POSSIBLE OUTCOMES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005281794
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2008
• Case Number: F-2008-01415
• Publication Date: May 17, 1982

uepuzy Jecz v fiat y vi /. L.r{{J
Room 3E944, Pentagon
UFMORANDUM TO The'Hor1orAYe''M nk C. ar ucci
-I thought you might find of?interest
our,recerit memorandum addressing some of-'
the possible outcomes of,-the Iran-Iraq
war and their'implicatios'for the US
and 'the region. l '
Director,
Near East/South Asia..
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS
FIE
SSQ '
L
I
A
? pOCUMENT :BECOMES UNC
 .Introduction
Iraq is.losing 'its wa'r' with Iran--in fact, its main concern
.Iraqis can do,'alone or in combination with abs., to
salvage much from the military situation..
now is'to prevent.an Iranian invasion. There seems little the'.
Saddam Hussein's total identification with the costly and
unpopular war points toward an early challenge to his ruse. The
most serious threat is likely to come from among the current
political and military leader's. Some of them may want to topple
the President,to'preclude?popular uprisings against'the regime.
A-period'of Iraqi instability--that would be exploited by Iran--
could.eventually result in an Islamic fundamentali9't government
their'implications for'US interests and for the region as a
We address below 'four'possible outcomes to the war, and
Border War - No' Peace, But No Mvasion '?
The most likely nea; term scenario in our judgment envisages
subversion.against Iraq, and refusing to allow reopening of the
through boeder clashes and'shelling of Iraq, 'engaging ?in
'
or'a member of the leadership in-power in Baghdad] and Iran
Iraq.being pushed out of Iran br.withdrawing?voluntarily; Saddam
 Subsequent developments would be dependent on the Iraqi
disintegration would improve the prospects for I.rr nian-supported.
the majority. Shia (See.-Map,)-and other ethnic groups. The Army's
Army's ability to avoid disintegration. The Army is essential to
Iraq's Sunni minority (20.percent.of the population) control over.
Ceasefire,"-Withdrawal, and Negotiations
* 4 000 44huAy wN{.-:wuu wwu1" 14" a Lw1_441 1i041 M/tAI. wcy
withdrawal, followed by a ceasefire and negotiationif, probably.
US. pol cy on the Palestinian. and Israeli.questions..
nothing, adding-to their already high level of:frus?tration with
,defend against this danger. The US would be pressed by Arab
conservatives to do "soiething" to help Iraq, and this could be
exploited,by the-US to try, to organize a regional consensus on
security.' Iran, of course, would interpret any such US move as
additional evidence of-Washington's hostility. The Arab.'
moderates, in. turn, would become more hostile.' if, tt)e US did
.to-stimulate an Islamic revolt in Iraq,-and grab efforts to
Implieatforis for the US .
Politics in the region would revolve around Iran's attempt
through the Islamic Conference.(See Appendix B). Iraq remains
despr,,ate for negotiations, but Iran shows no interest. Even
may not now.be enough. to entice Iran into negotiations.
Implications. for the US
compl.ete.public vindication of its position and substantial
reparations--the Iranians have used the figure of $1,00 billion--
-?Saddam's regime might manage to hold power; at a minimum,.,
danger of an Islamic fundamentalist,regime coming to power
in Baghdad in the near term would lessen.
on Cairo'to adopt a' tougher line toward Israel.
-- Settlement with Iraq would imply Iran does,not inten
-- Iraq would.turn to rebuilding its economy, reinforcing its
drift.away from the'Soviet orbit.
There would be less'need for quick Egyptian'reentr.y into the
Arab orbit'as the protector of moderate Arabs against .
Iranian Shia revolutionaries. This would stiffen Arab terms
for Egypt's reentry--probably in the'form?of more pressure
..aggressively export its revolution.
 Iranian Military Enters ' Iraq .
.On balance,.we do not expect the Iranian military to move in
,force into Iraq, but the temptati'on will be great and the call is
a close one. Tehran could opt for any of three forms of direct
.military intervention to try to bring down Saddam Hussein:
-- An all-out attack to spark a general insurrection.
-- Limited military incursions either 'for tactical reasons or
to support local uprisings.
Introduction of a "liberation.armyi' of Iraqi exiles,'
POWs, and possibly~Iranian volunteers.
The Iranians are providing military training to some of the
estimated 50,000.1 agis expelled, from Iraq during.the past three.
ye'ars:,.. They could be introduced' into Iraqi" Kurdistan where,
combined with~ loca Kurdish rebels, they could capture a major,.
city and pfocDaim provisional government. The same tactic.
could be used in B srah, if Iraqi regular Units in the south
collapse.. The Ira ian army would need to maintain pressure along
the border to prevent Baghdad from dispatching. units to. crush the
rieagling operation army.
logistic problems involved. (See Order,of Battle Table).
army. totally.collapses, however, we~o not believe Tehran's
forces are, capable of taking Baghd or Karbala because of. the
likely-target of a.full-scale Iranian attack., Unless the nIragi
kilometers of Basrah,'Iraq's second largest city and, the most
Iranian troops at the border already are within 200
--,The ffS would..be criticized by Arab moderates for'not doing
more to restrain Iran.
-- US refusal to help Iraq would be'seen by moderate*Arabs as.
carrying. the fight,to Iraq territory.
Impi?icatiohs for the US
US. interests generally would be adversely affected by Iran's
confi rmin a.widel-held suspicion that US lic _is__tied to
The Gulf Arabs might be. more' willing to accept US support in
the intelligence and security fields, but-they also might
ask. for security guarantees..
 We doubt that an Iranian invasion would trigger a general
Arab-Persian war) The Arabs might make symbolic internal troop
. people.
e?
fighting; the ground forces of all Arab Gulf'states combined
,amount to less. than one-third of Iraq's ground forces. A?large-
scale commitment of Egyptian troops could have a significant
impact, but Cairo probably would not,risk heavy involvement 'in a
cause that at best would have only,modest support from its
,movements and even-'some, small-scale deployments to Iraq in i
support of Saddam in-the hope that these; might constrain the!
Iranians. None of the moderate Arab states except Egypt have the
military capability to,make a significant contribution to the
flow of oil from the,Gulf.
escalate.the war along,the length of the Gulf.
The Strait' of Hormuz could be'closed'by Iran, ending the
as a whole. :Iranian. responses to,such moves could quickly
danger for US interest3,"with broad implications',for She region
Implications-for the US
Active"Arab intervention would present the most serious
-- The moderate, pro-Western Gulf states'would turn to the US )
Vulnerable.oil targets on,both'sides of the Gulf would be,
open'to attack.',,'.'
--,Syrian involvement could, not be precluded.
for direct assistance; the-Iranians, Syrians and Libyans
would turn to the Soviets. The Iraqis might look to both
Washington and Moscow to see which would be more'\
forthcoming.
-- US temporizing' or help to Iraq would.be viewed as
abandonment of its Arab friends.
The War and the Region in Perspective,
Saudi Arabia' and the other 'Gulf States will do whatever is
and check Iran. However much Iraqi forces have been discredited
by the war, the Gulf states' still believe that only the, present,
Baghdad. regime, or one li,ke'it, stands between %hen and'the
spread of Iranian and radical,Arab.(Syrian', Libyan, Palestinian)
within their limited power to help Sa am ussein stay .in power.
 If Iran stops its advance at the border and initiates either
a war.of attrition or protracted negotiations designed to
undermine Saddam,?the Gulf states will.continue to provide
.logi.stic and financial support to prevent 'Iraq's position from
deteriorating further. They also will encourage Jordan and
probably Egypt to help bolster Baghdad in whatever way they
can., -At the same time, they might renew Gulf offers.to-Fran to
help'pay war damages in'the hope oL inducing Iran's leaders to
accept a compromise.with.Baghdad:
The.Gulf?.states are unlikely to'commit military forces .to
the fighting. They know this,.would have. no impact on the outcome
and only increase the risk of Iranian retaliation Rather, were,
Iran to, invade Iraq in force or to open supply lines to Shia and
Kurdish.rebels. inside Iraq, 'the` Saudis and others--b~e,,aides
looking more anxiously'to the'US--probably would cast about for
some way-to involve the Arab League or even the UN to shore up
SaddamHussein..
Syria's President'Assad is likely to continue-his support,
..for Iran.if it undertakes a limited invasion of Iraq.,. He I
probably would become increasingly, uncomfortable, however,.?with a.'?
larger Iranian military adventure.. Assad fears a'Shia
fundamentalist'regime in.'Baghdad. that might increase Iraqi
support for'Syr.ian Muslim fundamentalists opposed to.Assad's
AlthoughJbrdan's King Hussein has sent volunteers--the
?2,000-man Yar.mouk Brigade--to.Iraq, he would be reluctant to send'
regular units because that would weaken. Jordanian defenses
against Syria and Israel. Still, if he could convince. Egypt and Saudi Arabia to send-troops, he probably'would feel. obliged to
ante up more Jordania orce's.
Jordan will. increa e. its efforts to galvJanize Arab sfSpport
for Iraq as the possibility of an Iraqi defeat becomes more
.real. The King probably will encourage the US to become involved
is trying to end the war..
Libya would continue to provide Iran with limited military
and political support if.Ira'n continued to-keep economic and
military pressure on Iraq. An Iranian invasion of Iraq,
,particularly one.using Iraqi dissidentb as surrogates, is
unlikely to upset the Libyans..Qadhafi might, in 'fact, use Libyan
influence to'help.stir the Kurds against the Saddain Hussein,
regime. At the same time, Qadhafi--to help his internati6nal
credentials--might be interested in acting as an intermediary in
peace negotiations in the event. of an Iraqi withdrawal and a
ceasefire.
 Egypt, although alarmed by the prospect of an I i
military .victory, is constrained by, a lack of ran an
tiler
su ort for ,nfro`
a s cou o ferto send military
avigers to .. a Gulf states and appeal to the US to increase its
security assistance to these states. An Iranian military advance
into Iraq, that appeared to threaten Kuwait'o? Saudi Arabia might
cause Cairo to send,, pilots to these, states to bolster their air
defenses, or 'dispatch a token
..battalion.
The Iraqi oil industry would benefit the most from a
ceasefire.
f
cant orce.to Iraq.
The Oil Factor J'
'i e y p 'commit large, numbers of ground
forces to the fray, and in any case, lacks the capability rapidly
to move a 404 nifi
t
fr.om?the Persian Gulf and within another. 2-6~'monthseexpr s
could probably be restored to Pre-war ports
million
world.?oil market:. Defense of the.$34 OPEC benchmark pprice..would
require the continuation.of an effective OPEC production
allocation scheme,.with Saudi Arabia willing to continue to
produce at relatively low levels. Iraq might be-willing to phase
1
.-per day,' however, would renew'downward R arre s
price pressures in the
re
s per ay to 1.5-2.0 million barrels per day. This
would be above Baghdad's OPEC production quota of 1.2
million barrels per, day.
An Iraqi attempt'to increase exports to'2 -4114r% b
14 Damascus allowed'Iraq.to,resume pumping oil through the
Iraq-Syria pipeline system, Baghdad could immediately ?
increase - production, from the'c,urrent level of about 750,000
bar
l d
A ceasefire would have only a small impact on Te(hran's
uction.in war-.risk an-urance on-tankers.calling at the Kharg
ability to produce sand export erude." The war has not imposed any
significant constraints on,Iranian.'export capabilities
r a . A
-= Within 4-6 months Iraq probably could resume crude
 Island export terminal, however, would further' improve the price'
competitiveness of Iranian oil and make it easier.for Tehran to
the largest refinery in the country.
.action 'in the south; however, could jeopardize oilfields
containing,over.half of-Iraq's productive. capacity and threaten
? with exports limited to thq Iraq-Turkey pipeline. Military
crude oil production and processing now takes place in the.north,
immediate effect on'current Iraqi crude oil exports.' A-,l Iraqi
An Irani1an'military move' into southern Iraq would have no
As long as the-Iranians occupied the area,* Baghdad would be
Shatt a1 Arab, about?20 kilometers from the border . It is
not,operating.
-- 'The Basrah oil refinery--accounting for about 45 ercent of
.-Iraqi refining capacity--is located on the west nk ef,the
-- All of Iraq's major southern oilfields--with a total
.capacity of about 2 million barrels per day--are within a.
about 75 kilometers..of the border.
unable to produce or export crude oil from its southern fields..
.Maieover, Tehran'might order the destruction or rempval,of oil
equipment'from.occupied areas in retaliation for similar Iraqi
actions, significantly reducing Baghdad's ability to quickly
-restore its oil.industry to pre-war conditions.- Any significant
market?.reacti.on would be unlikely unless.thece was evidence that
EMMIMMISM
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 IRAN-IRAQ: ?QRDER OF BATTLE
CIAI estimates as of 15 April 1982,
eroore the Khuzpptan offensive
1 1
'Ground Forces Iv
.Personnel
Division Headquarters
Armored
Infantry
170,000-190,000a
Mechanized infant;y
Maneuver brigades
Maim battle tanks
-Armored personnel?carrie ,s "
i rt4llery (over 100-inn)
Self-propelled
`owed
Air and Air Defense Fort
Personnel*.
Combat-'aircraft'
Attack helicopters
SA.M. batteries
Major naval combatantse
200,000 to 250,000 men. `
bEccludesian?estimated 370,000 paramilitary forces.
Fewer half are operationally'ready.'
aSome`,60 75 percent are apraticnally ready. '
eincludesdestr s frigates and
Dyer ? ga.. '. missile boats..
8
4
\..4
3
1
825-1,000
1,3'00-1,400
665-775
255-275
450-500
75,000-80,000
300c
132.
.24
Iraq
350,000b
15'
8
2
71
2,600
2,350
1,435
205
1,230
30,000
425d
105
55
5
ai cludesRevolutionary Guard and other paramilitary forces which number