NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005301354
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00571
• Publication Date: July 14, 1990

APPROVED FOR
RELEASED DATE:
01-Sep-2009
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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?TolrSteret-__,
(-NS NID 90-1631X
14 July 1990
Contents
USSR: Party Congress Ends
1
East Germany: Jittery Over Economic Protests
Notes
India: Government Teetering
6
in Brief
10
Special Analyses USSR: Gorbarhev's Hollow Victory at the Pam Congress
USSR?West Germany: Kohl Heads to Moscow
Liberia: Rebels Still Showing Caution
11
13
15
14 July 1990
IMO
?TUTSceret---
Proposed CPSU Politburo Lineup
Ex officio members Age Current Responsibilities
Mikhail Gorbachev b 59 CPSU General Secretary; USSR President
Vladimir Ivashko b 58 CPSU Deputy General Secretary
Mykolas Burokevicius 63 First secretary, Lithuanian Communist Party
Givi Gumbarid7e 45 First secretary, Georgian CP
Stanislav Gurenko 54 First secretary, Ukrainian CP
Islam Karimov 52 First secretary, Uzbek CP; president, Uzbek SSR
Petr Luchinskiy 50 First secretary, Moldavian CP
Kakhar Makhkamov 58 First secretary, Tajik CP; chairman, Tajik SSR
Supreme Soviet
Absamat Masaliyev 57 First secretary, Kirghiz CP; chairman, Kirghiz SSR
Supreme Soviet
Vladimir Movsisyan 56 First secretary, Armenian CP
Ayaz Mutalibov 52 First secretary, Azeri CP; president, Azerbaijan SSR
Nursultan Nazarbayev 50 First secretary, Kazakhstan CP; president, Kazakh
SSR
Saparmurad Niyazov 50 First secretary, Turkmen CP; chairman, Turkmen
SSR Supreme Sovi..t
Ivan Polozkov 55 First secretary, Russian CP
Alfred Rubiks ? 55 First secretary, Latvian CP (.
Enn-Arno Sillari 46 First secretary, Estonian CP
Efrem Sokolov 64 First secretary, Belorussian CP
Nominees c
Aleksandr Dzasokhov 56 Chairman, Liternational Affairs Committee, USSR
Supreme Soviet
Ivan Frolov 60 Party secretary; editor, Pravda
Yuriy Prokofyev 51 First secretary, Moscow city party committee
Galina Semenova 53 Editor, Krestianka
Yegor Stroyev 53 Party secretary for agriculture
Gennadiy Yanayev 52 Chairman, All-Union Council of Trade Unions
? Reflects decisions of CPSU Central Committee plenum on 13 July 1990.
b Member of Politburo before this reorganization.
c Voting to be announced 14 July 1990.
?ThrSeoreL
14 July 1990
USSR; Party Congress Ends
The conclusion of the 28th CP.S7.1 Congress yesterday saw sweeping
changes in the party's leadership that disenfranchise the central party
and state apparatus and shift power in the Politburo and Central
Committee to regional party leaders. The effects of this historic overhaul
of party decisionmaking are far from clear.
New Central The congress elected a new 412-member Central Commietee by secret
Committee ballot from a list of nominees selected by regional delegations to the
congress rather than from a predetermined list imposed by the party
leadership, as in the past. When the initial results were read,
Gorbachev fought successfully to overturn the decision of the
congress to drop candidates who had received the most negative
votes. Those candidates included several prominent reformers and
Gorbachev allies such as Presidential Council member Shatalin and
Deputy Premier Abalkin. Defense Minister Yazov also received a
significant negative vote. Six former Politburo members?Ligachev,
Vorotnikov Zavkov Yakovlev. SIvun'kov. and Medvedev?were not
nominated.
New Politburo
Comment: The election of many new members unknown in the West
makes the new Central Committee hard to predict. The body will
have less representation from the central apparatus and key
institutions, such as the military, but a larger number of local and
regional party officials. The regional basis of its selection plus the
large number of negative votes received by both reformers and some
traditionalists indicate a significant polarization that Gorbachev will
have a difficult time controlling.
After the congress adjourned, Gorbachev announced that the Central
Committee would complete its work of selecting a new leadership in
several hours, but TASS later announced that the plenum would
continue today. According to a press report, two members of the
Central Committee say the proposed Politburo membership includes
Gorbachev, Deputy General Secretary Ivashko, the 15 republic first
secretaries, Moscow party boss Prokofyev, trade union chief
Yanayev, Central Committee secretaries Stroyev and Frolov, head of
the Supreme Soviet International Affairs Commission Dzasokhov.
and editor Galina Semenova.
Comment: The extension of the plenum beyond what Gorbachev had
planned suggests the Politburo list is contentious and could still
undergo significant changes. If the proposed list holds up, the
continued
14 July 1990
The Proposed New Politburo
The 15 republic bosses added to the Politburo are products of their constituent republics
and hold widely varying views. Several, especially Petr Luchinskly of Moldavia and Givi
Gumbaridze of Georgia, have supported much of the agendas pushed by nationalists in their
republics. Others, such as Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, support greater economic
autonomy for their regions but want to avoid confrontation with the center. The majority,
however, have little sympathy for most nationalist demands. The six remaining new
members include:
? Pravda editor Ivan Frolov, a radical reformer and former Gorbachev aide, is the first
journalist to serve concurrently as a party secretary.
? Yegor Stroyev, proponent of radical agricultural reform, is likely to replace Yegor
Ligachev as the country's top agriculturalist.
?Moderate Gennadiy Yanayev, head of the troubled Soviet trade union apparatus.
? Yuriy Prokoryev, a moderate who currently serves as Moscow city party boss.
? Aleksandr Dza,sokhov, another moderate who is chairman of the Supreme Soviet
International Affairs Committee.
--Galina Semenova, a reformist editor.
The average age of members of the new Politburo is 54.
rt ?
14 July 1990
Gorbachev Looks
to 1992 for
More Change
Politburo members members who are not regional party bosses should be
strong Gorbachev supporters and much less traditionalist than the
Central Committee as a whole. But the Politburo's more numerous
regional leaders may, together with the body's increased size, make it
difficult for the Politburo to reach a consensus on critical issues.
The new Politburo, in any event, will mark a historic shift in control
of the party from the central leadership to the periphery. In addition,
with the exception of Gorbachev, there evidently will be a clear
separation between the party and state leadership, ending the
presence in the party leadership of key state leaders like the premier,
the KGB chief, and the foreign and defense ministers,
Gorbachev closed the congress by asserting that "the party is alive
and will continue making historical contributions to Soviet c9ciety
and world civilization." He warned, however, that it will be washed
.up if it does not reform itself. Earlier in the day, Gorbachev
announced plans to convene a party conference, or another full-
fledged party congress, in 1992 to adopt a new program. The congress
elected a 127-member commission of party heavyweights?including
Politburo members, secretaries, and republic party bosses?to draft
the program in the next six months, using as a basis the "program
statement" approved by this congress
Comment: The decision to defer final adoption of the party program
and to convene another major party meeting in less than :wo years
will give Gorbachev another opportunity to reshape the party
leadership. As head of the new commission, which includes many
allies, Gorbachev will be in position to influence strongly the
direction of the new program. He almost certainly will pay close
attention to the next delegate selection process to ensure tighter
control of the conclave. By calling another major party meeting with
powers to make personnel changes, Gorbachev also puts his tenure as
General Secretary at risk, although by 1992 he may have already
decided to focus full time on the presidency.
2
14 July July 1990
OD --
77- "
,
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14 July 1990
3 14 July 1990
???????????????????????=0..mon
EC Preparing for German Unification
The EC Commission is accelerating preparations for integrating East Germany into the
Community. Although agriculture and antitrust policies arc causing problems, an EC?East
German customs union is nearly complete to smooth trade 'retail:ins when formal unification
comes. The Commission has scheduled a meeting for late next month to consider the
technical implications of unification.
Bonn and the Commission may lock horns over conditions governing the access of East
German farm products to the EC market and over the size of increases in the EC grain and
dairy production quotas necessitated by their addition. The Germans may push for higher
quotas than the Commission would prefer. The EC probably will require cuts in meat and
dairy production. East Germany will reduce milk production through herd slaughter and
hopes to export surplus beef to the USSR, Concern is growing
in the Commission that takeovers of their East German counterparts by WL 4 German
companies may violate EC antitrust laws. EC Competition Commissioner Erman wants a
greater role for the Commission in vetting future deals.
The EC 4grees that East Germany can fulfill its trading commitments to the USSR and other
CEMA members until most expire at yearend, but the Germans must work out arrangements
to move future trade to a market basis. East Germany will be eligible for EC regional eid
after formal unification, but poorer member states will argue against major grants to keep
their grip on the bulk of such aid.
14 July 1990
71-17"Seefet?__
EAST GERMANS': Zittery Over Econemie Protests
Warning strikes and farmer protests over the initial effects of German
economic and monetary union are making East Berlin nervous Mat
unrest might dampen private investment critical to East German
recovery; Bonn's support for rapid market reforms there remains
unshaken
Sporadic protest strikes for wage hikes and job security resumed after
more than 120,000 metal and electrical workers walked out last week.
Unemployment rose sharply to 1.6 percent last month, and East
German workers reportedly fear sudden exposure to West German
competition may push unemployment above 20 percent later this
year. Several reports claim West German labor unions are exploiting
the unrest to expand their influence in the East. East German
Economics Minister Pohl recently warned the country's unions that
the survival of East German firms depends on keeping wage demands
in line with productivity.
Farmers protested in Leipzig and elsewhere this week what they say
is a takeover of the domestic food market by West Germans and arc
demanding more curbs on imported food. Finance Minister Romberg
said in a recent interview that much of the consumer goods industry
will collapse if Western goods continue to displace East German
output.
Meanwhile, Bonn and East Berlin agreed to limit to $3 billion
liquidity loans to some 5,000 East German enterprises requesting aid
to meet payrolls this month?less than a third of what the enterprises
claim to need. Officials in Bonn have expressed satisfaction that the
initial currency conversions appear to be going smoothly.
Comment: Both governments expected significant economic
dislocation and some unrest as East Germany converts to a market
economy and interest groups organize for all-German politics and
exercise newly won rights. Some East German officials are
increasingly nervous, however, that demagogic appeals of opposition
parties and unions for protection from market forces will reduce the
public's willingness to endure difficulties during the transition, fuel
more strikes and emigration to West Germany, and scare off badly
needed private investment. Nevertheless, the limits on loans to East
German enterprises indicate that Bonn is not overly concerned about
the course of monetary union and that Chancellor Kohl believes
voters will see improved economic conditions by the time of the
elections in December.
?
4
14 July July 1990
OD
. :7 ..... --.- ? -
111S.J.,,?
TODSPElret-
14 July '990
;
5 14 July 1990
1.#
?INDIA: Government Teetering
The resignations yesterday of three cabinet ministers could
bring about the collapse of Prime Minister Singh's government, and
press reports today have him offering to step down. The Ministers of
Commerce, Energy, and Tourism resigned over the reinstitution of
Deputy Prime Minister Lal's son as Chief Minister in Haryana state.
Two of the ministers?Arum Nehru and Arif Mohammad Khan?
were architects of Singh's Janata Dal party.
Comment: Singh's government is increasingly factionalized, but he
has previously withdrawn offers to quit his post. The resignations
probably were meant to warn him he must stop accommodating Lal,
who the ministers believe is threatening their political strength in the
party. The ministers probably will return to the cabinet if Singh
privately agrees to limit I.al's influence. Concessions by Singh,
however, might anger Lal, who has threatened to resign from the
cabinet: his resignation probably would brine down the government
-TF11--S) 6.11Cret-
6 14 July 1990
OD
14 July 1990
.....
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14 July 1990
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14 July 1990
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9
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14 July 1990
0
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14 July 1990
In Brief
Europe
USSR
g.!
V,
East Mia
? Some 20,000 Romanians marched in Bucharest yesterday
demanding release of student leader detained in crackdown last
month ... government calls lack of incidents positive. probably
hopes allowing protest will improve its image.
?Lithuania to set up centers to register those refusing to serve
in Soviet military.., probably would do repub?,c-legislated
alternative service orrjoin volunteer militia cover for those
resisting Soviet draft.
? City of Moscow petitioning Soviet Defense Ministry to assign
son... 3,000 local conscripts annually to its police force ... de facto
alternative service if implemented, will spur other officials,
activists to press for same.
? Japan's Deputy Foreign Minister visiting China Monday to brief
on Houston summit, announce release of $5.4 billion aid package
... technical aid talks planned later this month.., first aid
probably to be disbursed by early fall.
? Chaos in South Korean parliament today as ruling party secured
quick passage of four bills denounced by opposition as
undemocratic ... several opposition lawmakers resigned yesterday
... increasing political strife likely.
10
= 7 ? ",??
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Special Analysis
USSR: GorLacher's Hollow Victory at the Party Congress
All the .Pails of shifts in leadership and policy are not yet in, but
ir appears that, while Gorbachev achieved most of his objectives at
the party congress, his failure to hold the party together or to move it
decisively toward democracy will further polarize the political situation
In the USSR and hasten the decline of the CPSU.
Gorbachev rallied reformers and moderates to his program in the
name of unity and decisively defeated the party's Neanderthal wing.
Although traditionalists dominated the first week, Gorbachev turned
the tide on Wednesday when his handpicked candidate, Vladimir
Ivashko, decisively ber.t Yegor Ligachev for the position of Deputy
General Secretary and sent the chief spokesman for Dartv hardliners
back to Tomsk to write his memoirs.
The party's program statement probably does not go as far as
Gorbachev wants, but it apparently will help democratize the CPSU's
internal practices. Gorbachev also engineered the selection of a new
Central Committee on a regional basis and a restructured Politburo
similarly chosen on a federal basis
Although Gorbachev got his way on most issues, he was not able
to achieve his key objective of preventing a split with the party's
democratic reform wing. His concessions to them in revising the
party's program and rules?most notably to accommodate their
demand for curbing the party's influence in the military?did not
atisfy their insistence on ending democratic centralism and on
allowing factions in the party.
The rejection of the party by Boris Yel'tsin and the democratically
elected mayors of Moscow and Leningrad undermines the value of
Gorbachev's symbolic victories over the hardliners. As a result, his
successes in moving the congress in a reformist direction are unlikely
to reverse the growing isolation of the CPSU and the polarization of
political power between the discredited party and the demooratically
elected state institutions w
prevail.
Polarization could be accentuated if the new, invigorated party
leadership tries to reassert its role in shaping policy at the center or
implementing it at the local levels. The Secretariat will be headed by
Deputy General Secretary Ivashko and may become a center of power
as it runs the party on a day-to-day basis. The danger will grow if
Ivashko and Gorbachev, who have differed in the past on economic
reform, drift apart and lvashko?working there full-time?uses the
Secretariat to build an independent political base.
continued
11 14July 1990
,
With the party in decline, Gorbachev will face growing incentives
to distance himself from it and to try to use the presidency to avoid
becoming irrelevant. By retaining the leadership of the party, he has
prevented it from being used against him, but it will be of declining
use to him as a political base in the increasingly democratic
environment. The decisions of close allies Aleksandr Yakovlev and
Eduard Shevardnadze to abandon the party leadership in favor of the
Presidential Council are one early sign that Gorbachev may veer in
this direction.
Next Steps
Gorbachev's tactical success at the congress has maintained his
mastery over the party, but the disputes at the meeting were often
irrelevant to what is happening in the country. As popularly elected
soviets (councils) become increasingly powerful, they are likely to
threaten party power and privileges more aggressively and to press
Gorbachev to make good on his commitment to transfer real political
power to the state institutions. These clashes are likely to make
Gorbachev's retention of both the presidency and the cost of the
party General Secretary increasingly untenable.
Now that the congress is over, Gorbachev will need to return to
addressing the country's growing political and economic crises. The
divisions in the country will make solutions dependent on an attempt
to form a coalition with Yel'tsin and other independent democratic
forces. Gorbachev indicated his willingness to consider a coalition in
his closing remarks, but it is not clear how far he is willing to go. The
steps he could take now to free himself from the party and to build
such a coalition include:
? Using his presidency to side more decisively with the new
state institutions by helping them strip the CPSU of its powers
and its financial and media organizations.
?- Moving toward conciliation with Yel'tsin and other
democratic reformers by working out joint approaches to
economic reform, renewal of the union, and other issues.
? Establishing a government of national unity that includes
genuine leaders of key constituencies.
If Gorbachev fails to move in this direction and continues to
temporize, be it from personal convictions or tactical considerations,
he will be increasingly irrelevant, and the country's travails are likely
to get worse.
12
14 July 1990
,10.Mayrafanno.a.taxamosma.....
Oi
Soviets Lay Groundwork for a United Germany in NATO
Gorbachev and Shevardnadze defended their German policy against sharp criticism at the
party congress, and both have praised the London declaration in terms that set the stage for
accepting a united Germany in NATO. Other Soviet officials and commentators have argued
that NATO membership for a united Germany would pose no threat to the USSR's security.
Gorbachev lauded the London declaration as a "significant step in the right direction" and
vowed to keep his current foreign policy on track.
? Gorbachev: "1 completely reject attempts to bring our policies into doubt as being
fully unacceptable.. .. [Our economic difficulty] is not a reason for not seeing and for
closing one's eyes to what the foreign policy is and what it has given the country as a
whole."
Shevardnadze noted that Moscow regards the London declaration as "a serious and
important political act."
?Shevardnadze: "The army of the future 'greater Germany' will be smaller than
today's West German army. What is best for us? To deal with the 500,000-strong
Btmdeswehr or, say, an army half that size in a united Germany?"
Soviet media commentators have called for acceptance of German membership in NATO
and provided Gorbachev with arguments that he is protecting Soviet security interests in
Europe.
?Aleksandr Bovin on Moscow radio: "To begin with, the prospect is absolutely certain.
Germany will be a member of NATO, and attempts to prevent it are illusory.... We
should calmly accept the inevitable future.... 1 am convinced that our security will
suffer no harm from it."
?And in lzvestiya: "Soviet strategic potential possesses such a safety margin that
'transferring' East Germany from one bloc to another will not have an appreciable
effect on the level of USSR security."
?on-sGladkov in Moscow News: "We may insist that we reject a united Germany as a
member of NATO, but the reality is such that this is going to happen willy-nilly....
Any talk about NATO being a threat to the Soviet Union can't be serious: there are
no reasons?economical, political, or ideological?for it."
3111rSeacet__
14 July 1990
Special Analysis
Kohl Heads to Moscow
WEST GERMANY;
Gorbachev may hint at readiness to accommodate German membership
in NATO during his talks with Chancellor Kohl tomorrow and Monday,
but he will try to exploit Kohl's desire for a fall agreement to gain
further commitments from NATO and more German economic aid.
Bonn is confident the NATO issue will be resolved by fall, but Kohl
intends to go forward with an all-German yr in December even if the
ex:ernal aspects of unity remain unresolved.
Kohl's visit starting today follows Moscow's favorable reception of
the NATO summit declaration, which the Soviets had said would be
crucial for their position on Germany in NATO. Wreover, Moscow
has already secured agreements in principle on keeping Soviet troops
in eastern Germany for a period after unification, on German
recognition of postwar borders, and on devising a new security system
for Europe based on CSCE. Gorbachev and his supporters probably
believe an agreed package of security and economic provisions is
within reach that would let them present a settlement leaving
Germany in NATO as adeauatelv guarding the USSR's security and
1
in its interests.
)Moving Toward a Deal
--7The Soviets regard ceilings on German national forces as key to
an agreement and will expect Kohl to build on Bonn's recently
reported willingness to set manpower limits at the negotiations on
conventional forces in Europe (CFE). Moscow will press for a ceiling
between the 390,000 Bonn has floated and the 250,000 Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze recently proposed; Bonn may go as low as
350,000. Kohl might endorse Soviet proposals for a joint declaration
by the alliances on their changing relations.
Security provisions are paramount for the Soviets, although
Gorbachev views economic benefits as essential to defending an
agreement against his increasingly vocal critics at home. He will angle
for assistance in addition to the credits and financing of Soviet forces
offered so far. Bonn is trying to meet Soviet concerns by proposing to
increase energy imports from the USSR. Further private West
German credits are in the works, and Kohl will hold out?and
probably exaggerate?the prospects for economic cooperation after
unification.
Moscow has called for the external aspects of unification to be
resolved by September, indicating it recognizes that the momentum
of the process has made stalling useless and possibly
13
continued
re
14 July 1990
? . "
"7-""inrclgezet
counterproductive. Over the next few months, Gorbachev will
intensify efforts to strike the best deal possible and to build domestic
acceptance of a settlement. Statements by Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze at the party congress and recent media commentary
suggest Moscow has already begun to prepare the public for
acceptance of Germany in NATO.
If Moscow Hangs Tough
Although prospects for a two-plus-four agreement are improving,
Soviet domestic politics or the USSR's insistence on continued Four-
'Power rights in Germany for a transitional period might complicate a
settlement. Bonn will face painful choices if Moscow has not moved
.on outstanding security issues by fall. Kohl's unification timetable
envisions a two-plus-four agreement by October, a CSCE "blessing"
of German unity in November, and all-German elections in early
? December.
Kohl has rejected Soviet proposals to delink external and internal
aspects of unification because they would maintain Four-Power rights
over a united Germany. He might reluctantly accept this course,
however, to permit the all-German vote, which he expects to win.
The West Germans probably will press for early talks on short-range
nuclear forces and may assure Moscow they will not deploy tactical
air-to-surface missiles even if pressed by Washington. Bonn has
virtually no incentive to leave NATO's military command. Strong
majorities of voters and elites favor German membership in NATO,
West German leaders realize
hints of leaving NATO would cause a crisis in relations with the US
and the European Allies.
Bonn's position probably would soften only if it thought Washington,
-Paris, and London were willing to compromise on the NATO issue.
Hardline Soviet policies might lead Bonn to seek accommodation but
also might backfire by feeding German nationalism and even stronger
Pro7_444cc..?C1.074;14.
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14 14 July 1990
OD
Current Developments, Mid-Jul ? 1990
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14 July 1990
711447 7.110
Special Analysis
LIBERIA: Rebels Still Showing Caution
The insurgents are likely to continue their strategy of advancing slowly
and may spend another week or more trying to wear down Doe's army
before attacking the center of Monrovia.
The rebels have made significant headway since they took Carcysburg
several weeks ago. They have moved within 16 kilometers of the
capital, cut two of three entrances to the city, blockaded the port. and
engaged the army on several fronts.
Insurgent leader Taylor probably would like to make good his boast
that he would begin taking Monrovia this weekend, but he has told
reporters the rebels are finding the going tougher as they approach the
capital. Command and logistic problems probably will force the
rebels to spend time regrouping before trying to move forward. When
they resume their advance, heavy fighting is likely in Paynesville,
Elwa, and other areas where the army probably will continue offering
resistance.
In addition to battle fatigue and logistic problems, the insurgents
have ,...countered ambushes near Bensonville on the outskirts of the
capital by forces of rival rebel leader Prince Johnson. Taylor
apparently decided to face Johnson's soldiers?probably numbering
between 200 and 500?before attacking President Doe's army again.
-Reports of food and ammunition shortages among Taylor's troops
suggest he may need more time to get supplies to the front lines
Monrovia probably will yet become a battleground: neither side
seems prepared to compromise in the peace talks in Sierra Leone. The
rebels insist they will not negotiate a cease-fire until Doe resigns. Doe
has some 1,600 fairly reliable troops in Monrovia and appears
determined to fight to the end; he has said he would destroy the
capital rather than let Taylor take over. Remaining loyalist units,
especially at Doe's Executive Mansion, are showing no sign of
breaking ranks despite the flight of some senior commanders
Poor tactical communications and indiscipline among new recruits
will impair the rebel leadership's ability to control operations as the
insurgents enter the capital, particularly if they have to fight their way
to the Executive Mansion. Rebels probably will engage in atrocities
against Doe's fellow Krahns and their Mandingo allies as well as
random killing and looting.
15
14 July 1990