NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005301360
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00571
• Publication Date: June 4, 1990

APPROVED FOR RELEASES
DATE: 09-01-2009
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CPAS NID 90-129JX
4 June 1990
Contents
Liberia: Rebels Closing In
1
USSR: Reaction to the Summit
South Korea: Discouraging Luxury Imports
5
Notes Taiwan: Reacting to Trade Deficit With Japan
In Brief
Special Analyses
7
West Africa: Reform and Unrest, Marching Hand-in-Hand
12
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4 June 1990
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Military Situation, 3 June 1990
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4 June 1990
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LIBERIA: Rebels Closing In
The rebels launched military and diplomatic offensives over the weekend
designed to undercut support for President Doe.
The rebels have taken Owensgrove and Harbel,
and probably have de facto control of Roberts
International Airfield. The army reportedly plans to counterattack.
Although the rebels control Buchanan, fighting continued there over
the weekend, and the army still maintained a toehold at the port.
Press reports indicate the rebels have gained control of Gbarn a and
an army unit disclosed the rebels have retaken Kakata.
A rebel spokesman said Friday the rebels have dropped their demand
that Doe surrender and stand trial. If Doe leaves the country, the
insurgents would agree to work with the existing bureaucracy anc:
legislature to set UD an interim government
There are signs the arrival of US Navy ships has slightly eased
tensions in Monrovia. Many Liberians apparently believe US troops
will intervene if the fighting reaches Monrovia.
Comment: The sudden surge in the rebels' offensives this weekend
probably is aimed at creating enough pressure to bring about the fall
of the regime without having to fight for the capital. Their unexpected
willingness to work with the bureaucracy probably will add to the
number of Monrovians eager to push Doe aside and end the chaos in
Liberia
Although there have been few signs so far of a backlash against
US citizens, once it becomes clear the US Navy's mission is limited
to evacuating Americans, the perception that the US is abandoning
Liberia could foster anti-US sentiment.
1 4 June 1990
I ?I ?I I
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Fop -Start-
Reaction in Western Europe
Initial reaction from NATO countries has been primarily in press
commentaries and is generally positive. West German Chancellor
Kohl, in the first high-level reaction available, said the summit had
improved the international framework for German unification and
expressed confidence that remaining problems, including the issue
of alliance membership; can be resolved. Most newspapers stressed
the cordial atmosphere at the summit and saw it as restoring the
momentum of improved relations between the superpowers. A
number of editorialists welcomed the progress on arms control,
although some West German commentators voiced disappointment
that President Gorbachev did not soften his objections to a united
Germany's membership in NATO.
On balance, the West European media see the summit as a success for
Gorbachev because he achieved much of what he wanted on trade
issues without making concessions on Germany or Lithuania. Several
commentators, however, expressed skepticism that the summit would
help Gorbachev much at home.
0
4 June 1990
ere
USSR: Reaction to the Summit
President Gorbachev undoubtedly has come from the summit buoyed
and in a stronger domestic position; Soviet commentaries have
unanimously acclaimed the summit unvsually productive and
successful.
Comments by Gorbachev stressing President Bush's vision, wisdom,
and willingness to achieve "real results" have been widely replayed in
the Soviet media. The Soviets have portrayed the significance of the
summit as extending far beyond the specific agreements signed,
noting the importance of coming to understandings about global
changes under way and citing plans for two more summits this year
as proof of a major break from the Cold War.
Comment: With progress in arms control and a trade agreement
in hand, Gorbachev goes home able to show new momentum on
foreign policy without having his hands tied on Lithuania. He
almost certainly will argue that the trade agreement symbolizes US
commitment to provide some economic relief. He also can counter
domestic critics of his foreign and arms control policies by pointing
to his tough position on Germany and US agreement to remain
broadly engaged in follow-on talks.
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4 June 1990
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SOUTH KOREA: KOREA: Discouraging Luxury Imports
Seoul's new campaign to discourage imports of selected consumer goods
is intended to please a public increasingly focused on social equity
issues; it probably will have little economic impact, including on imports
of specific US products to which South Korea has promised to open its
market.
The South Korean press reports that MTI's Trade
Committee will investigate 200 consumer imports and restrict those
judged to harm domestic industry. The Korea Trade Commission
reportedly will study whether imports of home ,ippliances, chocolates,
clothing, and other goods are harming domestic producers. The
media report the government will tighten testing of imported
consumer goods for safety and environmental standards, and Korean
trade associations are telling their members to curb purchases of
luxury goods.
Comment: Recent opinion polls show the South Korean public is
outraged by the conspicuous consumption exhibited by many wealthy
Koreans. The government apparently hopes to convince voters that
addressing income inequities has become a priority policy issue.
Although government planners are concerned about the $1 billion
trade deficit in the first quarter of this year, consumer goods account
for less than 10 percent of imports. The government would be
reluctant to restrict severely a broader range of imports; higher tariffs
and the imposition of quotas would hinder efforts to slow inflation
and facilitate industrial restructuring. Seoul, moreover, also is aware
that backtracking on promises to open its markets would evoke a
negative reaction from the US, South Korea's largest export market.
onrStreret-
$ 4 June 1990
T?Serret-
Taiwan: Trade With Japan,
1980-89
Billion US $
16
1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
326821 8.90
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4 June 1990
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TAIWAN: Reacting to Trade Deficit With Japan
Taiwan announced on Thursday it will reduce Japanese machinery
imports, restrict Tokyo's participation in bidding for public projects,
and investigate its alleged dumping of goods in Taiwan markets.
Taiwan ran a $7 billion trade deficit with Japan last year; the deficit
grew at a 2-percent annual rate through April to reach $2.5 billion so
far this year, almost offsetting Taiwan's trade surplus with the US for
the first time. President Li Teng-hui recently publicly criticized
Tokyo's cautious handling of unofficial relations, blaming the
inability to resolve the trade imbalance on Japan's unwillingness to
allow bilateral ministerial talks.
Comment: Taipei views the bilateral deficit as a major threat to its
economic stability, but the new measures are similar to others Taiwan
has implemented to restrict Japanese imports and will do little to ease
its dependence on the Japanese market. If the deficit with Japan
continues to grow, Taipei probably will be increasingly reluctant to
make trade concessions to Washington that might reduce its surplus
with the US.
"1-17-5"e) cret,
6 4 June 1990
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In Brief
USSR
? Lithuanian President Landsbergis said yesterday he, Russian
Republic leader Yel'tsin will soon sign trade agreement ...
reportedly agreed last week on process to discuss terms ... suggests
Yel'tsin moving to challenge Soviets' Baltic policy.
? Surrounding oblasts curtailing meat, milk, vodka, other deliveries
to Moscow ... retaliating for Soviet city's ban on food sales to
nonresidents... supplies already low, effects likely to show within
two weeks if negotiations fail.
? Unloading of scarce meat, butter, fruit lagging at Soviet Far East
ports ... refrigerator car shortages, bureaucratic squabbles blamed
... holdup will aggravate already tight food situation,
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0'
Unrest in West Africa
4'." Francophone country
Sporadic rioting, near daily demonstrations
since March .. . may force postponement of
promised multiparty elections this month
President's tolerance of unrest encouraging
further demands, producing unease among
ruling elite.
Regime corruption fueling demands for
pat/cid change ... President Traore
re/nets multiparty system, calls for
participation in ruling party.
Student, labor, ethnic unrest since February
. some concessions but regime still one-
party state dominated by military.
Single-party regime declined last month to
endorse multiparty system, but offered press
freedom. . . economically stable, little popular
demand for political reform.
Mounting popular dissatisfaction with
lackluster Biya regime. . . opposition rally
late last month tested government claim
of political openness . . . seven died in
resulting riots as security forces tried to
block crowd.
Pressure for political, economic ,e form
resulted in riots by teachers, students early
last month . . . now quiet. . . President
Kolingba clinging to single party . . claims
multiparties will lead to anarchy, offering
limited liberalization within ruling party.
President Bongo dissolved only political
party, promised opposition role after riots
in February. ... trying to placate striking
workers malor_rioting last month
following death of an opposition leader
. . . ethnic violence may prompt regime
to renege on political reform.
Mobutu promised three parties, new
constitution in April . public increasingly
skeptical, sees reforms as cosmetic. .
widespread student unrest last month . . .
Belgium suspended direct loans In response
to harsh crackdown.
719137 1003110) 6.90
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4 June 1990
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Special Analysis
WEST AFRICA: Reform and Unrest, Marching Hand-in-Hand
The recent unrest sweeping West and Central Africa?especially the
Francophone countries?may lead to backtracking on political reforms.
The lack of resources with which to ease resentment over corruption and
. .
economic austerit will nonetheless continue to un
/
Recent rioting in once relatively stable countries such as Ivory Coast,
Gabon, and Cameroon is rooted in rapidly deteriorating economic
conditions, although it has inducted demands for political
liberalization. Weak oil prices and the collapse of prices for coffee
and cocoa have undone some of Africa's economic success stories. As
living standards decline and unemployment rises, hostility toward the .
ong-entrenched rulers and anger over austerity
measures have ignited public protest.
In Ivory Coast, for example, successive strikes and demonstrations
since March by various public-sector workers forced President
Houphouet-Boigny to suspend IMF-backed wage and employment
reductions. New austerity measures announced last week avoid
controversial cutbacks but are u likel ? ,m?
economic problems.
i.
Political Demands on the Rise
Economic grievances have spilled over into demands for far-reaching
political reforms, including the removal of out-of-touch leaders and
the adoption of multiparty democracy. Lacking resources
uch leaders as Houphouet-Boigny and
Gabon's President Bongo have promised political change in gradual
steps in the hope of appeasing critics while maintaininy control of thp
process.
Many African governments fear that, without progress toward
political liberalization, they will lose Western aid and investment to
the newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. The regimes do
not intend to relinquish power, however, and are likely to backtrack
on reform rather than risk losing control. Zaire's President Mobutu
already has stepped back from announced moves toward political
pluralism: he has shifted authority from technocrats in the cabinet
to cronies in the presidency, while security forces have brutally
suppressed opposition and student demonstrations.
continued
"TorSreret-
12 4 June 1990
?
1-1 ?1 1? 1 ?1
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Pressure for political liberalization will aggravate underlying ethnic
and regional tensions held in check by autocratic leaders. Few if any
of the political groups now organizing appear able to create broadly
based parties that could win elections, establish governments, and
sustain commitments to economic reform. Gabon's movement
toward pluralism recently resulted in intertribal violence following
the death of a leading opposition figure. Several leaders continue
to insist that only one-party states can contain longstanding local
rivalries that bedevil the region, and they have been quick to head
off any sign of political unrest.
Diminishing French Interest
While non-Francophone Africans also seek political and economic
change, the most serious unrest has occurred in France's former
colonies. These countries share a history of relying on Paris to bail
them out of economic difficulties without insisting on fundamental
reform. As Paris reevaluates its role in Africa, assistance is likely to
fall short of its clients' expectations because of French budgetary
concerns, competing interests in Eastern Europe, and decreasing
commercial interest in Francophone Africa.
France is likely to offer former colonies debt-relief schemes but
probably will demand closer links between assistance and economic
reform. On security issues, President Mitterrand wants to avoid
taking sides in internal conflicts and probably will intervene only if
French lives or substantial commercial interests are at stake?as in
Gabon, where French troops recently evacuated threatened
expatriates?or where external threats exist, as in Chad.
No Relief in Sight
African leaders will find it harder and harder to balance popular
demands for economic concessions and political change with calls for
more reform by international lenders. Further unrest is likely in a
region already prone to coups, and some longtime leaders friendly to
the US may pass from the scene. Facing scarce resources and hard
choices, many desperate regimes are likely to look first toward
satisfying the demands of key backers in the military and security
services and crack down harshly on protest and opposition activity.
The last three paragraphs in the foregoing Special Anal s w
inadvertently omitted from the Daily of 2 June.
13
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4 June 1990