INTELLIGENCE INPUT TO NSDD 250 TASKING

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005297305
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2008
• Case Number: F-2008-01723
• Publication Date: January 16, 1987

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?16 January ?1997 ? .1987 .
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(b)(3)
MEMORANININ FOR: The Honorable Caspar W. lkrlwkwger
.3UbJECT.-
The Secretary of Defense
intelligence Input to NSDD 250 Tasking
ea
1'. Among other things, NSDO 250 tasked the Director of*Central
Intelligence to assess likely Soviet and other foreign reactions to a
US-Soviet agreement to do away with ballistic missiles of all ranges. The
attached response wis prepared by the National intelligence Council and was
reviewed by senior officers'in the Defense Intelligence Agency and in CIA. i
am arding this package to.you at the direct request of Frank Carlucci.
?.. The paper covers a lot of important issues; there is a short overview
that I would strongly recommend to you. I want to emphasize that, although I
think it is-highly unlikely that the Soviets would go along with a move to
eliminate ballistic missiles while retraining bombers-and cruise missiles,
they, in fact, would hl in a much-bettor position to.'take advantage of such a
new regime than most people realize. These points are well documented in the
paper. The Chairman, National Intelligence Council, and the National
intelligence Officer-for Strategic Programs are available to discuss the
issues in this paper further with you or members of yopr staff. F__1
ti- : Acting Director of Centltbl Intelligence
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
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 or
SOVIET AND OTHER FOREIGN REACTIONS TO
A ZERD?RALLISTICA SSILE W*LD
'y.
N,tlonol' Into1119tnco Council
January I' 7)
 3'E`CRE.T~{
OVERVIEW ........................................:.........................2
e K
THE SOVIETS IN A ZERO-iALLISTIC-MISSILE WORLD .............................5
The Soviet Strategic Outlook....;................................... .S
Sources of, and Limits to, Aoctrinal Change ..........................6
Thai Soviet Calculus...
...............................................?
Soviet Affensive Forces tinder the U.S. Proposal ...:.............~...10
Cheating or Rapid buildup Following a Ran....
.......................12
Soviet Assessment of Effectiveness of U.S. Air Oefensea .............17
Soviet Defensive Systems .... ............`.............i..............1e
Projected Future Soviet Forces* 69660*6900022
............Soviet Assessments of. Third Country Nuclear S,ystems .................2e
Page
THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES ......................5...........x..........34
The NATO Allies* .....
...............................................34
China,...* goo goo go o :o*oooooooooooooooo o*oo ooooo oe*oooooo osooo ooo*oo *37
Nth Countries .......................................................39
 OVERVIEW
There are strong and compelling reasons--doctrinal, institutional,
byreaucratlc, personal, economic, and strategic--for the USSR to reject
proposals that promise to eradicate the UISSR's ballistic missile arsenal.
Qoctrinally. i+allistic missiles occupy essential roles in supporting Soviet
global ambitions and are important weapons for securing Soviet military
opJectives on the battlefield. From a force structure perspective, they carry
1.011 over h0'Prrcont of the Soviet Intercontinental range nuclear weapons and
g>"bitious.modernization efforts fpr both ICBMs aqd SLBMs are already
pnderway. Moreover, the future of key military and industrial bureaucracies
"wins Inextricably linked to efsuring?the primacy of the role that ballistic
missiles play in the USSR's broader game plan for extending its influence.
Also, the apparent savings associated with an agreement to remove all
pallistic missiles could be more than offset by the increased expenditures
pecessary to augment and further modernize the remaining Soviet strategic
.1p?ces, both offensive and defensive, and general purpose forces. For these
and other reasons, it is highly unlikely that the USSR contemplates an arms
?cpntrol regime with the 113-that would result in the removal of all 'IS and
*pviet ballistic missiles.
? At the s rem time, however there have been forces at play in the Soviet
9efense arena which would foci tat* the USSR's transition to a zero ballistic
Missile world and that would serve them well should such an arrangement ever
come shout. Soviet defense decisionmakers tasked with assessing how the USSR
could meet its strategic objectives In a zero-zero ballistic missile world by
?1996 would undertake their work mindful that the USSR is already replacing its
ieavy homher force with Rlackiack and Rear N, is flight testing a variety of
Fruise missiles including a supersonic missile, and possesses substantial and
Jpgroving air defenses, an operational ARM system, a large civil defense
pparatus, and a huge deep underground shelter network designed to protect the
SR's leadership in the event of nuclear war. Moreover, they would be
P atively pleased by the current conventional balance. even as they address
sting and serious deficiencies in their air forces. In short, a
zero-zero ballistic missile agreement would not catch the USSR fully flat-
footed. And erha s most importantly the absence of fat-fl in ballistic
missiles wou d o a on way to resolving the principal concern of Soviet war
p anners: nw to anticipate, avoid or handle the potentially "Sudden'
glronsltion to Genera nuclear war from a conventions] conflict lump! that
i, expect to win? The elimination' of all US lost-fl-vin
a s c
sf es would mitigate this central problem for the ?
Mile it is unclear whether in a zero ballistic missile world the risk of
escalation from conventional to nuclear war would decrease. e Ikelihood of
cr ses and even convent ona- conchowever, could ncrease. (Nonetheless,
par se --even a conventional war--remains unlikely.) very 1, the
elimination of ballistic missiles could reduce somewhat political stability.
py increasing Soviet propensity for risk-taking, since the Soviets might fudge
that the probability and potency of any US response would likely be decreased
in a world without ballistic,
rissiles.
 3FMML
Fnssever sns ,uviers znnnw wows snw m1#1 .ry isiuis61.iuns ur specirIC
arms control concepts nr proposals, they are clearly and, for the moment,
primarily playing a political game about which they are very serious.
Achievement of Gorhachev's two principal arms control objectives--stopping SDI
and deflecting the Reagan Administration from its entire national security
agenda of arms buildup and counter-Soviet actions-- would make the 1990s much
easier for the USSR than they would otherwise be. They would facilitate the
reconciliation of Soviet, internal economic and social modernization with
continued and possibly expanded Soviet roles as an international superpower.
In the eyes of the Soviet military planner the actual likelihood of arms
control eliminating nuclear weapons, all strategic forces, or whole classes of
weapons is probably so small as to he practically zero. Rut the Gorbachev
campaign surrounding radical arcs control could well promote effects such as
those above--with nr without agreements--and Soviet military power would gain
therefrom.
Key NATO 0l4.i, especially the nuclear powers, frill continue to oppose
the elimination of US 'arid Soviet ballistic missiles on the grounds that it
will undermine the concept of nuclear deterrence and weaken the perceiver Ili
commitment to Western Europe's defense.
-Stmt
 A zero-zero ballistic missile Sg reement between the United States and the
Soviet Union would be cause for concern In neijing--despite Its longstanding
call for the abolition of nuclear weapons. China would expect to come under
great International pressure to accede to any US-Soviet treaty, and they would
mot went to be perceived internationally as dragging their feet on an historic
opportunity for sharp cuts In nuclear arms. At the same time, compliance with
an agreement that eliminated ballistic missiles while allowing strategic.
defenses and nonballistic offensive systems would nullify China's deterrent,
which relies exclusively on ballistic missiles that can threaten the Soviet
Union. As a result, we believe ROJI ng we'ild at a nlnlmum attempt to retain
Its present nuclear capability and pursue a political strategy designed to
deflect International pressures to sign on.
 3fenz
THE SOVIETS IN A ZERO.IIALLISTiC-MISSILE WORLD"
1. Soviet foreign policy is driven by forces stamming from historical
and Ideological ronts. Soviet national security policy seeks to promote, the
ILSSR's global objective of extending its influence either directly as in
Afghanistan or through proxies such as the Sandinistas in Central America and
the Cubans in Africa. Neither the arms control policies of the sixties and
seventies *or the US arms reduction agenda of the eighties; has in any
appreciable way altered the Soviet world view and its Marxist Leninist
agenda. Nor is any prospective arms reduction agreement likely to alter
Soviet strategic *objectives, although it could change the Soviet gameplan for
securing those strategic nhjectives? that is because the Soviets see arms
control as a means for managing their program for achlevina global objectives
and not as a substitute for the national objectives.
The Soviet Strategic Outlook
2. The HHSSC's national security d'ecisionmakers underwrite the
research, development, testing and deployment of its strategic nuclear
arsenal for two principal reasons. first, as Marxist-Leninists they see a
deep and abiding antagonism with the West that could well result in nuclear
war--even if such a war is no longer deemed fatalistically inevitable.
Anything short of serious war-waging capabilities would, in their view, be
inadequate preparation for'this contingency. Second, such forces also give
the USSR superpower status with attendant foreign policy influences.
Strategic nuclear weapons --principally ballistic missiles--are the most
visible confirmation of Soviet superpower status; they are their primary
capital when it comes to affirming the USSR's status as a co-equal with the
US--a perception that 1s critical to their global objective of extending their
influence and control. %trateglc nuclear forces underpin an assertive Soviet
foreign policy bb projecting an image of military strength. Soviet leaders
appreciate the political utility of world perceptions of military power and
have long stressed the contribution of strategic forces to the USSR's
superpower status. They recognize that military power Is their principal
foreign policy asset and that continued high levels of defense efforts, both
I'm acquisition of forces and in research and development programs, are
necessary to sustain and expand Moscow's global role.
3. Although the Soviets share the Welt's goal of avoiding nuclear war,
the avenue they chose, early in the strategic nuclear era, for securing that
goal was different than the one followed by the West. As a continental power
that had long understood warfare as the art of advancing, conquering and
occupying an opponent's homeland, they rejected Western concepts of mutual
assured destruction. (HAD) as a sound basis for strategic nuclear force
planning. Instead they derisively described MAU as. little more than a mutual
suicide pact that they had no Intention of joining. Their refusal to sign on
to MAP was enduring even while their appreciaaion of the consequences of
nuclear war matured. Throughout the Seventie , while exercises featuring
nuclear play became more realistic, reflecting higher and higher casualty
rates, and statements by Soviet leaders increasingly touted the horrendous
. St" ;
4
 consequences of nuclear war, the USSR has continued its emphasis on the
proaarement of strategic weapons with warfighting attributes, and Its
commitment to passive and acti!e strategic defenses designed to facilitate the
survival of the leadership the necessary for centralized war
'direction and reconstitution.
4. The Soviets apparently believe that in the present IIS-Soviet
strategic relationship each side possesses strategic nuclear capabilities that
could devastate the other after absorbing an attack. Soviet leaders have
stated that nuclear war with the United States would be a catastrophe that
must be avoided if possible and that they do not foresee such a conflict as
inevitable. Nevertheless, they regard nuclear war as a continuing
possibility. They seek superior capabilities to fight and win.a nuclear war
with the United States, and have been'working to Improve their chances of
prevailing in such a conflict, A tenet of their strategic thinking holds that
the better prepared the USSR is to fight In various contingencies. the more
likely It 1s that potential enemies will he dissuaded from Initiating attacks
on the Soviet Union and Its allies and hesitant to counter Soviet political
and military actions. To this end the Soviets are developing and deploying
forces.that will enable them to deal flexibly with conflict contingencies in
various geographic settings that differ In scope and In am harder
skirmishes to protracted intercontinental nuclear war.
Sourees of, and Limits to, doctrinal Change
S. Soviet omilitary discourse on intercontinental nuclear war--both
classified and unclassified--for virtually all of the post World War iI
nuclear era has focused an what Soviets military theorists have described as
the initial nuclear phase--the opening nuclear salvos-which they have
routinely described as potentially decisive. While it is true that Soviet
understanding and characterization of that Initial nuclear phase has evolved
over the lost three decades, such evolution has cane about only as the result
of long and divisive doctrinal debate and has always affirmed the conclusion
that the outcome of a ICS-Soviet nuclear war could be determined by the initial
nuclear strike. This emphasis has occurred, despite their realization that
even general nuclear war could become protracted, and extend over a period 059
weeks or months,' a possibility that requires survivable nuclear assets and
command and control capabilities. In essence. Soviet doctrinal discussions
ultimately evolved from a belief that general nuclear war would begin with
spasmodic launches of each side's entire arsenal, to allow for an initial,
conventional opening war phase which over the years they have come to perceive
as being of greater and greater duration and complexity. This evolution has
been slow and painful.
A. foctrinal evolution in the USSR begins with debates among military
theorists, which are then followed by war games and simulationse then by
testing and evaluation in fiefld exercises--and ultimately by codification by
the political military leade'rshlp of the USSR. This process can take a decade
or more to run its course. And thor are no short acts on cosmic Issues that
affect Soviet military doctrine: Th s one reason, but not the only one,
 that the Soviets have rejected, for a number of years now, what they describe
as one-sided IIS proposals that seek to restructure the Soviet strategic
arsenal.- As such any new US proposal that would require *radical changes in
the makeup of Soviet nuclear forces will be perceived as running counter to an
orthodoxy and doctrinal decisionmak Cng process that the Soviets describe as
scientific.' The process that creates Soviet military doctrine and the
resultineSoviet force structure are slow to change. The Soviets are 40
suspicious of proposals that require radical shifts in the way their
scientific' process dictates they think; these proposals are almost sure to
be ryactid.
7. Soviet military doctrine's preoccupation with the initial phase of a
nuclear war with the US, derived in the first instance from the tremendous
destructive capability of nuclear weapons and secondly from the creation of
fast-flyers'--ballistic missiles that can strike the US or the USSR in thirty
minutes or less. In the one hand the potential presented by nuclear weapons
for delivering a knock-out punch argued for reliance on fast-flyers and once
ballistic missiles become the leading edge of the two sides' arsenals it made
the initial nuclear phase even more important in Soviet orthodoxy. The
further enshrinement of the tenet which holds that the initial nuclear phase
can he.decisive in turn had a synergistically derived impact on the role and
status of ballistic Missiles.
a. In addition, ballistic missiles quickly become a symbol of Soviet
prowess particularly on the international scene where it has become the one,
area in which the USSR has gained a'status co-equal with the US as a
superpower. nomestical-ly, the top Soviet political leaders. until recently,
were directly involved in the creation o1 the Sevi_et ballistic missile force
and saw their careers. prosper in direct propoVtibi to the growth of the USSR's
.status as a ballistic. missile power. Srfrzhesv, for example, began his
meteoric rise to the post of General Secretary as the principal party
Secretary charged-by Khrushchev with overseeing the ballistic missile industry
in the early 196iht.:?Aldhough such direr personal ltnkage between the ?
political leadersM p?and the fate of the. rategic ballistic missile is
changing there is likely still to be a st ng residue of this. Moreover,
within the military structure itself the p ple that controlled and operated
large ballistic missiles bdceae an independent service, the Strategic Rocket .`~
Fortes (SRF) and soon thereafter, the officially acknowledged senior service
in all of the IJSSR's Armed Forces. And unlike Its US counterpart, the SRF is
a one- system service--it possesses only fast-flying ballistic missiles. To
ban ballistic missiles means the end of what the IISSR?officially describes as
its senior military service. The bureaucratic pressures marshalled by the SRF
within the military against such a proposal would be intense. (Although there
might he some in the USSR's Ground Forces from whose ranks the real leaders of
the USSR's professional military establishment still , who would see such
a development as a 'just reward given the symbolic lighting this service has
gotten since the 106ps). The story they would carry would resonate well with
the lobbying of a defense industrial sector whose leaders--the'hissile
designers--have been national heroes. The ballistic missile defense industry
is not one that is readily convertible to other endeavors and'so a ban on
 t ein the tarhe want continuing strategic forte modernlzatton. That
s a . Soviet mi doctrine does evolve, the USSR's strategic arsenal is on
the pate of div ftitlon, there is a changing of the guard in the USSR's
nit'lonaj. seaiA and it is the USSR's global objectives which are
arae rev*e'Mtha~l the means they have adopted for reaching those ends.
Wes'. ? '
Sal mizsiUs would almost certainly incur ham s for important, one
ca n. 6*.4eqftnts of'the Soviet .polity.
-thy 'them ire strong and compelliag reasons--doctrinal.
iAftitut~iwi~ j b" kuc.ratlc, personal, econoA c, and strategic-- for the USSR
to reject Or~ee~~oo~~~~8 that promise. to eradicate the USSR's ballistic missile
arsenal, .1W ,ec ? Soviet proposals for the elimination of all strategic
oTfensive..aru5.:(I . Stiles, and heavy bombers) was probably an attempt to
kep.the ? R once through a series of confusing indications of tough
and concil.la ehangps in Soviet policy. Moscow probably sees such an
? ap oachtis;.f~atitrabl*?to t1le. creation of a political . atmosphere hostile to
The Sovlet'Calculus
10. Soviet defense declslonsakers tasked with assessing low the USSR
could meet its strategic objectives in a zero-zero ballistic missile world by
1996 would undertake their work mindful that the USSR is already modernizing
its heavy bomber force; Is flight testing cruise mjsslles including a
supersonic variant, possesses substantial air defenses, a;well as an
operational ABM system, a large civil defense apparatus rid a huge deep
underground shelter network designed to protect the USSR's leadership in the
event of,nuclear war. Moreover, they would be relatively pleased by the
Current conventional balanco'even as they address existing and serious
deficiencies In their air forces. In short a zero-zero ballistic missile ?
world would not catch the USSR fully flat-footed. In particular, their
conventional force dominance would hold them in good stood, In such a
scenario. Perhaps most Importantly the absence of fas -fly in ballistic
missiles would o a on wa to reso vine e r a concern o vet war
0 anners: aw to anticipate, avo or handle e transition to general
nut ear war from conventional con c in Europe that expect to
WIAT heelimination o all 115 s would Mitigate this
central r ens or e USSR. At a sane time, owever. Soviet p anners
wou V go av! to Consider:
--The extent to which an expanded Soviet bomber, tactical aircraft, and
cruise missile force could assume the remaining key strategic lssions
in a zero-zero ballistic missile world, heretofore assigned prrlly
to ballistic missiles--especially ICBMs.
--Their assessment of the US ability to create a strategic defense that
could sifIftiflcantly attrit remaining Soviet strategic assets.
 -Their confidence that the United States would not acquire a strategic
advantage during or after-the period of transition from a force reliant
mainly on ballistic missiles to a force comprised' solely of bombers and
cruise missiles.
--Their perception of how difficult It would be to manage the transition
to?a zero ballistic missile world.
.-Their ability over the next decade to produce and deploy additional
heavy bombers and cruise missiles with existing production facilities
t and without moor disruptions In industry and the economy.
--Their preference that such a proposal provide some. cost savings or, at
a minimum, not Increase spending for defense above.that programmed in
the absence of an arms control agreement.
--Their ability to retaiftor create a covert force of ballistic missiles,
especially ICIMS. l.o ?
strategic assessment of the deg which. their passive and active
-Their a ectatlons ncernl third cdunt
. . - xp Rg
lesser degree, of
ill. A key clamant of the Soviet strategic force postul?e is the
capability to preempt the enemy's use of nuclear weapons:, The means for
accomplishing this initially would be greatly affected by a? zero ballistic
missile force. The time required to employ bombers will seriously hinder
Soviet capability to achieve a preemption of a US strategic strike. Force.
reposturing (such as placing SLCMS off the US shores) may soQlve part of the
problem, but may not achieve their damage, limitation requirdlments or provide
timely enough response or reliable C3 connectivity with the o19h level of
certainty specified in their war plans. Thus, at least initia ly, a zero
ballistic missile world would leave the Soviets without the means to achieve a
basic tenet of their current strategic war plans. Soviet military planners
also place high priority on capabilities to destroy enemy targets under a
variety of wartime conditions, including retaliation. The Soviets probably
believe that elimination of ballistic missiles has the potential to JeopaSdize
their capability to cover these targets. particularly under circumstances of
retaliation; they would probably he somewhat less confident that their
improved bomber force could cover these targets as wall.. ~~ ?
enhanced,
ry r weapons deve
lopment
 13. Even in a zero-zero ballistic'missile world the Soviets would still
Soviet OffOsive Forces Under the U.S. Proposal
12. We doubt that the Soviets would alter the basic missions of. their
remaining .strategic nuclear offensive forces --and certainly not in'the near
tefm--even under an agreement eliminating ballistic missiles. Soviet'military
writers routinely emphasize the importance of rapidly. ?destreying an opponent's
wormaking capability in a-strategic war. in evaluating. the U.S. proposal.
Soviet mililtary' planners would consider t~e capabilities of- their aouber and
cruise missile forces* to meet their projected targeting requirements.
partial,arly those requirepnts for the Initial nuclear strike. while allowing
for operational obstacles such as reliability problems, readiness factors and
attrition from enemy air dEfenset. Soviet planning for conventional conflict
in Europe would almost certainly evolve, however, since much ,of what
constitutes Soviet tactics for conventional .Mar in Europe is tailored to meet
the possibility that the West could resort in very short order to the use of
nuclear armed ballistic missiles with ve short flight'times. Soviet
planning and forces would continue to be based on fighting and winning a
conventional or nuclear war against NATO. Although the Soviets are placing
more emphasis on fashioning their theater forces and operational planning to
fight a protracted conventional war against NATO. their military doctrine and
tactics would still be based 4n the-realization that i1ATO could resort to
nuclear weapons during combat. The threat of escalation to nuclear combat one
the field would remain present even without ballistic missiles.
perceive the need to grapple with a complex set of time urgent targets which
would still command the attention of Soviet fbrce?planners and would still
magnify the importance of the initial Soviet nuclear strife; bombers on the
grand, submarines in port and GLCNs id their garages are inviting targe
that would by much less vulnerable to ittack once deployed from home bases.
For this reason the Soviets would still perceive the need for fast flyers--
either supersonic, and ultimately hypersonic, cruise missiles, deployed. for
example in converted SSNNs off the 1IS and European coasts* or a?covert
ballistic missile force. Ibrlovir. because they would probably assume that
the'US would see the zero'ballisttc missile world from.similor perspectives,
? they would assume.a US requirement for fist-flyers; hence the spectre of a
surprise first strike would likely remain a prominent concern for military,
planners, although it would4tI1l be our judgment that the most likely
scenario for nuclear conflict is one In which the nuclear conflict grows out
of a major international crisis or a conventtohal conflict in one or more
theaters.
14. The Intelligence Community belfeves the Soviets expect war to begin
following a period of increased tension end crisis, during which time the
Soviets generate their frmed forces. Also the Soviets apparently believe that
a major nuclear conflict. if it occurs, would be moyt likely to arise out of a
conventional cogtlict, further. the Soviets see little likelihood that the US
or NATO would aunch a surprise or sudden attack from a normal peacetime
posture without providing warning.
 15. As a result. we db not believe the Soviets would adopt a large-scale
strip alert posture for their intecontlnental bomber force. However, the
Soviets may opt to place a small portion of their bomber force (a few aircraft
per main operating base) on strip alert as the ballistic missiles are phased
out. With the advent of the AS-1S-equipped REAR H. the Soviets have
instituted a limited peacetime patrol program. as the size of the
bomber force increased, so might this program.
16. targeting Re ulrements. The'elimination of ballistic missiles would
result in a not reduction e xed strategic targets by about 500 from the
current total of about 6,500 worldwide. The greatest change would be the
elimination of about 1,200 time- urgent hardened targets--i.e.tall U.S. ICBM
silos and launch control facilities. This would be partially offset by
additions to Soviet strategic nuclear targeting requirments.
--There would be afore i 1i. bases for cruise missiles--although many of
these missiles probabl uld be based near existing ports, air bases,
and ground forces instal tIons already targeted by Soviet nuclear
forces; and,
--The Soviets.would anticipate an expansion of U.S. and allied air
defense installations, which would sea renter threat to attacking
Soviet offensive strategic forces.
17. The Soviets also would anticipate an increase In US 6LCMs,. unless
these wer prohibited or limited b .an INF agreement, and would see a
corresponding requirement to attack any 6LCMs that could be located in field
operating areas by Soviet reconnaissance. Rarring a marked Increase In the
deployment of U.S. or allied 6LCMs or a major breakthrough in Soviet
reconnaissance capabilities, Soviet weapons requirements for attacking. field-
deployed missiles probably would not dramatically increase. In any case, the
Soviets probably would expect that the united States would continue to deploy
more ALCMs and SLCMS .than GUMS,
16. Other Considerations for Forc Siting. In assessing their
requirements for strategic orces, e Soviets would consider, in addition to
the nuiaber of targets, the wartime operational obstacles to the successful
delivery of weapons to targets.
? ,be Soviets may anticipate reliability prohlems with long-range land-
attack cruise missiles, wh c1 Incorporate new technologies.
--The Soviets probably believi that their cruise missile forces will not
achieve the day-to-day readiness of their silo-based ICBM forces.
Thus, many of these cru seT~m ssiles may not be available for nuclear
strike operations when nuclear war begins. The Soviets would plan to
generate their cruise missile forces during a period of conventional
war with the United States, but they could not count on this.
1 11
 --Soviet cruise Missile carriers--especially submarines--would be at
least at vulnerable to attacks during a conventional phase preceding
nuclear warfare as were their ballfstic missile predecessors. Expected
force attrition might offset planned force generation.
The Soviets might anticipate formidable U.S. and allied air defenses
that would reduce the netrativit of Soviet cruise missiles and
cruise missile carriers. ecause ey probably would see US and NATO
naval forces as major threats to Soviet submarines carrying SLCNs, the
Soviets might allocate most of their SLCNs to targets in Eurasia, and
use mostly ALCMs in attacks against North American targets. They still
would be concerned, however, that U.S. and allied air defenses would
lnterceot many Soviet cruise missiles and bombers.
20. Soviet military planners would factor In all of the above
considerations in determining reserve requirements for their strategic
forces. Although we cannot replicate Soviet calculations of bomber and cruise
missile requirements for the and of 1996--when all ballistic missiles would be
eliminated--our analysis indicates that the Soviets may require about 5,000 to
e,000_cruije missiles--assuming no upgrading of U.S. air defenses--and up to
21. under an arms control agreement that would eliminate ballistic
missiles during the next ten years but retain heavy bombers indefinitely
thereafter, cheating must be examined separately for the two distlrict periods
of the agreement:
Cheating or Rapid Auilduo Following a *Ran
-19M-1996, during which time ICNNs. SLRNs, and heavy bombers would be
allowed.
--1996 and beyonA, during which time heavy bombers would be permitted,
but ICBMs and SLBNs would be banned.
During the first period, cheating could take the-form of 'Soviet deployment of
ICINs, SLRNS, and heavy bomberi in'excess of the numbers permitted. During
the second period, however, cheating could be in one of two form.-the. Soviets'
 could deploy excess heavy bombers and bomber weapons; or they could de to
ICBMs and SLR Ma in?violation'of the ban on those types of-systems.
22. In the period through 1996, during which time aggregate limits would
be in effect an delivery vehicles and their weapons as ballistic missiles were.
being reduced to zero, Soviet attempts to cheat could take any of several
forms. Setow are some illustrative examples, listed in order from thosi we
can monitor.with lower confidences to those we can monitor with higher
--Stockpile excess numbers of mobile ICkM launchers and missiles.
--Deploy excess numbers of mobile ICBMs.
--Convert other aircraft to perform missions of heavy bombers.
--Fail to dismantle heavy bombers.
--Stockpile excess numbers of heavy bombers.
--Deploy excess numbers of heavy bombers.
--Fall.to convert SSRNs to SSNt.
--Produce new or Improved systems.
--Test new or improved systems.
23. In the period after 1996, by which time alq ballistic missiles would
have been reduced to zero, Soviet attempts to cheat could take any of several
forms. Below are some illustrative examples., listed In order from those we
can monitor with lower confidences to those we can monitor with higher '
-.Deploy existing bombers and their weapons In excess of the numbers
permitted.
--Deploy new bombers and their weapons in excess of the numbers
permitted.
.-Stars, ICBMs under the guise of space-launch vehicles.
--Retain road-mobile ICBMs.
--Retain rail-mobile ICBMs.
--Retain SLBMs In SSBN%.
--Retain ICBMs in silos.
 --Test, produce, or deploy any ballistic missile systems that had existed
prior to elimination.
--Create new iallistic missile systems.
24. . No Judie that after ballistic missiles 'were el iminate4, the
prospects of Soviet.~hsating are clearly largar?in the area of mobilq_misslles;
both road-mobile and rail-mobile. Me -assume that any Soviet cheatln4,.would be
done fora military reason and would be sufficient to meet specific military
requirements. ,In a zero ballistic missile world, the Soviets would consider ?
US C):assets, US bomber airfields and ports, and nations possesstng nuclear
weapons (other thanhthe US) as primary targets that a covert ballistic missile
force could be appl led against. We assume that cheating could be done using
either the 10-RV SS-Z-24 rail-mobile system and/or the 1-RV or 3-RV SS-25-
class road-mobile system, although for a given number of total RVs the higher
deployment level and attendant infrastructure necessary in an SS?2S-class
force would be more susceptible to detection. (In the discussion below we use
the example of-,the SS-X-24 rail-mobile system with 10 RVs.) Soviet cheating
with covert ballistic missiles could be of two basic variants. One option
would be to maintain a covert force in cold storage and generate it at the
 32, Another issue is the Soviet capability to rebuild a significant
ballistic missile force following the arrival of the two sides at a complete
ban by 1996. if 'the Soviets were able to maintain $ome key production
S
 facilities and test capabilities--for instance, under the guise of supporting
their space program--in addition to their design bureau teams, than the
potential would exist for reintroduction of a force of at least several
hundred ballistic missiles in a matter of?severdl years.* The Soviets would
probably be able to introduce such forces considerably quicker than the united
States; it is uncertain whether they could out ac*, 11S defensive deployments
designed to keep up with such a possibility.
33. The Soviets also would pursue new technologies to field such lystems
as hypersonic -cruise missiles and low-flying terrain avoidance vehicles with
stealth technology. Over the long run, they might believe that these
systems--which would be allowed under the U.S. START proposal--would provide a
better basis for deliverin ronipt or surprise attacks against U.S. offensive
strategic forces.
Soviet Assessment of Effectiveness of II.S. Air Defenses
34. Perhaps the key element in Soviet calculations of their requirements
for strategic weapons under an agreement eliminating ballistic missiles would
be their assessment of the effectiveness of 1I.S. and allied air defenses. We
have little information on Soviet estimates of potential U.S. continental air
defenses. Soviet writings have reflected little concern over 11S air defenses,
largely because since the early 1960s the United States has placed little
emphasis on defending North America from attacks by what for many years was a
declining Soviet strategic bomber threat. The Soviets are well aware,
however, of the considerable emphasis assigned by the 1I.S. military to air
defense of tactical military targets such as aircraft carrier battle groups
and army troop formations. Soviet military writings and exercises demonstrate
considerable respect for the ability of U.S. air defense system to defend
3S. The Soviets probably expect that the United States could design and
-begin to deploy an impressive air defense network for North America by
adapting technology and many of the systems involved in:
r-the Aegis and Patriot phased-array, surface-to-air missile (SAM)
systems ;
--the AWACS aircraft;
--the Phoenix long-range air-to-air missile;
--the F-14 and F_1S interceptor aircraft.
These systems, in Soviet eyes, are technically superior to similar systems in
the USSR such as the SA-10 SAN and the Foxhound and Flanker Interceptors. In
addition, the Soviets probably judge that the U.S. would he able to use
forward basing for AWACS and interceptor aircraft in Alaska, Canada
Greenland, Iceland and Norway. The use of bases in these areas would give the
United States some capability to intercept Soviet bombers before they could
launch their cruise missiles. The Soviets, therefore, probably would believe
7
 10 'tP_ T
that their ability to launch'an effective bomber/ALCM strike against North
America would depend largely on their ability to :destroy a significant portion
of any forward-based defensive systems prior to escalation to titercontinental
war, Although the Soviets could not he sure that such defenses would ever he
fielded, a worst-case Soviet scenario In which U.S. forward-based air defenses
remained, largely intact, probably would envisage significant attrition--
perhaps as high as SO percent--to the initial Soviet attacking force.
Soviet nefensive Systems
36. Air nefense. The Soviets would also be concerned that US planning
to develop and e~looy the Strategic Defense initiative would mask p14is for a
system that could counter not only ballistic missiles but the full range of
the Soviet aerodynamic threat. Indeed they would probably be even more
concerned about the military effectiveness of an SOI system In a world without
Soviet and US ballistic missiles than they would in a world unconstrained by
arms control. Thus they would have to factor in substantial attrition factors
i
b
ildi
h
f
i
i
n
u
ng t
r aerodynam
c
orce for the late 199Os.
e
37. Soviet nefensive.S stem. Soviet military planner; almost certainly
would argue or increased investment --ipp strategic air defense to protect their
homeland assets from the enhanced airbbrne nuclear attack capabilities they
would project for the VS. The Soviets have traditionally pursued three
methods to defend their homeland:
--Preemptive attacks on U.S. and allied nuclear forces;
--Active defenses to Intercept and destroy 11.5. and allied missiles and
aircraft in flight;
--Passive defenses' (hardening and dispersal) to negate the effects of
arriving U.S. and allied nuclear weapons.
In an environment without ballistic missiles, the Soviets probably would judge
that the relative effectiveness of these three methods would change. The slow
speed and uncertain penetration ability of cruise missiles make these systems
poor replacements for ICBMs assigned the mission of destroying and disrupting
a U.S. and allied nuclear attack. Thus, they would-have to assume they would
have to face a large, coordinated bomber and cruise missile attack. The
Soviets might believe that passive defenses, combined concentrated air
defenses and denial of U.S. and allied wartime recqnn issance, could provide
survivability for selected homeland assets. At thelt least, the Soviets
would expect more assets would survive longer into he nuclear war (unless the
United States fielded hypersonic cruise missiles) than they would if targeted
by ballistic missiles. As far as air defense effectiveness is concerned, the
absencd of 11% ballistic missile attacks to accomplish defense suppression
would leave the Soviet air defenses relates undegraded prior to their
engagement of the aerodynamic attack.
 SECRM
improve the effectiveness against U.S. bomber and cruise missile forces.
39. The Soviets will continue to make substantial investments In
strategic air defenses.. The lowest force projections for strategic defenses
in the latest national intelligence Estimate--which would include the addition
of 200 strategic SAN battalions and 1,400 new interceptor aircraft (to replace
larger numbers of older systems)--would require roughly 40 billion rubles for
procurement'over the next decade. The Soviets almost certainly would invest
substantially larger sums on air defenses, particularly in the face of an
enhanced US aerodynamic threat but such increases would ultimately depend on
their assessment of the extent to which these increases In investment would
numbers of U.S. cruise missiles from reaching their targets.
38. On the other hand. Soviet planners would see any prospective U.S.
strategic aerodynamic force as placing great technological and numerical
demands on their air defenses. Soviet writings in
the 1980s consistently state that U.S. ALCMs and SLCMS will be exceedingly
difficult to destroy. The Soviets probably believe that the deployment of
U.S. ALCMs with stealth technology will wake it even more difficult for them
to detect cruise missiles once they have been launched. Overall, Soviet
planners probably would not be sanguine about their ability to prevent large
41. Such a force build-up probably would be accompanied by increases in
support forces; AWACS aircraft and tankers would be especially In high
demand. We currently project that the Soviets would need approximately 30-50
MainstoW AWACS aircraft to support a mid-1990s force. An increased air
and SAM forces by some 20 to 25 percent by 1996.
40. A Soviet move toward a zero-zero ballistic missile environment
probably would result over the next decade in at least a halt in the projected
modest decline of the size of the air defense forces. If not some overall
growth. The US Intelligence Community, in observing the historical long-term
gradual decline in interceptors, has projected that Soviet SAM and interceptor
totals would decline by five to 15 percent over this period. (The overall
capability would significantly Increase, as the new system are much more
capable than those being replaced.) The Soviets, however, could halt this
numerical decline by decreasing their retirement of old systems and increasing
production of new systems such as the Foxhound, Flanker, and Fulcrum
Interceptors and the SA-10 SAM. Slowing retirements of old systems would be
the easiest course for the Soviets, but such a move probably would require
them to develop more modification programs for existing systems. They have
done so for the Flogger interceptor, and the large number of mid-1960s-
vintage flagons currently operational could make this venerable interceptor a
candidate for updating. The Soviets also apparently are improving their
ability to deploy more SA-10s than we currently project by adding new
calibration lines at their SA-10 checkout facility. Similar increases in newt
interceptor deliveries would be more difficult and probably could be
accomplished only by reducing other aircraft production, by reducing fighter
exports, or by adopting some combination of the two. (sing a combination of
measures, the Soviets most likely could increase the size of their interceptor
 defense force could easily double this requirement. Although such an effort
probably would exacerbate current production problems with the Mainstay.
Increased deployments would release the Soviets from having to find the larg
numbers of additional ground-based radars that.-because of line-of-sight
Moreover, the Soviets will- undoubtedly provide air-to-air refueling for soave
of their new fighters. They might see the need to dedicate some 100 to ISO
tankers--In addition to the tankers required by their enhanced bomber /
force--to support the fighters and air-reluelable AWAC% aircraft during
operations out away frpm Soviet. territory* These long-range intercepts would.
be a desirable improvement in Soviet air defense operat`jons as the Soviets
attempted to intercept IIS aircraft prior to their launching of cruise
missiles. Another means to extend their air defense coverage forward during a
conflict would be the establishment of forward air defense bases in occupied
territory, such s 1n Scandinavia or key northern islands, such as
Spitzbergen.
42. Longer term efforts that could result in significant new systems
deployments in the-late 1990s and beyond include:
--The development of new interceptors capable of unrefueled operations in
excess of 2,000 km from Soviet territory to engage cruise missile
carriers;
--The development of a long-range SAM, as a replacement for' the SA-S,
with the capability to engage bomber-sized targets at a range of 4011 to
800 km.
--The development of ground-based and ~irhorne high-energy laser weapons;
--The real-time integration of early warning radars with high-speed
computers to allow processing of intermittent tracking data from
several radars. -(Such a capability could prove useful in tracking low
observable targets).
--Ristatic over-the-horizon radars designed to detect low-observable
penetrators;
--Space-based electro-optical and radar 'detection systems eventually, to
track bombers and cruise missiles throughout their night.
--Space-based kill weapons to use tho early warning data from long-range
detection systems for kills againIt aerodynamic targets for from Soviet
territory.
We know that the Soviets are working on some of these development!. such as
laser weapons. Many of these developments would require Soviet advances in
technologies that are likely to be most challenging for the Soviets. These
would include computers and microelectronics and a variety of sensor
 technologies. In many regards, the US SDI program is intended to advance the
'state-of-the-art' in i,,itV some areas. The Soviets probably would look at a
coitetition advanced !' .Aefonse technologies in the some light as they see
the,S01 challenge. r
43. Othaf T*fenses. Avdrall, we judge that the Soviets would feel that
their longstanding commitment to conventional strategic air defenses would
give therm a net advantage in this area, as compared to the 11S, in coping with
the transition to a zero ballistic missile world. Despite their healthy
respect for 11S technological prowess;. the existing Soviet nationwide air
defense system would mean fewer institutional and budgetary headaches in the
transition phase than they would expect the 11S to have to deal with. Their
.biggest problem would be the nature and pace of air defense modernization, and
the ability to make the operational and organizational changes -not esseryr in
order'to get the full advantage the improvements offer.
44. we judge that the Soviets would attempt to preserve the ARM Treaty
? and forego investments in an expanded ASH defense in favor of investment in
other military forces or In the economy. The Soviets. :,pre aring for the
possibility of a US breakout from a zero-zero ballistic ssile environment.
wild continue to develop ground-based AIMS and directed energy weapons. Such
developments could include interceptors with sufficient accuracy to use
nonnuclear warheads, and radars with improved capabilities to discriminate
'real targets from decoys and chaff, and improved battle management
capabilities. These developments could be incorporated into the Moscow ASM
defense, a deployment that the Soviets would continue to maintain, especially
should other countries--particularly the People's Republic of China--maintain
ballistic missiles, and would also provide the basis for an AIM system
suitable for more widespread AIM defenses. The Soviets probably would conduct
these development efforts In a manner that they would present as fully
consistent with a strict interpreation of the 1972'Treaty, and any visible
research in space based AIMS probably would be restricted to basic laboratory
work or would he ambiguous and thus interpretable as for ASAT.
4S. We would not expect to see any significant changes in Soviet passive
defense development sjnce air-delivered nuclear weapons would not seem to
affect passive defense any differently than those from ballistic missiles
They are likely to continue their leadership protection program, including
deep underground facilities--a program that has been steady for nearly 40
years. The Soviets are likely to continue their civil defense shelter effort
at a level that would keep pace with population growth. This program
currently is capable of sheltering approximately 11 percent of the Soviet
urban population and this portion should grow by a percent or two over the
next decade. Other civil defense proarams such as the evacuation effort are
notypected to change appreciably..
J
 46, Soviet Pert tions of the US.AeroA namlc Threat. The Soviets have a
healthy respect or U. . technological prowess, one at creates substantial.
'concern about the current fords of bomber and cruise missiles now in the U.S.
Inventory and one which is likely to. cause Soviet planners to project
substantial technological advantages for follow-on systems in the next ten
years. in contrast, the designers of Soviet strategic aerodynamic systems
appeared for many years to have fallen into relatively low rpute, altIIugh in
the last five years we have seen a major effort to modernize the
intercontinental bomber fleet and develop long-range cruise missiles.' Soviet
national security planners are unlikely to belts shat, left to their own
devices, these designers could compete with their stern counterparts. The .
substantial Soviet ability through espionage to even up this disparity
notwithstanding, Soviet planners would be wary of a U.S.-Soviet competition
dominated by aerodynamic threats. The technological disparity would dictate
resort to the time- honored Soviet approach of balancipg reliance on
technologically inferior forces by deploying'a quantitatively superior arsenal
in areas not constrained by any existing arms control sublimits, and making
extensive use of active and passive defenses. Moreovir, the lesser
technological capability of the Soviet aerodynamic force 1s of much less
significance so long as the United States does not deploy a major homeland air
,,iroiected Future Soviet forces
47. rate is Offensive S stems. The Soviets would evaluate the U.S.
proposal In light o e eeway 11. would provide them to shift their offensive
forces towards bombers at a measured pace that minimized dislocations in the
economy and disruptions in their defense industrial base. In moving to an
all-bomher and cruise missile, force the Soviets also would have to factor In
other considerations such as:
--Their possible objective of maintaining the maximum number of ballistic
missile warheads allowed during the transition period. This objective,
however could limit their ability to deploy bombers and ALCMs
especially if all Bear H and Blackjack are counted as ALCM-equipped
aircraft. For exanple, it they retained a,AQO ballistic missile
warheads in 1991--the "axiom allowed--to stay within the 6,000-warhead
limit, they coul4 deploy only 1,200 accountable ALCMs and bomber
weapons. However,, If the Soviets slowed deployments of Bear H and
Blackjack ALCM-carriers before 1901 to keep their accountable ALCMs
from exceeding 1,200 In 1991 they probably could not produce enough
bombers after 1991 to approach the 6,000 ALCM limit In 1996--unless
they chose to bring now bomber production facilities on line after
1991.
...The Soviets also would be sensitive to the pace at which the Ignited
States was shifting its forces toward bombers, in order to ensure that
the United States did not gain an advantage in ballistic missiles
during the transition period.
 3tott
48. Table 1 illustrates potential Soviet forces that could result from
an agreement to eliminate ballistic missiles'by 1996. Some of the key
assumptions of this force are:
--The Soviets retain all 1.650 accountable SS-1R warheads allowed in
1991.
--The Soviets retain slightly'fewer than the 3,300 ICBM warheads and
4,000 ballistic missile warheads allowed-In 1991 in,order to proceed
more reasonably with their bomber~nd ALCM programs.
--lost of the ballistic missiles rftained are on newer MIRVed ICBMs and
SLBP .-this would result in a force with for fewer SNDVs than the 1,600
allowed.
--All Bear N and Blackjack bombers are capable of carrying ALCMs and are
counted as such. All Blackjacks are counted as carrying 12 ALCMs,
although some may be configured with payloads of bombs and SNAMs rather
than ALCMs. Bear N aircraft are deployed with only 6 ALCMs (carried
internally) until the mid-1990s in order to minimize the number of
accountable ALCMs and allow the Soviets to retain more ballistic
missile warheads. During the mid-1990s these aircraft are deployed
with an additional six ALCMs (carri externally). for a total of 12.
--The Soviets do not deploy a new ltrategic heavy bomber until after
1996. Beginning in the early.1990s.?they deploy cruise missiles with
same use of stealth technology. During the mid-1990s they deploy
.improved versions of the Blackjack Incorporating some stealth
technology, air-to-air missiles an& improved electronic countermeasures
equipment. This new aircraft might not be t with ALCMs.,in order
to count as having only one bomber-weapon.
49. The forces in Table 1 are consistent with our estimate of production
capacity for Soviet weapons systems. We estimate that the Soviets could
produce some 450 to 500 Bear N and Blackjack aircraft by 1996, at the expense
of other aircraft programs, using production capacity that is either readily
available or convertible in one to two years.
--We estimate that if the Soviets forego production of Backfire medium
bombers and Classic transport aircraft and devote all of the resources
at the Kazan airframe plant to the Blackjack program they could produce
about 30 Blackjack per year by.the early-to-mid-1990s.
--Similarly, we judge that if the Soviets were willing to forego the
production of Bear f aircraft for the Navy they could convert the
Taganrog as rfraee plant to produce the Bear N. Combined with
production of Bear H aircraft at the Kuybyshev facility, this would
enable the Soviets a about 36 of these aircraft per year by
the early 1990s.
Sim
 TABLE 1
fttsntw Int$Mlinintal Atma room
Slat"
SS-10
(10-19 IITa)(a)
33-23 ohms (mob)
(1 NO
33-11.0 Nf)
33.13 (1 M)
3S-1T (9 Ma)
35-19 (6 Nis)
Nov 19x6
SNDTs/YSaeons
.306/3010
72/ 72
911/ 991
60/ 60.
150/ 600
36012160
4
?139l/64 (a)
33-M-6/T-I 272/ 272
(1 1N1)
33-N-17/7-II 12/ 12
(' S, )
33-N-S/D-I, D-IZ, 292/ 292
0/N-111 (1 RY)
33-11-18/D-III 224/1"8
(T Rio)
SS-N-23/D-IV, D-III 48/ 192
(9-10 IIYs) (b)
33-9-20 class 10/ 800
Typhoon (10 "S)
&aqs 928/3136 (b)
Near N (6-12 ALCMs) 59/ 359
(6-12 ALCMs) (a)
Blaolc3aclc 6/ 12
(12 ALCMs) (d)
Near AA/C/C (e) 100/ 100
(bombs A ASM.)
bison bombers (s) 20/ 20
Dombera 185/ 3y6 (s)
lae 1991 Doe 1996
SNDTs/INamonsT*/Yesaons
163/1650
90/ 90
210/1260
963/3000 (a)
96/ 386
100%1000
30//1996 (b)
60/ 980
85/1020
163/1500
230/2760
950/5100
 17
TABU 1 C1TirIIR1!'D
3NDVs
2511
938
Ralliatie Nisaile RVs
9556 .
4196
(Aoeountable) (a) (b)
ALOIs 6 bomber Weapons
'S6
1500
(e)
3LCNa (not accountable -- 1000
under guts apMomant) (t)
I1W ulasiless (a)
33-20-class 411/1323 33/ 99
GLCVA N N N as
(a) ICON weapons totals are for accountable RVs. It is assumed that the
33-13 is tested with no more than 10 RU and is counted as having
10 RVs, although we judge that this missile is capable of carrying
as many as many as 1 Rte. It all 33-1$ ICBNs were deployed with 14
RVs,: the total4!`(r"ICNI and ballistic aiuils. RVs Mown
increase by about-1200 RVs is 1936 and 600 RVs in 1991.
(b) The 33-N-23 is assumed to be counted with 6 RVs-?the number a Soviet
official at Geneva has elaiaed has been tested with. this system. V.
believe that the 33-R-23 is deployed with 10 M. It this system is
counted as having 10 RVs, this totals tor SLBN and ballistic missile
Me shown here would increase by 233 IIVs in 1936 and 576 RVs in 1991.
(e) It is assumed here that the Soviets would continue to deploy the Bear N
only with six A3-15-clan ALOIs (mounted internally) through 1991 in
order to ainisiao their accountable ALQIM and lea" room for the
maxima number of ballistic missile RVs. W belie" that the tar N _
is capable of carrying an additional six of theme $1.01. mounted
externally. It is assumed that after 1991 the Soviets equip the
Mar Ni with 12 A3-19 ALCMs an ha~all~of these aircraft are then
counted as carrying 12 ALCM5. u
(d) The totals slcwn here assume that each Blackjack carries 12 ALCMs,
although we estimate that some of then airy will carry
a mix of bombs and 3RAM3 rather than ALCMs. craf
(e) Under the proposed counting rules, aircraft equipped only with bombs
would be counted as deployed with one weapon each. M estimate that
a total of about 350 bombs and MA currently are carried on older
 .j
TAKE 1 TD&I
(~) Under an agreement calltng fot the elimination of all bLaLatio alutloae
the soviets probably Mould place a major e^plnaia on NN deployment of
lens-ranee SLOIs. 'NN figures dorm here assume that they deploy w11-21
class SL Is an Victor. 402AA, Alcula, and sierra sub^arinss, and on
converted Tankes and Delta SSW that mculd'have their AM launchers
diimantled under such. an agreement.
(S) the forces depicted hero assume that a separate 11W agrseaent limits
an soviets to 100. wheads on 111 1iasi1cs and that
ballistic missiles are eliminated in 1991. 4
 60. The Soviets might consider converting other large airframe plants--
such as the one at 111'yanovsk-that currently is producing the AN-24 Condor
transport aircraft--to produce heavy bombers. Such conversions, however,
would take years to accomplish and reduce the Soviets' ability to
produce transport aircraft.
S1. The Soviets probably would not he constrained by a shortage of
capacity to produce cruise missile airframes. Two production plants currently
are in operation and the Soviets could bring on-line additional plants--they
might convert plants that formerly produced ballistic missiles. They might
face a bottleneck however, in the production of guidance components--for-
example the terrain mapping radar.
12. neploying a force of 450 bombers--a force about two and one-half
times the size of the current force--would require a significant investment in
infrastructure. The Soviets would have to construct a number of now
airfields, or enlarge existing airfields to support bombers, and procure
additional communications, maintenance and ground support equipment. Such a
force probably also would require a large number of Was tanker aircraft--
perhaps as many as 450, compared to our current estimate for the mid-1990s of
100-1110 to support both bomber and air defense needs. In order to produce
this number of tankers--which use the IL-76 airframe--the Soviets would have
to'stop producing transport and AWACS aircraft using this airframe. (But we
judge they would, if anything, produce more AWACS.) In addition, the Soviets
would have to train hundreds of additio it aircrews, as well as addiyional
mechanics and technicians.
59. In the absence of any limits on long-range SLCMs, we judge that the
Soviets also would place a major empahsis on the deployment of these
systems. It is difficult to predict the classes of submarines (and the
loadings of these submarines) that would be deployed with SLCMs. Candidates
for the_ SS-NX-21-class would be Victor-class, 402AA, Akula, and Sierra
'submarines, Yankee and Delta ballistic missile submarines that would have
their SLOW launchers dismantled under such an agreement could also be
converted as cruise missile carriers. (The 402AA is a converted Yankee.) We
estimate that larger, supersonic SS-NX-24-class SLCMS would be deployed on a
new class of submarine, and thus the number of these SLCMS is constrained by
the submarine prodution rate. In sum, we judge that under the U.S. proposal,
the Soviets might deploy some, 1,700 to 2,000 )on -range SLCMs by the and of
1996, compared to the 400 to Ann we normally project for thotold-199ns. About
half of these would be SS-NX-21-class SLCMI deployed on converted Yankee and
Delta SSPNs. (We judge that the Soviets could convert about four of these
submarines per year). We estimate the Soviets could maiptain a continual
dept eyment of some 2f fl SLCMs off the US coasts by the early 1940s. However,
the Soviets would' regard such a forward deployed force as vulnerable during a
conventional phase of conflict and the Soviets could not rely on having these
units available as a first-strike force.
 54. The force in Table 1 assumes that an INF agreement limits the
t Sov1