AMERICAN POWS AND MIA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005359868
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-00396
• Publication Date: December 4, 1981

APPROVED FOR RELEASE^DATE-.
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4 December 1981
MEMORANDUM, FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John E. Koehler
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT : American POWs and MIAs in.Southeast Asia (U)
Per your request the attached data relative to the above subject in
support of your testimony before the House Task Force on American POWs
and MIAs in Southeast Asia on 8 December 1981 is provided for your
information. The package consists !of individual inputs from the Imagery,
SIGINT and HUMINT Offices plus a compilation of talking points for your
use. Also provided is a working dpaft of the DIA prepared testimony
statement which will be presented by RADM Burkhalter. Please let me
know if we can be of any further assistance in this matter.
64ohn E. Koehler
Attachment:
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SUBJECT: American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia
DISTRIBUTION:
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Clinton H. Winne, Jr., USAF
Deputy Director,, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia
FROM : Harry C. Eisenbeiss
Director, Office of Imagery Collection and Exploitation
1. The following is provided in support of Admiral Inman's appearance before
the House Task Force on American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia on 8 December.
readout of any significant finds relative to this subject. (See DIA imagery
report on a suspect POW detention facility at Attachment 3.) OIA supports any
IMAGERY:
2. The DIA is the executive agent for stating imagery collection require-
ments in response to the POW/MIA problem and for exploiting such imagery.
RADM Paulson, DC, is the senior DIA officer responsible for MIA/POW matters.
DIA is also responding to the House request and Admiral Burkhalter, Deputy
Director, will present DIA testimony. For the most part, imagery requirements
are generated in an effort to confirm/negate reports from HUMINT sources. These
imagery requirements can be categorized as either area search or surveillance
depending on the specifics of the information available. Area search is
employed whenever a source provides only a general location of a possible POW
camp. Surveillance coverage is used to monitor known facilities that are
suspected to house POWs/MIAs. DIA performs primary imagery exploitation against
this problem. NPIC does not do detailed exploitation, but would provide initial
3. Historically, this imagery requirement has been fairly small in number.
For example, in 1981 only about nine requirements have been identified and only
six facilities are presently active for imagery collection. There are no
special area search requirements currently identified for collection, although
Vietnam and Laos have standing equirements requiring complete
 C01340882
SUBJECT: American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia
search coverage on a periodic basis. The Intelligence Community is very
sensitive to the importance of this problem. These requirements receive
.whatever collection priority is required to meet imagery needs. The primary
factor affecting requirement satisfaction is the adverse weather conditions that
are prevalent in this region throughout most of the year and the requirement for
very high resolution imagery to accomplish the detailed readout required.
Attachment 1'summarizes requirements that were identified during 1981 and the
coverage acquired during the specified collection period. Attachment 2
summarizes overage of Vietnam and Laos acquired by the two
most recent KH-9 missions.
4. Inputs from D/OSC (Attachment 4), D/OHC (Attachment 5), DDO
(Attachment 6), working draft of the DIA testimony (Attachment 7), and talking
points (Attachment 8) are attached as indicated.
1 - Recent Collection Reqmts. and Coverage Accomplishments
2 - of Vietnam and Laos
3 - UiA imagery 1eport
4 - OSC Input
5 - OHC Input
6 - DDO Input
7 - DIA Draft Testimony Statement
8 - Talking Points
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T.O ; EGRET
ATTACHMENT 1
Recent Collection Requirements and Coverage Accomplishments
TOE' SECRET
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ATTACHMENT 2
Coverage
Vietnam and Laos
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jMAGERY ANALYSIS NOTES
ATTACHMENT 3 t
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Attachment' 4
MEMORANDUM FOR: Harry C. Eisenbeiss
Director, Office of Imagery Collection & Exploitation
.. fROM:
Director, Office of-STUNT Collection
'SUBJECT: POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia
REFERENCE: DD/ICS Note, Same Subject dated 27 Nov 1981
1. In response to the above reference the following information
is provided.
a. SIGINT collection requirements levied against the POW/MIA
rop bl em.
Currently there are three active requirements in the
National SIGINT Requirements List (NSRL) which request information on
POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia,
b. " Evaluation of SIGINT Efforts.
The following evaluation of the results of NSA's SIGINT
efforts to date was provided by Chief, 85 NSA. B5
Is the focal point in NSA for all actions connected with the Southeast
Asia POW/MIA'issue.
(11 To date there has been no SIGINT information either
substantiating or refuting the existence of unaccounted for U.S.
POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia. NSA, however, continues to task
available collection resources against NSRL requirements concern-
ing POW/MIA information.
1 DEC 1981
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SUBJECT: POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia
A'
2. The DDCI in his previous capacity as DIRNSA was aware of all NSA
initiatives with regard to U.S. POW/MIAs. NSA B5 is not optimistic that
Attachments
a/s
formation on this issue.
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ATTACHMENT 5 t
4 December 1981
MEMORANDUM T
Director, ortice or m , Collection
and Exploitation
Director, ice of HUMINT Collection
SUBJECT: HUMINT Collection on the POW/MIA Problem
in Southeast Asia
1. National concerns and priorities regarding POW/MIAs are
reflected in the National HUMINT Collection Plan #34 on Indochina,
issued in March 1981. HUMINT collection responsibilities for
objectives on the subject as it relates to Vietnam, Kampuchea
and Laos are assigned to State (advisory), the CIA's clandestine
service and DIA, with supporting responsibilities for the
military services, DCD and FBIS.
2. HUMINT collection which has been productive on POW/MIAs
been primarily from debriefing of refugees from Vigetn
a t o u g querie , ave no now a ge o this subject. As a
the reporting on POW/MIAs from debriefings is meager. In the
case of DoD, the debriefing and reporting is done by the Joint
Casualty Resolution Center, whose entre to refugee camps is on
humanitarian grounds. FBIS gives the subject a very high priority;
however, reporting has been limited to material from the Vietnamese
media, almost all of which is general and reactive to U.S.
commentary. F-1
4. In sum, HUMINT collection managers and field entities are
fully aware of the importance of the POW/MIA issue and are attempting
to improve collection. Collection opportunities, however, have
been scarce.
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.SUBJECT: HUMINT Collection on the POW/MIA Problem
in Southeast Asia
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - IC Registry
1 - D/OHC Chrono
1 - O'HC Chrono
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Attachment 6 t
._. TKS -'aft'
No CIA $tatio
bY 41ri b:r" COMMENTS
U-nat is '? the 'p'riority of tth
PbW/1TA issue at- CIA?
-hen-any evable inforsation
n s o to ned in-the field, the highest priority is
assigned..-.to its -verification.
1i.--What-are the resources being assigned to this probldm
specifically assigned to the POW/MIA Problem.
At CIA-Headquarters there is no DBO officer'who has
within CIA?
Al en one a ve,
er or any information on :POW/MIA*s. `
iII. what are-the roadblocks-to resolving this issue? Now
can these barriers be eliminated?
The primary roadblock to resolving this issue continues to
J)e thecooperative attii'ude of the governments of Vietnam-and-
3..aos. They claim they have no POW's and are searching for' NIA's.
 leaks of confidential activities, and publicity given
`r."e? ~.`` j ? sav*~r..
h
Rcfticoted requests over t e years s by
by tfie U.S. Government for
'
more inform .tion or entry into these countries of investigative,
teams N:vL, been stalled. Continued diplomatic efforts cor.bin'd
with intelligence community-efforts to obtain positive
inforn.atior.-appLLr-to be the best available course of action at
this time..
Unfortunately, another and serious roadblock to obtaining
positive information on the subject is the publicity given to
TOP,gECRET
4result
an a namese eve t at claiming to
possess information on POW/MIA's is a way to ensure entry to
the Unted States, various Indochinese resistance groups view it
as a i thod of obtaining covert U.S. Government financial and
:I.: support, and professional fabricators see it as a way
of obtaining funds. The continued visits to Thailand of
"ariou= soldiers of fortune working on their own or on behalf
of private groups serves to additionally confuse the issue.
Considerable intelligence community time and effort is wasted
on the stories of fabricators and soldiers of fortune. Also,
the actions of adventurers and inaccurate publicity has
undoubtedly caused the Vietnamese and Lao to tighten security
and to become more intransigent in their attitude towards our
diplomatic efforts.
IV. Has the United States intelligence community achieved
smooth cooperation among its members on this issue?
We believe there is good cooperation among the mem"rs of
the intelligence community both at the Headquarters level and
in the field. DIA is recognized as the focal point for all
POW/MIA information and CIA passes all-Information obtained an
activity.and-will continue-to cooperate fully.
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Vl. What more can the united States Government do to assist
the intelligence community on this issue?
sufficient support and cooperation is being provided at
this time. We know that if additional resources are necessary
tnat the administration will be responsive to any requests.
The. problem is not one of resources or even intelligence,
..specially in the case of alleged POW's. It has not been
demonstrated, at least on the basis' of" the considerable
available information, that additional collection resources
would lead to a definitive resolution'of this issue. Sufficient
:csets are in place and a large volUmei of information is
continually being screened and' checked. To'csate, information
Indicating locations of POW's and MIA's in Laos or Vietnam has
not proved credible. We and DIA have gone to considerable
lengths to check out the more promising leads.
'VII. What moofELean the United States, intelligence community
do on"this issue?
The intelligence community continues to be alert and
t:uceptive to any information concerning POW/MIA's. We will
actively and aggressively continue to search for, and follow up
on new sources of information.
 TOPrCRET
Statement of
RADM E.A. Burkhalter, Jr., USN
Deputy Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
Prisoners of War and Missing in Action
Before the
Task Force on American Prisoners
and Missing in Southeast Asia
House Subcommittee
Asian and Pacific Affairs
9
December 8, 1981
PRAl
coNFinEWiaL
Attachment 7 to
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" U IIU~;(1 :i,,.L I hill ~LLRS:
(,iii~i~:'~,~n Ili,
DUE TO PRIOR COtl4ITMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN HIM OUT OF TOWN, THE DIRECTOR OP'THE.
DEFENS1 INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES WILLIAMS, HAS AS,:E[rt~E
TO PPPEAR BEFORE THE TASK FORCE TODAY AND REPRESENT THE AGENCY ON THE SUBJECT
OF DIA'S INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE FATE OF AMERICANS STILL
UNACCOUNTED FOR-IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO YOUR INVITATION AND COME BEFORE YOU
ON THIS MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE. THE TASK FORCE'S VIGOROUS EFFORTS DIRECTED
TOWARD DETERMINING THE FATE OF THOSE AMERICANS LISTED AS PRISONER OF WAR OR
MISSING IN ACTION AND WHO STILL REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR IS WELL RECOGNIZED BY
DIA. I ALSO KNOW THAT THE TASK FORCE IS WELL AWARE OF DIA'S ROLE AND
CONTRIBUTIONS.
IN THAT REGARD, I DO WANT TO REAFFIRM DIA'S FULL COOPERATION WITH YOU IN THIS
MATTER. I WOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE RIGHT FROM THE START THAT THE CRITICAL NEED
FOR CONTINUED INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS IS RECOGNIZED'.ANO I ASSURE YOU THAT DIA
WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT.NEEDED FOR AS LONG AS
AMERICANS REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. RADM JERRY PAULSON, WITH
WHOM YOU ARE FAMILIAR, IS THE ASSISTANT VICE DIRECTOR FOR COLLECTION
MANAGEMENT AND HEADS OUR PW/MIA STAFF.
LIKE MOST MILITARY MEN,,MY PERSONAL ASSOCIATION WITH MgN WHO ARE NOW AMONG T4
MISSING HAS KEPT ME CLOSE TO THE ISSUE FOR MANY YEARS. AS PART OF DIA'S
COMMAND ELEMENT I FOLLOW THIS AGENCY'S EVERY DAY EFFORTS ON THIS ISSUE THROUGH
A DAILY REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR. I CAN SAY WITHOUT RESERVATION THAT DIA
REMAINS DEDICATED IN ITS PURSUIT-AND RESEARCH OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD LEAD
TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE PRESENT FATE OF THESE MISSING AMERICANS.
ASSUREDLY, THE PW/MIA FUNCTION HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE STRONG COMMAND
ATTENTION WITHIN DIA.
, . 0RAFT
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,%r TER li.';V) N . 1/i 1-Ui; L f i . . . , I : l ;UL Al -i 1::.
ADD, AND REGRETTABLY SO, THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE,;
SITUATION SINCE DIA'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIM014Y OF SIX MONTHS AGO.
r?'
THERE ARE STILL 2,496 AMERICANS WHO WERE DETERMINED TO BE EITHER A PRISONER,
MISSING OR KILLED (BODY NOT RECOVERED) THAT RE" 1,Ii; UNACCOUNTED FOR. WE NAVE
STRESSED IN THE PAST THAT DIA MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE:TERMS OF AN
INDIVIDUAL STATUS. OUR GOAL IS TO RECOVER ANY AMERICAN - WHETHER LIVE OR
DEAD. OUR COLLECTION AND RESEARCH EFFORTS RELATIVE TO REPORTS OF AMERICANS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA REFLECT OUR DEDICATION TO THAT END.
UNDERSTANDABLY, THE REFUGEE REPORTING FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA CONTINUES TO BE OUR
MAJOR SOURCE OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN
1975 WE HAVE ACQUIRED A TOTAL OF _1 303 REPORTS BEARING ON THE PW/MIA
FIRST HAND
PROBLEM. OF THE TOTAL REPORTING, 386ARE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS. APPROXIMATELY 33
PERCENT OF THESE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS HAVE BEEN EQUATED TO AMERICANS WHO HAVE
SINCE BEEN-ACCOUNTED FOR. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT'.USING A SLIGHTLY MORE LIBERAL
10
APPROACH, THAT AN ADDITIONAL A PERCENT OF THE SIGHTING REPORTS WOULD EQUATE TO
ACCOUNTED FOR AMERICANS. SOME OF THE REMAINING SIGHTING REPORTS ARE
FABRICATIONS AND OTHERS ARE REPORTS FROM PERHAPS WELL INTENDED BUT MISGUIDED
INDIVIDUALS. THERE ARE OTHER SIGHTING REPORTS WHICH WE HAVE EXTENSIVELY
INVESTIGATED AND OTHERS,FOR WHICH OUR FO
LLOW UP EFFORTS CONTINUE. DESPITE THE
1:3. .1 1 1
LARGE NUMBER OF SIGHTING REPORTS WHICH REMAIN UNRESOLVED AND OUR PERSISTENT
EFFORTS, WE STILL CAN NOT PROVE THAT THERE ARE ANY AMERICANS BEING DETAINED
AGAINST THEIR WILL.
AS A CASE IN POINT, WE HAD HIGH HOPES FOR ONE OF OUR RECENT LIVE SIGHTING
REPORTS. APPROXIMATELY 165 MANDAYS HAVE BEEN EXPENDED IN HOPEFUL PURSUIT OF
THE,TRUTHFULNESS OF THE SOURCE"S INFORMATION. THE INTERVIEWS, INVESTIGATIONS,
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS AND ANALYTICAL RESEARCH COVERED A PERIOD BACK TO 1954,
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AFTER THIS THOROUGH EXAMINATION ARE WE NOW SATISFIED THAT THIS SOURCE HAS BEEN
DECEPTIVE AND UNTRUTHFUL.
DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS DIA H".c., TAKEN EVER INCREASING STEPS TO INTENSIFY ITS
EFFORTS AND CAPABILITIES CO,-.,:E,:Sl1RATE WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE.
DIA'S PW/MIA STAFF IS CURRENTLY AT A MANNING LEVEL OF 15 PERSONNEL. THE STAFF
HAS ADDED PERSONNEL WITH LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES IN VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE, AND
WITH EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATIVE BACKGROUNDS. THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF THE STAFF
RELATIVE TO ANALYTICAL SKILLS AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN BACKGROUND INCLUDING
INCOUNTRY EXPERIENCE IS EXCEPTIONAL. ADDITIONALLY, WE ARE REGULARLY ASSISTED
IN OUR EFFORTS THROUGH THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM, PHOTO INTERPRETERS,
LINGUISTS, INVESTIGATORY PERSONNEL, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS ON A
WORLD WIDE BASIS. NO BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS ARE IMPOSED ON RESEARCH,
INTERVIEWS AND INVESTIGATIVE FOLLOW-UP ASSOCIATED WITH DIA'S PURSUIT OF PW/MIA
INFORMATION. ALTHOUGH TRAVEL ALLOCATIONS REMAIN AUSTERE FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
THIS SAME POLICY OF NO CONSTRAINTS APPLIES-TO TRAVEL FUNDS ASSOCIATED WITH
DIA'S QUICK REACTION TEAM WHICH TRAVELS WITHIN CONUS AND OVERSEAS TO INTERVIEW
SOURCES OF POTENTIAL PW/MIA INFORMATION DEEMED ESSENTIAL TO OUR EFFORTS.
OUR WORKING RELATION AND SUPPORT FROM OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TO BE EXCELLENT. ESPECIALLY
NOTEWORTHY IS THE COOPERATION AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE JOINT CASUALTY
RESOLUTION CENTER PERSONNEL TO OUR TASKING AND FOLLOW-UP REOUIREMENTS RELATIVE
TO REFUGEE INTERVIEWS.. IN ORDER TO ENSURE A COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING EXISTS ON
VARIOUS ISSUES AND REQUIREMENTS, DIA RECENTLY BROUGHT THE JCRC BANGKOK LIAISON
OFFICER TO WASHINGTON FOR EXTENSIVE WORKING DISCUSSIONS AND MEETINGS WITH
SENIOR LEADERSHIP. ADDITIONALLY, THROUGH DIA INITIATION, THE STATE DEPARTMENT
OBTAINED AUTHORIZATION FOR JCRC PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT PW/MIA INTERVIEWS WITH
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IEIUULLS lit' 111ONG I:U15.2 r,,,. ~~;;(!. -.,: Ji_.L -.s, .
DEBRIEFINGS HAS BEEN EXEMPLARY THROUGHOUT THE VARIOUS REFUGEE CAMPS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA. THEIR PROFESSIO>ALIS:; GREATLY FACILITATES OU'r: ANALYTICAL
EFFORTS.
DIA PROVIDES THE INTELLIGENCE UPO,; WHICH DECISIONI?;AKERS DEVELOP U.S.
GOVERNMENT POLICY. THE LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AID STATE
MEMBERS OF THIS TASK FORCE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE BEEN UPDATED ON
OUR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS THROUGH INFORMAL CLOSED SESSION BRIEFINGS.
WHEN OUR RESEARCH HAS DEVELOPED INFORMATION TO A POINT THAT FURTHER PURSUIT
WARRANTS ACTION BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OR CHARTER OF DIA THEN AT THAT POINT
ACTION IS TRANSFERRED TO THE APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATION OR AGENCY. ANY
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN THIS MANNER WOULD BE PROVIDED TO DIA FOR
FURTHER ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION. I THINK IT WORTHWHILE AT THIS POINT TO
NOTE AGAIN THAT ALTHOUGH THIS IS A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE, SOME OF THE INFORMATION
MUST BE CLASSIFIED AND REMAIN SO IF OUR-EFFORTS ARE` TO BE EFFECTIVE AND ALSO
TO PRECLUDE HARM TO ANY AMERICANS WHO MIGHT STILL BE, HELD IN CAPTIVITY.
SINCE PFC ROBERT GARWOOD, USMC, RETURNED FROM VIETNAM IN FEBRUARY 1979, DIA
HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE MARINE. CORPS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES CONCERNING HIS
CASE. ALTHOUGH RESTRAINED FROM DEBRIEFING GARWOOD DUE TO HIS COURT MARTIAL,
DIA DID HAVE, :ACCESS TO c'W/MIA INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY THE MARINE CORPS, AND BY
THE FORMER CHAIRMAN AND A PRESENT MEMBER OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE DURING 1979.
THE MARINE CORPS RECENTLY ADVISED DIA THAT THE PRESENT STATUS OF GARWOOD'S
COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS WERE SUCH THAT THEY HAD NO FURTHER
RESERVATIONS IN REGARD TO AN INTERVIEW WITH GARWOOD. A LETTER HAS BEEN SENT
FROM DIA TO GARWOOD`S COUNSEL REQUESTING HIS COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE IN
OBTAINING A GARWOOD INTERVIEW DEDICATED TO THE HUMANITARIAN ISSUE OF RESOLVING
THE FATE OF THOSE AMERICANS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
DRAFT
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PW/141A ISSUE. DURING PREVIOUS TESTIMONY BEFORE THIS SUBCO-4,MITTEE, DIA
i ,.: :.uU $ I ILAST ASIAN' CG :;-sUN; I ST L6;.11;.,4. l U Ll.
REPORTED THAT IT HAD JUDGED AS VALID A FORMER VIETNf;N-:ES[ ]!;FORMATION THAT THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS IN ITS POSSESSION' THE RC-;f;lt~~
OF SOME 400 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL LOST AS A RESULT OF 1-3STILTTIES IN
INDOCHINA. THE. FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THIS SUBCOMM1lLTTEE CONFRONTED THE VIETr,Ar1ESE
GOVERNMENT WITH THIS INFORMATION IN HANOI. VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS DENIED ANY
KNOWLEDGE OF THESE REMAINS. IN OUR TESTIMONY IN JUNE OF THIS YEAR IT WAS
NOTED THAT THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAD RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THEY WOULD
PROVIDE THE REMAINS OF THREE ADDITIONAL MISSING AMERICANS. IT WAS ALSO NOTED
THAT THE RETURN OF THESE REMAINS WERE WELCOMED, AND IN A LARGER SENSE, IT WAS
A CYNICAL REFLECTION ON THEIR INTRANSIGENCE ON THIS ISSUE. THESE REMAINS HAVE
SINCE BEEN RETURNED AND IDENTIFIED AS BEING THREE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD BEEN THE
SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATION FOLDER EFFORTS. IN PARTICULAR, THESE CASES WERE
THREE OF FOUR INCLUDED IN MEETINGS WITH THE VIETNAMESE JUST PRIOR TO-AND AT
THE TIME OF THE VIETNAMESE ANNOUNCEMENT.. THE EVENT OF A SIMULTANEOUS RETURN
OF THESE THREE INDIVIDUALS CONSIDERING THE' CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THEIR
LOSS, VARIED YEARS OF LOSS, AND CONFIRMED KNOWLEDGE FOLLOWING THEIR LOSS,
CLEARLY SIGNALS THAT THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT JUST RECOVER THESE INDIVIDUALS ON
THE BASIS OF DETAILED INFORMATION PROVIDED IN OUR NEGOTIATION FOLDERS.
IT IS CLEAR THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE WITHHOLDING INFORMATION. ALTHOUGH THERE
HAVE BEEN OCCASIONAL SMALL GAINS, THE OVERALL ISSUE OF AN ACCOUNTING REMAINS
VIRTUALLY UNACCOMPLISHED. RECENT PROPOSALS TO THE VIETNAMESE FOR A
CONTINUATION OF THE PW/MIA MEETINGS IN HANOI THIS PAST FALL AND A RECIPROCAL
PW/MIA VISIT TO HAWAII, WERE DEFERRED BY THE VIETNAMESE. A VERY RECENT '
PROPOSAL FOR A STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPECIAL PW/MIA MISSION TO VISIT
VIENTIANE WAS ALSO TURNED DOWN BY THE LAOTIANS. WE ARE STILL AWAITING THE
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HANOI. THE VIETNAMESE AND LAO REACTION TO THESE PROPOSALS IS TYPICAL OF.'tHIEIR
LT jTUDE OVER THE YEARS. THEREIN LIES THE ROADBLOCK TO ACHIEVING AN
ACCOUNTING FOR OUR MISSING.
THE EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR DIA'S EFFORTS AS PREVIOUSLY STATED BY THE Tr-
FORCE AND THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS HAVE BEEN MOST
ASSURING AND THAT SUPPORT WILL BE CALLED UPON SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE. AT
PRESENT IT IS FELT THAT ACTIONS OF THE TASK.FORCE AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE,
COUPLED WITH THOSE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE
COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA THROUGH ALL AVAILABLE DIPLOMATIC
CHANNELS IS OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION TO ACHIEVE ADDITIONAL ACCOUNTING OF OUR
MISSING MEN. FURTHER RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE RESTS WITH THE INFORMATION HELD
BY THOSE GOVERNMENTS AND NOT IN THE INFORMATION HELD BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.
IN SPITE OF THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS ON THIS ISSUE, IT
IS DIA'S INTENT AND DUTY TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND
FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY.
DIA HAS PLACED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON.INFORMATION RELATING TO AMERICANS WHO
MIGHT STILL BE ALIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A
DEDICATED AND PROFESSIONAL EFFORT TOWARD A SUCCESSFUL ACCOUNTING FOR AMERICANS
MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
MR. CHAIRMAN, I WANT YOU TO KNOW DIA'S RESOLVE IS UNWAVERING. LIEUTENANT
GENERAL WILLIAMS, MYSELF, RADM PAULSON AND HIS STAFF WILL CONTINUE TO
COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH YOUR TASK FORCE.
DRAFT,
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TOP.` CRET Attachment 8 t
American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia
Intelligence Community very sensitive to the importance of
POW/MIA problem.
-- Imagery, SIGINT and human resources have been tasked to collect
information on this problem.
Imagery - generated ffort'o confirm or negate reports
from HUMINT sources. Over 900operations to date in 1981.
-- Imagery search is employed whenever a source provides a general
location of possible POW camp. Surveillance coverage is used to monitor
known facilities that are suspected to house POWs.
-- Requirements receive whatever priority is required to meet the
imagery need.
Imagery hampered by adverse weather prevalent throughout most
of the year and the requirement for very high resolution imagery.
-- In 1981, only nine requirements identified for imagery collection
and only six facilities are presently active for imagery collection.
SIGINT - Currently, three active requirements in National
SIGINT Requirements List (NSRL).
To date, there has been no SIGINT information either substantiating
or refuting the existence of POWs/MIAs in Southeast Asia.
HUMINT - Collection responsibilities for POW/MIA problem have
been levie on State, CIA's clandestine service and DIA with support
from DCD and FBIS.
HUMINT collection which has been productive primarily derived
from debriefing of refugee nd Vietnam.
-- Some HUMINT information has been derived from Vietnamese
media.
-- Continued diplomatic efforts, combined with Intelligence
Community attempts to obtain positive information, appear to be best
course of action at this time.
-- Need to control leaks of classified activities against the
problem and limit the publicity given to independent actions by private
groups.
TOP .'ECRET
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