NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005500146
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Case Number: F-2007-00450
• Publication Date: October 5, 1985

Moots, of
Coodrol
Intoffigonco
_I _Z. 7...1.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
RIPMIIIIIIVIP1111PMMIPMPVtMPKWPSIOPIIIrUAVRV.
IP
APPROVED FOR RELEASED DATE:
07-22-2010
-l'airthscret?
CPAS MD 85-233JX
b uctoper 79O
Cm 61 6
Contents
1
USSR: Party Plenum Rumored 3
Hobo
Uganda: Talks Deadlocked
Liberia: Preelection Tension
Bolivia: Government Victory
Finland-USSR: Dissent in Finnish Communist Party
In Brief
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
8
9
9
10
Special Analyses
Singapore: Is the Magic Fading?
11
13
Peru: Promoting an Activist Foreign Policy 15
NI
-4eritscret-
6 October 1985
VIP
?
p
?
1
T-ep-Georet-
5 October 1985
to
I
p
?
2
s,
?Teo-Seent-
5 October 1885
0
0
0
?Tes-ilearat-
5 October 1985
USSR: Party Plenum Rumored
A plenum of the party Central Committee reportedly set to
convene in the next few days will probably publicize the long-
awaited draft of a ROW party program and could ODWOVIIII further
changes in the Politburo and Secretariat.
Rumors in Moscow predict a plenary session of the Central
Committee Immediately after General Secretary Gorbachev returns
from Francel
Comment: A plenum this month to approve publication of the draft
party program has long been rumored, and the Politburo session last
week approved the draft program for presentation to the Central
Committee. The draft almost certainty will temper the 1950's
program, which reflects Khrushchev's too-optimistic vision of the
Soviet future. The new program will provide further insight into
Gorbachev's domestic agenda. The Politburo session also approved
the draft five-year plan for 1986-90, which Gorbachev had remanded
last spring for further work, and it could also be discussed at the
plenum.
The most likely personnel changes flow from the replacement last
week of Premier Tikhonov by Gorbachev associate Nikolay Ryzhkov.
If precedent is followed, Tikhonov will be removed from the Politburo.
Flyzhkov's movement to a government post also leaves a gap in the
Secretariat, although his responsibilities for overseeing Gorbachev's
economic revitalization program could be covered for now by
assigning them to other secretaries.
There have also been persistent reports that Gorbachev wants to get
rid of several other remaining members of the old guard on the
Politburo. Recent press criticism of corruption In the Moscow region
suggests that Viktor Grishin may be a prime target.
International Department First Deputy Chief Vadim Zagiadin and
USA and Canada Institute Director Georgiy Arbatov may be in line to
replace the secretaries who run the Central Committee's two key
foreign relations departments.
3
-Top-Secret-
5 October 1985
4ep-Seefet-
5 Octobe( 1985
???1
4
-TesrElecrat-
5 October 1985
I
I
0
I
-Tep-Socret-
5 October 1985
Mt
?
O
?
s
4ep-Seeret-
5 October 1985
?
UGANDA: Talks Deadlocked
The third round of peace talks between government and rebel
negotiators in Nairobi adjourned on Thursday without an agreement
r an a reed date to resume discussions.
the sides remain at odds over the composition of the ruling
military council and the integration of insurgent forces into the Army.
Meanwhile, government garrisons In southwestern Uganda remain
under siege by the rebels, and the Army has again demonstrated Its
indiscipline and brutality by killing 25 children as it pillaged church
missions near Kampala,
Comment: Time is on the rebels' side. The Army is undermining
support for the government by preying on the civilian population, and
It is unable to hold its own against the insurgents. Rebel leader
Museveni was last reported 10 days ago to be in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania. Should he surface in Uganda, it would indicate that the
rebels intend to obtain their political objectives on the battlefield.
LIBERIA: PreeNction Tension
Head of State Doe plans to tamper with election returns in the
election scheduled for 15 October to ensure not only his victory but
also the election of selected opposition candidates,
harassment of
opposition parties by young members of Doe's party has become
increasingly frequent and brutal. Meanwhile, Doe plans to impose a
curfew soon to forestall a nossrle move by the opposition to thwart
the election*
Comment: By rigging victories for opposition members, Doe probably
hopes to secure their cooperation and at the same time put a better
face on the already-discredited elections. Nevertheless, his party's
violent intimidation of most members of the opposition and his record
of arrests and manipulation of opponents probably will increase
popular frustration with the reoime whatever the election results.
-T-oo-Seerot-
5 October 1985
S
?
BOUM: Government Victory
The end of the four-week-old general strike on Wednesday resolved
the first major challenge to President Paz Estenssoro's new
government. The latter has promised to release more than 100 trade
union members from remote detention camps and to meet with labor
leaders to discuss possible assistance for workers hardest hit by the
President's austerity program. Congrass on Wednesday ratified the
state of siege that was declared when labor leaders refused to settle
the strike.r
Comment: Paz Estenssoro won a major victory by breaking the strike
without making significant economic concessions. The legislature's
approval of the state of siege reflects the deal that the major
opposition party struck with the President last week?a tactical
alliance that will greatly strengthen his hand as he carries out fiscal
reforms. The release of the remaining detainees should deflate the
human rights chargesldvI;iw_)0*ov nsed ment's strong-arm
approach
7
-T-ce-fileetet-
6 October 1985
S
?
?
FINLAND-USSR: Dissent in Finnish Communist Party
The minority Stalinist faction of the Finnish Communist Party has
received an ultimatum from the party leadership to conform to the
majority's Eurocommunist policies by Monday or face reprisals?
including expulsion. In support of the Stalinists, however, the Soviets
have intensified overt pressure on the majority moderates' faction to
reach an accommodation. The party Central Committee is scheduled
to meet on 13 October to consider the dissidents' response to the
ultimatum.
Commont: The party has become increasingly divided in recent years
as the Stalinists have resisted the moderates' control. The moderates
probably are trying to unify the party now to increase the
Communists' chances in the 1987 parliamentary elections. The
leadership resents Moscow's interference in internal party affairs but
probably will need to accept some compromise.
Whatever the outcome, however, the crisis within the party is
not likely to affect official relations between the Finnish and Soviet
Governments significantly.
4-ep-Secret--
5 October 1985
vle
S
9
?Top4erael-
5 October 1985
?
ht Brief
Americas
Pacific
Middle East
USSR
? Indian Ambassador in Havana confirms Prime Minister Gandhi to
arrive in Cuba atter Commonwealth meeting in mid-October. ... no
major business likely, may discuss nonaligned issues ... visits by
foreign leaders this month helping Castro's prestige.
? US-registered Greenpeace flagship arrives off French Pacific
nuclear test site today... Greenpeace leaders say no breach of
12-mile limit Manned Frrch Navy will board any ship that
crosses line.
? Press reports Israeli settlers yesterday moved into Qidmat Zevi,
new agricultural settlement on Golim Heights ... construction
begun in late 1983 by Likud government ... first new civilian
settlement on Golan Heights since 1981.
? Iran's First Deputy Foreign Minister Besharati-Jahromi traveling to
UAE, Qatar, Bahrain ... will probably register Tehran's anger at
support for Iraq and pose implicit threat of retaliation if attacks on
Khark Island continue.
? Gorbachev at Paris press conference reiterated Soviet refusal to
restore relations with Israel until Arab-Israeli dispute settled ...
rebuttal of speculation Moscow to renew ties but renest of Soviet
recognition of Israel's right to exist.
International
? Adjournment of OPEC meeting without new compromise on
production quotas sets stage for unilateral production increases
. price decline may be offset for a while by higher winter demand
and current uncertainty about Iranian and Soviet exports.
10
?Tea-Secret-
5 October 1985
?
II
W.
11
Up rid-
5 October 1985
wit
12
?Top-Swot-
5 October 1985
?
S
LEE &an Yew
Age 62. . . has ruled for 26 years as Singapore's first
and only Prime Minister .. . brilliant, shrewd,
sophisticated, and tough-minded politician with
combative instincts . a perfectionist who brooks
little opposition . . . democratic socialist and strong
anti-Communist . . . supports US economic and
military presence in Asia.. . Cambridge
educated . . . married with three grown children.
?Tee-Seeret-
5 October 1985
?
Special Analysis
SINGAPORE: Is the Magic Fading?
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's visit to Washington from 7 to
11 October coincides with a rare period of economic and
political turbulence for the island republic that could change
Lee's plans to step down from the prime-ministership in three
years. Me sharp decline In the growth rate of the economy from
an annual rate 01 10 percent in the first quarter of 1W4 to a
contraction of 1.4 percent In second quarter 1985 Is
unprecedented. Meanwhile, the poor showing of 1.00'S ruling
party In elections last year has encouraged many among the
usually tractable population actively to support tho political
opposition.
Atter 20 years of growth averaging over 9 percent annually, the
economy has ground to a halt. Production in the critical oil refining
Industry is dwindling as Indonesian and Middle Eastern producers
develop their own refineries; manufacturing is feeling the effects of
weak International markets for electronics products and computer
peripherals. More Singaporeans lost their jobs in the first five months
of 1985 than In all of 1984.
Lee's first reaction to the economic slowdown has been to fund new
firms to invest in high-risk, high-technology ventures, typical of his
long-term strategy of moving the country up the technological ladder.
The government recently admitted, however, that the higher costs of
doing business are eroding the city-state's international competitive
edge. Wages that have risen an average of 10 percent yearly since
1979 have pushed Singapore's labor costs to almost 70 percent
above Hong Kong's, the next highest in the region. Lee has called for
a voluntary two-year freeze on wanes. but concedes the economy
may not fully recover until 1987.
On the political front, two vocal opposition members of Parliament?
who defeated two of the ruling party's strongest young candidates in
last December's election?have raised the tenor of political protest.
Lee is reportedly distressed because the ruling party's share of the
popular vote dropped to 63 percent from 76 percent in the 1980
election. One opposition member has gained supporters by attacking
the administration on human rights, freedom of the press, academic
Independence, excessive ministerial and bureaucratic power,
intolerance of the o osition and impediments to strike action by
organized labor.
13
continued
-Tep-Secrat-
5 October 1985
?
?
Singapore: Economic Indicators,
1975-85
Note scale change
Real GDP Growth
Percent
12
Real Gros* Is Ntainfasissed
Expects
Percrni
40
0 1979 80
854 -10 1979W
85'
Real Growth he Construed's Real Growth Is Penniman
Activity Refining sod Peintinam Protects
Percent Percen
Prothictitity and Real Wages Value of the Sialutaure
la Maasfaeinring Dollar
197? =100 US Cents
100 1978 79 80
Estimated.
Productivity is real manufacturing output divided by number
of norkers in manufacturing. Real u.ages are real earnings
per starlet per hour.
84 40 1978 80
ZINO? ION
-Tep-Seeriot-
6 October 1986
4
?
?
?
Teo Se?rwt?
Concern About the Succession
Lee believes that securing his legacy as the architect of Singapore's
economic achievements requires reversing the current downslide and
that a smooth transition to a new generation of leadership Is required
to prevent a drastic change in economic policy. Lee has placed
several promising young technocrats in party and aovernment
positions to test their capacity for leadership.
Lee is nonetheless ambivalent about lumina over the reins of
government.
Lee underscored
his lack of confidence in the younger generation of his party by
introducing his eldest son?Lee iisien Loong?into Parliament in
1984 and making him head of Singapore's new Economic Committee.
The move prompted murmurs of a Lee dynasty and undercut other
succession hopefuls among the technocrats.
Looking Ahead
Upon returning home, Lee will probably impose tighter political
discipline both within his party and among the population as a whole.
He has already begun to clamp down on his ministers to ensure that
the ruling party speaks with one voice; Lee is even suggesting that the
one-man-one-vote system may not be appropriate for Singapore.
A crackdown on dissent would be ill received by younger
Singaporeans increasingly exposed to the Western philosophy of
questioning authority. Together MO the economic slowdown,
opposition parties are almost certain to crow in both size and
influence in the next few years.
Leo may decide to postpone moving out of the prime-ministership if
he believes he is the only man capable of bringing Singapore out of its
economic doldrums. Under the best of circumstances, he is unlikely
to turn power over to a younger generation without retaining a
watchdog role for himself. At Lee's behest the Cabinet is drafting an
amendment to the constitution to make the honorary presidency an
elective position with enhanced powers?which Lee probably intends
to reserve for himself after the 1988 elections.
14
-TowSeeret-
5 October 1985
Special Analysis
PERU: Promoting an Activist Foreign Policy
President Garcia is coupling his energetic approach toward
Peru's domestic problems with an activist nonaligned foreign
policy. Although his Initial efforts to take on a leadership role in
the region have had mixed results, his policies on foreign debt
and Central America are likely to be a continuing source of
friction with the US. In addition, his desire for Soviet military and
economic assistance will off4s_ors_v new opportunities to
strengthen its ties to Peru.
Garcia's foreign policy is rooted in ruling-party tradition and is based
on a commitment to Peruvian nationalism, anti-imperialism, and
regional integration. Defining anti-imperialism as opposition to
concrete actions against other states' sovereignty by either
superpower, Garcia also views international Issues from a distinctly
Third World perspective. Reaffirming his nonaligned credentials, he
frequently denounces the "two imperialisms" that fuel the East-West
conflict and stresses the importance of North-South issues for Latin
America.
The Debt issue
At the UN on 23 September, Garcia linked imperialism and Latin
American debt In a thinly veiled attack on US hemispheric policy. He
has aggressively promoted his approach to Third World debt in every
available forum, but his proposal for a Latin summit to discuss a debt
strategy has attracted little support.
Garcia insists that he does not favor a debtors' cartel, however, and
carefully distinguishes his limited-payment policy from the
nonpayment urged by Cuban President Castro. The rivalry between
the two men on the debt issue shows no sign of abating and will
probably delay the long-expected Increase in the level of diplomatic
relations with Havana.
Central America
The animosity between Castro and Garcia may eventually intrude on
the Peruvian leader's desire to promote friendly relations with
Nicaragua because Managua is backing Havana on this issue. So far,
however, Garcia has been an outspoken defender of the Sandinista
regime and an ardent critic of US policy. He recently asserted that the
15
continued
?Ten-Seeret-
5 October 1985
vie
4
?
internal political process in Nicaraaua will eventually Improve itself,
Soviet Ties
Notwithstanding his philosophical reservations about Soviet
imperialism, Garcia expressed a desire to improve relations with the
Soviet Union shortly after his alection.
Garcia evidently is looking to the Soviets?Verus cruel
supplier of military hardware for over a decade?to help keep within
acceptable limits the austerity-mandated sacrifices he has imposed
on the armed forces
Peruvian exports to the USSR surged last year, primarily the result of
a trade agreement that allowed Peru to pay part of its $2 billion debt
in goods. bilateral trade to continue
growing over the next few years, and Garcia has welcomed Soviet
offers of technical assistance for Peruvian industrial development
projects.
Garcia's staunch nationalism MOMS he will probably prnceed
cautiously with Moscow. Nonetheless, his need for increased Soviet
aid, combined with a convergence of perceived interests on some
foreign policy matters, has paved the way for resumption of the close
bilateral ties of the 1970s. Moreover, the potential for growing friction
between Lima and Washington over the debt and Central A
may increase Garcia's proclivity to cooperate with the Soviets.
te
-Tep-Seeret--
6 October 1986
gle