THE THAI ELECTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005379420
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2009
• Case Number: F-2009-00054
• Publication Date: February 5, 1976

CONTROL NUMBER
REGISTER OF PERSONNEL HANDLINGtLASSIFIED DOCUMENT 403
DATE RECEIVED
5 Feb Z9
RETURN TO OFFICE, CHAIRMAN, JCS LASSIFIC
ROOM 2E865. THE PENTAGON
DOCUMENT NUMBER COPY NUMBER DATE OF DOCUMENT
Memo to Asst to Presfor SA(ccCJCS) from DCI 4 Feb 76
SUBJECT (b)(1)
The Thai Election and its Implications for the US (b)(3)
THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE. T,I RCULATION OF THIS
DOCUMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO INDIVIDUALS INDICATED BELOW. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE FOR RECORD PRIOR TO DISPATCH TO ANOTHER OFFICE, OR OTHER DISPOSITION.
THIS FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.
TO
NAME
INITIAL
REMARKS
CHAIRMAN. JCS 00
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ECUTIVE 02
5 February 1976
THE A551STANT TO
01
THE CHAIRMAN
INFORMATION
1
.
.
ADMINISTRATIVE
04
ASSISTANT
2. DCI warns that upcoming Thai elections
CHAIRMANS STAFF GROUP
(April 76) may present problems for US
AIR FORCE MBR 01
relations:
CHAIRMANS STAFF GROU
NAVY MBR. 01C
- US presence likely to become an issue
CHAIRMANS STAFF GROUP
in campaign.
MARINE MBR O1D
CHAIRMANS STAFF GROUP
- Election could produce:
ARMY MBR OlE
LEGAL ADVISOR AND
--' Centrist-conservative government
LEGISLATIVE ASST OWF
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
-- Coalition of right or left.
(SPEECHES) OIG
- A military takeover - sympathetic
MARINE AIDE 05
to U.S.
ARMY AIDE 06
3. Recommend you scan pages i-iii (high-
lighted).
j
2789g.
COLONEL CONLIN
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TODECLASSIFICATION
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DATE: 10-20-2009
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 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
4 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
(National Security Affairs)
1. The attached Interagency Intelligence Memorandum contains the
intelligence community's assessment of how the present election campaign
in Thailand will affect Thai-US relations and prospects for retention of
a residual US military presence in Thailand.
2. As the memorandum indicates, there is a strong possibility that
the Thai military may assume control of the government at some point
before elections are held, or soon thereafter. Within the Thai military
establishment, there is considerable nervousness, plus a growing disen-
chantment with Thailand's experiment with parliamentary government.
Moreover, there are rivalries and crosscurrents within the military
establishment which could result in one or another clique's attempting
a preemptive coup against the presumed plans of some other group. In
short, the situation in Thailand is fluid and subject to quick and
dramatic change.
3. We gave serious consideration to issuing the attached study
as an "Alert Memorandum." Our decision not to use that particular art
form should not be misconstrued as a sign of complacency about the state
of affairs in Thailand. We will, of course, keep a close eye on this
situation and alert you promptly to any new developments giving further
grounds for concern.
r George Bush
2769s~ ~ota
cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 (b)(1)
(b)(3)
The Thai Election and
Its Implications for the US 0 2 7 B 9 g U
NIO IIM 76-008
February 1976
 With elections scheduled for April, Thailand is experiencing
a growing sense of malaise concerning the country's experiment
with parliamentary democracy.
-- This sentiment is expressed by King Phumiphon, the
military, and many prominent civilian figures.
In these circumstances, there is a strong possibility that the
military might decide to assume control. For the moment, the
King appears to be against such a course, and many military
leaders would be loathe to act against the King's wishes. The
situation is fragile, however, and subject to quick change.
Other developments which would increase the likelihood of acoup
are:
-- a sharp deterioration of the security situation.
-- a breakdown in public order caused by widespread
strikes or anti-government disorders.
-- the prospect of a left-of-center coalition coming to
power which would threaten the vested interests of
the military and conservative elements in Thailand.
* This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central InteZ-
Zigence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.
27696- Q
 Short of a coup, there is also a possibility that the elections may
be postponed, leaving Khukrit, the present caretaker prime minister,
to rule through emergency decree.
-- Khukrit, the military, and the King may well come
to prefer this alternative over going through with
the elections.
Implications for the US during the election campaign
-- By the 20 March deadline on removal of US combat
forces, the US will probably be able to complete
the negotiations now in train with the Khukrit
government regarding the residual US military
presence.
-- But there is no assurance that an agreement signed
by Khukrit will be honored by a new government.
-- The election campaign probably will complicate
Thai-US relations. The US presence is likely to
become an issue in the campaign, and campaign
pressures may force some candidates to insist
on a total US military withdrawal.
Implications for the US after an election
-- if an election is held, it would be likely to bring
another centrist-conservative government into power.
- Such a government would probably be as fragmented
and contentious as the present government, but it
would keep Thai policy toward the US more or less
along.present lines.
-- A less likely possibility is either a coalition based
exclusively on rightist elements, or one which included
the Socialists.
- A rightist government would be cooperative with US
interests, but would still be restrained by politi-
cal considerations on how far it could go, or ap-
pear to go, in accommodating the US.
\ 2 7 6 9 6 A? ~
 - A government in which the Socialists had a strong
voice would make it difficult, if not impossible,
for the US to maintain any military presence in
Thailand. Such a government, however, could
prompt the military either to force the government
to resign or to overthrow it.
In the event of a military takeover, the resultant government
would be sympathetic to US interests.
-- It would be unlikely, however, to reverse the long
term trend toward a more non-aligned Thai foreign
policy. Nevertheless, a military government might
call for a substantial increase in US assistance if
faced with a greatly expanded insurgency or a break-
down of civil order in the country.
27696-
 THE DETAILS
1. Thailand is scheduled to hold a general election early
in April, its second in little more than a year. This is an
election that few Thai want and that many believe will do little
to strengthen Thailand's nascent parliamentary process. In the
interim, Prime Minister Khukrit will continue to head a weak
caretaker government amidst a growing disenchantment with the
parliamentary system that runs particularly deep within the
military but also extends to the King and, to some degree, the
public at large.
2. The Thai, with a long history of authoritarian government,
have no deep commitment to Western style "democratic" government.
Parliamentary institutions and practices have only recently entered
a period of testing and adjustment under the still new constitution.
With its parliamentary system lacking roots in Thai political cul-
ture, the unwieldly coalition Khukrit had put together and the
compromises he had made with student, labor, and other "leftist"
interest groups have been seen by many Thai as signs of weakness
and "instability" rather than the normal political rough and
tumble of an open parliamentary system.
Rumbling on the Right
3. In recent months, King Phumiphon Adunyadet, who played
a key role in the toppling of the former military regime in 1973
and who remains closely identified with Thailand's new democratic
constitution, has added to the conservatives' malaise by stressing
his own dissatisfaction -- in delphic fashion -- with the political
status quo. Although he remains aloof from day-to-day involvement
in politics, he recently issued a public warning against the
communist threat to Thailand, calling for a campaign of national
unity. Clearly, the collapse of the Laotian monarchy, combined
with Thailand's own internal economic and political problems, have
ov-
alarmed t enthusiasm for the Khukrit
ernment.
Pro a ly by design, the King has given no clear
indication of the extent of his dissatisfaction, the concrete
steps he would endorse to alleviate its causes, or those he would
consider too extreme in the present situation.
27 696- CCU
 7. We nevertheless believe that there is a threshold for
military action against the political system. Any one or a
combination of the following circumstances would likely galvanize
the military into action against the civilian government:
-- a sharp and sustained deterioration of the security situa-
tion either within Thailand or along Thailand's borders
with Laos or Cambodia;
-- a breakdown in public order caused by widespread strikes
or anti-government demonstrations;
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27696- `p"O
 -- the prospect of a left-of-center coalition coming to
power that would threaten the privileged position
of the Thai military or the substantial economic interests
of its leadership. In this respect, the October 1973
"Revolution" has yet to produce a revolutionary Thai
government. The Thai politicians that have managed
the government since parliament was first seated in
1974 have prudently refrained from encroaching on Thai
military equities.
The Next Two Months
8. All factors considered, the present situation would seem
to weight the odds against a blatant military move to scrap the
parliamentary system between now and the general elections scheduled
for April 4. There still appears to be considerable support among
the Thai power elite for continuing Thailand's parliamentary ex-
periment in the hope that the elections will produce a more sta-
ble and effective government.
10. Another possibility is that the military, perhaps seconded
by the King, will decide that elections at this time are not likely
to produce an acceptable government. There is growing conservative
pressure for Khukrit to move his. government toward a more authori-
tarian and stable footing. There is also growing sentiment within
the armed forces for the postponement of the elections and the
replacement of the present unwieldy coalition cabinet with a new
civilian team that would rule through the emergency powers of the
present constitution. At the moment, such a shift toward a more
authoritarian posture within the present constitutional framework
appears more likely than an outright military takeover in defiance
of constitutional procedures.
C r~r \
22636-C0`4
 11. Khukrit, himself, could come to see some advantages in
moving toward greater authoritarianism within the existing con-
stitutional system. Aside from possibly ensuring the military's
continued acquiescence in a parliamentary system, such a move could
help him deal more effectively with a number of difficult domestic
problems that could damage his own and his party's chances of
retaining political power.
12. We believe the King would probably go along with an
agreement between Khukrit and the military leadership to postpone
the elections and rule through emergency decree, although the
King would expect Khukrit and the military to take the lead in
working out such a consensus. The King's acquiescence in this
move would be even more likely in the event of a crisis or in a
situation where he believed that a military takeover was the only
other alternative.
13. But except under extreme circumstances such as the pros-
pect of a left-wing government coming to power -- which he would
consider a direct threat to the crown -- we do not believe the
King is prepared to scrap the constitution he was so instrumental
in creating and lend his support to a restoration of military rule.
Furthermore, agitation on the part of Praman and other critics
of the present government within the military could ultimately force
the King to take a more positive position regarding his support
for the parliamentary system. This in itself might substantially
lessen political tension in Bangkok between now and the elections.
15. Krit's claim that he will not run in the coming election
comes as a surprise to most observers, since he is considered by
many a leading candidate for prime minister. Krit may fear that
the next government may not last any longer than the present one,
 and he may also fear that charges of corruption will be aired
against him in the campaign. If he does remain out of the race,
he will almost certainly provide financial support to various
parties and candidates on the political right, and he will be
a factor in the negotiations to form the next government.
16. Another complicating factor is Khukrit's uncertain
health. A sustained period of severe stress could force him
to step down, possibly even before the election. Praman, in
his capacity as deputy prime minister, would be the logical suc-
cessor. Should this occur, it is possible that Praman would
attempt to manufacture a pretext for postponing the elections,
at least for several months, in order to strengthen his politi-
cal base.
Implications for the US
17. During the Election Period. At present it appears the
United States will be able to complete its ongoing negotiations
regarding the residual US military presence with Khukrit's caretaker
government.* Several factors, however, may undermine any agree-
ment arrived at prior to March 20.
-- As the election campaign begins to pick up momentum,
it probably will generate new pressures for a fur-
ther loosening of Thai relations with the US, as
happened in last year's campaign. At some point
in the campaign, Socialist and Democrat Party poli-
ticians may force Rhukrit to acknowledge that his
government in March 1975 formally called for the
withdrawal of all foreign military personnel and
not just combat troops.
-- Both North Vietnam and Laos are insisting that re-
moval of the American military presence in its
entirety is essential to the establishment of nor-
mal diplomatic relations. The sentiments of those
 who feel an accommodation with its communist
neighbors is essential to Thai security could
be roused during the campaign so that they insist
on a total US withdrawal.
-- The recent appointment of Anan Panyarachun, former
ambassador to the US, as the Foreign Ministry's
Undersecretary, adds another element of uncertain-
ty to Thai/US relations. Anan, who takes office
at a time when Foreign Minister Chatchai will be
concentrating most of his attention on the election,
-- Finally, given the personalized character of Thai
politics, there is no assurance that any agreement
signed by the Khukrit caretaker government will be
honored by a new government.
18. After the Election. No parliamentary party dominates
the field of contenders in the present election campaign and even
the Thai cannot predict its outcome. It is possible, moreover,
that the shape of the eventual government will not become imme-
diately apparent even after the returns are in. Prolonged inter-
party negotiations may be required to form a coalition. Three
outcomes are more likely than other theoretically possible
permutations -- a centrist-conservative coalition government; a
conservative-socialist coalition; or a rightist coalition.
19. We believe that the most likely outcome of an election
is for another fragmented and contentious centrist-conservative
based coalition not unlike the last Khukrit government. Such a.
government would probably keep Thai/US policy more or less along
- 6 -
27698 taco
 present lines. The majority of likely candidates for parliament
are conservative businessmen or former government or military
officials who favor close relations with the US. Their views
are affected, however, by the prevalent assumption that the US
is no longer prepared to accept major responsibility for Southeast
Asian security affairs and that the US cannot be depended on to
come to Thailand's aid in the face of an increased communist
threat. For example, Democrat Party leader Seni Pramot, arguing
that Thailand should have a non-aligned foreign policy, has already
gone on record against the continued presence of US military "ad-
visers."
20. The conservatives, and particularly senior military of-
ficers, recognize that Thai military forces remain dependent on
US material aid. Although there is now growing concern over the
implications of this dependency relationship and its impact on
the effectiveness of the Thai military, the conservatives believe
that Thailand must continue to maintain good relations with the US
in order to keep necessary aid flowing. In addition, Prime Minister
Khukrit and other senior government officials seem genuinely con-
vinced of the value of maintaining US security facilities in Thai-
land. Unless he radically changes his position in his attempt to
expand political support, a new Khukrit government would pose few
problems for the US. Given Thai concern over its material dependency
on the US, however, it can be expected that a new Khukrit govern-
ment would pressure the US for greater assistance in developing
their own military production facilities.
21. The next prime minister, however, could have difficulty
putting together an exclusively conservative coalition, considering
the strong rivalries and animosities among some conservative par-
ties and factions. This could lead to an effort to include so-
cialist representation in a political marriage of convenience. if,
for example, Seni's Democrat Party wins the largest number of seats,
and its prospects appear fairly good, Seni would probably try to
form a coalition with other centrist or rightist elements.
22. If he fails in this effort, Seni would probably turn to
the Socialist Party, as he has in the past. The Socialists would
demand a voice in Thai foreign policy, and pressure for the re-
moval of the US residual presence and termination of US military
\S'
X 27 6 ' tw'
 aid would increase. In their most recent policy pronouncement,
the Socialist bloc called for the elimination of all "imperialist
influences," (including foreign investment), the repudiation of
all existing treaties and secret agreements, and the introduction
of a "non-aligned" foreign policy -- all measures to reduce or
eliminate US security ties with Thailand. A strong Socialist
voice in the coalition would make it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for the US to maintain any military presence in Thailand.
This situation, however, could create the political climate in
which the military would preempt any precipitous change in Thai
foreign policy either by forcing the government to resign or by
overthrowing it.
23. A third possibility is a rightist parliamentary coalition.
Such a government would be cooperative with US interests, but
political considerations are likely to limit how far any rightist
government can go in working with the US. Praman, for example,
is likely to do or say whatever he believes will strengthen his
political position and would not support US interests if he
believed it would cost him much political support. He has gone
on record, however, in opposition to any broad effort to weaken
Bangkok's security relationship with the US, and has made it
clear that he places a high value on the continued flow of US
military aid.
24. If Praman, Krit or some other rightist figure comes to
power through a military backed overthrow of the parliamentary
government, their inclination to cooperate closely with the US
would probably prevail initially over any attempts by the Foreign
Ministry to steer a more neutral foreign policy course. The
Thai military leadership, however, has drawn generally the same
conclusions from the end of the Indochina war and the withdrawal
of US military from the region as have other Thai politicians.
Although a Thai military based government would seek to maintain
H 't is unlikely tnat sucn a
government could reverse th gterm trend toward a more non-
aligned Thai foreign policy. On the other hand, a greatly ex-
panded insurgency or a general breakdown of civil order could
create the kind of situation whereby a Thai military government
would call for a substantial increase in US assistance.
~8, 27696-[Ole