NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 29 APRIL 1980

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005148765
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00460
• Publication Date: April 29, 1980

Director of
Central
Intelligence
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^
DATE: 01-20-2010
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
29 April 1.980
T-1-1.1 see-ret
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
 An assassination attempt was made on Iranian Foreian
Minister Ghotbzadeh this morning in Kuwait.
the Kuwaiti Public Security Chief is
saying Ghotbzadeh is in a hospital, but it is unclear
whether he was hit by shots. Kuwait has closed its
borders, placed emergency police on alert, and set up
roadblocks in the capital. The Kuwaiti Government is
stating publicly that many shots were fired on Ghotbzadeh's
motorcade, but that no one was hurt.
29 April 1980
 Situation Report
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Briefs and Comments
France-Chad: Withdrawal of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Nigeria-Zimbabwe: Aid From Lagos . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
South Yemen: Hasani Assumes Leadership . . . . . . . . . . 6
Special Analyses
Argentina: Expanding Nuclear Program . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Cuba: Implications of Refugee Situation. . . . . . . . . . 10
29 April 1980
 KOROESTANI yTEHRA
i' -, on 0 ca iauau
Najafabad ?
ltr a
Arabian
Sea
 the Revolutionary Council
has custody of the hostages. The militants, however
probably have not given up control.
Tehran radio report that the hostages have been dispersed
to Qom, Tabriz, Yazd, Esfahan, and Najafabad.
As a result of the abortive rescue mission, there
reportedly have been numerous arrests of Iranians sus-
pected of cooperating with the US. Security seems to
have deteriorated in Tehran over the last few days, with
several explosions in the city and some shooting around
the Embassy.
29 April 1980
 Economic Developments
Romania has bought two tankers carrying
Iranian oil at $35 a barrel, but that Bucharest does not
intend to sign a long-term contract at such a high price.
Last week, Iran announced that Romania had agreed to buy
40,000 barrels per day over their 60,000 barrels per day
agreement at a price of $35 per barrel.
the Iranians may be using the Romanian
purchase to convince other buyers that there is demand
at $35 per barrel, when in fact Iran faces significant
resistance.
Hungary is not interested in buying Iranian oil at the
present asking price. Hungary has
nothing to offer Iran in barter and speculates that
Eastern Europe in general cannot supply Iran wit the
type and quality of manufactured goods it wants.
2
29 April 1980
 The withdrawal of the 1,200-man French military contingent
from Chad probably will Lead to a resumption of full-scale fighting
among the country's 11 factions.
French
officials apparently end to move mos o the orce
overland to Cameroon during the next few weeks. French
troops helped evacuate Europeans from the former colony
during the current round of fighting but have avoided
other involvement.
Paris' decision to withdraw grows out of its concern
that staying would risk formal condemnation by the OAU
for interfering in Chad's internal affairs. Although
several African leaders told the French
that withdrawal will lead to disaster, none are willing
publicly to support the French presence.
In a larger context, President Giscard may finally
have decided that the situation in Chad is hopeless and
that restoring order there would require far more troops
than France can spare, especially given tension in North
Africa and in the Persian Gulf.
With no moderating forces present in Chad, the
anticipated fighting could lead to the breakup of the
country into two or more separate states. Although
President Goukouni has combined his forces with Vice
President Kamougue and Foreign Minister Acyl Ahmat,
troops loyal to former Defense Minister Habre--a powerful
northern leader--still control most of the capital.
Libya, which has supported each of the major factions
at one time or another, probably will seize on the French
departure to try to extend its influence in Chad. The
Libyans now occupy 114,000 square kilometers of northern
Chad.
29 pri
 NIGERIA-ZIMBABWE: Aid From Lagos
Nigerian President Shagari last week pledged
$18 million to the new Zimbabwe Government for civilian
manpower training. Shagari's pledge underscores Lagos'
commitment to majority rule in southern Africa. Nigerian
economic aid to other African countries in the past five
years has totaled only $40 to $50 million. Nigeria's
diplomatic mission in Salisbury reportedly will include
a military mission, suggesting that Lagoa will also con
sider requests for military assistance.
SOUTH YEMEN: Hasani Assumes Leadership
Hasani was officially instal led as
President last weekend. He is the first South Yemeni
leader to serve simultaneous) as head of government,
party, and state.
6
29 pri
 ARGENTINA: Expanding Nuclear Program
Argentina has scored a major breakthrough in its efforts to
import advanced technology to develop its nuclear program without
having to accept "full-scope" safeguards that would also cover the
indigenous nuclear facilities that it plans to build on its own.
The Argentine Government completed negotiations
last month with Switzerland to purchase a heavy-water
production plant and with West Germany to build a third
nuclear power reactor. The successful negotiation of
these contracts without having to agree to "full-scope"
safeguards has given a tremendous psychological boost to
Argentine nuclear experts, who had been concerned that
US and Canadian pressure would persuade the two European
suppliers to insist on more stringent safeguards. If the
West Germans and the Swiss had maintained a united front
with Canada and the US on this issue, Argentina would
have been faced with accepting broader safeguards or
suffering a serious slowdown in its nuclear power program.
The heavy-water plant, scheduled to be completed in
1984, will provide Argentina with an indigenous source
of the moderator and coolant it needs for natural uranium
reactors. The reactor, projected for startup in 1987,
will be followed by three more large power plants that
Argentina hopes to have operating by the year 2000.
The failure of the West Germans and Swiss to persuade
Argentina to accept "full-scope" safeguards probably has
established a precedent for future Argentine contract ne-
gotiations. Most states supplying sensitive nuclear
materials or equipment must accept that Argentina, which
has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, will
adamantly resist safeguards on nuclear facilities based
exclusively on its own technology.
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29 April 1980
 Argentina will still need to import technology, but
it plans increasingly to rely on domestic firms in the
construction of the additional power reactors. Buenos
Aires hopes to increase participation by domestic firms
in construction of the plants to about 90 percent by the
1990s.
In future negotiations for nuclear materials and
equipment, Argentina is likely to avoid seeking new deals
with either the US or Canada if they continue to insist
on more stringent safeguards and export controls. The
Videla government resents Washington's decision to delay
the shipment of enriched uranium for Argentina's research
reactors, particularly since the requests for the fuel
were submitted before the new safeguard requirements
established by the US Non-Proliferation Act of 1978
became effective. The two governments could still reach
an understanding on safeguards pertaining to the Argentine
nuclear program that would enable the US Government to
resume these shipments, but the protracted dispute over
this issue has encouraged Argentina to look elsewhere
for enriched uranium.
Soviet Assistance
The impetus for cooperation between Argentina and
the USSR reflects in part Moscow's desire to improve
relations with a traditional US ally that has reacted
adversely to criticism from Washington on human rights
and nuclear proliferation. There is no evidence thus
far, however, that the Soviets have violated their inter-
national legal commitments in their capacity as a supplier
state.
29 April 1980
 Dealings with Brazil
Argentina's success in avoiding stringent supplier
restrictions could provide a new dimension to its nuclear
cooperation agreement with Brazil, scheduled to be signed
when the presidents of the two countries meet next month
in Buenos Aires. Despite major differences in the tech-
nologies and status of their nuclear programs, both
nations have reacted with similar nationalistic opposition
to US nonproliferation policies. Officials of both gov-
ernments predict that a nuclear agreement will highlight
the growing spirit of cooperation between these tradi-
tional rivals and thereby undercut international demands
for Argentina and Brazil to adopt "full-scope" safeguards.
They may discuss possible Argentine adherence to
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which would establish a
nuclear-weapons-free zone in the continent. The treaty
has been signed and ratified by all Latin American coun-
tries except Cuba and Argentina. In addition, there are
indications that the two countries want to work together
to press industrial nations to provide sophisticated
technology with as few restrictions as possible, and
even some talk that Argentine-Brazilian cooperation may
establish the basis for a South American version of
EURATOM.
9
29 April_19H
 CUBA: Implications of Refugee Situation
By initiating a massive exodus of Cubans directly to the US,
President Castro hopes to alleviate growing domestic pressures on
his regime. The Cuban Leader probably believes his tactics will
press the US to negotiate on his terms to control the flow. Con-
tinued disorder in MarieZ, however, could create new dome-sue
problems for Castro and cost him international prestige.
Castro's primary objective is to get rid of political
malcontents as well as those dissatisfied with economic
conditions. Over the past few years crime, vandalism,
worker apathy, illegal departures, and even some isolated
incidents of antigovernment activity have increased.
The Cuban leader also is retaliating against Peru
and Venezuela, which had embarrassed his regime by grant-
ing asylum to people forcing their way into those coun-
tries' embassies. Similarly, Havana is striking back at
the US for failing to prosecute boat hijackers. In ad-
dition, Cuba wants to embarrass the US by portraying
Washington's reluctance to accept the refuaees as a con-
tradiction of its human rights policy.
Castro apparently believes that he is in the driver's
seat and that he can retain the initiative regardless of
what the US does. He will continue--and may step up--
the flow of refugees in order to press Washington to
enter into formal negotiations.
In any discussions with the US, Castro will resist
attempts to involve other countries or international or-
ganizations and will push the US to accept large numbers
of refugees. He also may seek assurances that, despite
planned US military maneuvers and "threatening" state-
ments by US leaders, the US has no hostile intent toward
Cuba. In addition, he may exert pressure on the US to
prosecute those who hijack boats to Florida.
Castro hopes to keep the US on the defensive by
stirring up an international outcry over the US military
10
29 April-IM
 exercises beginning on 8 May at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
His address at a massive rally on 1 May probably will
key the campaign. The Cubans also are planning their
own military maneuvers and large demonstrations through-
out the island on the first day of the US exercises--
including a march of one million people past the US
Interests Section in Havana.
Pressures on the Regime
In recent months, Castro has become increasingly
disturbed by signs of what he regards as growing US
hostility toward Cuba. He probably also fears that
Washington might--particularly in the wake of the abor-
tive rescue attempt in Iran--act precipitously against
his regime. The Cuban President sees events in Central
America as heightening internal pressures on the US for
action to contain Communism, and he believes that Cuba
would be the most inviting target.
If the chaos caused by the refugee exodus begins to
work against him, however, Castro could find it more
difficult to dictate terms. Over 1,000 boats are tied
up at Mariel harbor, and the Cubans are encountering grow-
ing problems in processing the refugees. Such difficulties
apparently already have forced Havana to suspend plans
for permitting private aircraft to pick up refugees
Although Havana had announced that any Cuban may
leave the island, some have been denied exit permits.
As the flow of emigres becomes more orderly the govern-
ment is likely to tighten its restrictions for departure--
particularly on military-aged males. The refusal of
several hundred Cubans to vacate the Peruvian Embassy
pending guarantee of safe passage could further undercut
Castro's credibility.
Implications
The departure of between 200,000 to 500,000 persons--
2 to 5 percent of the population--would alleviate some
economic difficulties. tual benefits, however,
would be limited.
--continued
pr11 1980
 Such an exodus would reduce pressure in the housing
sector, but it would bring only a small and temporary
reduction in demand for food and scarce consumer goods.
While Cuba has an overall surplus of labor, the sudden
departure of skilled individuals could disrupt some
sectors of the economy.
The domestic political benefits could be higher.
Castro has been successfully using the refugees as a
scapegoat for the regime's economic failures, and a mass
exodus would reduce the need for greater repression. On
the other hand, the continued presence of boats waiting
to pick up friends and relatives could have an increas-
ingly unsettling effect over time on those who remain.
Castro evidently recognizes that his actions will
have negative repercussions in Latin America, and he
probably has written off any major Cuban gains there in
the near future. Relations with Peru and Venezuela will
be the most seriously affected, but the negative fallout
probably will not be significant in those states generally
friendly toward the Castro regime. If Castro does not
resolve the refugee issue rapidly, however, Cuba is likely
to fail again in its bid for a seat on the UN Security
Council.
Havana is on the defensive elsewhere because of its
efforts to softpedal the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Prolonging the refugee crisis is likely to erode Havana's
influence among Third World states. Moreover, no matter
how the refugee issue is resolved, Cuba is bound to lose
some of its allure as a model for economic development.
let
12
29 pri 1980