CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005339976
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2009
• Case Number: F-2008-01829
• Publication Date: July 16, 1959

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CO3I O
CENTRAL INTELLIGEN.CE AGENCY
' OFFICE OF CURRENT , INTELLiGE'NCE
ARAL RECdRU
pZEASE REW, R G. A-18
}LC'x1~.I3CX A?~C~~S'
APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 06-29-2009
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 SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 July 1959
Five of the nearly 40 cab-
inet members are known to be
leftists of varying hues. They
range from openly pro-Communist
Sudjono, a deputy minister for
"mobilization of the people's
potential," through "national
Communist" Prijono, who is
deputy minister for education,
to "leftist nationalist" Mo-
hammad Yamin, minister for so-
cial and cultural affairs.
Compared with the former cabi-
net, however, leftist represen-
tation has been reduced.
The cabinet promises to
adequately supply. consumer
The killing of two Ameri-
in the recent Communist
attack on a MAAG detachment at
Bien Hoa, near Saigon, high-
lights a security problem that
has long existed in South Viet-
nam. The Diem government, in
contrast to its initial success
in quashing large-scale dissi-
dence following the
end of the .Indochina
war in 1954, has in
more recent years
been virtually pow-
erless to suppress
sporadic acts of
Communist violence
committed princi-
pally in the rural
areas by a small but
well-organized un-
derground.
The most nota-
ble feature of this
campaign of terror
has been the assas-
sination of several
hundred lesser Viet-
namese officials.
This situation has
kept the Diem regime
off balance and has
diverted money, at-
tention, and energy
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items for the people, to estab-
lish security, and to continue
the "struggle" for West New
Guinea. There is little indi-
cation, however, that effec-
tive remedial action in the
realms of economy or security
is possible within the near
future.
The Indonesian Communist
party has announced it will
support the cabinet's program
but will criticize "any waver-
" ' wishes."
from the task of making.South
Vietnam's economy viable in the
long-term competition with North
Vietnam.
It is uncertain whether
the Bien Hoa terrorism fore-
shadows a new phase of Commu-
nist violence directed. against
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 July 1959
American activities and influ-
ence, or is merely another de-
velopment in persistent Commu-
nist efforts to. create insta-
bility in South Vietnam and fo-
ment lack of confidence in
Diem's leadership.
In recent years, numerous
reports have been received of
alleged Communist plans for
anti-American terrorism, but
the last previous incident in-
volving American personnel was
in October 1957 when bombs in
Saigon injured 13 MAAG members.
Hanoi radio, however, depict-
ing the recent attack as a man-
ifestation of growing anti-
American sentiment among the
Southern masses, warned that
the only way for the American
"imperialists to avoid wrath-
ful blows at their heads is
to quit South Vietnam:" Hanoi
has also called on the people
`-from north to south" to use
20 July--the fifth anniversary
of the Geneva agreements--as
an occasion to demonstrate
their "spirit of revolutionary
struggle against the traitorous
Diem clique and American inter-
ference in Vietnam."
Communist propaganda re-
cently has also taken a threat-
ening tone toward Laos, where
American personnel are soon to
be introduced to assist the French
military mission in training the
small Laotian Army. The Commu-
nist bloc, which heretofore has
relied primarily on restrictive
provisions under the 1954 Ge-
neva agreements to limit the
American military presence in
Laos, can be expected to react
sharply to this development.
With an extensive Communist
underground responsive to Hanoi
existing in Laos, parallel acts
of violence against American
PEIPING ANNOUNCES REFORM PROGRAM IN TIBET
Peiping has announced a
two-stage program of "democratic
reform" and "socialist trans-
formation" for Tibet which is
designed to bring about the
eventual destruction of those
elements of the Tibetan social
structure most opposed to Chi-
nese rule--the nobility and the
clergy. Details of the program
are under discussion at the
second plenary session of the
Preparatory Committee for the
Tibetan Autonomous Region now
being held for that purpose in
Lhasa.
Peiping, possibly antici-
pating difficulties, has care-
fully avoided any reference to the
time required to complete the
program. The Chinese Commu-
nists are asserting that the
suppression of the "upper
strata" during the revolution
last March has made possible
the immediate start of the re-
form program, which was original-
ly to be delayed until 1962.
The first step of the
program includes the complete
suppression of the rebellion
and the elimination of the
"feudal practices" of the up-
per classes and monasteries,
such as unpaid forced labor and
excessive rent and interest.
The second step will be the
redistribution of land. Peiping
has fuzzed over whether the re-
cipients of land will be indi-
vidual peasants or "the people"
--some form of collective owner-
ship.
The regime has been explic-
it, however, in,differentiating
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
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 29 January 1959
CENTRAL INTELOGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
AP:CHTZAJ RECORD
PLEASE; h~ L RNEI.DG. A-18
AGEI`ICY ARCHIVES,
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 January 1959
General Ne Win has apparent-
ly been convinced by the politi-
cally oriented "young colonels"
in his entourage that a six-
month extension of his term as
prime minister beyond the April
expiration date is required to
achieve the immediate tasks the
army has set for itself in revi-
talizing the government. He
will therefore ask Parliament,
some time after it convenes on
9 February, for such an exten-
sion. The Ba Swe - Kyaw.Nyein
faction of the Anti-Fascist Peo-
ple's Freedom League (AFPFL) has
already given its informal
sanction to an extension, and
Ne Win is believed to be seeking
a similar assurance from former
Prime Minister U Nu, who leads
the rival AFPFL faction.
Nu has not yet shown his
hand on the question, but the
army's recent arrest of Thakin
Kyaw Dun, the secretary general
of. the :Nu faction, may well have
left the former prime minister
in a vindictive mood. Ne Win
might win a bare parliamentary
majority even without the votes
of Nu's followers, but he would
doubtless prefer to have army
rule legitimatized. by the over-
whelming vote of both factions.
Even if Parliament should
insist on national elections in
April as originally planned by
Ne Win after the army take-over
last September, the army clearly
intends to retain a substantial
voice in civil affairs. Ne Win
told Ambassador McConaughy re-
cently that he would abide by
Parliament's decision as to
whether to reconfirm him in
office, name another prime
minister, or insist on new elec-
tions, but that in any case
certain key army colonels would
retain their administrative
posts for at least two years.
Furthermore, the army in-
tended to guide the country and
re-educate the politicians for
another "twenty years." The
prime minister indicated dis-
gust over the behavior in of-
fice of both AFPFL groups, which
before the party's split last
spring had ruled Burma for ten
years,. and expressed the opin-
ion that the Communist-led
National United Front would win
by default if the public knew
the truth about the mismanage-
ment and corruption his investi-
gations had uncovered.
Meanwhile, the army con-
tinues to move vigorously in
its efforts to reform almost
every facet of public life in
Burma. It is becoming increas-
ingly apparent, however, that
the army probably will not ful-
fill its promise to eliminate
the Communist insurrection in
Burma this year. Only.two or
three months of good campaign
weather remain before the annual
monsoon rains begin.
SEGRE:F
President Ngo Dinh Diem's
government continues to make
appreciable progress toward po-
litical and economic consoli-
dation in South Vietnam. Em-
phasis is being placed on the
rapid build-up of a strong mili-
.tary establishment to counter
the threats of internal and
external Communist aggression.
The government's preoccupation
with national security matters
has been accentuated by grow-
ing Communist influence in
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
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1PATTE'2NS AND PERSPECTIVES
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 January 1959
neighboring Cambodia, and by
Communist North Vietnam's mili-
tary activity along the Laotian
frontier.
South Vietnam's armed forces
of some 146,000 men now have a
relatively high degree of combat
effectiveness, although they are
still capable of offering only
limited resistance to external
aggression by the numerically
superior North Vietnamese Army.
At the same time, South Vietnam's
two major paramilitary forces--
the Civil Guard and the Self-
Defense Corps--are undergoing
streamlining and training suit-
able to their primary responsi-
bility of maintaining internal
security. Communist terrorism
remains a problem, particularly
in rural areas, where security
sweeps are mounted periodically
to break up bands of dissidents.
In the economic field, the
Diem government is giving high
priority to its agrarian reform,
land development, and road-
building programs in an attempt
to undercut Communist subversion
and infiltration. The govern-
ment has also decided to expand
rice production as a primary
source of income, rather than
to concentrate on agricultural
diversification or rapid in-
dustrial development. The
country hopes to be in a position
by 1961 to export 600,000 tons
of rice annually,compared with
exports of less than 200,000
tons in recent years.
The authoritarian nature
of the Diem government and the
repressive aspects of its mili-
tant anti-Communist posture con-
tinue to alienate various seg-
ments of the South Vietnamese
community. The ever-tightening
control of the government's Can
Lao party over all aspects of
political activity is a special
source of irritation. At the
same time, the nation's first
popularly elected National
.Assembly is showing signs of
increasing maturity. and of be-
coming more than a rubber stamp.
President Diem, aware of the
shortcomings of his government,
has stepped up his inspection
trips throughout the country in
popular support.
LAOTIAN CABINET
The new Laotian cabinet of
old-line politicians and reform-
minded army officers and young
civilians is a considerable im-
provement over its predecessor.
Premier Phoui Sananikone's re-
cent grant of full powers en-
abled him to appoint his cabinet
without reference to the as-
sembly. However, his freedom
of action was limited by the
necessity of satisfying the
demands of his party--the con-
servative Rally of the Lao
People (RLP)--while meeting the
pressures of the reformers for
an action cabinet. Phoui's
solution was to retain all the
members of his preceding govern-
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ment, but to reshuffle port-
folios and add threearmy of-
ficers. The result is probably
the strongest cabinet in years,.
but some deadwood and several
opponents of reform remain.
The key portfolios of
finance, defense, foreign af-
fairs and information now are
held by young and apparently
capable civilians or army of-
ficers. The removal as minister
of religion of Bong Souvanna-
von-,.whose patronizing attitude
had alienated members of the
Buddhist hierarchy, should im-
prove the government's relations
with that group. The transfer
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