POLITICAL LEGITIMACY DI IM--POST-GAMSAKHURDIA GEORGIA: THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005403091
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 23, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-00705
• Publication Date: April 13, 1992

POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
POI,I1'ICAI, LEGITIMACY
Summary
APPROVED FOR
RELEASE^ DATE:
27-Jul-2010
Georgia remains mired in a crisis of political legitimacy, despite the recent creation
of an interim government headed by former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.
Continued military rule in many regions of the country, infighting and maneuvering
among rival political and paramilitary groups, ongoing ethnic problems, and lingering
popular support for ousted President Gamsakhurdia are all factors contributing to
the problem. A faltering economy and surging crime rate are further straining Georgia's
political fabric. Acting Prime Minister Sigua's attempts to stem the crisis with
proposed parliamentary elections, a series of political and economic reforms, and
renewed economic contacts with the former Soviet republics and the West have thus
far failed to stabilize the situation. Resistance to Shevardnadze's leadership among
some political leaders and segments of the population and the limited prospects for
holding successful parliamentary elections probably means continued political infighting
and violence, adding to instability in the Caucasus.
The ouster of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgia's first democratically elected president,
in January 1992 has created a political vacuum and a crisis of legitimacy for the
ruling interim government. This government--the State Council--is an outgrowth of
the Military Council which drove out Gamsakhurdia and then seized power. After several
unsuccessful attempts to reconvene parliament, the Military Council--comprised of
former Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua, National Guard Commander Tengiz Kitovani, and
paramilitary leader Jaba loseliani, the three leading opposition figures--first formed
an advisory consultative council, comprised mainly of political and paramilitary leaders
who helped overthrow Gamsakhurdia. When this effort failed to create a widely accepted
civilian body, the Council in March tapped former Soviet Foreign Minister and Georgian
Communist Party boss Eduard Shevardnadze to head a State Council, which would serve
as an interim government. Shevardnadze's appointment was clearly an effort to break
Georgia's international isolation, as key western states had refused to develop political
and economic ties with the repressive Gamsakhurdia regime and remained cautious after
its ouster. In addition, the members of the Military Council probably hoped Shevardnadze's
outsider status might allow him to broker new parliamentary elections, originally
slated for June.
Political Legacy of a Violent Overthrow
The interim government has not yet succeeded in its principal goal of restoring
order in Tbilisi and western Georgia. Many Gamsakhurdia loyalists continue to resist
the new Georgian government even though Gamsakhurdia fled the region following his
aborted comeback attempt in January (see box). Although demonstrations have slowly
receded in Tbilisi, both violent and non-violent acts of protest persist throughout
western Georgia.
The Military Council attempted to reestablish order initially by placing these regions
 under military rule. It established special curfews and banned the possession of
unregistered firearms. Nevertheless, hostilities between forces loyal to the new
government and local Gamsakhurdia loyalists have resulted in several recent deaths,
including the assassination of several policemen and the burning alive of three Georgian
Shevardnadze's return has intensified opposition to the interim government and created
new political infighting within the leadership. Terrorist activity by Gamsakhurdia's
supporters rose sharply following Shevardnadze's return and appointment as Chairman
of the State Council. Shevardnadze remains a hated figure among Garnsakhurdia's supporters,
despite recent polls ranking him as the most popular politician among Tbilisi residents.
Demonstrators in western Georgia recently burned him in effigy. Some members of
the State Council apparently feel threatened by Shevardnadze's political stature.
Several of the political and paramilitary factions which helped topple Gamsakhurdia
are pursuing their own agendas at the expense of the interim government. Foremost
among them is the Georgian National Congress party, led by Georgi Chanturia. Perhaps
the best known Georgian dissident in the West, Chanturia has held several press conferences
in Tbilisi and Moscow at which he attempted to pass off his proposed policies as those
of the new Georgian government. Chanturia, who is strongly opposed to Shevardnadze,
also traveled recently to Spain in an effort to persuade
members of the exiled Georgian royal family to return to i isi to e p esta is
a constitutional monarchy. Members of the royal family rebuked Chanturia and publicly
derided his visit as an exercise in self-promotion.
Apart from fending off pro-Gamsakhurdia forces and curtailing resurgent infighting
within its ranks, the interim government faces several key tasks in its effort to
restore stability; specifically, it must diffuse ethnic tensions in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, define its relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States, and
expand economic ties to the former Soviet republics and the West.
Tensions between the new regime and the Ossetian and Abkhazian minority groups remain
high despite the new State Council's stated desire of reaching peaceful settlements
with all of Georgia's minorities. Sporadic Georgian-Ossetian fighting persists in
the troubled South Ossetia region, serving as an irritant to Georgian-Russian relations.
........._ ......................._..
In January, shortly after Gamsakhurdia's ouster, the South Ossetians staged areferendum--although
most of the voting took place in neighboring North Ossetia--that overwhelmingly backed
a call for South Ossetia's incorporation into Russia. Meanwhile, nationalist leaders
 in the western Abkhaz region have sought to preserve, if not enhance, their autonomy
from Tbilisi. Abkhaz officials, however, face a dilemma. If they support the State
Council they risk reprisals from Gamsakh'urdia loyalists who dominate the region, while
shunning cooperation with the State Council may invite military interventio
Relations with these ethnic groups will be aggravated by the interim government's
decision to renew efforts to establish a Georgian military. While the leadership
of the former Military Council views the establishment of military forces as necessary
to consolidating power and safeguarding Georgian territory, the Ossetian and Abkhaz
minorities see such forces as the chief threat to their autonomy. The new government
has not yet confronted the dangerous task of disarming the numerous paramilitary groups
in South Ossetia, but will likely come into conflict with them, as Garrmsakhurdia did.
The fate of former Soviet forces in Georgia also remains unresolved. Their relations
with the Gamsakhurdia regime had been pooh
Since the ouster, the 100,000 CIS troops remaining in Borgia ave
had to defend themselves and their equipment against attacks from pro-Garnsakhurdia
militants. Although relations between the new regime and CIS forces appear to have
improved--Shevardnadze, in fact, has asked Russian President Yel'tsin not to withdraw
Russian troops--it is unlikely that the interim government will be able to prevent
continued harassment of CIS troops by local militants. It is also unclear whether
Georgia will drop its claims to CIS weapons and equipment now that Gamsakhurdia is
gone. Renewed calls for full control could cause a rift in relations with the CIS
and, more importantly, Russia
Although the new government has also sought enhanced economic ties to the other
former Soviet republics, it probably will refrain from joining the CIS, at least over
the next several months. Shevardnadze probably favors Georgian membership in the
CIS but a ears to have abandoned this idea for now. Acting Prime Minister Sigua
has told the press, that he does not believe
the CIS will survive long enough for a future Georgian Parliament to vote on applying
for membership.
Georgia is already taking steps to break its international isolation. Now that
Georgia has made significant progress in gaining diplomatic recognition, it will continue
to press the West for much needed foreign aid and investment. Shevardnadze is already
spearheading such efforts, promising that democratic reforms will soon be in place.
Elections--Key to Normalization
Because Gamsakhurdia won 87 percent of the vote in the 26 May 1991 Presidential
election, the holding of new parliamentary elections is critical to resolving the
crisis of legitimacy in Georgian politics. Acting Prime Minister Sigua proposed to
hold elections in June, but many of Georgia's political factions have not yet agreed
to participate. The State Council, without such support, faces divisive boycotts
at the polls. The boycotts of the 1990 parliamentary elections which swept Gamsakhiardia's
coalition into power spawned the opposition movement which later overthrew him. Many
members of the consultative council--including Shevardnadze--believe that elections
should be postponed until the fall and recent reports indicate this is the most likely
outcome. To build support for new elections, the State Council will have to convince
a large majority of Georgia's disparate political parties and factions that elections
will not lead to the creation of a new authoritarian regime. Although the leaders
 of the Council--excluding Shevardnadze--have promised to retire from political life
after successful elections are held, many Georgians remain skeptical that they will
give up power so easily. There have also been charges from some activists that the
interim government is seeking to implement its own policies before elections in an
effort to hamstring the policy options of any future government.
Even if elections are held, the new leaders will face another major decision: what
type of government to establish. Thus far, the State Council has not indicated what
mechanism will be used to resolve this question, although some leaders have suggested
holding a popular referendum. Members of the former Military Council had been unclear
as to what form of permanent government they favored other than one which does not
provide for a strong executive, if any executive at all. Proposals floated thus far
range from a parliamentary democracy with or without a council of ministers, to a
constitutional monarchy, to the return of Gamsakhurdia to power. The latter two proposals
have foundered on the refusal of any member of the exiled royal family to return to
Georgia from Spain and the categorical opposition of the new regime to consider allowing
the return to power of Gamsakhurdia. As a last resort, the State Council might allow
Gamsakhurdia to return to Georgia if he promised to eschew any political involvement,
but Gamsakhurdia would be unlikely to accept this stricture. A parliamentary system
would thus be the most likely form of government to emerge in Georgia. Nonetheless,
many former opposition members fear that this would be a long transitional process,
and that in the transition period Shevardnadze would position himself as the permanent
de facto head of state.
Prospects
The crisis of legitimacy in Georgian politics is unlikely to be resolved unless
its myriad political and paramilitary groups put aside conflicting allegiances and
objectives sufficiently to conduct new elections. Although Shevardnadze commands
tremendous respect both at home and abroad, it is by no means clear that his reputation
and political astuteness will enable him to draw Georgia's divided political forces
into a democratic process. If he holds elections without securing the participation
of Georgia's many political factions, the interim government will likely face boycotts,
protests, and further violence. In addition, acts of terrorism or political assassination
could quickly undermine the first steps toward stabilization.
Moreover, success on the domestic front partly depends on Shevardnadze's ability
to build productive economic ties with the other former Soviet republics, as well
as the West. Shevardnadze will attempt to capitalize on recent Western recognition
by seeking substantial economic aid for Georgia's beleaguered economy, arguing that
such assistance is vital in his effort to promote stability and nail down a date for
new elections. Substantial foreign aid, credits, and technical assistance might facilitate
efforts to bridge some differences among the various political groups in Georgia--particularly
if such assistance were tied to Georgia's commitment to hold new elections.
If successful elections establishing some sort of ruling coalition are not held
by year's end, Georgia may again plunge into widespread civil conflict and perhaps
return to authoritarian rule. Many Georgians appear to be increasingly disillusioned
with continued unrest, declining living standards, and the interim government's policies.
Some Georgians have even begun calling for astrongman--although no political figure
has been singled out--to assume control of the government and restore order
Continued political infighting and violence over
next six months could enhance the attractiveness of such sentiments to a weary populace,
paving the way for a new Gamsakhurdia-style strongman.
 Appendix
Eduard Shevardnadze (Chairman) age 64, returned to his native land with a mandate
to use his considerable international contacts and expertise to lead Georgia out of
isolation. He has met with success on some fronts, notably gaining diplomatic recognition
from the West. His other priorities center on achieving domestic stability and encouraging
economic growth. Shevardnadze is intent on attracting foreign investment and improving
relations with other former Soviet republics, especially Russia.
he is trying to bring adversaries together to alleviate ethnic tensions in t e country.
Shevardnadze is not without detractors, however. Some remember him unfavorably
as Communist Party boss of the republic (1972-85); reports indicate he was the target
of assassination attempts on several occasions. Others feel his six years in Moscow
as Foreign Minister left him too wedded to the center and out of touch with Georgian
politics.
Jaba loseliani (Deputy Chairman), about age 65, is the most colorful member of the
State Council. Dubbed "the charismatic former bank robber" by a Western newspaper
for his criminal past, loseliani draws his power from his leadership of Georgia's
best-armed private militia, the Mkhedrioni. He supported Shevardnadze's return in
early 1992.
After many years as a criminal (his record included bank robbery and about 25 years
in jail), loseliani moved on to a career in drama and theater by the late 1960s.
He is a playwright, critic, author, and has taught at the Tbilisi Theater Institute.
Tengiz Sigua joined the crusade for Georgian independence in the late 1980s. He
became a member of Gamsakhurdia's Roundtable-Free Georgia coalition, where he was
a protege of Gamsakhurdia. When Gamsakhurdia became Chairman of the Georgian Supreme
Soviet in November 1991, Sigua became Prime Minister. He resigned in August 1991,
protesting his president's autocratic rule and economic mismanagement. He joined
anti-Gamsakhurdia forces, where he became the choice of many to lead a government
once Gamsakhurdia was ousted.
As Acting Prime Minister, Sigua has focused on improving the country's economy.
His Council of Ministers has issued decrees on land reform, rescinded a joint ventures
tax, and in investigating measures on demonopolizing certain economic activities.
A metallurgist by profession, Sigua is 58.
Tengiz Kitovani has lost power and prestige in recent months. He had been co-leader
of the ruling Military Council, but lost out when it was abolished in March. Kitovani
also had headed Georgia's powerful National Guard, but stepped down in late February.
He retained some authority by becoming First Deputy Prime Minister for security issues
shortly thereafter.
Kitovani was once an ally of Gamsakhurdia, with a friendship dating from childhood.
He was elected to the Georgian Supreme Soviet in 1990, and was appointed to head
 the National Guard at its inception in mid-1991. Kitovani and many of his troops
fled Tbilisi later that year in protest of Gamsakhurdia's actions, and formed one
of the core groups in the effort to overthrow the president. Kitovani, swell-known
sculptor, is about 55 years old.
Members of the opposition and disaffected Gamsakhurdia allies--including former
senior government officials and elements of the Georgian National Guard had joined
forces following the failed August 1991 Moscow coup to demand Garisakhurdia's resignation.
After several months of street demonstrations and sporadic fighting, forces loyal
to the opposition coalition laid siege to the Georgian Parliament building where Gamsakhurdia
had taken refuge in late December. Gamsakhurdia then fled to Armenia after two weeks
of intense fighting left several hundred dead and much of Tbilisi's historic quarter
destroyed. He attempted to rally supporters by briefly returning to western Georgia
in late January but soon withdrew to Checheno-Ingushetiya, where he remains in exile.
Since fleeing western Georgia for Groznyy, Checheno-Ingushetiya in late January,
Gamsakhurdia has appealed to the international community to deny recognition to the
"illegal" Shevardnadze-led State Council. In mid-March Gamsakhurdia: convened a meeting
in Groznyy of 70 of the 134 deputies of the former Georgian Parliament in an effort
to establish a government in exile. Aside from issuing a pro forma condemnation of
the new State Council, the deputies have done little to help Gamsakhurdia in his bid
to return to power. Chechen President Dudayev--united with Gamsakhurdia by a mutual
hatred of Russia--has provided Gamsakhurdia asylum as well as the limited resources
needed for continued political agitation.
This box is~~
Growing Economic Costs of the Crisis
The near total breakdown of Georgia's economy has exacerbated the political crisis.
that fuel shortages have paralyzed most
Georgian heavy industry and transportation. His acting finance minister has stated
that 80 percent of industrial enterprises are standing idle. Prices in the local
markets have skyrocketed, making most goods unaffordable for the average consumer
despite a 100 percent increase in government salaries
In addition, the interim government's attempts at radical economic reform
are contributing to the turmoil. The decision to free prices on basic foodstuffs
has met with consumer anger, while efforts toward privatization of Tbilisi apartment
blocks has generated confusion among most tenants.
Georgia's political crisis and battered economy have given rise to an explosion
of criminal activit .Crime in Tbilisi has risen dramatically since Gamsakhurdia's
ouster Armed robbery and car "kidnappings"--gangs
stealing cars and then offering to return them if a ransom is paid--are increasingly
common. Few people venture out after dark fearing that militiamen are just as likely
to perpetrate a violent crime as to prevent one. After Garrisakhurtlia's overthrow,
an official amnesty freed 4,200 petty criminals, despite protests from the police.
Drug abuse is also on the rise.
 LDA M 92-20089
13 April 1992