASS has also criticized the NATO countries for
failing to stop US "reckless actions." (U)
Cuba
President Fidel Castro has sent a message to
Khomeini expressing "solidarity" in the face of "grave
threats" made by the "Yankee imperialists" against the
Iranian revolution. (U)
China
In a previously scheduled meeting with Ambassador
Woodcock yesterday, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang
Wenjin expressed sadness and regret over the American
deaths and continued sympathy for the US as it tries to
resolve the hostage crisis. China has not yet publicly
commented on the rescue mission.
Japan
Japanese Prime Minister Ohira today was generally
sympathetic to the US action; he stated that the aborted
mission will not affect Japanese sanctions against Iran.
4
26 April 1980
 CUBA: The Refugee Situation
President Castro has diverted attention away from the situa-
tion at the Peruvian Embassy by initiating a massive exodus of
Cubans to the US.
As many as 2,000 persons have arrived in Florida by
boat in the past week, and yesterday Castro indicated
private aircraft would also be allowed to pick up ref-
ugees. Hundreds of those who have arrived in Florida
were not among the estimated 10,800 who sought asylum in
the Peruvian Embassy compound.
At least 1,200 refugees remain virtual hostages on
the Embassy grounds. Soldiers, policemen, party members,
and government officials believed to be on the compound
presumably are convinced their lives would be in danger
if they left. Most probably will remain until safe pas-
sage off the island is guaranteed by another country or
some international body.
Castro is seeking to shift international attention
from the domestic problems that provoked the refugee
situation to US military exercises scheduled for 8 May
at the US Naval Base at Guantanamo. He believes they
represent a real threat to his government and is solicit-
ing international support in protesting the exercises
as an unjustified military provocation.
As part of this effort, Castro plans to rally 1 mil-
lion people in Havana on May Day and to hold demonstra-
tions throughout the island, including a march involving
another 1 million in front of the US TntPrPsts Section
on the day of the exercises.
26 April 1980
 CUBA: Afghan Initiative
Cuba's efforts to reduce the damage to its interests caused
bz the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan so far have been inconclusive.
Because of its economic and military dependence on
the USSR, Havana could not avoid supporting Moscow's
position. This undercuts Cuba's claims to Third World
leadership and may endanger the economic benefits Havana
receives from key Arab nations. Cuba was one of only
nine members of the Nonaligned Movement in the UN to vote
against the resolution condemning the invasion.
The Cubans reportedly have no concrete proposals
other than to mediate a meeting between Presidents Zia
and Babrak in Havana. Zia flatly rejects the idea until
Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. Other
nations have been negative or noncommittal.
Castro's efforts have temporarily circumvented criti-
cism from the Nonaligned nations, but Havana's respite
will be brief if the hard line taken by the Islamic Con-
ference in January is reaffirmed at its meeting next
month. Over the longer run, Cuba's continued indentifi-
cation with the Soviets on this issue is likely to erode
further Castro's position in the Nonaligned Movement.
Wr 54 'A $8
6
26 April 1980
 EC: Summit Meeting
EC heads of government probably will reach a compromise on
the UK's net contribution to the EC budget when they meet in
Luxembourg tomorrow and on Monday, but a complete solution to the
problem is not yet in sight.
Enough of a compromise is expected at Luxembourg to
dissuade Prime Minister Thatcher from making good on her
threats to block EC farm price increases and to withhold
the UK's payments to the Community. Some aspects of the
budget problem could be taken up again at the next EC
summit in Venice this June. Full resolution of the
budget issue depends on reform of the EC's farm policy,
which France will not even consider until after its
presidential election next spring.
26 April 1980
 The Sandinistas are taking a tough Zine in dealing with reaction
to their efforts to pack the Council of State.
Sandinista leaders have initiated a well-orchestrated
campaign of harsh media statements, diplomatic contacts,
and private signals to force political opponents back to
their minimal demands. Speaking for the Sandinista Na-
tional Directorate, Bayardo Arce on Wednesday publicly
attacked Alfonso Robelo--who resigned this week from the
governing junta--for disloyalty to the revolution. Arce
said that Robelo and Violeta de Chamorro, another junta
moderate who recently quit, will be replaced by "repre-
sentatives of the masses."
The Sandinistas' intransigence has been rein-
forced by their concern that armed groups opposed to
their rule are becoming increasingly active.
Robelo, meanwhile, continues to organize opposition
to the Sandinistas. Some 17 members of his Nicaraguan
Democratic Movement have resigned their government posts,
9
26 April 1980
 PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN: Calls for Accommodation
Some of President Zia's opponents are calling for a more ac-
commodating policy toward the Soviet-imposed regime ,
but Zia is unlikely to alter his hardline approach.
Two opposition leaders--both recently released from
six months' house arrest--have strongly denounced Zia's
policy toward Afghanistan and the political repression
under his regime. The widow of executed former Prime
Minister Bhutto, who now leads the left-of-center Paki-
stan People's Party, has stated that she would accept
the present regime in Kabul, prevent the Afghan dissidents
from operating out of Pakistan, and force the refugees
back across the border. Former Air Marshal Asghar Khan,
leader of a moderate party, has urged that Zia hold di-
rect negotiations with Afghan President Babrak.
The People's Party would probably win any free elec-
tion; Asghar Khan is popular among military officers,
industrialists, and professional people. The attacks by
these two leaders could become a serious threat to Zia
but evidence is lacking, so far, of any groundswell of
support for an accommodation with Afghanistan. Most
Pakistanis are likely to react against the repression of
their coreligionists in Afghanistan, and the denunciations
of Zia on the Afghan issue could strengthen his limited
political base.
Zia shows no sign of dealing with the Babrak govern-
ment while Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan_
10 F_
26 April 1980
 USSR - WEST GERMANY: Reaction to Olympic Boycott
An authoritative article in Pravda yesterday signed
by "A. Petrov," signifying Central Committee approval,
criticized West Germany's decision on Wednesday to boycott
the Olympics as "an obvious relapse back to the Cold War
in West German policy." In Bonn, Soviet Ambassador Sem-
yonov warned a West German official that the decision
will revive the Soviet population's memories of Nazi
aggression. Both Pravda and Semyonov, however, took care
to balance their comments. The Pravda article heaped more
of the blame on the US than on West Germany, and failed
to mention Chancellor Schmidt by name; Semyonov hinted
that the boycott would not become a major impediment to
bilateral relations.
26 April 1980
 President Suharto is deeply angered by US plans to
halt PL-480 rice sales and to cut other aid and by suc-
cessful US efforts to block concessionary rice sales by
Japan to Indonesia. The government fears that the US
cutback and Indonesia's strong foreign exchange position
will encourage donors to commit at next month's meeting
of the Indonesian aid consortium less than the $2.1 bil-
lion recommended for this year by the World Bank. One-
fifth of Indonesia's 2 million tons of rice imports last
year was subsidized by the US and Japan. Rice supplies
are always a key political issue, and Suharto wants to
make certain that there are no shortfalls.
Ministers from member states of the organization of
African Unity are meeting to prepare for a two-day economic
development summit to begin Monday in Lagos. The keynote
speaker at the ministerial session, Nigerian Vice Presi-
dent Ekwueme, has called for greater self-sufficiency in
food production and more rapid industrialization to reduce
dependence on the developed countries. The ministers have
appealed for restraint by the new government of Liberia,
welcomed a Zimbabwe delegation, and renewed OAU efforts
to end hostilities in Chad. Few chiefs of state are
likely to attend the summit, reflecting their uneasiness
after the assassination of Liberia's President Tolbert,
this year's OAU chairman.
Tee SeeFet
12
26 April 1980
 SOUTHEAST ASIA: The Kampuchean Issue
Leaders of some of the states that comprise the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations--Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia,
and the Philippines--are trying to change ASEAN's position that
Vietnam must withdraw its forces from Kampuchea and allow the
Kampucheans to determine their own future. No member state, how-
ever, will risk breaking ASEAN unity to negotiate separately with
Vietnam on a compromise solution. Any change will come slowly after
the emergence of an ASEAN consensus and Vietnamese concessions.
Malaysian and Indonesian leaders are providing the
impetus for change. They consider China to be the pri-
mary threat to regional security, and they also are con-
cerned about the potential dangers to internal stability
posed by their important domestic Chinese populations.
Like other members of ASEAN, Malaysia and Indonesia
were shaken by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They
now fear that Hanoi's almost total dependence on Moscow
for aid--fostered by China's long-term strategy of bleed-
ing Vietnam in Kampuchea--will enable the Soviets to
increase their military presence in Vietnam.
Leaders in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta believe that
the limitation of superpower rivalry in Southeast Asia
should be one of ASEAN's primary goals. They also be-
lieve that the US should ultimately influence the situa-
tion by recognizing Vietnam and, together with Japan and
the West generally, should provide economic aid. This,
they argue, would enable Vietnam to reduce its dependence
on the USSR and act as a buffer between ASEAN and poten-
tial Chinese expansionism.
13
26 pri
 Thailand, as ASEAN's frontline state bordering
Indochina, will play the critical role in determining
any change in ASEAN policy. The replacement of former
Prime Minister Kriangsak--the architect of Thailand's
current pro-China stance--by General Prem seems to have
started a reappraisal of policy toward Vietnam.
Some Thai leaders still believe that the Soviet-
backed Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea represents a ma-
jor threat to Thailand and must be opposed. They also
contend that China would be angry at any change in
policy and might retaliate with increased support to the
quiescent Communist Party of Thailand. Other Thai of-
ficials believe that .Thailand must come to terms with
the reality of Vietnam's presence in Kampuchea,
and fears it may be left out on a limb.
Singapore is reacting nervously and will continue
to preach against any change in policy. It has taken
the toughest anti-Soviet, anti-Vietnamese line in ASEAN
Singapore's ability to sway its fellow ASEAN members
is limited because its predominantly Chinese composition
makes it suspect in the eyes of some key ASEAN leaders.
The Philippines probably will agree, although reluctantly,
to a change in policy so long as it represents an ASEAN
Hanoi's Position
united and arrogant.
The major question is whether Vietnam is willing to
make concessions that would satisfy both Thailand and
ASEAN as a whole. Hanoi insists the Kampuchean situation
is "irreversible," and its tough leadership remains
Top ge&r-et
 On the other hand, Hanoi may be feeling the pressure
of its international isolation. The Vietnamese also may
be unhappy over the prospect of unending dependence on
main a credible fighting force.
The time thus may be ripe for both sides to negotiate.
ASEAN probably would seek a withdrawal of Vietnamese
troops at least some distance away from the Thai border,
a broadening of the Phnom Penh regime and, perhaps most
importantly, the return home of Kampuchean refugees.
Hanoi would press for the recognition of the Heng Samrin
government and the cessation of aid to Pol Pot. There
have been some oblique hints that Hanoi might be willing
to make changes in the Heng Samrin regime, but there is
no sign that Vietnam would undertake a substantial with-
drawal of its troops as long as Pol Pot's guerrillas re-
and possibly Jakarta, next month.
Two events will provide indicators of any progress
toward a compromise solution: the visits of Thai Prime
Minister Prem to other ASEAN capitals and Vietnamese
Foreign Minister Thach's trips to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok,
In the meantime, ASEAN will continue to espouse in
public its tough policy and to emit conflicting messages
in private as a means of testing official and public re-
action. ASEAN will collectively resist superpower pres-
sure to sway the course of the discussion, but Thailand,
Singapore, and the Philippines will watch carefully for
signs of any US policy change before making up their
26 April 1980