NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005301366
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00571
• Publication Date: June 11, 1990

(b)(3)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
09-01-2009
CPAS NID 90-135JX
 Liberia: Peace Talks Planned as Fighting Continues
Czechoslovakia: Civic Forum Triumphs in Vote
EC--Iran: Talk About Rcpairir g Rciatimr_
Special Analyses USSR: Democratic Reformers Challenging Gorbachev 10
 To
Canada: Proposal for Senate Reform
Senators are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister. The
104 seats are now distributed according to regional representation. Quebec and Ontario
account for about half the members.
The compromise package provides a five-year deadline for the provincial premiers to
reform the Senate into an elected body with more equal representation among the
provinces. If an agreement is reached, according to press reports, Ontario would give up
six of its 24 seats; New Brunswick and Nova Scotia would lose two each. Quebec would
keep its 24 seats but would gain in proportion to Ontario. Should the premiers fail to reach
agreement, the Senate automatically would be reapportioned to add two new seats each for
the four western provinces and Newfoundland.
Current Distribution of Senate Seats
Western Provinces
(24)
Ontario
24
Alberta
6
Saskatchewan
6
Quebec
24
British Columbia
6
Manitoba
6
Newfoundland
6
Maritime Provinces
(24)
Yukon Territory
New Brunswick
10
Nova Scotia
10
Northwest Territories
Prince Edward Island
4
 r
Prime Minister Mulroney and the provincial premiers on Saturday
patched together an agreement on the Meech Lake accord, but a more
decentralized Canada almost certainly will result.
The Premiers of Manitoba and Newfoundland-the last two to
approve the accord-signed a compromise that would begin Senate
reform but would not alter Meech Lake's recognition of Quebec as
a "distinct society." The premiers added a nonbinding letter by
constitutional experts declaring that the "distinct society" clause
complements but does not override the Charter of Rights; the letter is
not part of the Meech package. A special commission will examine a
largely symbolic "Canada clause" to be added to the preamble to the
Constitution. It expands definition of the Canadian identity to
include recognition of multicultural and native groups
The Premiers of Newfoundland, Manitoba, and New Brunswick
have the support needed to win approval of the package in their
legislatures by the 23 June deadline. However, Newfoundland's
Premier Wells, chafing over the deal, is threatening to hold a
provincewide referendum on the issue.
Comment: Despite his threat, Wells is unlikely to risk the compromise
by placing the issue before the public in Newfoundland, where the
accord is unpopular. Quebec Premier Bourassa and Mulroney have
scored big political gains. Bourassa will be viewed in Quebec as
having won the province's right to protect its French language and
culture. Mulroney, taking credit for having "saved Canada," probably
will try to take a more federalist approach in the immediate future to
undercut his rival Jean Chretien, a strong federalist who is likely to be
the next Liberal Party leader
Quebec's demands for more autonomy, however, are likely to
continue. Any concessions to Quebec are likely to draw similar
requests from other provinces, particularly in western Canada. Senate
reform is likely to grant more seats and influence to the smaller and
western provinces, increasing their ability to fight for regional
 ~+ " a..1o ir,yr x11r5
Soviet Union
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Interethnic Conflict in Kirghiz S.S.R. and
Uzbek S.S.R., 10 June 1990
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l I June 1990
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S.S.R. gthni;
clashes
continue
Tajik S.S.R.
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 one
Although the casualty count continues to rise, apparently mostly from
delayed reporting, security forces maintained control in the Kirghiziya
and Uzbekistan areas of the Fergana Valley and in Frunze yesterday in a
still-explosive situation.
Scattered fighting continues in smaller cities near Osh, and Soviet
media report at least 115 dead and 460 injured in the conflict
between Kirghizis and Uzbeks, including three dead and 41 injured
in the security forces. Nevertheless, authorities claim partial success
in calming Osh and the Uzbekistan border region. Ministry of
Interior and army forces reportedly control the ethnic Uzbek city of
Uzgen, where 68 deaths and the worst destruction apparently
occurred. Armed bands, some dressed in police uniforms, reportedly
arc still cn aging in Mil?alld-ru!i attacks in rnau, of h'
smaller cities. Efforts to evacuate some Uzbeks and open u
intercommunal dialogue reportedly are also under way.
students and nationalists have been prohibited, and the peo le
Comment: Authorities seem anxious to begin the work of peaceful
reconciliation. However, casualty figures may further inflame the
situation. In Uzgen, most of the casualties probably are Uzbeks.
Having secured control of Frunze, Kirghiz Republic authorities are
able to ignore calls for political change by an emerging nationalist
movement, but Kirghiziya is likely to face further interethnic conflict
and political instability.
-'T'~lo '+~
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 Delegations from the Liberian Government and the Liberian Council
of Churches are expected to arrive in Sierra Leone today for peace
talks with rebel representatives. The discussions reportedly are
designed to seek common ground for negotiating a cease-fire and an
Comment: The negotiating positions of the two sides are likely to be
far apart. The rebels probably will continue to demand that President
Doe leave office before a cease-fire can be arranged. Meanwhile, Doe
till refuses wn
militarily and may be in a position to resume consolidating their
Barring a major army
offensive, the rebels are likely to continue gaining the upper hand
 This week President Havel probably will ask Marian Calfa, a
member of Public Against Violence, to stay on as Prime
Minister. But Havel, a consensus builder, may give the
prince-ministership to the Christian Democratic Union to
help heal campaign wounds and broaden his support base. In
that case, he probably will tap current Deputy Prime Minister
Jan Carnogursky.
Calfa quit the Communist Party in January, a month after
becoming Prime Minister. He has worked for political and
economic reform. If he stays on, he probably will continue
Lu ire a policy inwpiementer, leaving poiucy formation
largely to Havel.
Jan Carnogursky
A longtime Catholic activist and right-of-center opponent
of the Communist regime, Carnogursky had been out of
prison only two weeks when he was named to the
government last December. He is a prominent voice in
Slovakia for continued union with the Czech lands but
with increased autonomy for Slovakia. His Christian
Democratic Union did worse than expected, but he will
continue to wield considerable influence, especially in
Slovakia, whether or not he becomes prime minister.
 CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Civic Forum Triumphs in Vote
program.
Comment: The alliance can control the Federal Assembly by
themselves, but its leadership almost certainly will accept the
Christian Democrats as junior partners. The size of the victory might
encourage the next government to speed up economic restructuring
while its mandate is si;ii strong. But the alliance is an amalgam of
many small groups, and internal disputes over its role might interfere
with its ability to govern. Havel, assured of reelection, will play a key
distant runners-up, each receiving 10 to 12 percent.
and Saturday. Exit polls indicate Civic Forum and its Slovak
counterpart, Public Against Violence, received 48 percent of the
ballots cast. The Christian Democrats and the Communists were
President Vaclav Havel's ruling alliance apparently has a clear
mandate to carry out political and economic reforms. More than
90 percent of the eligible voters turned out for the election on Friday
BULGARIA: Likely Communist Win
Preliminary election projections indicate the Bulgarian Socialist
Party (BSP)-the former Communist Party-will finish well ahead of
the main opposition group, the Union for Democratic Forces (UDF).
Predictions based on a "quick count" of about 38 percent of the party
preference vote, carried out by a nonpartisan Bulgarian monitoring
group and the US National Democratic Institute, give the BSP
48.3 percent and the UDF 34.9 percent. The Agrarian Party is
winning 8.3 percent and the pro-Muslim Rights and Freedoms
Movement 5.7 percent; no other party is receiving more than
l percent. Official results for the half of the 400 parliamentary seats
to be determined by proportional representation are expected early
today, but winners in the 200 single-seat districts will not be known
Comment: Even if the BSP wins a clear majority, it will try to form
a coalition government. It is looking to the West for approval and
economic assistance, and Prime Minister Lukanov repeated yesterday
that the BSP sees a coalition government as in the country's best
interest. An effective government may still be some distance away;
the UDF and the Agrarian Party are pledged not to join a BSP
government. Even if they go back on this pledge and enter a coalition,
consensus on pressing issues like economic reform and depoliticizin
the bureaucracy and security service will be difficult to reach_~
 EC-IRAN: New Talk About Repairing Relations
The EC appears ready to accept an Iranian official's suggestion of
a way to normalize relations ruptured last year by Tehran's death
sentence on Salman Rushdie. According to a British press report, an
Iranian Foreign Ministry official last week suggested Tehran would
not pursue its vow to kill Rushdie if the EC condemned "insults" to
Islam. The UK, which has blocked efforts to lift EC diplomatic
sanctions against Iran, responded fav to the suggestion,
according to press orablit was disappointed by
later objections from Supreme Leader Khamenei. The Irish, who
currently hold the EC Presidency, reportedly are circulating among
suggestion.
Comment: Iranian hardliners remain opposed to rapprochement,
but this formula could offer both sides a way out of the impasse.
Although the normalization process could be sabotaged at any point,
the West Europeans are eager for a share in Iranian reconstruction
contracts. They also believe normalizing relations with Tehran might
 Trouillot. persecute the armed forces for past abuses.
the President has angered the Council by
unilaterally naming a new finance minister. Meanwhile, hardline
Duvalierist Claude Raymond has announced his candidacy for
President Trouillot faces renewed pressure from within and outside
her administration that may further reduce her ability to move
toward an election. arrest warrants
issued last week for three Army officers have fueled concerns in the
military that the populist Council of State, which shares power with
Comment: The military's reaction to the arrest warrants poses the
most immediate threat to Trouillot. Salary supplements and
protection against external investigations have kept key military units
in check, but their tolerance may evaporate quickly if the warrants
are served. Although the Council probably will not try to force
Trouillot to withdraw the finance appointment, it will look for new
ways to limit her autonomy, and some members may resign in
protest. It is unclear how the Provisional Electoral Council, which
oversees voting, will rule on Raymond's candidacy; excluding him on
opt
 ou -
o
 - Novelist Vargas Llosa conceded Peru's presidential election
yesterday to opponent Fujimori after early exit polls give latter
7- to 9-point lead ... final count expected late this month.
- Soviet Uzbek Communist party congress last week blamed
Moscow's economic policies for causing republic's low living
standard ... called for political, economic sovereignty ... most
defiant gesture so far by Central Asian party.
- In Yugoslavia, Serbian Republic's Communist Party, Socialist
Alliance to merge, forming Socialist Party ... Communist strength
declining, strongman Milosevic trying to improve position before
anticipated Serbian elections later in year.
- East Germans Thursday arrested Red Army Faction terrorist
living in East Berlin for a decade ... probably had long-term
involvement with state security service ... more arrests likely as
East, West Germans examine security files.
o0
I I June 1990
 - Ivory Coast President Houphiouet-Boigny has sacked Army Chief
of Staff. . . almost certainly scapegoat for recent mutiny by Army
troops. . . new chief likely to establish rapport quickly, gain
-- India says trade dispute with Nepal over ... probably suspending
economic sanctions only temporarily to bolster new Nepalese
Government ... Kathmandu still must address New Delhi's
concern about Nepal's ties to China.
-Sri Lankan Tamil militants killed one, wounded 10 Army troops
yesterday ... first clash in 13 months ... may derail negotiations,
both sides prepared for more violence.
To~
 -'T~o '3~ere~
 oT
Special Analysis
Unless President Gorbachev makes decisive moves, democratic reformers
will increasingly dominate Soviet politics. The more they do, the more
Gorbachev will also come under pressure to move sharply to the left or
the right to regain the initiative.
Boris Yel'tsin's election as chairman of the Russian legislature gives
democratic reformers a highly visible although divided platform for
promoting reform. In Moscow, Leningrad, and other key cities,
reformer-controlled city councils are pursuing bolder reform agendas.
The non-Russian republics, especially in the Baltic region, are
pressing for greater autonomy and Western-style political and
economic systems. Even the Communist Party's Democratic
Platform faction, which is demanding an end to the leadership's tight
control, is rapidly gaining strength and now claims the support of
about 40 percent of party members. A poll this spring indicated that,
although more than a third of all Soviets favor "slow, cautious"
reform, 41 percent support accelerated change.
The democratic reformers face serious obstacles, however, before
they can change Soviet policy. The party bureaucracy still controls
most of the levers of power in the center and the provinces and will
offer serious political battle. Moreover, most democratic reformers in
the peripheral republics have focused on local nationalistic and ethnic
issues over which they have greater influence. They generally favor
bolder moves toward a multiparty democracy and blame the
apparatus for domestic problems.
The Western-style reformers among them favor private property
and a free market economy. This view is especially strong among
intellectuals in big cities and among supporters of the Democratic
Platform. Yel'tsin and other populists back a strong economic and
social safety net.
Gorbachev has consistently underestimated the strength of the
democratic reformers and increasingly appears to be reacting to
events. He seriously miscalculated in trying to stop Yel'tsin's bid
to chair the Russian legislature. By ducking a direct election to the
presidency last March, Gorbachev missed an opportunity to get a
popular mandate for the forceful actions necessary to reverse the
 is largely a series of half measures. His public approval rating is
Gorbachev nonetheless apparently thinks he can hold the center
together. He has tried to regain control of events in recent weeks by
reining in democratic forces and giving priority to the concerns of
traditionalists while continuing to advance some reforms. Although
he remains fundamentally at odds with traditionalist objectives, he
needs the support of the military to control unrest and will continue
to rel n the party s his chief political base, at least in the short
term.
increase his odds of remaining the key player.
the program of the Democratic Platform at the party congress, or
forming a new proreform coalition. Such moves would not give
Gorbachev control over the Westernizing reformers, but they would
Democratic reformers appear to be outpacing traditionalists, pushing
the country further toward democratic change. The empowerment of
democratic institutions could press the central leadership harder to
seek a genuine popular mandate. Rather than let himself be overtaken
by events, Gorbachev might opt for bold initiatives, such as standing
for popular election as President, abolishing the Congress of People's
Deputies and making the Supreme Soviet directly elected, embracing
If Gorbachev is willing and able to accommodate the democratic
reformers, he may succeed in limiting the polarization and
confrontation that threatens to dominate politics at both the national
and regional levels. Nevertheless, confrontations between
increasingly assertive popularly elected institutions and leaders and
an intransigent party apparat could paralyze policy. Gorbachev might
use his presidential prerogatives to reimpose some authoritarian
controls and curb the growing radicalization of the institutions and
public. As the traditionalists, especially party and security officials,
grow increasingly alarmed by the breakdown of social order, they
could take action on their own. Although such an effort probably
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