KOSOVO: IMPACT OF 24 SEPTEMBER FRY ELECTIONS IN KOSOVO

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005445129
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-00733
• Publication Date: September 19, 2000

APPROVED FOR RELEASE[] DATE:
06-23-2010
Intelligence Report T ' T/
Office of Europe and Russia Analysis 19 September 2000
United Nations Special Representative to Kosovo Bernard Kouchner this month
publicly announced that he would allow the 24 September FRY elections to be
organized and carried out in Kosovo, but stated that the UN Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) would not assist Belgrade in its election preparations or implementation.
? Yugoslav politicians have begun their campaign in Kosovo, which offers
FRYPresident Milosevic an important source o votes rn the FRY
presidential and parliamentary elections.
Belgrade is establishing voting stations for Kosovo Serbs in southern Serbia, and
Serbian officials this month announced plans to set up hundreds ofpolling stations
in Kosovo as well
? Some local Kosovo Serb leaders loyal to the regime will almost certainly
set up polling stations, perhaps in rivate homes although not on the
scale announced by Serb officials.
Kosovo Albanian political leaders are resigned to UNMIK's decision to allow voting
in Kosovo, and do not condone efforts to disrupt polling. However, scattered ads of
violence are likely to occur, especially ifAlbanians come. into close contact with Serb
voters.
? Intra-Serb violence could also occur in Serb-dominated regions such as
Kosovska Mitrovica where the vote is particularly contentious and pre-
Kosovo Serbs would not view a Milosevic victory as a surprise. Those who support
the opposition would be disappointed with the result, but continue to focus on
providing for their own community. Regime loyalists, meanwhile, would be
emboldened, at least in the short term.
? In the event of massive demonstrations Serbia-wide, some Kosovo Serbs
might be amenable to increased cooperation with the international
community, particularly if it also entailed additional assistance. C
q"A'-4jW, a", 19, Zr; !'F! tw Mm ,pq_ o moarusbooECa.
t~ w F-
 United Nations Special Representative to Kosovo Bernard Kouchner this month
publicly announced that he would allow the 24 September FRY elections to be
organized and carried out in Kosovo, but stated that the UN Mission in Kosovo
-(UNMIK) would not assist Belgrade in election preparations or implementation.
? Kouchner agreed to provide security for those voting in the FRY elections
in Kosovo, but banned the use of public buildings for the ballot, according
Even before Kouchner's statement, Yugoslav politicians had begun their campaign in
Kosovo, which offers the regime an important source of votes-obtained legally or
through fraud-to help boost Milosevic's prospects in the elections. Holding the
elections in Kosovo also reinforces the regime's claim that Kosovo remains part of the
FRY.
? Gorica Gajevic, secretary general of Milosevic's Wiling Socialist Party of
Serbia (SPS), kicked off the regime's campaign in the central Kosovo town
of Gracanica in late August and, in a blatant attempt to try to buy the
political support oflosovo Serbs, promised the crowd that new homes
would be built for returning Serbs.
? Following upon Gajevic's pledge, the Belgrade-controlled FRY Committee
for Friendship and Cooperation in Kosovo in September outlined its plan to
assist Kosovo Serbs by building new homes, providing improved
transportation to and from Serbia, and supplying Serb farmers with fuel and
provisions, according to press reporting.
This report was prepared by analysts in the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force.
 The Yugoslav Federal Election Commission in mid-September announced publicly
that 7,861,327 voters are officially registered for the 24 September FRY
presidential and federal elections. In the southern Serbian districts of Vranje and
Prokupije, to which Kosovo now belongs following electoral law changes in July, a
total of 1,512, 501 voters are registered, according to the Commission.
? Roughly two-thirds of these, or just under 1 million registered voters, likely
reside in Kosovo; the vast majority are ethnic Albanians. There are
approximately 100,000 Kosovo Serbs remaining in the province.
The Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) has been slower off the mark in initiating
an election campaign in Kosovo, largely because its leaders assume that Milosevic will
continue his tradition of stealing Kosovo Serb votes despite their efforts. DOS
politicians contend that the lack of election observers in Kosovo makes the province
fertile ground for election fraud.
? Senior DOS member and Democratic Party Chairman Zoran Djindjic
recently stated publicly that the opposition would not recognize a single
vote from a polling station in Kosovo if an opposition member does not
The FRY Assembly on 24 July passed an election law gerrymandering the electoral
boundaries of the FRY, absorbing three Kosovo electorates into the southern Serbian
districts ofProkuplje and Vranje, which are SPS strongholds.
? The Prokuplje electorate includes Kosovska Mitrovica and Pec as well as
another 14 municipalities, according to press reporting. The Vranje
electorate includes Pristina and nine other Kosovo municipalities.
? Kosovo Serbs are expected to travel from the province to Prokuplje and
Vranje to cast their votes. In addition, Belgrade officials last month
announced publicly that "special" polling stations would be established
elsewhere in Serbia wherever more than 100 displaced Serb voters reside.
The votes of displaced Kosovo Serbs, regardless of where they are cast,
3 Fek, Beet ei
 In addition to the polling booths in Serbia, Belgrade officials publicly claim that as
many as 500 polling booths will be established in Kosovo
Kouchner also he expects no more than
fifteen polling stations to be erected in Kosovo.
Kosovo Serb Reaction to September Ballot
Leading Kosovo Serb politicians overwhelming applauded Kouchner's early
September decision not to prevent the FRY election from being held in'Kosovo, but
otherwise have differed in their response to the September ballot.
The moderate Gracanica Serb National Council (SNV) announced this month that it
would not participate in the election out of fear that it would cause divisions among
Kosovo Serbs and provide Milosevic the opportunity to use Kosovo votes to remain in
power.
? The more hardline Kosovska Mitrovica SNV led by Oliver Ivanovic
initially announced its plans to boycott the elections, but Ivanovic later
4 fit
 reversed his position and announced his support for opposition candidate
Kostunica for FRY President.
? The pro-Belgrade Kosovo Serbian National Assembly (SNS) in northern
Kosovo in early September announced its plans to support Milosevic, laying
the groundwork for confrontation between it and Ivanovic.
Tensions within the Kosovo Serb community are likely to increase as elections
approach, perhaps resulting in violent incidents. In mid-September, DOS presidential
candidate Kostunica-who has a track record of defending Kosovo Serb interests-
traveled to the divided town of Kosovska Mitrovica in an attempt to try to win Kosovo
Serb votes from Milosevic, but a fiery crowd of Milosevic supporters hurled tomatoes
and rocks at him while he was giving a speech.
? Press reports indicate that violent clashes between Ivanovic loyalists and
regime supporters broke out in Mitrovica earlier this month. Ivanovic
publicly accused Belgrade of trying to bribe his supporters to vote for
For Kosovo Albanians, the UNMIK decision to allow the FRY elections to be carried
out in Kosovo came as an unwelcome surprise
? Both Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) Chairman Ibrahim Rugova and
rival Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) Chairman Hashim Tbaci stated
publicly this month that they "would not recognize the outcome of any
election in Kosovo that Serbs intended to hold."
Leadership sentiments notwithstanding, violence could erupt if Kosovo Albanians
come into close contact with Serb voters. Polling stations in regions with large Serb
populations-such as northern and northeastern Kosovo-will be easy for KFOR to
protect and are likely to be relatively safe. However, smaller Serb enclaves in eastern
 and central Kosovo-as well as any Serb convoys traveling between Kosovo and
Serbia-will be more vulnerable to attack.
Kosovo Serbs almost certainly assume that FRYPresident Milosevic will remain in
his post after elections-legally or otherwise. However, the Kosovo Serb community
is not monolithic and there will likely be mixed reaction to the election results.
? The majority ofKosovo Serbs still view Milosevic favorably, probably in
part due to their lack of Serb independent media outlets in Kosovo and
Belgrade's provision ofpensions and stipends to the Kosovo Serb
community. The election result will likely embolden these Serbs and
intensify their hope that Kosovo will soon return to "its rightful place as
part of the FRY."
? Kosovo Serbs tied to the opposition will reluctantly accept the result,
recognizing that their immediate priority is their local Serb community,
Should Milosevic win elections through blatant fraud and subsequently face massive
Serbia-wide demonstrations, Kosovo Serbs-if aware of the scale of social discontent
in Serbia-may reassess their relationship with the FRYPresident, especially if a
e
w
6
 viable alternative is waiting in the wings. Such a scenario could strengthen
moderate and opposition voices in the province and perhaps cause some Belgrade
loyalists to seek new sources of support for their community.
? However, Kosovo Serbs will not turn to cooperation with the international
community overnight Some may accept Belgrade's propaganda line that
opposition demonstrations are a Western scheme to remove the Belgrade
regime.
? Local Kosovo Serb leaders, though, may begin to hedge their bets and
seek alternative sources of social and financial assistance for their
constituency, creating an opportunityfor the international community to
create some distance between Belgrade and the Serb community by
Kosovo Albanians will ignore the election results. After years of suffering under his
regime, Kosovo Albanians tend to perceive the FRYPresident as unassailable and
view current efforts to oust him as ineffective.
? Kosovo Albanians are unlikely to find any comfort in a Serbia governed
by a nationalist Kostunica. Kosovo Albanians almost certainly fear that a
successor government in Belgrade would cause international attention and
resources in the region to shift from Kosovo to Serbia and, possibly, derail