SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005445202
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
June 24, 2015
Document Release Date:
August 25, 2010
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2009-00733
Publication Date:
October 3, 2000
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
DOC_0005445202.pdf | 77.49 KB |
Body:
APPROVED FOR RELEASE[] DATE:
06-23-2010
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
if 0 v (-~ uu0 0)
ors
Tuesday, 3 October 2000
National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Reproduction of this Document Prohibited
Readership is limited to those on approved reader list on file with CIA SEIB Control
Officer. The undersigned hereb.r acknowledge reading this document.
C "=I' gr-251Tq{'... ~ t~: r 11?f7 [lam 7t y ~t~
PASS SEIB 00-231 CHX
3 October 2000
I11111111111NIIIIIINIIINIIIiN11111IIMIIHIIINIIII
FRY: Milosevic Heading for Second-Round Win
Analytic Perspective
President Milosevic is likely to win his gamble to hang on through a second
round of voting on Sunday because the opposition's general strike will not
have enough time to drive him from office.
- The greatest threats to the regime are strikes by coal miners and
oil refinery workers, which could force electricity rationing within
a few days, but they are not likely to drive Milosevic from office
Milosevic yesterday charged that the opposition's goal is the breakup of
Serbia, which could set the stage for imposing a state of emergency in
response to the protests. Opposition leaders immediately branded his
The general strike is critical for the opposition because it will indicate
whether the people will take the risks of confrontation necessary to oust
Milosevic. Opposition candidate Kostunica overcame Serb political apathy
to win the first round, but he must prevent new apathy from undermining
the strikes.
It is unlikely, however, that Milosevic would attempt a crackdown before
the second round of elections.
The opposition shows no sign of abandoning its plan to boycott the runoff.
Milosevic is counting on the boycott to help him declare victory.
1 3 October2000
A second-round victory for Milosevic might muddy the waters over the
legitimacy of the first round just enough that many Serbs would not be willing
to stay in the streets. Opposition unity may begin to fray as disagreements
over strategy and tactics-now behind the scenes-come into public
view.
The end for Milosevic-if it came-would be sudden, most likely soon after
the runoff. It would require heavy pressure from the streets, the public loss
of Russian support, and voices from within the regime-voices Milosevic
could not ignore, such as Army Chief of Staff Pavkovic-telling him he has
to go.
- Moscow may threaten not to recognize a Milosevic victory if he
does not allow independent monitoring of the voting, which would
_Xap*eeru~
2 3 October 2000
COMINT acs
4:eP^9eCref
3 3 October 2000