NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005301377
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00571
• Publication Date: June 23, 1990

APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 09-01-2009
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Contents
Notes
USSR: Outlining a Transitional Period for Germany
: Russian Party Chief Elected
2
Yugoslavia: Centrifugal Forces Increasingly Evident
3
Palestinians: Anti-US Rhetoric Escalating
4
USSR: Defending Continued Aid to Afghanistan
8
West Germany: Calming the Europeans on GEMU
8
In Brief
10
Special Analyses
' South Africa: Mandela's Visit to Washington
14
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23 June 1990
German
-
German Reactions to Shevardnadze's Proposals
The Western Powers and West Germany were quick to reject Shevardnadze's proposals.
The Kohl government shows no sign of wavering on its insistence that a unified Germany
be in NATO from day one. Bonn also is not prepared?at least not yet?to accept any
arrangement in which all NATO-stationed forces would have to leave Germany as a
condition for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Although membership in NATO and a
continued US presence in Germany remain nonnegotiable, the West Germans still hope to
win Soviet acquiescence in a two-plus-four agreement before the end of this year through
economic incentives and concessions on other security issues, including steps to 'change'
NATO, institutionalize CSCE, and limit the Bundeswehr's size.
Shevardnadze's proposals on Berlin?particularly the USSR's apparent readiness to
give up occupation rights?probably scored some propaganda points with the German
public. Although a senior East German Foreign Ministry official responded favorably to the
proposals, Bonn is unlikely to accept an early withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin, and
East German wishes may carry less weight after the GEMU is implemented on 1 July. Most
West German officials long have said that US, British, and French forces should remain in
Berlin as long as Soviet troops are in East Germany; West Berlin's Social Democratic mayor
yesterday reiterated that stance in rejecting Shevardnadze's proposals. The Allies and the
Germans also see a continuing presence in Berlin as providing a platform from which to
monitor any residual Soviet military presence in eastern Germany.
"TurrSestet_
23 June 1990
USSR: Outlining a Transitional Period for Germany
At the two-plus-four ministerial in Berlin yesterday, Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze made a few concessions but largely elaborated
on Moscow's earlier positions, suggesting again that significant changes
in NATO are key to further movement in the USSR's position.
Shevardnadze proposed that a united Germany remain in both
alliances for five years before choosing its alliance status. He called
for foreign forces in Germany to be halved within three years, with
only "symbolic contingents" remaining. Shevardnadze also advocated
a withdrawal of all Four-Power forces from Berlin within six months
of political unification and the elimination of other features of the
city's special status. He described a final two-plus-four document that
would substitute for a peace treaty and would include an a reement
to limit German forces either in CFE or some other forum.
The Soviet Foreign Minister continued the USSR's recent focus on
next month's NATO summit in London, saying that settlement of the
external aspects of unification would require changes in structure and
strategy and the adoption?with the Warsaw Pact?of a "new code of
conduct." He reaffirmed Moscow's commitment to holding a CSCE
conference in November to ratify an agreement on Germany and said
that this timetable would require the adoption of a final document at
the two-plus-four ministerial in Moscow in September.
Comment: Shevardnadze offered concessions to German sensitivities
by giving up the USSR's demands for a peace treaty and for German
force levels to be negotiated in the two-plus-four forum, but most of
his proposals merely amplified earlier Soviet positions. Moscow
undoubtedly expected some of the positions he took, such as the
five-year transitional period, to meet with immediate rejection; those
stances may have been intended primarily to place added pressure on
NATO to produce results next month. Shevardnadze's new stress on a
short timetable for concluding the work of the two-plus-four forum
probably reflects Moscow's recognition that unification is accelerating
and that time is unlikely to enhance Soviet leverage.
Moscow probably hoped the proposals on Berlin would play
particularly well with the German public and, by freeing Berlin to
be the capital, reduce any resentment at the USSR's insistence on
maintaining Four-Power rights during the transitional period. The
Soviets may also calculate that a favorable response by the Germans
would strengthen Moscow's efforts to link Soviet and Western troop
withdrawals from Germany.
1 23 June 1990
-11
USSR: Russian Russian Party Chief Elected
Regional party secretary Ivan Polozkov, who publicly espouses a
traditionalist program, has become first secretary of the Russian
Communist Party, an outcome that might pose serious problems for
President Gorbachev.
In the first round of voting at the Russian party congress yesterday,
Polozkov, who narrowly lost the post of Russian Republic chairman
to Boris Yel'tsin last month, received 1,017 votes, outpolling six
other candidates, but 300 short of the total necessary for victory.
Oleg Lobov, the little-known second secretary of the Armenian
Communist Party, received 848 votes. A runoff was held later, and
TASS and Western media today report official word of Polozkov's
victory with some 1,396 votes.
Gorbachev reportedly supported Polozkov in the contest with
Yel'tsin, but Polozkov has repeatedly expressed sympathy with
traditionalist party secretary Ligachev. In his speech at the Russian
party congress on Wednesday, Polozkov accused the Politburo of
policy mistakes, called for a public referendum on the transition to a
market economy, and urged continued adherence to party discipline.
Lobov had served with Yel'tsin at Sverdlovsk in the mid-1980s, and
TASS yesterday hailed him as a politician "capable of finding
compromises" who has good working relations with Yel'tsin. Western
press reports indicate he is a centrist who has Gorbachev's support.
Comment: Polozkov's strength in the voting and reactions to
the speeches of other traditionalists indicate they have significant
support among Russian delegates, who make up 58 percent of the
delegates to the CPSU congress opening on 2 July. The victory by
Polozkov strengthens traditionalists in the CPSU, improves their
chances for thwarting Gorbachev's plans for party reform,
and increases the odds of a direct challenge to his leadership.
2 23 June 1990
YUGOSLAVIA: Centrifugal Centrifugal Forces Increasingly Evident
Ethnic passions pitting Serbs against Croats and Slovenes and Serbs
against ethnic Albanians in Serbia's Kosovo Province continue to
threaten Yugoslavia's integrity.
The new Slovene and Croatian governments are emphasizing their
intention to restructure Yugoslavia or secede. Slovenia's Foreign
Minister Rupel is leading efforts to win international support for
the republic by announcing the opening of "cultural informational
centers" in Brussels and Munich; he will seek US support in a
Washington visit next month. Slovenia's Prime Minister Peterle
reiterated this week that his republic will no longer contribute funds
to the federal government for Yugoslavia's underdeveloped regions.
Croatian President Tudjman in a recent interview once again said
he plans to lead Croatia to confederation or independence as soon
as possible; he claimed that the Bosnian and Croatian republics are
a geopolitical unit that belong together.
Serbian President Milosevic is under growing pressure from Serbian
nationalists. Vuk Draskovic's extremist Serbian Renewal Movement,
which dominated the recent demonstrations in Belgrade, is calling on
Serbia to subdue its ethnically Albanian province of Kosovo once and
for all. Serbian and Albanian delegates to the Kosovo legislature are
battling over the extent to which a new constitution should guarantee
Albanian autonomy. Ultranationalist Serbian groups are offering to
support Milosevic if he cracks down on the Albanians,
Comment: The resurgence of rightwing nationalism in Serbia is
forcing Milosevic to take a hard line on Kosovo and on protecting the
ethnic Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. Tudjman's recent statements on
Bosnia will add to tensions with Serbia
The situation in Kosovo is currently the most explosive: a Serbian
declaration of martial law or a suspension of the Kosovo legislature
would spark communal violence. The rift between Serbia and the
northern republics would also widen; Slovenia and Croatia almost
certainly would distance themselves from Serbian repression in
Kosovo.
3 23 June
"TiirSticret---
IMMO.
European Reaction to the Suspension
The West Europeans are divided over the US halt in talks with the PLO. West Germany
understands the reasons for the US decision and hopes the dialogue will resume soon. The
UK deplores suspension of the exchange and says its support for PLO participation in peace
talks remains unchanged. Other West Europeans have expressed disappointment at the
breakoff. The EC summit opening Monday probably will call for the UN's presence in the
occupied territories and a continued US role in the peace process.
23 June 1990
OP'
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PALESTINIANS: Anti-US Rhetoric Escalating
Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, angry and frustrated
at the US suspension of the dialogue with the PLO, are warning it will
cause more violence in Israel and the occupied territories, including
retaliation against US interests.
Leaders in Arab East Jerusalem called a three-day general strike
Thursday in reaction to the US announcement and an earlier clash
with Israeli border police in which a Palestinian died. The strike
quickly degenerated into an anti-US protest featuring slogans such as
"America is our biggest enemy." A Palestinian leader from Nabulus
warned that US officials would be in jeopardy. Israeli security
imposed a curfew in Arab East Jerusalem yesterday after hundreds of
masked Palestinians again attacked Israeli border police with iron
bars, chains, and rocks.
Palestinian leaders in the occupied territories believe the suspension
applies to them and they will continue to boycott discussions with
US officials Islamic
fundamentalists view the suspension as a blow to the PLO and a boon
for radicals in the territories. Moderate Palestinian leader Hanna
Sinyurah warned the move could escalate the intifadah and lead to
a regional war.
The PLO Executive Committee on Thursday again officially denied
responsibility for the PLF's attack on Israel and reaffirmed the
PLO's commitment to Yasir Arafat's renunciation of terrorism. The
Executive Committee stressed the PLO had not abandoned the goal
of negotiations with Israel and called on the international community
to work for an international conference on the peace process.
Comment: Palestinian hardliners almost certainly will use
the suspension to reinvigorate the intijadah and win adherents.
The Executive Committee's reaffirmation of the PLO's pledge in
December 1988 to pursue a negotiated settlement and the somewhat
muted tone of the statement may indicate Arafat hopes to keep his
moderate initiative alive, even if on the back burner.
ov
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Soviet Aid Aid to Afghanistan, Pro and Con
"We have condemned that war; we have called it a crime. Good. How long then are we going
to feed that war with our lethal weapons from Russia? How much is being spent on that war
... the Americans reckon that, per month, it's at least $300 million ... not just arms, it's the
thing we're most short of In Vladimir Oblast ... food is rationed; it's all going there
Let us leave that nation in peace."
?Russian Republic Deputy, 21 June 1990
"What does it mean for the USSR to have an unfriendly state as its southern neighbor...?
The cost of maintaining the Soviet-Afghan border will rise many times . We may talk of
curtailing aid to Nicaragua, Angola, and Ethiopia, whose debts are greater and which are far
removed from us, but Afghanistan is close at hand and could be a time bomb ... ."
?Commander of Soviet Military Advisory Group in Afghanistan,
Komsomolskaya Pravda, 14 June
"What is 120 million rubles in economic aid? It is chicken feed for a state. If the question
arises, I will go to Moscow and hold one-on-one talks with every member of the Supreme
Soviet, I will go to the leaders of the interregional group and make my entreaties, but we
must rake in these millions for Afghanistan."
?Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan Pastukhov,
Komsomolsicaya Pravda, 14 June
01
23 June 1990
USSR: Defending Continued Aid to Afghanistan
Soviet foreign policy officials have begun emphasizing to domestic
audiences the importance of continued aid to Afghanistan despite
rising criticism from Soviet journalists and legislators. They are
saying that Afghanistan, unlike other Third World clients, is a powder
keg on the Soviet border. These officials note that the cost of military
aid has decreased since the withdrawal of Soviet troops last year and
claim that continued military aid is necessary to prevent insurgent
elements from overwhelming Kabul. Some press commentaries talk
of a moral obligation to a nation whose turmoil Moscow helped to
create and of future ecromic benefits to be reacted from maintainina
current support levels.
Comment: Although Soviet economic aid has declined since its peak
last year, Moscow has not reduced deliveries of military aid.
Moscow's stronger public stand for Afghan aid suggests it is
concerned that support to Kabul will increasingly become the focus
of legislative critics who are pushing for across-the-board cuts in
Soviet foreign aid.
WEST GERMANY: Calming the Europeans on GEMU
Bonn's decision to guarantee credits for the USSR and Hungary is
part of an aggressive effort to assuage concerns in European capitals,
including Moscow, that the German economic and monetary union
(GEMU) to be implemented on 1 July will adversely affect their
economies. Bonn has announced it will guarantee a $3 billion credit
for the USSR, and Chancellor Kohl has hinted publicly that West
Germany will guarantee a $480 million credit for Hungary. Senior
Soviet and Hungarian officials had recently been emphasizing trade
disruptions they fear from the GEMU. The West Germans also
announced yesterday they have reached agreement with Warsaw
on rescheduling part of Poland's debt.
Comment: Bonn's efforts at reassurance focus largely on the USSR
and Eastern Europe, the regions most likely to suffer early downturns
in trade with Germany as the GEMU takes effect. But German
leaders realize they must also allay EC concerns that the GEMU will
drive up interest rates and slow Western growth. During the EC and
0-7 summits, the West Germans will emphasize that, even in the
short term, the GEMU will increase German growth and yield export
opportunities for Bonn's partners that outweigh prospective interest
rate hikes
8
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In Brief
USSR
? USSR to resume payments on $647 million owed US for lend-
lease during World War II will help remove legal restrictions
on borrowing from US banks.
?All five Soviet Central Asian republic leaders met yesterday in
Alma-Ma to begin coordinating political, economic strategies...
trying to increase regional sovereignty. ... united front will
strengthen hand in dealings with Moscow.
?USSR's Ukrainian party chief Ivashko resigned yesterday, will
remain head of republic's Supreme Soviet.., replaced by
traditionalist Second Secretary Gurenko ... apparent bow to
opposition to one person holding both top posts.
10
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23 June 1990
-ftrirSoccet_
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Middle East Knesset member Zalman Shovel, a banker, likely
new Israeli Ambassador to US ... chosen for factional affiliation
. probably will have little influence in formulating policy.
Europe
? First Italian general strike over wages in eight years set for 11 July
.employers refuse to continue wage indexing, unions want weak
coalition government to intervene. .. strike to be staged three days
after World Cup soccer final
Tou -Secret-
11 23 June 1990
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South Africa
Mandela on the Move
Mandela has become increasingly comfortable in asserting
himself since his release from nearly three decades in
isolation. He still defers to the collective leadership of the
ANC and remains attentive to the sensitivities of those who
have struggled to break the white monopoly on power during
his absence. Nonetheless, the notable lack of high-ranking
ANC officials accompanying Mandela in the US suggests he
enjoys greater decisionmaking independence and the
executive leadership's trust. On the other hand, the small,
largely working-level delegation may be unable to prepare
him properly to address diverse audiences or to respond to
unexpected issues.
Mandela is handling well both the stresses and the
opportunities of the fanfare surrounding him. He remains
unembittered toward those who imprisoned him, focusing on
the task at hand rather than dwelling on the past. Mandela
reacted with calm indifference to recent press allegations that
the CIA had been involved in his arrest in 1962
327O5 5.90
23 June June 1990
TOIT-Seerel?
Special Analysis
SOUTH AFRICA; Mandela's Visit to Washington
ANC patriarch Nelson Mandela views Washington as the most
influential external actor in southern Africa and is seeking continued
pressure on Pretoria. At home, he must rally his diverse, multiracial
supporters for negotiations with the government; he undoubtedly believes
his trip abroad will enhance his credentials and bring moral support and
Mandela and other senior ANC leaders are committed to negotiations
to end apartheid and have worked closely with Pretoria behind the
scenes. For example, they have cooperated on freeing political
prisoners and handling refugee affairs,
Mandela has sought to reassure audiences he envisions peaceful
change leading to a new South Africa that:
? Respects both majority and minority interests.
?Protects private property while redressing the inequities of
apartheid.
?Encourages private enterprise and foreign investment.
Leading the ANC Through New Challenges
Mandela must guide the ANC through an unprecedented era of overt
negotiation and political organization that will put a premium on
alliance building. The ANC is the most popular political force in
South Africa, but it faces rival antiapartheid groups and restive
factions within its own ranks.I
Some hardline members of the ANC, other black opposition groups,
and township youths are convinced that international sanctions and
militant domestic protests have forced President de Klerk to the
negotiating table, They believe white resolve
is weakening and want to increase pressure until Pretoria agrees to
an interim government and a constitutional assembly elected on a
nonracial basis. These elements are also unwilling to bury grudges
with Zulu leader Buthelezi, whom ANC sympathizers regard as a
government collaborator and an instigator of the anti-ANC violence
in Natal.
Mandela is also challenged to control the ANC's externally based
military wing, which has resisted talks with Pretoria and has not
always obeyed the political leadership. He undoubtedly wants to
enhance the ANC's capability to wage an armed struggle should talks
with Pretoria collapse, but he does not want unauthorized attacks
to disrupt talks or to make it seem the group is not committed to
a peaceful settlement.
14
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Seeking Support Abroad
Internationally, Mandela is campaigning to maintain diplomatic
pressure on Pretoria and to raise funds. He believes continued
pressure is necessary to achieve more tangible results in dismantling
apartheid. By persuading the international community to keep
sanctions in place, Mandela probably hopes to show his militant
supporters he can be an effective leader and a tough negotiator with
Pretoria. He is also trying to win the confidence of the ANC's military
wing by finding new sources of materiel to sunnlement reduced aid
from Eastern Europe and the USSR.
Outlook
The ANC probably will make little progress reconciling the often
contradictory demands of its constituency until after its national
conference in December, when delegates elected from each region will
vote for a new executive body. Until then, the ANC will lack a formal
platform and will vacillate between moderate and hardline rhetoric.
Even while the group labors to find its voice, it most likely will retain
the largest following. Nonetheless, Mandela must proceed cautiously
toward negotiations with both Buthelezi and Pretoria or risk losing
some black support to antiapartheid rivals or Communist Party allies.
Mandela sees the US as a potentially vital donor of humanitarian,
financial, and technical aid the ANC needs to prepare for
negotiations, to recruit and train new members, and to resettle exiles.
The group's fundraising in South Africa will probably fall far short of
its needs, and Mandela undoubtedly hopes Washington will helv rally
overseas support.
The Mandela itinerary is being used to show appreciation to longtime
allies, and the ANC has scheduled his visits to reward nations,
cities, or groups that have long supported its call for sanctions and
disinvestment from South Africa. He has delayed meeting with Prime
_Minister Thatcher, who has campaigned against South African
sanctions, even though he visited the UK and spoke at well-attended
events organized by British antiapartheid groups. Mandela
undoubtedly recognizes US sensitivities on some ANC ties but has
nonetheless expressed symbolic support for the PLO, Havana, and
Tripoli, regarding them as past or potential supporters of the ANC
cause.
15 23 June 1990