PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: IRAQ
• Keywords: IRAQ
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005299384
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2009
• Case Number: F-2008-00678
• Publication Date: January 1, 2003

Challenges in
hallenges in
(U) Principal
Challenges I
Iraq
aq
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
ICA 2003-04
January 2003
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^DATE:
23-Sep-2009
 National
Intelligence
Council
(U) Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq
Prepared under the auspices of Paul R. Pillar,
attonal Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia.
Inquiries may be directed to the NIO on
January 2003
S T/
 Scope Note
At the request of the Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, this
Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) examines the internal dynamics of Iraq that will
frame the challenges for whatever government succeeds the regime of Saddam Husayn. It
discusses the main political, economic, humanitarian, and security issues inside Iraq that are
likely to demand attention during approximately the first three to five years after Saddam
departs. In particular, it looks at the prospects for representative government in Iraq and at the
ethnic, tribal, and religious forces that will affect its development.
How these issues unfold would depend heavily on the events leading to Saddam's
removal. The effects of his ouster through the invasion of Iraq by a Coalition military force
could vary significantly according to the duration of the war, the damage it caused, and such
other factors as the size and cohesiveness of the Coalition. Subsequent occupation by a Coalition
force obviously would make that force the dominant influence on events in Iraq in the immediate
aftermath of the invasion. This assessment makes no projections about specific wartime
scenarios or the policies of an occupying force. Nor does it focus primarily on the immediate
humanitarian demands or need to locate weapons of mass destruction that would be handled by
the Coalition military forces in the first days after a war. Instead, it identifies and analyzes the
medium- to long-term challenges that any post-Saddam authority in Iraq necessarily would face.
The ICA was reviewed in draft by three prominent experts in the history, politics, and
regions dynamics of the Middle East
Their comments were taken into consideration in the preparation o this paper.
The regional repercussions of an ouster of Saddam, including postures of neighboring
states toward a post-Saddam Iraq, are addressed in ICA 2003-03, Regional
Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq (SECRET January 2003.
 THIS PAGE WAS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 Contents
(U) Scope Note
(U) Key Judgments 5
(U) Discussion
(U) The Historical Legacy 9
(U) Saddam's Great Leap Backward 11
Eroding Nascent Political Institutions 11
(U) Iraq's Political Culture: Implications for Democracy 13
Political Islam 15
Discredited Arab Nationalism 15
Opposition in Exile 17
(U) Domestic Divisions and Conflict 19
Shia-Sunni Strife 20
Kurdish Options 22
Inter-Tribal Conflict 24
(U) Humanitarian Issues 25
Population Displacement 25
Food and Water 25
Health Care and Sanitation 28
Existing Infrastructure 30
(U) Financial Strains and Economic Opportunities 30
(U) Immutable Foreign Policy Interests 34
(U) Implications for Iraqi Security 36
Weapons of Mass Destruction 36
Terrorism 38
3
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 Key Judgments
(U) Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq
The greatest medium-to-long-term challenge in Iraq if Saddam Husayn were ousted
would be the introduction of a stable and representative political system in place of Saddam's
apparatus of oppression. The building of an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult, and
probably turbulent process, with potential for backsliding into Iraq's tradition of
authoritarianism.
? Iraqi political culture does not foster liberalism or democracy. Iraq lacks the experience of a
loyal opposition and effective institutions for mass political participation. Saddam's brutal
methods have made a generation of Iraqis distrustful of surrendering or sharing power.
? The principal positive elements in any effort at democratization would be the current relative
weakness of political Islam in Iraq and the contributions that could be made by four million
Iraqi exiles-many of whom are Westernized and well educated-and by the now-
impoverished and underemployed Iraqi middle class.
Iraq would be unlikely to split apart, but a post-Saddam authority would face a deeply
divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict
with each other unless an occupying force prevented them from doing so.
? Sunni Arabs would face possible loss of their longstanding privileged position while Shia
would seek power commensurate with their majority status.
? Kurds could try to take advantage of Saddam's departure by seizing some of the large
northern oilfields, a move that would elicit forceful responses from Sunni Arabs
? Score-settling would occur throughout Iraq between those associated with Saddam's regime
and those who have suffered most under it.
Iraq's large petroleum resources-its greatest asset-would make economic
reconstruction less difficult than political transformation. Iraq's economic options would remain
few and narrow, however, without forgiveness of debt, a reduction in reparations from the
previous Persian Gulf war, or something akin to a Marshall Plan.
? Iraq's economic and financial prospects would vary significantly depending on how much
damage its oil facilities sustained in a war. If they remained relatively unscathed and any
administrative issues involving organization of Iraq's oil industry were resolved, it would be
possible to increase oil production within three months from 2.4 million barrels per day (b/d)
to 3.1 million b/d.
 ? A less oil-dependent economy with a strong private sector would be required to generate the
more than 240,000 new jobs needed each year to accommodate the rapidly growing labor
force.
Major outside assistance would be required to meet humanitarian needs. Increased
numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, combined with civil strife, would strain
Iraq's already inadequate healthcare services, food distribution networks, and supplies of potable
water.
? Most Iraqis depend on government food rations and are not equipped to deal with hoarding,
looting, or price gouging. Rapid reconstitution of the distribution system would be critical to
avoiding widespread health problems.
? Iraqis have restored their physical infrastructure quickly after previous wars. The difficulty
of restoring such services as water and electricity after a new war would depend chiefly on
how much destruction was caused by urban combat.
The foreign and security policies of a new Iraqi government necessarily would defer
heavily in the near term to the interests of the United States, United Nations, or an international
Coalition but also would reflect many continuing Iraqi perceptions and interests. Those
perceptions would
increasingly shape the Iraqis' policies as they reasserted their independence.
? These threat perceptions, along with a prideful sense of Iraq's place as a regional power,
probably would sustain Iraq's interest in rebuilding its military. Unless guaranteed a security
umbrella against its strategic rivals, Iraq's interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction
would eventually revive.,
? A new Iraqi government would have little interest in supporting terrorism, although strong
Iraqi sympathy for the Palestinians would continue. If Baghdad were unable to exert control
over the Iraqi countryside, al-Q'aida or other terrorists groups could operate from remote
areas.
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 (U) Iraq: Population Density
Persons per
square kilometer
0
Uninhabited
D
1 to5
D
6 to 50
51 to 500
501 to 5,000
11111110
5,001 to 200,000
Total population, 2002:
24 million.
0 700 Kilometers
 Discussion
(U) Principal Challenges
in Post-Saddam Iraq
The ouster of Iraqi dictator Saddam
1u- sa would pose a variety of significant
policy challenges for whoever assumes
responsibility for governing Iraq. These
include political transformation, controlling
internal strife, solving economic and
humanitarian challenges, and dealing with
persistent foreign policy and security
concerns. The greatest medium-to-long-term
challenge would be in fashioning an even
partially liberal, democratic, and stable polity
in place of the system of oppression that
Saddam has maintained. Political
transformation is the task in which the
underlying problems are most deeply rooted
in Iraq's history and culture and least
susceptible to outside intervention and
management.
(U) The Historical Legacy
Iraq's experience with democratic-
or even representative-political institutions
has been limited. Its experiments in pluralism
ended long ago, and the socio-economic
foundations for a more open political system
that were laid in the 1960s and 1970s have
collapsed.
? Iraq's most promising experiment with
representative institutions took place
under the Hashemite monarchy (1920-
1958), when political parties operated
more freely than at any other time in the
country's history. Although personal ties,
traditional patron-client relationships, and
management by the regime greatly
influenced the political process, the Iraqi
Chamber of Deputies was a somewhat
representative body.
? Formal suffrage requirements in Iraq were
comparatively liberal during the
monarchy. However, low levels of
education and literacy, the absence of
transportation and media networks, and
the overweaning influence of tribal
shaykhs in the countryside meant that,
outside the cities or among rural elites,
voting rates were low and the integrity of
the ballot was questionable.
? Modern participatory mass politics was
only beginning to emerge when the
monarchy was overthrown in a military
coup in 1958.
Iraq's leaders have struggled to
create an Iraqi national identity since the
country was created following World War I
out of three former provinces of the Ottoman
Empire. The Sunni Arab minority has
provided most of Iraq's leaders, continuing a
traditional leadership arrangement established
during Ottoman rule and sustained through
the British mandate. Individual Kurds and
Shias, as well as Christians and Jews, have
held influential positions, but such exceptions
were not indicative of Sunni power-sharing.
Prior to 1968, the merchant class, the ulema,
and some tribal shaykhs were influential in
government and within their own
communities.
Despite its dictatorial rule over the
last 35 years, the Ba'th Party initially made
progress in developing institutions that might
have supported the growth of democracy.
Motivated by a pan-Arabist, socialist
Sk~T/~
 Occupation and Transition: Likely Iraqi Attitudes
In the early months after a forceful ouster of Saddam, stability in Iraq would depend
partly on the perspectives of Iraqis toward whatever interim authority military or civilian,
foreign or indigenous-was in control, as well as on the ability of that authority to perform the
administrative and security tasks of governing the country. The potential for tension would exist
between those two elements of stability: the type of authority most acceptable and legitimate in
the eyes of Iraqis might not be the same type most capable of running a war-damaged Iraq.
That tension probably would be minimal during the first. few weeks or months after a
war. The top priorities of most Iraqis would be to obtain peace, order, stability, and such basic
needs as food and shelter. Personal needs would take preference over politics. Prompt provision
of such services as clean water also would help to refute the Saddam regime's propaganda that
the US-led West had imposed sanctions to hurt ordinary Iraqis.
Once the most pressing needs became less of a worry for most Iraqis, however, politics
and-the-nature of the ruling authority would become increasingly important to them. Iraqis
would expect progress in transferring power from foreign occupiers-however much they had
been welcomed as liberators-to indigenous leaders. Attitudes toward a foreign military force
would depend largely on the progress made in transferring power as well as on the degree to
which that force were perceived as providing necessary security and fostering reconstruction and
a return to prosperity.
Other recent instances of political reconstruction following intervention by a foreign
force provide only limited lessons for Iraq, given the major differences between cases. Examples
such as the Balkans and East Timor suggest that a foreign military presence might be acceptable
to most of the population if it served a clear security need and progress toward indigenous rule
continued. The attitudes of most Iraqis would be shaped far more by what they see a foreign
force doing in their own land than by foreign models. Some Iraqis, however, might point to
Afghanistan as a model for how authority ought to be turned over to an Iraqi-led and staffed
government within two or three months of Saddam's ouster.
Iraq's history of foreign occupation-first the Ottomans, then the British has left
Iraqis with a deep dislike of occupiers. An indefinite foreign military occupation, with ultimate
power in the hands of a non-Iraqi officer, would be widely unacceptable.
some senior Iraqi military officers who oppose Saddam find the idea of a western
power conquering and governing Iraq anathema and a motivation to fight for Saddam where they
otherwise would not. External opposition leaders have expressed similar sentiments. The
Opposition Conference in December 2002 formally rejected "any type of occupation, foreign or
local military rule, external trusteeship, or regional intervention." The Kurdish leader Jalal
Talibani said more pointedly, "If we don't accept an Iraqi general, how are we going to accept an
American general?"
S I
 ideology, and a desire to consolidate power,
the Ba'th used social reforms, oil wealth, and
secularist policies to bridge or paper over
many of Iraq's ethnic and religious gaps and
engender a sense of "Iraqi-ness."
? In the 1970s, with the help of
mushrooming oil revenues, Baghdad
invested in its human capital and
infrastructure by supporting education and
medical services throughout the country.
In 1987, UNESCO recognized Iraq as
having achieved a literacy rate of 80
percent.
? Baghdad coupled this investment with
road building, electrification, and
provision of fresh water in rural and urban
areas. Although pockets of backwardness
remained, the infrastructure contributed to
a growing industrial sector and an
increasingly urbanized population. At the
same time, the regime cultivated rural
areas by implementing land reform and
establishing agricultural cooperatives.
? Shia actions during the Iran-Iraq War-
their defense of Iraq in the name of Iraqi
nationalism-demonstrated the extent to
which a sense of national identity had
been established along the Shia-Sunni
fault line.
(U) Saddam's Great Leap Backward
Over the last two decades, Saddam's
misadventures against Iran and Kuwait
have undermined the social, political, and
economic gains previously made under the
? At least 400,000 Iraqis died or were
wounded in the Iran-Iraq War. Although
the conflict spurred growth in Iraq's
heavy industrial and military-related
economic sectors, Baghdad diverted
resources from social and educational
programs to support the war effort.
The economic readjustments during
and after the Iran-Iraq War and the UN
sanctions following the Gulf war exacted a
substantial price. Iraq's obstinacy in evading
its disarmament obligations has prolonged the
economic problems, reducing the general
population to a state of dependency while
giving rise to previously unseen rampant
corruption.
? In 1980, Iraq's per capita GDP was poised
to overtake that of Greece. Now Iraq's
GDP per capita is $2,500 while Greece's
GDP per capita is estimated at $17,900.
? Such basic services as electrification and
clean water currently reach less than half
the population.
UN figures indicate that literacy has
dropped to 50 to 60 percent. Although
school enrollments have risen since the
Oil for Food (OFF) Program began in
1996, attendance has fallen and dropout
rates have risen. A brain drain has
continued, and most of Iraq's once
thriving middle class has been
impoverished.
(U) Eroding Nascent Political Institutions
Saddam's policies increasingly have
emphasized his own survival at the expense of
the few representative political institutions
Iraq had developed.
On assuming power, Saddam gutted
the Ba'th Party of independent political power
and ideological authority and remade it into
an instrument to ensure his survival. The
Ba'th has become an instrument of internal
security and control rather than a means of
political mobilization. Saddam has
11
 Iraq: Comparative Social Indicators Table
Demographics
Total population, 2001 (millions)
23.8
66.1
69.5
2.0
284.8
Population growth rate, 1991-2001 (average annual
percent)
2.9
1.4
1.9
3.8a
0.9
Urban population, 2000 (percent of total population)
77
62
45
98
77
Total fertility rate, 2001 (births per woman)
4.8
2.0
3.1
3.2
2.1
Life expectancy at birth, 2001 (years)
65b
68b
64
76
77
Infant mortality, 2001 (per 1,000 live births)
92b
52c
60
11
7
Education
Literacy rate, 2000 (percent)
58b
77
55
82
100
Enrollment rates (percent)d
Primary
85
98
101
77
102
Secondary
42
77
78
65
97
Post-secondary
12
18
20
19
81
Income
GDP per capita, 2001 (thousand US $)e
2,475
6,304
3,821
14,798
35,100
a Figure is average for 1996-2001.
bEstimate.
?1999 figure as reported to the UN by the Statistical Center of Iran.
dEnrollment rate is the total enrollment, regardless of age, divided by the population of the official
age group which corresponds to a specific level of education. Data vary from 1995 to 1997.
?2000 purchasing power parity rates.
CO A
12
SE
 SE
emphasized the need to recruit younger
members to the party, but real influence
remains in the hands of a limited inner circle,
and new recruits appear to view the Ba'th as
an avenue for landing a job or even obtaining
a ration card. Indeed, heavy-handed tactics
used to increase the power base of the Ba'th
Party have generated strong resentment
toward the party in many sectors of society.
The party probably would collapse with the
regime, although some of its original ideals
could find expression through former party
members who might form networks for overt
or covert political activity.
Saddam has manipulated and
rearranged other Iraqi centers of power and
political institutions, subordinating them to
military/security organizations and to
revitalized tribal structures.
? The degradation of Iraq's socio-economic
structure, coupled with the reemergence
of regional and tribal power bases since
the Gulf war, has intensified traditional
tribal, religious, and ethnic differences,
undermining the progress made in forging
a national identity. Rather than erase
these fissures, Saddam has exploited them
to solidify further his hold on power by
nurturing the belief that only he can hold
Iraq together.
? Although Iraq had a large, well-trained
and competent cadre of technocrats and
civil leaders, Saddam has tried to
eliminate all those he suspects of
nurturing a personal following in the
military or in the civil sector.
(U) Iraq's Political Culture:
Implications for Democracy
The undemocratic nature of Iraq's
political culture means that any development
of stable democracy there would be a long
and probably difficult process. Saddam's
brutal regime has left its mark on the Iraqi
psyche. In addition to fostering pervasive
fear throughout the society, the strong distrust
between Iraqi groups is unlikely to dissipate
quickly. The culture of brute power has direct
implications for the forging of a democratic
political system. In Saddam's Iraq, the
surrendering of power leads to brutal
subjugation. Once power is held in Iraq, it is
rarely relinquished peacefully. When Saddam
leaves the scene, any new authority will need
to demonstrate and earn sufficient trust for
Iraqis with any degree of power to become
convinced they can safely hand it over or
share it.
Iraq's political culture largely is
bereft o the social underpinnings that directly
support developmentof broad-based
participatory democracy. The non-regime
political elite has largely disappeared through
exile or death. More than 70 percent of the
population has been born or reached
adulthood since Operation Desert Storm and
know only war, sanctions, deprivation, and
Saddam's rule. Few Iraqis have any firsthand
experience with pre-Saddam Iraq.
Development of a new political
culture more conducive to democracy would
require building upon the now-impoverished
but still talented Iraqi middle class. Despite
their economic straits, many members of this
social stratum-at least those who were adults
before deprivations began during the Iran-Iraq
War in the 1980s-may retain attitudes
similar to those of liberal bourgeoisie in
developed democracies. The political
attitudes of their offspring could be more
problematic.
Stable democracy in Iraq would
require development of a new system of
political parties with nationwide
 constituencies cutting across ethno-religious
boundaries.
? Some small "political parties" operate
inside the country (primarily in northern
Iraq), but none appear to have a
sufficiently broad base of support to
assume the reins of power following
Saddam's departure.
? The major Kurdish political parties are
unlikely to develop any significant
support among the Arab majority in Iraq.
? The Ba'th Party, having become a
repressive instrument of Saddam's
regime, has become discredited and is
unlikely to serve as a model.
The idea of free and democratic
elections, although somewhat alien, probably
would be a popular concept with the vast
majority of the Iraqi population. But the
practical implementation of democratic rule
would be difficult in a country with no
concept of loyal opposition and no history of
alternation of power. Those groups that
retained a power base following Saddam's
removal would be reluctant to voluntarily
relinquish whatever influence they had until
they felt sufficiently secure-on a personal as
well as a group level. The experience of the
Kurdish-controlled north, where neither
Kurdish party has been prepared to concede
power to the other, is instructive (see text box
on page 16).
? Although Iraqis might be enthusiastic
about casting votes, we do not know what
their perception of "democracy" is. Many
Iraqi citizens probably would continue to
rely heavily on authority figures for their
well-being and direction. The history of
strong authoritarian rule has left most
Iraqis heavily reliant on the central
government. Unless Saddam's removal
were followed by re-establishment of a
strong and central authority, many Iraqis
would begin looking toward more
traditional regional, tribal, or religious
authorities for support and guidance.
? Some Iraqis would be quick to blame
economic problems and other difficulties
in their daily lives on a breakdown of the
previous order. There might be some
longing for the more functional aspects of
Saddam's authoritarian regime, similar to
nostalgia for an undemocratic past
observed in other states that have
undergone major loosening of their
political systems (such as South Africa
and the former Soviet Union).
The lack of ingrained democratic
traditions, innate distrust of other groups, and
the tendency to substitute tribal, ethnic, or
sectarian loyalties will impede the
development of a stable democracy. Initial
expressions of enthusiasm for democratic
norms and procedures-not only from
ordinary Iraqis, but from any new Iraqi
government, which would want to stay in
good graces with the US-led Western
democracies-would not reflect a sudden
alteration of that culture. A stable and
democratic Iraqi political system, if one
emerges, is likely to be the result of a long
evolution that supplants traditional loyalties
and practices.
? Democracy or representative institutions
could provide a forum to adjudicate
competing tribal or sectarian differences.
? However, forcing short-term political
accommodations between competing
interests before new patterns of trust had
developed could be destabilizing. Iraq
lacks traditions even comparable to that of
the loyajirga in Afghanistan, which
enables groups there to have some role in
14
S T/~
 making or at least ratifying such
accommodations.
? Even with a long-term political evolution,
sustained nurturing of democratic
institutions would be needed to minimize
the chance of drift toward the
authoritarian patterns that have dominated
Iraq's 80-year history.
(U) Political Islam
A factor in favor of possible
eatization of Iraq is the relatively low
politicization of Iraqi Shiism-the country's
majority Islamic creed-particularly in
comparison to Wahhabi Islam in Saudi Arabia
and the Persian variant of Shiism practiced in
Iran. This does not mean, however, that the
trend could not take root in post-war Iraq,
particularly if economic recovery were slow
and foreign troops remained in country for a
long period. Academic research indicates that
the political vitality of Iraqi Shiism declined
throughout the 20t century.
? Since the early 20th century, the Iraqi state
has eroded the power and wealth of the
Shia religious establishment, established
clear boundaries between religion and
politics, and generally promoted a secular
vision of society.
? In the early 1900s, Shia clerics were
primary motivating forces in the rebellion
of both Shia and Sunni communities
against the British. By the Shia rebellion
against Saddam in the 1990s, they no
longer played a lead role.
? Nevertheless, traditional religious elites,
particularly in the Shia south and portions
of Baghdad, have influence through such
religious institutions as the Najaf
Theological College and Husayniyas
(community worship centers) as well as
through the ulema, religious scholars.
The Sadah, descendents of the prophet,
play prominent roles in mediating
disputes.
? Islamic non-governmental organizations,
such as the al-Khoei Foundation, an
international Shia religious, charitable
institution based in London, also have
influence in the Shia community of Iraq.
No major fundamentalist trend
within either the Shia or Sunni communities
emerged under the Ba'th-possibly as a result
of the regime's repression. Travelers to Iraq
report that members of the younger
generation are more attracted to
fundamentalism than their parents were-
perhaps in reaction to the failure of the Iraqi
state as well as to the same developments that
have boosted political Islam elsewhere in the
region. A more politically open society could
provide fertile ground for these nascent
fundamentalist tendencies. The ability of
fundamentalism to take hold in Iraq would
depend in large part on how quickly Iraq
recovered economically from the lingering
effects of sanctions.
(U) Discredited Arab Nationalism
Another favorable factor, and an
unintended consequence of Saddam's rule,
has been that one of the prime Arab
alternatives to democracy-secular
authoritarian nationalism has been
discredited. The appeal of this variety of
authoritarianism would be likely to be
restricted to a small minority that directly
benefited from Saddam's regime.
15
+T
 (U) Kurdish Democracy-A Case Study
Iraq's Kurdish groups point to their "democratic experiment" in northern Iraq as an example of how
democracy can work in a post-Saddam Iraq. The Kurds have made progress in developing democratic
institutions and aspects of a liberal society over the last decade, but habits and perspectives also necessary for
democracy are lacking.
When Saddam withdrew his forces from large portions of northern Iraq in 1991, traditionally rival
Kurdish parties put their differences aside and worked with the international community to establish security,
order and humanitarian relief in an extremely volatile environment.
Elections were held in May 1992 for a regional assembly and to select a single regional leader. The
elections seemed to herald a new beginning for a people whose rivalries had long hampered cooperation and
who had known the worst excesses of a brutally repressive regime. The elections were conducted under
largely peaceful conditions, with minimal accusations of fraud, and were heralded as a success. However, the
parties were unable to live with the results.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Masud Barzani won the election, 51 percent to 49 percent,
but the eader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Jalal Talabani, refused to accept the outcome. In an
effort to forestall fighting, backroom negotiations resulted in an agreement in which the KDP and PUK would
have an equal number of seats in the Assembly (with a token number awarded the Assyrians) and the two
parties would forge a "unity government" with shared responsibilities and a rotating prime minister. (Such
smaller groups as the Assyrians and Communists were given ministerial portfolios, but the real power was
distributed between the PDK and PUK.) Neither Barzani nor Talabani took an official post, leaving it to
trusted lieutenants to assume the ministerial positions. Although follow-on elections to determine the leader of
northern Iraq were scheduled repeatedly, they never took place.
Barzani and Talabani continued to jockey for the preeminent position, and full-scale fighting between
the erupted in 1994. Combat continued intermittently until August 1996, when the KDP called on
Baghdad to help wrest the provincial capital of Arbil from PUK control. The PUK's ouster resulted in the
expulsion of the Iraqi National Congress and the withdrawal of the US and Coalition military presence from
the north.
Since 1996, the Kurds have worked toward gradual rapprochement, with only sporadic intervals of
violence. Northern Iraq remains distinctly divided between KDP and PUK zones (with some smaller parties,
most notably certain Islamist groups, controlling smaller areas of land). The relationship has reached a level of
cautious cordiality-assisted in no small measure by the significant largesse both parties enjoy from the Oil-
for-Food Program in northern Iraq and by revenues from smuggling and transit "taxes.
With the two militias geographically separated, the parties have managed to establish some
"democratic" institutions within their respective areas. Substantial progress has been made in developing
elements of civil society and enabling ordinary Kurds to live in non-authoritarian conditions. Efforts have
been made to improve freedom of the press, there has been some movement on reforming the judicial systems
and police forces, and local municipal elections have been held. The Joint Assembly that was elected in 1992
reconvened in October 2002 after not having met since 1994.
S T/
 (U) Opposition in Exile
The external opposition does not
have the popular, political, or military
capabilities necessary to play a leading role
after Saddam's departure without significant
and prolonged external economic, political,
and military support.
External Iraqi opposition groups
amide limited progress in submerging
their differences and developing a unified
front. In 2002, several Iraqi external
opposition parties held conferences designed
to forge unity. At the meeting in December
2002, they called for a democratic and federal
Iraq, formed an advisory committee of 65
members, and unanimously opposed a US-
imposed post-Saddam political solution.
They remained unsure, however, what their
role would be in post-Saddam Iraq.
? The conferences could have done little
without high-level US input. Inter-
personal and organizational problems
persist, and many oppositionists worry the
US presence will make it difficult for
them to gain traction with the Iraqi public.
? Internal divisions and inability to come to
agreement led to a postponement of their
scheduled mid-January 2003 meeting.
Most opposition parties are
organized along geographical or ethnic lines,
undercutting their ability to attract a
widespread political base within Iraq and
undermining attempts to forge a united
opposition. Some Iraqi Sunni oppositionists
criticize the West for compounding that
SE
tendency by supporting Kurds and Shia to the
perceived exclusion of Sunni Arabs.
? The Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)-an Iranian-
backed Shia Arab opposition group-has
some following in the Shia tribal areas.
? At the December 2002 meeting, the al-
Khoei Foundation played a pivotal
peacemaking role between Shia factions.
The al-Khoei Foundation, which has a
large following in Iraq, promotes the
separation of religion from politics.
? The two major Kurdish opposition parties,
the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have
extensive support within their respective
regions in northern Iraq, but they have
mounted few successful joint ventures and
have no base outside the north.
The opposition has made scattered
attempts to unite various factions and groups.
Such efforts seem to work only when they are
formed as a counter to another political party
or ethnic group. The Iraqi National Congress
(INC) has claimed to be an umbrella group
for all opposition groups but the December
conference made it clear that it can no longer
claim that role.
? Although they are technically part of the
INC, the PUK, KDP, SCIRI, and the Iraqi
National Accord-an Iraqi nationalist
group of former military and security
officers-formed the Group of Four to
meet informally outside the framework of
the INC.
? The various Assyrian oppositionists have
coalesced under a US-based umbrella
group, ostensibly to protect their minority
interests. Turkomen are represented by a
 number of groups that do not operate
under INC auspices.
Regardless of what political role the
external opposition parties assumed, the
return of individual exiles could aid the
development of political institutions and civil
society. The US Committee for Refugees
estimates that four million Iraqis live outside
Iraq. At least a quarter of them have left Iraq
in the last ten years.
? Scattered reporting suggests that a
relatively high proportion of these
expatriates are middle class professionals
or businessmen. Many of them reside in
the West, where they have been exposed
to democratic norms and values and
possibly would bring those values back to
Iraq.
? The more skilled exiles would be able to
play significant roles in rebuilding Iraq.
In so doing they could over time
constitute a constituency for democracy.
(U) Domestic Divisions and Conflict
Any new authority in Iraq would
face a country with societal fractures and
significant potential for violent conflict
among domestic groups if not prevented by an
occupying force. Some of the domestic
divisions are emotion-laden but less visceral
and extreme than in some countries in which
ethnic conflict has been the basis for
genocide.
The principal division is the three-
way split among Sunni Arab, Shia, and Kurd,
which is based on ethnicity and religion but to
some extent involves a geographic
concentration of each group in the central,
southern, and northern regions of Iraq
respectively. The geographic pattern is least
distinct with the Shia, especially in Baghdad
and other urban areas, where many Shia live
alongside Sunnis. Other societal divisions,
including ones based on tribal identities,
would add to the challenge of maintaining
domestic peace and stability.
? These divisions have not generated
constant civil war during Saddam's tenure
largely because of the de facto secession
of the Kurdish north-protected by the
northern no-fly zone-and severe
repression by the regime. This
suppression includes past use of chemical
weapons against Kurds and draining of
marshes in the south to help subjugate the
predominantly Shia marsh Arabs. The
lifting of the repression and the restoration
of Iraq's territorial integrity would open
the way for heightened competition for
power among the different groups and
new suspicions about what grabs for
power other groups were making.
? Saddam has widened societal splits by
exacerbating hostilities and suspicions
among ethnic, tribal, and religious groups
in an effort to co-opt some and subjugate
others.
Despite these societal fissures, Iraq
would Ge unlikely to split apart. Most Iraqis
have national identity and pride in being Iraqi
that transcends their ethnic and religious
differences. More significantly, the
The harshness of the Saddam
regime's methods would form the basis for
another split: between those associated with
the old regime-and its brutality and
 favoritism-and those who have been its
victims. The desire among many of the latter
for reprisals against the former would be
strong.
If responsibility for internal security
had been passed from an occupying force to
an Iraqi government, such a government
would have to walk a fine line between
dismantling the worst aspects of Saddam's
police, security, and intelligence forces and
retaining the capability to enforce nationwide
peace. Those elements most closely
associated with Saddam would have to be
protected against immediate reprisals if they
were to face a judicial process rather than
vigilante violence. The Special Republican
Guards, Special Security Organization, Iraqi
Intelligence Service, Saddam Fedayeen, and
Directorate of General Security are all
associated with internal repression and
surveillance. Local police and the Regular
Army are less tainted by association with
Saddam's rule and could assist in law
enforcement.
? In the immediate aftermath of Saddam's
removal, those Iraqi forces capable of
putting down unrest and restoring order
would tend to employ, if not otherwise
checked, the familiar tactics used under
the Saddam regime, meaning quick and
possibly brutal repression.
? Over the longer term, the police and
security forces would need to be rebuilt
and restructured if they were to gain the
trust of the Iraqi people and avoid the
excesses similar to those under Saddam's
rule.
? The Regular Army has been relatively
unpoliticized below the command level
and, once purged of the security and
intelligence officers embedded within it,
could be used for security and law
enforcement until police or a local
gendarme force is established.
Shia-Sunni Strife
For the most part, Iraqi Shia and
ve lived peacefully together and do
not have a legacy of sectarian strife.
Nevertheless, the threat of Shia reprisals for
the oppression they have suffered under
Saddam's rule is a major concern to the Sunni
elite and could erupt if not prevented by an
occupying force. The underlying causes for
violence involve political reprisals more than
ethnic or sectarian divisions.
The broader Iraqi Sunni Arab
community does not publicize its views
regarding a redistribution of power in Iraq.
Anecdotal reporting indicates that some
elements of Sunni society would oppose a
regime that did not allow the Sunnis to
continue to prevail in the military, security
services, and government. Other Sunni
Arabs, especially ones having extensive
interaction with Shia in daily urban life, might
view power less starkly in sectarian terms and
be open to a more representative political
system. In any event, creation of a
government that was both stable and more
representative would require Sunni
acceptance of an end to their longstanding
domination of Iraqi politics.
? A decentralized or federal democracy with
minority protections might better protect
the Sunnis' interests but would still mean
loss of their privileged status.
Major sectarian fighting would be
likely ifthe Sunnis retained their political
dominance in Baghdad and most of central
Iraq but neither they nor a foreign power
controlled the south.
S]
 Ar Rutbah
Buhayrat ar
Razazah
Urban flashpoint
An Nukhayb
Selected oilfield in northen Iraq
Area of Concentration
? Kurd
? Kurd/Sunni Arab
Sunni Arab
Iraq: Ethnic and Religious Flashpoints
Shia Arab
SunnVShia Arab
Sunni Turkoman
Other
Sparsely populated
Iraq Population, 2002
24 million
aRepresents fewer than I million people in Iraq and includes Christians, Persian
Shies, and small numbers of other ethnic groups. These groups are scattered.
This map shows areas where ethnoreligious groups are traditionally
concentrated. it is not meant to imply that an ethnic group is a majority in all.
21
s l6
lAkashat
'Bountlary esentation IS
`not pacessetiy authoritative,
`Hafar al Batin
KUWAIT
Persian
Gulf
0 50 100 Kilometers
0 50 100 Miles
 SE /
? Spontaneous uprisings in 1991 showed
that civil unrest in the south could quickly
spin out of the control of local authorities
and open the way to a bloodbath among
stranded security and Ba'th Party officials
and government troops. While Saddam
was able to maintain control during Shia
rioting in 1999, demonstrations in the
capital illustrated Baghdad's vulnerability,
which would be heightened if Iraqi
security services were weakened after a
change of regime.
? Rather than resulting in the
dismemberment of Iraq, Shia revolts
could lead to brutal Sunni military
operations to reassert control over Shia-
controlled areas, if Iraqi military elements
retained the capacity to reassert control.
? A severely crippled Iraqi military might
not be able to muster a forceful response,
notwithstanding the galvanizing effect of
a Shia uprising on Sunnis in central
provinces.
? Oil facilities and export terminals in
southern Iraq would be vulnerable to
seizure by Shias.
Shia groups might try to seize some
economic assets, but they would be unlikely
to stake a territorial claim on any specific
portion of Iraq with the aim of establishing a
separate "Shia state." To the contrary,
statements by major Shia opposition groups
with strong ties to the Iraqi Shia population
suggest the Shias prefer to assert control over
the state through majority rule or, at a
minimum, to play an integral part in its
governance.
(U) Kurdish Options
Although the Kurds have
consistently reiterated their commitment to
the territorial integrity of Iraq under a
federated system, they could choose to take
advantage of a military confrontation, or
confusion in the immediate aftermath of
Saddam's demise, to wrest control of key
areas in order to increase their own leverage
within Iraq.
? If not prevented from doing so by an
occupying force, the Kurds might try to
take advantage of military action, Sunni-
Shia strife, or a weak post-Saddam
government-as they did in March
1991 by seizing key territory and
economic facilities. In particular, Kurds
could attempt to seize key oil facilities
around Kirkuk and/or Mosul-which
constitute nearly one third of Iraq's oil
capacity-and then seek to have them
included in an autonomy agreement with a
new regime. Mosul and Kirkuk have been
major sticking points in previous
negotiations between the Iraqi Kurds and
the central government.
? Property disputes will erupt as Kurds and
Turkomen try to reclaim from Arab
residents homes lost during Baghdad's
decades-old Arabization campaign. Large
numbers of Arabs could be displaced in
any violence that was allowed to break
out, especially in the regions stretching
from Mosul in the north, southeast
through Kirkuk, to Khanaqin on the
Iranian border.
? Kurdish parties, despite their efforts at
rapprochement, still harbor political,
territorial, and personal resentments and
distrust of one another that could erupt
into internecine fighting over how to deal
with a new regime and/or over control
over key territory.
? Armed Kurdish factions control territory
and the smuggling of goods and people
across the borders with Turkey and Iran.
S
 (U) Iraq: Tribes and Subtribesa
Dahuk ~.`
*-Sinjar,,?~
Arbil
f G
S
r f As
At Ta'mim i Sulaymaniyah
'. rst
Most Iraqis see loyalty -14
more in terms of their own tribal and
clan ties than in any political entity.
le)
d
~ r
\ Oar umaydah alAarah
weakened by the 1958 revolution and subsequent
land reform. Greater government centralization has
BAGHDAD! caw'
~(o,~?~"mod/.jUb
al-Janabi\ yd'
ap(Sawa
\ shim a~n?c Barv
at Nawa ' 1 Q.~ `1 Bayli
a al at-~ Lao, APou
/ ? \ of yasiri al-Khaz'll Ranuaikab Albu Tamim
Muhammad OZaYIIal- .
new Iraqi identity that focused on the Ba'th Party. He also mobilized
his own clan and family networks into Iraq's military and security services.
Later, to address an unstable domestic security situation after the Gulf war,
Saddam resurrected and co-opted tribal rule by giving rewards to and consulting
with tribal leaders to ensure their support.
r a~~~D Mundafiq
Persian
Gulf
SECRET/
 Their ties to a range of illicit activities and
groups provide them with extensive
revenues. Many of these groups almost
certainly will resist being disarmed and
being put under the rule of law by a post-
Saddam administration.
Although many Iraqi tribes affiliate
t hemselves with Saddam, for most the ties are
based on self-interest. Almost all tribes
probably would distance themselves from him
as soon as they assessed his demise was
inevitable and alternatives were available.
Some tribes that remained opposed to Saddam
might seek reprisals against those who
supported him.
? Saddam's ruling elite is drawn largely
from a handful of Sunni tribes.
Numerous tribe-based coup plots
(U) Iraq's Tribal Structure
About 75 percent of Iraqis identify
with a tribe, although many of these are urban
residents who probably feel little allegiance to
tribal leaders elsewhere in the country. At its
most basic, a tribe is a group of people who
trace their origin to a common ancestor. There
are over 200 tribes in Iraq, some of which have
both Sunni and Shia wings.
F-IThe importance of tribes to Iraqi
society fluctuated during the 20t' century.
They reached a low point in cohesion and
influence in the 1960s under the impact of the
1958 revolution that overthrew the monarchy
and the subsequent rapid modernization and
urbanization of Iraqi society. After the Iran-
Iraq and Gulf wars, Iraq's tribes experienced a
significant revival. Their fighting prowess
caused Saddam to laud their traditional values
of courage under fire, manliness, and,
increasingly as the repository of "sacred Arab
essence."
SE
avcurred since 1991, suggesting that
powerful Sunni or Shia tribes would seek to
play a role in determining a successor regime.
? While some anti-regime tribal elements
have joined the Iraqi opposition, some
tribes could take unilateral actions aimed
at shoring up their strategic positions
within Iraq when Saddam leaves the
scene.
? Key tribes could attempt to wrest control
of economic targets-key oil facilities,
dams, or other economic assets-either as
bargaining chips or as assets that could be
sold off. In 1991, Kurdish tribes in the
north made sizable profits by selling to the
Iranians machinery confiscated at various
dams.
Once a successor regime had
consolidated power, the tribes probably would
seek accommodation with it. As in the past,
tribal leaders could be expected to negotiate
with a new regime for their own advantage.
The tribes would offer a social structure that
could be a stabilizing influence in some parts
of the country.
 (U) Humanitarian Issues
The humanitarian situation in Iraq
has improved considerably since
implementation of the OFF Program in 1996,
but most Iraqis remain vulnerable to
disruptions in basic services, particularly food
and potable water supplies. The impact on
humanitarian needs of a new war would
depend on its length and severity. A
prolonged struggle to depose Saddam and
install a new regime would be likely to cause
more flight of refugees and internally
displaced persons and to disrupt severely the
distribution of food and health services.
(U) Population Displacement
Some 1 million people are displaced'
in Iraq-700,000 Iraqis are internally
displaced, and 230,000 Palestinians, stateless
Bidoons, Iranians, and Turks are refugees in
Iraq. In the northern region, many of the
internally displaced have been moved a
number of times as a result of Baghdad's
Arabization campaign and have suffered
arbitrary detention, expropriation of property,
and destruction of their villages. They
depend to some degree on international
assistance, and many live in camps where
their movement is restricted and they are not
permitted to work.
The UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) expects a Baghdad-
centered military operation would displace
another some 900,000 persons internally and
create 1.45 million more refugees. If Saddam
withdrew his forces into major cities in an
attempt to use the populace as "human
shields," both civilian casualties and civilian
flight could be much larger. These numbers
would vary considerably depending on the
geographic concentration of the war and its
duration.
? Under the UNHCR's worst-case scenario
some 50,000 Iraqis might flee to Kuwait,
20,000 to Saudi Arabia, 60,000 to Syria,
50,000 to Jordan, 270,000 to Turkey, and
as many as 900,000 to Iran.
? Repatriation of refugees and internally
displaced persons would stretch further
Iraq's already strained food and medical
supplies.
? Iraq's neighbors could try to influence the
political dynamics in Iraq by forcing
refugees back into Iraq, or threatening to
do so in order to pressure the new
government.
The internal security situation would
affect the humanitarian challenge. Civil strife
would cause disruptions in electricity and
water purification or distribution if
generators, pumps, or plants became
damaged, seized, or looted. Food stored in
warehouses under the OFF Program would be
a prime target for looters, and distribution
would become paralyzed by fighting, refugee
flows, criminal activity, or hoarding by the
military.
U Food and Water
Iraq's dependence on the ration
basket distributed by the government makes
the populace extremely vulnerable to the
disruptions in supply. About 60 percent of
Iraqis use the food basket as their primary
source of food. The average Iraqi does not
have the reserve food stocks or financial
resources to cope with the panic buying, price
gouging, and hoarding that would accompany
a breakdown in the food distribution system.
Revitalization of the food ration
distribution system would be critical in
the aftermath of war. UN officials have
said that the OFF Program would be
suspended during the war and reinstated
SE
 only when the UN regained control of the
system.
? Since July 2002, Baghdad has issued
double-and sometimes triple-food
rations to all Iraqis. This could reduce the
number of Iraqis needing food
immediately after the war. The World
Food Program estimates, however, that
4.9 million Iraqis could immediately
require food because of displacement and
the selling of food rations to earn money.
? Securing the government's food
warehouses after a war and implementing
an efficient and equitable food distribution
system would be critical to avoiding
widespread hunger.
? As of December 2002, Iraq had paid for
some 5 million metric tons of foodstuffs
to be delivered for 2003 under the OFF
Program. This food, provided its delivery
is resumed after the war, plus the
upcoming spring harvest season, would
provide enough of a supply of food.
Distribution problems, access to milling
facilities, and looting could hinder getting
this food to Iraqi households.
The new government would require
significant outside assistance to help rebuild
Iraq's water and sanitation infrastructure.
? Iraq's infrastructure already has suffered
extensive damage. Both the long-term
impact of economic sanctions and
Saddam's manipulation of resources to
shore up his regime have reduced the
availability of spare parts and equipment.
Currently, most of Iraq's water
treatment plants function well below designed
capacity, resulting in shortages of potable
water, highly polluted river systems, and
increases in sanitation-related health
Iraq: Agricultural Resources
nsufficient to Satisfy Needs
L_] A scarcity, of arable land, poor agricultural
and irrigation practices, frequent droughts, soil
salinity, and high evaporation have made Iraq a
food deficit country. Only 15 percent of Iraq is
arable, and more than 70 percent of this is
cultivated. Baghdad imports between 60. and 70
percent of the country's food needs and relies
heavily on imported seed for most crops.
Iraq grows a variety of grains, vegetables,
an fruit. Grain-primarily wheat, the staple
food, and barley is Iraq's most important crop,
totaling 1.9 to 5.0 million metric tons annually,
depending on rainfall.
Wheat and barley (a feed crop for livestock)
are planted in the fall and harvested in May
and June, mainly in the rain-fed plains and
valleys of the north and northeast. Barley
also is grown in the Mesopotamian Plain
because of its salt tolerance. Rice and corn
comprise 15 percent of total grain
production.
The US Department of Agriculture
estimates grain production for 2002 reached
2 million metric tons (MMT), an 11 percent
boost over the previous year, but still less
than two-thirds the 1994 level of 3.3 MMT.
problems. UNICEF estimates that only 41
percent of the population in rural areas has
access to safe water, and 30 percent of the
population lacks adequate sanitary services.
Access also has declined in urban areas,
including Baghdad. Underlying causes
include unreliable electric power for water
and sewage treatment plants, deteriorating
water and sewage pipes, and shortages of
supplies and equipment. Ongoing lack of
spare parts, further damage during a war, and
shortages of experienced personnel would
make quick rebuilding of facilities difficult.
26
SE //~
 (U) Iraq Crop Calendar
SAW
14
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
Woodland/forest
Meadows and pastures
(sheep and cattle)
Arable land
Irrigated farming
Rough grazing/
nomadic herding
0 Wasteland
Boundary representation is
not nnooooorlly suthoritski-
0 100 Kilometers
0 100 Mlles
 (U) Worst-Case Scenario
Humanitarian challenges will be
shaped largely by the military conflict that
unseats Saddam. In the worst case, Saddam
uses chemical or biological weapons against his
own people and Coalition forces and destroys
Iraqi oil facilities and dams either to slow an
attack or deny the benefits to any successor
government.
Blowing up oil wells or burning them would
create significant air pollution and increase
the number of people seeking refuge
elsewhere.
? The release of toxic hydrogen sulfide gas
associated with oil production in the north
would add to the humanitarian problem.
Destruction of dams would have a ong-
term impact on a subsequent regime,
however, limiting future flood control,
irrigation, and other projects.
? Existing medical facilities simply would be
unable to cope with widespread use of
chemical or biological weapons.
Deprived of oil revenues, Iraq would
be dependent on the international community
for food and medicine. The costs of
reconstruction of the oil wells would be a
further drain on scant resources.
(U) Health and Sanitation
Despite large infusions of
humanitarian supplies under OFF, regime
mismanagement, corruption, and misguided
priorities have caused an overall decline in
Iraq's healthcare delivery and sanitation
infrastructure. According to the Iraqi
Ministry of Health, an estimated $2 billion
and 2 years would be necessary to restore and
fully rehabilitate existing Iraqi hospitals to
pre-1991 condition. The current Iraqi medical
system is not structured to handle civilian
wartime mass casualty trauma and public
health problems.
? A few, primarily private, hospitals in
larger towns and government and private
outpatient facilities in smaller towns have
closed because they lack supplies,
personnel, and equipment. Medicines and
medical equipment obtained through OFF
have not been disseminated widely.
? Public health and preventive medicine
currently are inadequate and will
deteriorate during war. Sanitation-related
diseases including diarrhea, typhoid fever,
and cholera have increased along with the
insect transmitted diseases malaria and
leishmaniasis. Childhood vaccine
preventable diseases-measles, pertussis,
and diphtheria, also have increased.
The already poor civilian healthcare
situation probably would be severely
damaged by the war and widespread civil
strife. Cuts in electricity or looting of
distribution networks could have a cascading
disastrous impact on hospitals at a time when
casualty rates are likely to be high. During
hostilities, distribution of medical supplies
and imports-already scant-will be cut off.
? Iraq's three main pharmaceutical
manufacturing facilities-Samarra Drug
Industries, Al-Kindi, and Amiriyah Serum
and Vaccine-rely heavily on imported
materials that would cease within days of
the onset of hostilities. If these facilities
were destroyed as suspected dual use BW
sites, Iraq would require additional
imports of the critical medicines and
animal vaccines that they provide in the
aftermath of the war.
28
S
 SE /
 ? Civil unrest would threaten the continued
presence of few UN or NGO workers who
play key roles in humanitarian and
medical programs in Iraq. This would be
in addition to whatever suspension of
outside assistance resulted from a military
conflict.
? Iraqi aid workers would be unable to fill
the gap of departing international
humanitarian workers in the short term.
They would not have sufficient training
and supplies to carry out the work and in
some cases would themselves become
refugees or would flee possible reprisals
due to their affiliation with the old regime.
Iraq's already high incidence of
disease would likely be exacerbated by the
further degradation of infrastructure.
? If populations were displaced into
overcrowded and unsanitary living
conditions in cities or camps, epidemics of
waterborne and respiratory diseases would
be likely and would significantly
complicate the ability of post-Saddam
authorities to return calm to Iraq.
? Fatality rates would be highest in children
under age five. Interruptions in routine
UN-supplied childhood vaccine deliveries
would increase the death toll.
(U) Existing Infrastructure
The long-term disintegration of the
domestic infrastructure to meet human needs
is not inevitable. The military confrontations
that have hurt Iraq's infrastructure over the
past decade, coupled with long experience
battling domestic insurgencies, have provided
Iraqi technicians with considerable expertise
in repairing damaged equipment with few
resources.
? A surviving remnant of Iraq's civil
authority could move quickly to repair
damaged infrastructure, especially if
outside assistance were available.
? The UN humanitarian presence in Iraq
under OFF has helped to establish and
streamline distribution plans and rationing
systems that could provide a measure of
continuity during the transition period for
a new regime.
? Members of the Iraqi opposition and Iraqi
expatriates have been studying the Iraqi
infrastructure and examining what the
most pressing needs of a new regime
might be. Return of many of these
expatriates and application of the
expertise they have acquired in the West
would be a valuable addition to meeting
Iraq's humanitarian needs.
Financial Strains and
Economic Opportunities
The combined effects of the Iran-Iraq
and Gulf wars resulted in the destruction of
important Iraqi economic assets. Baghdad
has made some progress rebuilding Iraq's
economic infrastructure, especially in the
Sunni heartland, but it still functions below
pre-Gulf war levels. Moreover, Iraq's longer-
term financial prospects are clouded by the
need to use oil and limited non-oil export
revenues to pay reparations to victims of the
invasion of Kuwait, finance high import and
reconstruction costs, and service a large
foreign debt load.
? Multiple studies from worst case to best
case put Iraq's oil export earnings at $8-
37 billion annually in the first year or two
after sanctions are lifted, depending on the
price of oil and potential damage to Iraq's
oil infrastructure during conflict. If Iraq
remains bound by the UN-mandated
30
SE
 THIS PAGE WAS INTENTIONALLY. LEFT BLANK
 compensation fund requiring that 25
percent of Iraqi oil revenues go to war
reparations from Saddam's invasion of
Kuwait and if claimants-primarily
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia-do not waive
their claims, Iraq would have $6-27.8
billion in revenue.
? The international community's response
to Iraqi foreign debt will be critical to
Iraq's ability to reconstruct its economy.
We estimate that Iraq's total official
foreign debt is about $120 billion,
including about $40 billion owed to
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for loans during
the Iran-Iraq war. Depending on
refinancing terms, Baghdad may have to
pay as much as $12 billion annually just
to service the debt.
? Resolution of Iraq's foreign debt issues
will be critical to attracting necessary
foreign investment.
Without debt forgiveness, a
reduction in the war reparations ratio, or
something akin to a Marshall Plan, Iraq's
economic options are likely to remain few and
narrow. Faced with the prospect of laboring
under a vicious cycle of deficits and debt for
years to come, a new regime almost certainly
would ask the international community for
debt forgiveness and economic assistance.
Financial burdens of the magnitudes
detailed above, if unrelieved, could impel
a more promising successor government
toward using repression, out of necessity
to quell economically-driven unrest.
Alternately, a successor government could
exploit the economic strains to increase
the resentment of the populace against the
United States and the West portraying
both as attempting to destroy Iraq.
(U) Oil Production Scenarios
If Iraq's oil facilities were relatively
undamaged by a war, Baghdad could increase
crude oil production from 2.4 million barrels
per day (b/d) to about 3.1 million b/d within
several months of the end of hostilities.
Boosting production to the pre-Gulf
war level of 3.5 million b/d would take an
additional 12 to18 months and cost $2 to 3
billion for oil well workovers and equipment
maintenance in existing oilfields as well as
drilling and completing new oilfields such as
West Qurnah and Majnoon. At $22 per barrel
of Iraqi crude, production at 3.1 million b/d,
and assuming exports of 2.8 million b/d,
Baghdad could gross $22 billion per year.
Using the same assumptions, when oil
production reaches pre-Gulf war levels of 3.5
million b/d, revenues would reach $26 billion
annually.
? Continuation of war reparations would
leave Iraq with $16.5 billion in revenue.
In 1997 the Iraqi Oil Ministry
developed an aggressive plan to expand oil
production capacity to 6 million b/d within
seven years of the lifting of sanctions. To
achieve this pace of expansion, extensive
foreign assistance would be required as well
as about $15 billion to develop the 10 major
oilfields.
If Iraq's oil facilities sustained major
damage through Coalition attacks or Iraqi
attempts to destroy the oilfields, oil-sector
reconstruction costs could exceed $5 billion.
Additionally, at least two years would be
needed to restore production to pre-war
output.
33
SI
 If a successor authority in Baghdad
were perceived by investors as both
politically and economically stable, Iraq's
massive proven oil reserves-second only to
Saudi Arabia-could be a significant lure to
foreign investment. This could permit
Baghdad to expand its oil output rapidly-by
an average of 500,000 barrels per day (b/d)
per year for several consecutive years-
rivaling the recent pace of expansion in
Russia and making Iraq the second largest oil
exporter in the world after Saudi Arabia as
early as 2005.
? The biggest prizes of the Iraqi oil patch
are the "giant" oilfields with recoverable
reserves of more than one billion barrels
each. International oil companies have
expressed interest in developing seven of
these fields and have signed contracts for
two.
Even with the attractiveness of the
Iraqi oil sector, Iraq would need a stable
central government and would have to refrain
from unreasonable demands on foreign oil
companies to realize its full potential as an oil
exporter. Iraq would be capable of
maintaining current production capacity of
about 3.1 million b/d almost indefinitely with
its indigenous resources and could even
expand it slowly with help from oilfield
service companies. Without extensive foreign
investment, however, Baghdad would be
unlikely to have the financial and technical
resources to reach its announced goal of 6
million b/d in capacity.
A post-Saddam government also
wouVd to focus on developing a strong
private sector to set the stage for a less oil-
dependent economy. A new government
would need to stress fundamentals, such as
developing a common currency, providing
clear legal protection for private property,
revitalizing the domestic financial sector to
provide credit to fuel investment, and
developing tax and trade policies that would
encourage private commerce.
Iraq's rapidly growing and young
population and current poor socioeconomic
conditions will place added strains on the
government. Iraq will need to create more
than 240,000 new jobs each year for the next
five years to accommodate the growing labor
force-a difficult task for a country where
currently as much as 50 percent of the labor
force is unemployed or underemployed. Any
significant demobilization of Iraqi military
personnel would add to this already high rate
of unemployment.
Immutable Foreign Policy
Interests
The departure of Saddam Husayn-
who has been a major cause of regional
instability and enmity by twice launching
wars of aggression against his neighbors-
would offer the prospect of enhancing and
stabilizing Iraq's relations with other states in.
the region. Dependence of a new Iraqi
government on the United States, the United
Nations, or an international Coalition that
overthrew Saddam would heavily affect that
government's foreign policies. Nonetheless,
substantial elements of continuity in Iraqi
foreign policy perspectives would remain.
Iraqis would continue to perceive threats
growing out of tensions that are grounded in
more than Saddam's aggressive behavior and
would seek assurance that these perceived
threats were being countered. A government
in Baghdad also would attempt to build on the
relatively stable modus vivendi that Saddam
has achieved with his neighbors over the past
ten years.
Baghdad's primary foreign policy
focus would be on the states that border Iraq.
The main Iraqi concern would be in guarding
s~.
 S T4
against meddling by one or more of these
neighbors in conflicts inside Iraq.
? Turkey would be a concern for a post-
Saddam Iraqi regime,
? Unless there is some movement on a
tripartite agreement, relations between
Turkey, Iraq, and Syria could become
increasingly fractious because of water
shortages in Syria and Iraq emanating
from the Southeast Anatolian
Development Project.
? Rivalry with Iran would be a continuing
reality for Iraq. The two states are, by
virtue of population and petroleum
resources, the main contenders for
military dominance in the Persian Gulf.
Centuries-old enmity between Persian and
Arab would remain, as would distrust over
the status and exploitation of Iraqi Shia.
The territorial and navigational issues that
underlay the Iran-Iraq war would
continue, as well as issues left by the war
itself (unrepatriated prisoners and general
rancor from eight years of combat). For
the near term, Iran would be a concern to
a new Iraqi regime in terms of internal
meddling more than military intervention.
Sunni Iraqis would be wary about
Tehran's attempts to curry favor with, and
perhaps dissension in, the Iraqi Shia
community. Over the longer term, Iran's
WMD programs would be of high concern
to Baghdad, particularly if Iraq's own
WMD programs were destroyed and its
conventional forces weakened by combat
with Coalition forces and subsequent
occupation.
? A new government in Iraq would be less
concerned about Syria than about either
Turkey or Iran. The potential for
interference is less, there would be
continued mutual dependence on Syrian-
Iraqi trade, and a collapse of the Iraqi
Ba'th Party might reduce some of the
Iraqi-Syrian tensions that have involved
differing claims to Ba'thist orthodoxy.
Both Baghdad and Damascus might be
interested in developing a bilateral
relationship that would help to counter a
perceived Turkish-Israeli-Jordanian
alliance.
? The traditionally close ties between Iraq
and Jordan probably would remain
strong, although the makeup of a new
regime in Baghdad would determine how
far the relationship would develop.
? A new regime in Baghdad likely would
renounce Saddam's earlier claims on
Kuwait to garner international political
and economic support over the near term.
In the longer term, traditional Iraqi
designs on Kuwaiti territory could
resurface. Unsettled territorial issues
would be a source of potential friction in
the future. Iraqi complaints about the UN
demarcated border-which regime
35
S
 officials argue restricts Iraq's coastal
access-could become an issue with a
new government. Iraq has long argued
that access to international waters is
essential to its national security and future
Iraqi regimes could seek enhanced access.
Iraq's foreign rivalries extend
beyond ts immediate neighbors. Foremost
among the perceived threats that will worry
Iraqis is Israel. A new Iraqi regime almost
certainly would stay in the Arab mainstream
in voicing strong support for Palestinian
statehood and criticism of Israeli actions
against the Palestinians. At the same time,
the Israeli destruction of Iraq's Osirak nuclear
reactor.in 1981 remains a humiliating
memory for most Iraqis, who have an abiding
and deep distrust of Israel.
Expansion of relations with a variety
of outside powers would be another likely
theme of post-Saddam Iraqi foreign policy,
partly to try to minimize the influence of any
single power. This objective would become
increasingly important to the extent that the
United States were perceived as having
gained overriding influence in a postwar Iraq.
Baghdad probably would welcome enhanced
political ties with Russia and the European
Union-and perhaps also with Asian powers
such as India and China-building on
commercial relationships.
Implications for Iraqi
Security Policy
New Iraqi leaders would understand
that Iraq would have to bend to the will of the
international community at least as much on
military and security matters as on any other
aspect of policy, given the nature of the threat
Saddam's regime has posed. Nonetheless, as
with aspects of broader foreign policy, there
would be significant elements of continuity in
Iraqi perspectives and ambitions. A
combination of crushing defeat, disgust with
the path on which Saddam had taken Iraq, and
inspired new leadership could move Iraq in a
markedly less militarist direction, somewhat
like Japan after World War II. We believe it
more likely, however, that any future
government in Iraq would retain interest in
rebuilding the Iraqi military, for several
reasons:
? To counter the potential threats that Iraqis
would continue to see from its neighbors,
? To ensure internal security and provide
domestic jobs.
? To restore the pride in Iraq's historical
and regional importance that most Iraqis
probably share; Iraqis would consider a
significant military capability to be an
essential component.
A security guarantee involving a long-term
foreign military presence might partially
assuage the first two concerns but not the
third.
(U) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
The issue of weapons of mass
d struction would not go away, even if
Saddam's WMD programs were destroyed.
Any successor regime probably would be
cooperative on disarmament issues in the near
term, however, to maintain international
support.
? An immediate challenge in post-Saddam
Iraq will be accounting for all of the
WMD. The prospect that some material
would be siphoned off by military,
security, or scientific elements to be used
later against Coalition interests will be of
immediate concern.
S T/,
 ? Long-term foreign monitoring and
inspections likely would be necessary to
ensure that Iraq's WMD infrastructure
was dismantled and destroyed.
? Alternative occupations for scientists and
technicians involved in WMD programs
would reduce their availability for a re-
established program as well as reduce
their willingness to market their technical
expertise or materials to others.
Iraq's interest in WMD capabilities
has been largely a result of the security
environment as well as Saddam's
megalomania. Unless guaranteed a security
umbrella against its strategic rivals, future
Iraqi leaders would likely have a continued
Post-Saddam Political Reconstruction: A Simulatio
a simulation in July 2002 that revolved around a post-Saddam negotiation
along the lines of the Bonn conference on Afghanistan. Participants included Iraq and Middle
East experts from both private and public sectors as well as Middle East experts
The participants played the roles of several Iraqi
actors, including Sunni officers, opposition elements, remnants of the Tikriti elite, prominent
Shia figures, and Kurds. External actors included regional governments, the United Nations, the
United States and several Security Council members and European countries. Principal
observations from the simulation included:
? Political transformation inside Iraq would require an extremely large, long-term US military
presence on the ground and willingness for the United States to go it alone.
Limited US military involvement led to a Sunni-Arab military-dominated regime working
with a loose confederation of relatively autonomous groups.
Iraqi players were preoccupied with short-term personal gains and holding onto power rather
than taking a longer-term view on what might benefit Iraq as a nation. Short-term alliances
can be formed, however, similar to what happened with the Kurds in 1991.
Iraq's neighbors) were prone to take unilateral steps to ensure their
? The UN did not readily step into line with US plans.
? International players were ready to resume business with whoever appeared to hold the
power in Iraq.
Arab League members were more comfortable with the formulas for governance proposed by
the Iraqi delegations than with the democratic formula pushed by the Americans. The Arabs
were concerned that an uncomfortably high bar was being set for the region.
 interest in WMD. Baghdad might become
one of the more vocal proponents of region-
wide arms control. Without effective nuclear
arms control, concerns about the WMD
capabilities of other regional states,
probably would lead
a future Iraqi regime to consider how to
rebuild the country's WMD programs.
A new Iraqi regime would be less
inclined than Saddam to support terrorism,
although traditional sympathy for the
Palestinians could mean continued ties to
some Palestinian organizations. Sponsorship
of terrorism would not be seen as fulfilling
national pride or meeting regional security
concerns in the same way that a strong army
or WMD program might.
The ability of al-Qa'ida or other
terrorist groups to maintain a presence in
northern Iraq (or, more clandestinely,
elsewhere) would depend largely on whether
a new regime were able to exert effective
security control over the entire country. In
addition, rogue ex-regime elements could
forge an alliance with existing terrorist
organizations or act independently to wage
guerilla warfare against the new government
or Coalition forces.
38
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