SADDAM HUSAYN LIKELY TO HANG ON

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005389147
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-00854
• Publication Date: June 1, 1992

(b)(1)
~b)~3)
Director of
Central
Intelligence
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 Director of --
Central
Intelligence .:
;Saddam Husayn:
~L~ke1y~To~ Hang; On
lnforrrmaiion available as of 12 June 1992 was used '
in the preparation of this Nationallntel/igence Estimate.
G -
The fol%wing intelligence organizations participated?~
in the preparation of this Estimate: : ,
'. The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency.:'- ,.
? The fVafional Security Agency
? The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, .
Department of State :- .
.:The Director for Intelligence, " '~ -
~- DepartmenfofEnergy.: : ' -;,;,,,,
_ ;.,:TfieOfficeoflntelligenceSupport,:;;~ _ '`: :' ~:`~ ?.-
Department of the Treasury ..
" also partici-pating:: - . ` ~ - -
.The Deputy Chiet of Staff for Intelligence..
' - Depariinent of the Army'
=The Director of Naval Intelligence. ? ~'; ! ` ,
Department of the Navy: ~.:..-
? 'The Assistant Chief of Staff, tntetligence, :'
-~
?
`:: Dep,`artment'of the Air Force .. ,
,The Directon-of Intelligence, ': ~ ' ' ": ~'
Headquarters; Marine Corps , ', %:. =,
?.~[:
: This Esiirriate was approved forpublication by the
National Fpreign Intelligence Board ?.,; , ' . ,
;~ .
`i Se~B'l-
` ~~~ June 7992
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 Key Judgments
~aaaam nusayn:
Likely To Hang On
Saddam Husayn is likely to survive the political and economic challenges
of the next year. Although he is significantly weaker than he was before -
tfie Gulf war, he appears stronger than he was a year ago. The only=real
threat to Saddam remaining in power over the next year is from a sudden,
violent effort to remove him by one or more people with access to him.
If we are wrong in our judgment about Saddam's survival, it is most likely
in underestimating the, current degree of unhappiness in the military and in
the Sunni core that have provided Saddam's base of power. Important
individuals in the inner circle and in the Republican Guard might be ready
to mount a coup against Saddam. A popular revolt is much less likely.
Saddam will continue to use the Army, the Republican Guard, and
intelligence and security forces to stifle dissent, reassert his control over
Iraq, and prevent the emergence of any potential rival. The resumption of
:Air Force fixed-wing flight activity in April probably added to public
'~T perceptions that the regime is'growing stronger and that citizens are
Economic sanctions alone are not likely to bring about Saddam's removal,
but they will contribute to public disaffection with his leadership. Sanc-
powerless to bring about change
lions Wray also be increasing popular resentment toward the West-Despite
sanctions, Saddam has managed to maintain his core support group by
providing goods and services not available to the masses. Saddam probably
believes that Iraq has withstood the brunt of the sanctions and that
international support for sanctions is ftagging.0
Saddam will continue to test coalition resolve by using economic pressure
and increasingly intimidating military positioning against the Kurds in .
northern Iraq. Should Provide Comfort not be extended, he would be freer
to expand his operations in the north-and may hope for Turkish collusion
in suppressing the Kurds. He will also be more likely to act against the
 Discussion
sanctions. Should Iran strike into Iraqi territory
again, Iraq would probably react with its air defense
weapons, including the launching of interceptors if
sufficient early warning were available. The opera-
tions by Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft, which many Iraqis
apparently believed had bun prohibited under the
terms of the cease-fire, is probably taken by Iraqi
citizens as an indication that the coalition is easing its
opposition to Saddam.
~ .
Extending His Reach In the South . .
Saddam is moving to reassert his authority beyond
Baghdad, especially in southern Iraq, where the Shia
rebels still operate. Saddam is aggressively probing
the coalition to see if it is willing to enforce UN
Resolution 688. He is demonstrating growing confi- .
Bence that he will not be punished for his actions.
~~
Saddam's ability to limit access of international .
observers and relief workers in the south gives him a
freer.hand to conduct military operations in the ,
marshlands in an effort to end the persistent, low-level
Shia insurgency. He is also depriving the Shias of .
adequate food and medical supplies and limiting [brit
access to the holy cities of An Najaf and Karbala'.
These tactics will set back the Shia insurgency but
will probably not pui it out of business.
He probably sees the Shiad as a more serioas long-
term threat to his regime than the Kurds. As his
forces extend their sway over the marshes, Saddam
will probably begin forcibly resettling Shia villagers in
Saddam Husayn is;not the strongman he was before
the Gulf war, but his regime continues to demonstrate
an ability to survive. Indced, Saddam's position
appears to be gradually improving, and the regime is
now more secure than it was a year ago .
Tightening His Grip
To maintain his personal security, Saddam will con-
time to isolate himself from all but his most trusted
colleagues and family members. Saddam has reorga- .
nized the military and security services to provide
additional protection for him, his family, and his
regime. Significant Republican Guard and other key
security services still surround Baghdad, acting as a
formidable barrier to disgruittled military or other
foes of the regime.
Saddam's policy of generously rewarding relatives
and cronies, along with fierce and swift punishment of
those with suspeMed loyalties, is likely to ensure the
continued support of his inner circle. They probably
have also accepted his argument that only he can keep
Iraq together and are Fearful of retribution from the
population if Saddam is no longer there to hold the
regime intact. In addition, his pervasive security
networks combined with the fear of purges, execu-,: -
lions, and retribution will serve to restrain other
potential opposition. According to exile and press
accounts that. we credit but cannot confirm; Saddam's
security services continue to round up suspected coup
plotters and disaffected military personnel.)
ity of Iraq's borders, but it also gave Saddam an:
excuse to resume Air Force fixed-wing flight opera- .
[ions and bolstered his case for lifting international
 Pressure on the Kurds
Saddam has not given up his designs to reimposo '
complete control over northern Iraq's strategic cities
and resources, including same oil facilities. At the .
same time, he seeks to avoid a major confrontation
with Operation Provide Comfort: '
? Saddam can be expected to continue to exploit
differences among the Kurdish leaders in an effort .
+ Ho wit] rely on his internal economic embargo of the
north, now in its eighth month, coupled with a
virtual military blcekade.of the region.
? Iraqi forces will continue to harass UN relief wark-
ersand impede their efforts in the north.
? Roughly half of Iraq's ground forces are deployed in
a defensive line facing the Kurdish-controlled areas
in the north. The layered air defense system-
including mobile SAMs--could be activated
quickly0
Saddam could significantly step up military opera-
tions against the Kurds with little advance notice. Bui
he probably will not mount a military offensive while
Operation Provide Comfort remains in place. Instead;
Figure 3. Saddam and Kurdish tender,
rorabanr.'(leecJ.
'?