RESPONSE TO DCI COMMENTS ON SLOC PAPER

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005499816
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: September 11, 1978

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T 0 r-s-r-f--*--R-z_
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DCI
11 September 1978
SUBJECT: Response to DCI Comments on SLOC Paper
AR 70-14
1. As you requested, we have revised the SLOC paper and
sanitized it for issuance at the,Se,cret?lavel. The paper also has
been updated to reflect additions to the submarine order of battle.
We reran the model, using a wider variety of assumptions than were
used with the original paper.
2. Within the limits of a Secret classification, most of the
points you raised are addressed in the revised paper as indicated
below.
DCI Memo
a. Change definitions of
naval missions.
b. 'TOUT study attempts too
much in the way of
coming to a conclusion
rather than explicating
the problem."
Response
Done. Pages 5-7 of our re-
vised draft contain .a brief
discussion of possible
Soviet sea control operations
in the Norwegian Sea and of
possible sea denial opera-
tions south of the G-I-UK
gap.
We are now less categorical
and have attempted to show
more variations in and to
the assumptions and have used
an additional measure of
effectiveness--cargoes lost
as percentage of necessary
cargoes shipped.
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DCI Memo
c. "Expand the dhe sensitivity
c
d. "Survival of NATO mer-
chant ships is not a
cardinal output function
in the event of general
war. A better measure
is cargoes delivered."
(Express as a percentage
of cargoes shipped.)
e. "Mining and attacks on har-
bors are not effective in
a non-nuclear war.
Mining by submarines would
be ineffective."
f. What preparations should
they be taking for inter-
diction? Would we recognize
them? Did the Japanese
know before WWII that we
planned on interdicting
their SLOC, or did we know*
that the Germans were
planning on that? Anti-
SLOC training can best be
accomplished in home waters
in the final approach to
and firing at a convoy.
-2-
"r0-19-5-R-4-R-E-T]
Response
Done. See, for example, page
A-10 of our revised draft.
Done. See page 22 and Annex.
The results, however, are
affected by evident uncertainty
within the Defense community
(both DOD and Navy) over the
amount of cargoes required.
The measures used in the paper
reflect a range of answers
currently being used in the
Pentagon and Norfolk.\
We have expanded our treatment
to include statements to that
effect which are consistent
with how these issues are
handled in N1E 11-14.
Soviet preparations for wartime
operations have not included in-
vestment in a force structure--
submarines with large torpedo
capacity--or training optimized
for interdiction. Neither
deficiency would preclude the
Soviets conducting a sea denial
operation but would affect their
capability to do so. The discussion
of training'
Those
assertions no longer seem relevant
and most of the discussion on
preparations has been deleted.
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DCI Memo
g. Don't we give the
Soviets credit for
building RORSAT?
h. Are Soviet submarines,
which are noisy and carry
relatively few torpedoes,
really specialized for
ASW and ACW?
-3-
Response
Yes and no. We assumed in the
capabilities assessment that
the Soviets would find and
attack as many targets as they
had torpedoes within the 15-
day period on station. The
RORSAT is unable, however, to
fully provide such coverage,
Soviet submarines are indeed
noisy and therefore poor ASW
platforms, although they
probably are the best available
to the Soviets. Their writings
for the last decade or so indi-
cate that they regard SSNs as
their best weapon for use
against Western SSBNS.
This was deleted from the paper.
Regarding carriers, the torpedo
loadings are secondary armament
for the SSGs and SSGNs likely
to be given ACW as a primary
task and reflect their belief
that the first salvo in a
modern war would be critical.
(See pages 14-15.)
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DCI Memo
i. Soviet ASW planning fac-
tors are optimistic.
What's the source?
j. Is our availability
data consistent with
NIEs and our other
readiness study?
k. On page 10 you talk
about 10% of their sub-
marines that are
operationally ready
being available because
of other force commit-
ment. Nowhere in the
study do I find how you
came to that calculation.
1. Soviet submarines probably
would interdict closer
to Europe.
-4-
Response
The statement on Soviet per-
ceptions of their ASW require-
ments was derived from two
DDO reports
Both are translations ot
articles written in 1966 for
Military Thought, a classified
journal published until 1971 by
the Soviet General Staff. We
agree that the planning factors
they used were too low. This
is not in the revised paper
because of its lower classifi-
cation.
Yes, in general. NIB 11-14
estimates 60 percent of the
Soviet attack submarine force
to be operational, with varying
degrees of effectiveness.
The calculations used to arrive
at this number are explained in
NIE 11-14, Section IV and
represent a best estimate of
force allocation given the
various competing requirements.
See pages 15-16 and Annex for
affects on results if attacks
were carried out close to
Europe.
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DCI NieMO
m. Aircraft might be able to
extend range by refueling
more than once.
n. What are wartime shipping
levels going to be?
Response
It would be possible but n
ractical as explicated in
memo to you which a
this issue
resse
See page 22. The answer to
this is evidently unclear but
authoritative sources give
figures of 2,000 .to 6,000 pOr
month.
o. What if our CVAs don't go See pages 24-25.
into the Norwegian Sea?
-5-
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