SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005512851
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: August 1, 1969

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL RELEASE
PROGRAM
JUNE 2017
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
Office of Strategic Research
CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 11-14-69:
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
PART I -- NAVAL FORCES
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AR 70-14
Copy No,
SR SP 69-10
August 1969 .
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Contents
Page
I. Missions of Soviet General Purpose
Naval Forces ....... . . 0 ? 1
II. Soviet Capabilities Against Submarines. 3
A. The ASW Problem 3
B. ASW Forces 4
C. ASW Operations and Training 6
D. Future ASW Capabilities . . . . . 9
III. Capabilities Against Carrier Task Forces
and Sea Lines of Communication 11
A. Defense Against Carriers 11
B. Interdiction of Sea Lines . . ? 13
C. Future Capabilities 13
IV. Soviet "Forward Posture" Capabilities 15
A. Combat Forces . ? ? ?el e?fd? ? ?? 15
B. Naval Presence 0 ? ? ? 0 ? ? ? ? ? 16
C. Intervention . .... ..... 18
D. Afloat Support for Distant
Operations . . . . . . . . 19
V. East European Naval Forces ? ? ? ? 22
ANNEX: Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval
Forces .
Submarines
Surface Forces
Naval Aviation
... .....
. - ...
Tables
1. Soviet General Purpose Submarines
Total Numbers, Selected Years at
Midyear . . . . . ...
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24
24
25
25
28
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Page
2, Soviet General Purpose Large Combatant
Ships, Total Numbers, Selected Years
at Midyear . .. ... ....... 29
3. Soviet General Purpose Naval Air Forces
Total Numbers, Selected Years at
Midyear . .. . ... .... . 30
4. Eastern European Naval Strength a
Midyear 1969 . . . . . . 31
71707P-S-FtlgREE
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Contribution to NIE 11-14-69:
Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces
Part I -- Naval Forces
I. Missions of Soviet General Purpose Naval
Forces
The primary mission of Soviet naval general
purpose forces is defensive--to prevent attacks
from the sea against Soviet territory. In addi-
tion, however, the navy is being increasingly
used to project a Soviet presence in various parts
of the world.
The highest priority task for the Soviet navy
is to counter the US ballistic missile submarine
force by developing the capability to destroy the
submarines which would serve as launch platforms
for Polaris and--in the future--Poseidon missiles.
Major advances were made during the past year in
the capabilities of the forces assigned to anti-
submarine warfare by the addition of new classes
of submarines with advanced electronics and
weapons, new surface ships, and increasing numbers
of new ASW aircraft.
The second-priority task is to counter Western
carrier task forces. The Soviets view the carrier
as a threat to their expanding naval operations
in the open oceans, as a platform for nuclear
strikes against the USSR, and as an obstacle to
the attainment of their foreign policy objectives.
Note: This partial OSR contribution to NIE 21-14-
69 discusses the naval and naval aviation general
purpose forces of the USSR and the East European
Warsaw Pact countries. In accordance with the
schedule for preparation of the estimate, a con-
tr-Lbution on ground and air general purpose forces
will be produced at a later date
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The task of developing the capability to
counter carrier forces had top priority in the
middle Fifties, and the Soviets believed they had
solved this problem by the early Sixties. The
Soviet combination of long-range reconnaissance
and strike aircraft, cruise missile and torpedo
submarines, and surface ships does present a
formidable threat to US carrier task forces, and
the major Soviet emphasis is now on refining
operational strategy and tactics and continuing
to improve both electronics and weapons.
As forces were developed to counter submarines
and carriers in the open oceans, the Soviets began
to use their fleets to project a new image of
Soviet military and political power. Soviet naval
"presence" is aimed at enhancing the Soviet image
in the nonaligned and communist-leaning or anti-
US countries, and special emphasis is being given
to the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean areas, where
British naval influence is waning. The navy is
still handicapped for this purpose by shortages
of the appropriate logistic support and mainte-
nance shipping designed to sustain naval operations
at great distances from base. This capability for
a sustained "forward posture" has become an ob-
jective of Soviet naval development.
The other major tasks of the naval general
purpose forces are to interdict. enemy sea lines
of communication, protect Soviet sea lines of
communication, repulse naval attacks in coastal
waters, and support the seaward flanks of ground
troop operations.
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Soviet Capabilities Against Submarines
A. The ASW Problem
The outlook for US naval capabilities
changed abruptly in the late Fifties with the
development of the nuclear-powered fleet ballistic
missile submarine. When operational capability
was achieved in 1960, the Polaris submarine became
the major sea-based threat to the USSR. The attack
aircraft carrier assumed a secondary role in US
strike planning--and in Soviet countermeasures.
In the same period, US nuclear-powered
attack submarines--with their range limited only
by crew endurance--became able to patrol for pro-
tracted periods far at sea and even into the
coastal approaches to the USSR.
The Soviets were thus confronted simul-
taneously with two major ASW problems: First and
more important was the task of building a defense
against the ballistic missile submarine. Second,
it became more difficult for the Soviets to pro-
tect their own missile submarines from submarine
attack.
The Soviet approach to countering the
Polaris threat during general war would probably
be threefold: First, the Soviets would probably
attempt to destroy Polaris submarine bases. Sec-
ond, they would probably attempt to trail ballistic
missile submarines leaving base and destroy them
while en route to their operating areas. Third,
Soviet antisubmarine task forces deployed into
probable Polaris launch areas would attempt to
detect, locate, and destroy US submarines there.
The protection of Soviet surface units,
submarines, and merchant ships from hostile attack
submarines would be conducted by the coordinated
efforts of ASW-capable ships, aircraft, and sub-
marines. Antisubmarine submarines would play the
major role.
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B. ASW Forces
During the past three years the Soviets
have made a number of advances in ASW. The scope
and timing of these developments indicate that a
serious effort is under way to upgrade the ASW
capability of the navy, reflecting decisions made
in the late Fifties.
Nuclear-powered attack submarines offer
the greatest promise for ASW, and the Soviets'
naval construction programs indicate they share
this view. Five new classes of attack submarines
have appeared since 1966--an unusually large num-
ber of new hull designs--including the nuclear-
powered C and V classes; the 196-B and 402-J
classes, which are probably nuclear; and the B
class, which is probably not nuclear powered. At
least some of these five are probably intended
specifically for ASW use and the others for anti-
ship missions against naval and merchant ships.
(See Table 1 on page 28 for current and projected
numbers of submarines, by type and class.) The
new C and V classes have participated in Northern
Fleet exercises, and in December 1968 a C class
attempted to intercept another Soviet nuclear sub-
marine.
The new submarines are believed to be
quieter than older classes and are probably
equipped with better sonars. Reduction of self-
noise, including sound isolation in machinery and
new prOpeller design, has been noted as a contin-
uing Soviet effort for the older classes, and
these and other advances are probably incorpo-
rated in the new classes. Since 1962 one R, one
W, one N, and three Z class have been fitted with
experimental bow sonars. We believe that the re-
sults of the tests of these sonars have been in-
corporated in the sonars on the new attack sub-
marines.
All major new Soviet surface combatants
are designed to have an ASW capability, and carry
both sonars and ASW weapons. Every unit produced
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since 1962 is also equipped with SAM armament,
which would facilitate ASW operations at sea with-
out air cover. The Soviets group their Kresta-
class cruisers and the Kashin- and Kanin-classes
of destroyers under operational ASW commands, and
all are equipped to operate the new KA-25 Hormone
helicopter from stern platforms. The Kresta class
has a hangar which can accommodate two ASW heli-
copters.
The most important new ASW ship is the
Moskva-class helicopter carrier--which the Soviets
call an "antisubmarine cruiser"--with its exten-
sive ASW and SAM armament and a complement of
about 15 Hormone ASW helicopters. The Moskva
reached full operational capability during 1968
and its sister ship, the Leningrad, has completed
sea trials and will probably deploy to the Medi-
terranean soon. Most of the systems on this class
are new developments, including the Hormone heli-
copter with dipping sonar, a hull-mounted sonar,
a variable depth sonar, and an ASROC-type ASW
weapon launcher.
Some of these new systems will probably
also appear on other new ships and be refitted on
some older ones. Over the past several years,
three Yrupnyy-class missile destroyers converted
to ASW ships have had their two SSM launchers
replaced by a SAM launcher and AA guns. The bow
was lengthened and an improved sonar was probably
installed.
The lead ships of two new classes of
combatants re now under construction. One ship,
being built is somewhat larger than
the Kresta-class cruiser. The other ship, being
built is smaller than a Kashin.
Although both are in the early stages of construc-
tion and details of their characteristics and equip-
ment are not yet apparent, the smaller unit appears
to have an opening in the stern, possibly for a
variable depth sonar.
New aircraft being supplied to the Soviet
ASW forces provide a limited capability for dis-
tant ASW operations, although their major impact
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is on short-range capabilities, and the deployment
of Hormone helicopters on the Moskva-class carriers
is a major improvement in providing airborne AS
support to afloat units. A new land-based ASW air-
craft--designated the May--which entered service
during the past year improves naval capability for
more distant ASW operations. This aircraft and
the small number of TU-16 Badgers used in an ASW
role can conduct limited ASW operations at a range
of about 1,000 nautical miles from base, although
they normally would be employed closer to the
Soviet coast.
The BE-12 Mail amphibian, which is rapidly
replacing the BE-6 Madge seaplane, is best suited
for ASW operations within a few hundred nautical
miles of the coast, although it is also capable
of operating at distances up to about 1,000 nm
from base. The Mays and Mails, in conjunction
with the land-based helicopter force of MI-4 Hounds
and KA-25 Hormones, will provide a substantial con-
tribution to Soviet ASW capabilities in coastal
areas.
Soviet operational capabilities to detect,
locate, and attack submarines within range of
patrol aircraft are improving as crews gain ex-
perience with the new and improved equipment and
detection methods--radar, ECM, sonar, and magnetic
anomaly detectors.
The Soviets have had passive short-range
hydroacoustic listening devices since 1940 and
these systems are now operational in all fleet
areas. They are estimated to be effective against
noisy submarines out to about 20 nm from shore.
C. ASW Operations and Training
ASW operations and exercises are increasing
in scope, expanding in realism, and moving to the
open ocean. The impact of new ASW developments
upon operations is already becoming apparent, al-
though capabilities are still greatest in the
coastal zone and weak in the open ocean.
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Basic approaches to ASW operations at sea
can be divided into several categories--submarine
vs submarine; submarine and ship vs submarine;
submarine and aircraft vs submarine; ship and
aircraft vs submarine; and combined submarine,
aircraft, and surface ship vs submarine. The
Soviets have at least experimented with all of
these.
The Soviets apparently consider the com-
bination of aircraft, helicopters, surface ships,
and submarines to be the most effective ASW force.
Helicopters have been largely restricted to oper-
ating from land bases in the past, but with the
deployment of Moskva in late 1968 the ASW heli-
copter force was able to put to sea.
The Moskva has been deployed in combination
with two or more major ASW surface units, heli-
copters, shore-based ASW patrol aircraft, and
possibly several submarines for coordinated ASW
operations. Although this group has operated only
in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, similar
forces may deploy to the Norwegian Sea and in the
approaches to the Sea of Japan when additional
helicopter carriers become available. (Only two
Moskva-class ships have been built, but additional
units may be laid down in a year or two when
performance of the first two units has been fully
evaluated.)
The emphasis on developing capabilities
and tactics to counter the Polaris threat has
been evident for some time. Soviet naval state-
ments continue to reflect concern, and current
ASW operations point to efforts to develop a capa-
bility to' counter Polaris units in their present
launch zones in the Norwegian Sea, the Mediterra-
nean,and the northwest Pacific Ocean:
--In the Norwegian Sea, the Soviets
are more frequently operating their sub-
marines and surface units and also are
starting to use land-based patrol air-
craft over these waters.
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n the Mediterranean,
They
apparently operate in pairs and employ
lying-in-wait tactics in key areas such as
the narrow waters of the Straits of Gibral-
tar and Sicily. P- and W-class diesel sub-
marines and possibly N-class nuclear units
have performed in this way.
--In the Pacific, Soviet submarines
frequently operate in the large area ex-
tending from the Japanese Islands to Guam,
Although ASW operations in the potential
Polaris launch zones have apparently been given a
high priority, there is evidence that Soviet
plans also include strikes against the Polaris
bases using the G-II and H-II class submarines
equipped with 650-nm ballistic missiles. Over
the past two years or so these submarines have
not operated in patrol areas threatening the con-
tinental United States, but have deployed in areas
where their missiles could reach the overseas
Polaris bases at Rota and Holy Loch (but not Guam).
Continuous surveillance of all three over-
seas bases--as well as the one at Charleston, South
Carolina--is maintained by Soviet intelligence
collection ships (AGIs), and the Soviets have used
AGIs and submarines in attempts to trail Polaris
submarines leaving port en route to patrol stations.
Soviet ships have also used harassment tactics--such
as crossing the bow of a submarine at close range--
against Polaris units entering and leaving port.
The location of most Soviet naval bases
forces Soviet ships to move along vulnerable tran-
sit routes through narrow seas to reach operating
zones. Soviet ASW forces must counter opposing
submarines along these transit routes in order to
free Soviet units for distant missions. In 1968,
the Soviets took some steps to protect their units
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in transit from Northern Fleet bases past the
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap by estab-
lishing two new diesel submarine patrol areas in
the Norwegian Sea and its approaches. Units on
these stations are in position to evaluate the
feasibility of countering Western submarines cap-
able of interdicting or shadowing Soviet subma-
rines and surface ships passing through the zone.
In local fleet areas, much of the naval
training is devoted to ASW operations.1
D. Future ASW Capabilities
Improvement in ASW capabilities is a slow
and costly process, but positive indications of
recent Soviet progress are unmistakable.
Data on two of the new classes of subma-
rine indicate they will be faster, quieter, and
deeper diving than older classes. We expect a
long-range ASW weapon in the attack submarine
force within a year or two as a parallel develop-
ment to the ASROC-type weapon now deployed in the
Moskva. One or more of the new classes--perhaps
the V class because of its speed--are probably
intended to trail Western nuclear submarines by
using active sonar.
Surface forces and air units will probably
show similar improvements in ASW as the new classes
of combatants become operational and as advanced
sonar and magnetic anomaly detection techniques
are perfected or improved with future training.
New fixed hydroacoustic detection systems
will begin to support the ASW forces when the sys-
tem installed off Kamchatka and the Kurils becomes
operational, probably in a year or two.
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By 1975, we believe Soviet ASW forces will
have some capability to detect nuclear submarines,
including Polaris units, in areas where Soviet ASW
forces can be concentrated. The probability of
such detection will be greatest in the vicinity of
narrow or restricted passages or in areas of the
Mediterranean Sea. In larger areas where subma-
rines can operate more freely, detection will con-
tinue to be difficult.
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III. Capabilities Capabilities Against Carrier Task Forces and
Sea Lines of Communication
The main task of the Soviet navy in the imme-
diate postwar period was the interdiction of sea
lines of communication. The war at sea during
World War II provided Soviet naval planners with
insights into the importance of sea lines to the
maritime nations--and into the effectiveness of
submarines against them. Early Soviet postwar
growth in submarine and surface forces was aimed
in large part at meeting the naval responsibilities
for interdiction.
When the US attack carrier became capable of
launching nuclear strikes on the USSR, naval de-
fense against the carrier assumed primary impor-
tance. This new task was a special application
of the interdiction mission, and required a variety
of new weapon systems. The delivery of these weap-
on systems to the navy in the late Fifties and
early Sixties gave the Soviets a capability which
they believe can fulfill this task.
A. Defense Against Carriers
The Soviet navy has relied heavily upon
cruise missile submarines and aircraft as the
principal defense against carrier attacks. The
Soviets have discussed the specific means to carry
out this naval responsibility in both open and
classified naval writings, and annual deployments
and exercises have demonstrated the application of
'these means.
The basic submarine weapon system for the
anticarrier mission is the nuclear-powered E class
equipped with 250-nm SS-N-3 cruise missiles. The
E class is routinely deployed on a continuing
basis, and usually one unit patrols in carrier
transit zones in the mid-Atlantic, one in the
western Pacific, and one is frequently in the Med-
iterranean. Although the E class can operate in-
dependently, the range from which it can fire its
missile is increased if a forward reconnaissance
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unit--submarine or aircraft--is performing target
location and reporting.
The SS-N-3 submarine force is divided be-
tween Atlantic and Pacific bases in direct relation
to the distribution of Western attack carriers.
Long-range T1J-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft, with
a Drambuie data link for extended target detection,
are available to operate from Soviet bases with
cruise missile submarines in the northeast Atlantic
and northwest Pacific.
The N-class nuclear-powered torpedo attack
submarine regularly operates in conjunction with
the E class. Overlapping E- and N-class patrols
in the Atlantic and Mediterranean throughout 1968
and the first half of 1969 illustrate a potential
pairing for anticarrier operations at times when
both types are in the vicinity of Western carriers
or carrier transit routes.
The diesel-powered J-class submarine also
carries the SS-N-3 missile, and can probably now
operate in the Atlantic and Pacific approaches to
the Soviet Union. A J class which limped back to
home base on the surface from a Mediterranean patrol
in 1966 was the only unit of this class deployed
outside the Norwegian Sea before this spring, but
exercises in the Norwegian Sea in 1968 and a Medi-
terranean patrol in 1969 indicate this class is
now ready for reliable operational use--about
seven years after the first unit joined the fleet.
Long-range naval aircraft, and occasionally
Soviet Long Range Aviation units, are employed in
reconnaissance and attack roles against carriers
and other surface ships. The chief weapons of at-
tack are the AS-2 and AS-5 air-to-slirfrp misgilec
which have ranges of about 100 nm.
Soviet nuclear- and diesel-powered torpedo
attack submarines have a short-range anticarrier
capability and employed in large numbers they are a
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threat to carriers and other surface units, but
they lack the standoff capability of the cruise
missile units. Deployments are routine in the
Mediterranean and frequent in the Norwegian Sea
during exercises and crisis periods, such as the
August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Soviet cruise missile surface ships of the
Kresta, Kynda, and Kildin classes have the ability,
given effective reconnaissance, to attack major
surface ships. These ships have lost their primary
role as an anticarrier force to the submarines,
however, and their missiles are now intended pri-
marily to provide antiship defenses for surface
forces.
Major fleet exercises in both oceans con-
tinue to feature the anticarrier theme as a central
element, and the large-scale "Sever" maneuvers of
July 1968 included E-, J-, and N-class submarines,
aircraft, and surface forces in anticarrier roles.
B. Interdiction of Sea Lines
Interdiction of Western sea lines of commu-
nication--particularly those in the Atlantic between
North America and Western Europe--remains a major
mission of the Soviet navy. The forces and measures
developed for the destruction of the carrier are
also effective in a general interdiction role, and
torpedo attack submarines are particularly suited
for this role.
C. Future Capabilities
The Soviets are taking steps to extend the
effective,operating range of their anticarrier and
interdiction forces, especially the submarines.
Of the five new classes of attack sub-
marines to appear since 1966, three--C, V, and
402-J--are likely to operate in the open ocean.
At least one of these, the C class, is fitted with
a new weapon system. This system may be a short-
range, submerged-launch cruise missile of the type
noted under development in the Black Sea during the
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r10 T
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early Sixties. Such a system would be particularly
effective against carriers and other surface ships
because the submarine would not have to surface to
fire and would gain a standoff capability, possibly
up to about 35 nm. The three classes will carry
torpedoes and by the mid-Seventies will probably
more than double the antiship capability operating
in the open ocean.
The attack submarine force will probably
decrease in number in the late Seventies as the
large force of medium-range diesel-powered sub-
marines is retired. The qualitative improvement
provided by the new nuclear units will far outweigh
this numerical decline and will contribute to a net
increase in capability.
Nuclear submarines can be kept on station
far longer than their normal unreplenished patrols
of about 60 days by the use of long-range surface
support ships. This support concept was tested
successfully in the mid-Atlantic in 1967, the
Indian Ocean in 1968, the Caribbean in 1969, and
probably will be used with increasing frequency
in the next several years. With both afloat and
shore support available, diesel-powered units
regularly make six-month patrols in the Mediterra-
nean.
New and improved missiles will probably
e deployed to increase antiship capabilities.
Jsa-class guided missile patrol
boats are being equipped with launchers smaller
than those formerly carried, evidently for a modi-
fied SS-N-2 short-range cruise missile. Another
type of Short-range naval cruise missile, probably
with a solid-propellant sustainer motor, is believed
to be in production but its specific application is
uncertain.
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IV. Soviet "Forward Posture" Capabilities
Soviet naval general purpose forces are being
used increasingly in out-of-area deployments. Ini-
tial efforts began in the Mediterranean and are now
expanding to include the Indian Ocean and the Atlan-
tic.
Such naval operations are increasing in scope,
probably in part to improve the navy's capabilities
to counter strategic attack by Western carriers and
missile submarines and in part because of the poten-
tial value of the navy for supporting Soviet foreign
policy. Through these deployments, the Soviets prob-
ably hope to create an image consistent with that of
great power status.
Forward deployment can be considered in three
general categories: the sustained deployment of a
combat-capable fleet such as has been maintained in
the Mediterranean; a "show the flag" naval presence;
and a force capable of projecting significant power
ashore by means of amphibious assault.
A. Combat Forces
Since the mid-Fifties, large annual exer-
cises have been held in the North Atlantic and smaller
exercises in the Pacific. Initial efforts to deploy
large naval combat forces on a continuing basis be-
gan in the Mediterranean after 1963.
From a few surface ships and submarines in
1964, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron has grown
to become the largest naval force which the Soviets
have regularly maintained outside their four tradi-
tional fleet operating areas. The squadron usually
consists of four to six major surface combatant ships,
some minor combatants, a few amphibious units, six to
ten submarines, and at least ten auxiliary ships.
Although the size of the squadron has at times de-
clined to about 20, it has reached a peak strength
of over 50 ships. The squadron is not expected to
increase in average size during the mid-Seventies
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but its antiship and ASW capabilities will improve
as new types of ships and submarines operate with
it.
The North Atlantic and North Pacific, along
with the Mediterranean, represent the areas of great-
est strategic naval interest to the USSR. Soviet
submarine operations in these areas began sporadic-
ally in the mid-Fifties and became continuous about
1963. Since then, deployments have grown steadily
in numbers of both submarines and surface ships and
length of time at sea.
Surface forces deployed in these areas are
more distant from Soviet bases than those deployed
in the Mediterranean and present greater difficulties
in continuously maintaining large forces. An ini-
tial experiment was undertaken during 1968 with the
six-month deployment of a combat force to a region
between the United Kingdom and Iceland.
The new submarines and large combatants will
substantially increase the force of long-range, com-
bat-effective units. As these units enter the So-
viet fleet, deployments in each area will probably
grow in size and duration, and may become continuous.
By 1975, the North Atlantic squadron could approach
the size of the Mediterranean squadron.
B. Naval Presence
Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean
is probably aimed primarily at influencing foreign
policy with an accepted Soviet presence in an area
where Western forces are drawn thin. The Soviets
have deployed small naval task groups of surface
combatants and submarines there in the past two .
years. The most notable was the cruise to Indian
Ocean ports in 1968 by the commander in chief of
the Soviet Pacific fleet.
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With the decline of British power east of
Suez, the Soviets will probably establish a semi-
permanent Indian Ocean force to advance their politi-
cal and military objectives there. By 1975 we ex-
pect that deployments in the Indian Ocean will have
become routine. Because potential naval opposition
in the area is weak, this naval force need not be
large to have impact. The typical Indian Ocean
force might be composed of one or two major comba-
tants, a division of escorts, a few submarines, and
a small support group.
Deployment on a regular basis will probably
depend on the acquisition of the right to use local
base facilities. Soviet efforts to acquire distant
land-based support have been directed toward use of
local facilities, often improved with Soviet assis-
tance, rather than development of wholly-Soviet for-
ward bases. This pattern is expected to continue.
The Soviet navy first showed interest in the
South Atlantic in 1967 when a submarine support group
operated near Cape Verde for about six months. The
submarines were in position to operate in major ship-
ping lanes and to intercept US naval forces en route
to the Mediterranean.
Although this activity has not been followed
by other deployments in the same region, Soviet in-
terest will probably continue. By 1975, we believe
that intermittent deployments will be made to the
west coast of Africa and to South America. These
operations may develop into continuous deployments
in the eastern portions of the South Atlantic if for-
ward land-based support can be obtained on the west
coast of Africa or at bases in the western Mediter-
ranean such as Mers el Kebir in Algeria. These de-
ployments are likely to be designed primarily to pro-
vide support for submarines.
Until 1965 the Soviet navy maintained a strong
influence in Southeast Asia through its close rela-
tionship with Indonesia. Since the deterioration of
TO
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-T`01"-FrE-G$.EaL
these relations, naval activity in the area has been
limited to transits between the Pacific and Indian
Oceans. Through 1976, Soviet naval interest will
probably be maintained primarily through occasional
or sporadic deployments.
Of the Caribbean countries, Cuba has by far
the greatest potential and capability as a base for
Soviet naval operations. Since an apparent intent
to support submarine operations in the area at the
time of the missile crisis in the fall of 1962, the
USSR has not attempted to use Cuba as a naval base,
however.
Cuba was visited by a small force of Soviet
naval units in July 1969, and such visits may become
periodic as a means of intruding visibly in a US
sphere of influence.
Soviet military assistance has been the means
of establishing an initial naval "presence" in a
number of areas in the underdeveloped world. Major
recipients--apart from Warsaw Pact countries and
Communist China--have been Cuba, Indonesia, India,
and some Arab countries.
Change from a supplier relationship to more
active naval presence has been slow to develop. In
the case of the UAR, although large-scale assistance
had been provided for some 15 years it took the Mid-
dle East war of June 1967 to open the way for the
Soviets to obtain the use of base facilities there.
Barring unforeseen political circumstances
that can be exploited by the USSR, the most likely
areas for continuing Soviet efforts to develop a
limited form of base rights are in the western Med-
iterranean and in India.
C. Intervention
Establishment of a naval presence or "for-
ward posture" combat force provides a potential for
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Soviet intervention in local crises. Under some cir-
cumstances, mere naval presence might advance Soviet
political objectives. In other situations a local
crisis might present an opportunity for Soviet com-
batant ships to reach the scene ahead of Western
forces.
Present Soviet amphibious forces are small
and are maintained to support ground and air oper-
ations in waters peripheral to the USSR and to help
secure key access routes controlling the Baltic and
Black Seas. These forces are not equipped nor do
they have the support necessary for use in more dis-
tant areas against opposition. Although a token
force of naval infantry in landing ships has been
maintained in the Mediterranean since June 1967, its
presence is probably primarily for political effect.
Soviet amphibious forces and naval infantry are ex-
panding only slowly, and have shown no indications
of being developed into a force for long-range oper-
ations against significant opposition.
D. Afloat Support for Distant Operations
Key to the Soviets capabilities for sus-
tained distant operations is the provision of afloat
logistic and maintenance support for the fleet. The
general purpose submarine force generally has been
adequately equipped with support ships to meet oper-
ational requirements, and no major deficiencies are
evident. Extensive shore facilities have been estab-
lished ,in the USSR to support the submarine force,
and afloat support serves as a mobile backup to the
shore facilities and for dispersal purposes. Restric-
tions on submarine operations appear to result mainly
from the limits of crew endurance and from the oper-
ating characteristics of the submarines.
The deployment of a group of surface support
ships to the Cape Verde and equatorial Atlantic Ocean
areas for about six months in 1967 remains the most
impressive single development in submarine afloat
support techniques. This Atlantic submarine support
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group consisted of a submarine tender, a missile sup-
port ship, an intelligence collector, a hydrographic
ship, an oiler, and a tanker. On six occasions North-
ern Fleet submarines were observed with this group,
and the force supported E- and F-class submarines
and possibly an N class. One E-class submarine was
associated with the group during the six-month de-
ployment.
This logistic support experiment probably was
a feasibility test. No further tests on a similar
scale have been noted, but if adopted, such afloat
support techniques would extend the length of time at
sea and the operating areas of out-of-area submarines.
The technique could also reduce the number of units
required for a given level of deployment.
Surface forces, in contrast, have operational
limitations because of inadequate afloat support.
Very little repair or resupply capability is avail-
able, thus limiting the size of a force that can be
deployed at a distance from the USSR and the length
of time such a force can maintain a combat capability.
The logistic deficiencies largely are the re-
sult of the neglect of auxiliary and support fleets
during Khrushchev's rule. The effect of such de-
ficiencies has been intensified by the rapid and con-
tinuing increase in Soviet naval out-of-area opera-
tions since 1963. Some efforts are being devoted
to producing new logistic support ships, but the
deficiencies will not be overcome quickly.
The Soviets may have a development program
for logistic support ships with increased speed,
cargo capacity, and underway replenishment capa-
bility. An unidentif large ship now
under construction in ould be the first
of a series of new suppor s ips for supply of widely
dispersed fleets and bases.
At least until the new logistic ships are
available in quantity, the Soviets probably will
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continue to press for the use of base facilities,
such as Alexandria and Port Said for the Mediter-
ranean Squadron. The Soviets may be negotiating
for similar base rights in other areas, such as
the Indian Ocean.
The Soviets biggest effort so far in dis-
tant operations--the Mediterranean Squadron--is
provided with afloat support by submarine tenders,
oilers, water carriers, repair ships, and rescue
ships, usually operating from fleet anchorages or
Arab ports. Merchant fleet tankers have unloaded
at the Port Said naval oil storage depot and have
on occasion also supplied oil directly to fleet
units.
.-MT)--SE4C41-EI.
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V. East European Naval Forces
The small East European Warsaw Pact navies, es-
pecially those of East Germany and Poland, are adopt-
ing improved tactics and expanding their capabilities
through training. They remain subordinate to the
Soviet navy, and combined exercises held during the
past few years have stressed coordination of the East
European naval forces with the Soviet fleets.
The primary responsibilities of the Polish and East
German navies include defending the Baltic and aiding
Soviet forces to seize and maintain control of the
Baltic exits. Their secondary responsibilities are
submarine and antisubmarine warfare.
East German forces, supported by Soviet patrol
craft, form the first line of defense in the Baltic.
The Polish navy is operating submarines in the open
sea more often and for longer periods. Two Polish
submarines which visited the Barents Sea area in 1968,
participated in an ASW exercise with elements of the
Soviet Northern Fleet, and Polish submarines also
have carried out patrols west of the United Kingdom.
Poland also has an amphibious force of some 40 ships
and small craft, and all indications point to its
steady growth.
The Soviets in the Polish port of Swinoujscie
will probably withdraw in 1970, leaving no Soviet
naval commands or naval logistics centers in Poland.
Polish naval strength is being built up at the port
to compensate for the Soviets' departure.
Romanian and Bulgarian navies participate in
patrol, minesweeping, and logistic functions in the
Black Sea, but the bulk of the Warsaw Pact strength
there is provided by the Soviet fleet. Last June
the Bulgarian navy did assist the Soviets in the sur-
veillance of US ships in the Black Sea, marking the
first such operation by an East European nation, but
the presence of the Bulgarian ships was probably for
political purposes and not necessary to the shadowing
operation, which the Soviets have conducted success-
fully by themselves many times.
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East European Warsaw Pact naval forces have a
small air arm made up of Polish IL-28 Beagle jet
light bombers. These aircraft are used primarily
for reconnaissance in support of pact naval forces
in the Baltic, but do have a limited capability for
attacking surface ships.
East European shipyards are currently producing
more military equipment for the USSR than East
European navies are receiving from the Soviets. For
example, in 1968 Poland received one fast guided mis-
sile patrol boat from the USSR, and East Germany re-
ceived one torpedo boat. In the same year, four of
the eight Polnocny-class landing ships and all nine
research ships built in Poland were delivered to
the USSR. East Germany is building a class of medium
minesweepers for its own use, and several salvage
lifting ships for the USSR.
The clarification of command relationships re-
mains a problem within the Warsaw Pact. Extensive
reporting in the Polish, East German, and Soviet
news media stressed the equality among the navies
taking part in the Baltic portion of the "Sever"
exercise in mid-1968, but a more equal sharing of
command responsibility apparently did not follow.
The March 1969 Warsaw Pact summit meeting resulted
in agreements to modify the pact's command structure
and approved "new regulations on combined armed
forces and combined commands," but in spite of this,
there has been little reduction in the firm Soviet
control of pact naval forces, suggesting that no
major Change can be expected.
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ANNEX
Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces
This annex briefly discusses the current strengths
of the major elements of the Soviet general purpose
naval forces--general purpose submarines, major sur-
face ships, and naval aviation--and projects force
levels through 1979. Details are presented in three
tables following the text. The fourth table, on
page 31, gives the current strengths of the naval
forces of the East European Warsaw Pact countries.
Submarines
The Soviet navy has about 60 cruise missile sub-
marines and 250 attack submarines in active opera-
tional status. The cruise missile submarines are
divided about equally between nuclear-powered and
diesel-powered units. The attack submarine force
includes 226 diesel-powered submarines and 22 nuc-
lear-powered units, a ratio of about ten to one.
Almost all of the modern long-range submarines
are assigned to the Northern and Pacific Fleets,
with about 80 of the older medium-range attack and
converted missile-launching units assigned to the
Baltic and Black Sea Fleets.
Cruise missile submarine strength is expected to
remain stable for the next couple of years. By the
mid-Seventies, phaseout of the converted W-class
diesel-powered units is expected to reduce the force
by 12 units.
Most of the five new classes of attack submarine
are expected to be produced in quantity, with total
output exceeding 100 submarines over the next decade.
The number of diesel-powered attack submarines
is expected to decline from 226 at present to approx-
imately 100 in 1975 and to about 50 in 1979 (see Table
1, page 28).
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Surface Forces
The Soviet surface combatant force of cruisers,
destroyers, and escorts totals 216 operational ships.
Of these about 20 percent are fitted with missiles.
The missile force numbers 44 ships, including the
two helicopter carriers--24 with surface-to-air mis-
siles (SAMs) alone, 11 with antiship missiles (SSMs)
alone, and 9 with both. All-gun ships include 11
cruisers, 55 destroyers, and 106 escorts.
The entire force was completed after 1948. Mis-
sile units began entering the fleets in 1958, and no
nonmissile cruiser or destroyer has been built since.
In the mid-Seventies the total force will be about
the same size as it is now, but the percentage of oper-
ational missile ships will have increased to an esti-
mated 40 to 45 percent in 1975. Of these, nearly all
will carry SAMs alone or in combination with SSMs.
We estimate that the all-gun force will consist of
three to five cruisers (depending on the number of
SAM conversions of Sverdlov-class cruisers), 23 des-
troyers, and 93 escorts. About 90 percent of the
major surface ships will still be under 20 years
old. (See Table 2, page 29.)
Current production and conversion programs for
major surface combatants emphasize ASW and air de-
fense capabilities at the expense of antiship cruise
missile capabilities. SAMs are added in the Kotlin
and Kanin conversions, Kresta carries SAMs, and the
two new classes now under construction may also be
equipped with SAMs.
Naval Aviation
The Soviet naval air forces presently have about
950 combat aircraft distributed among the four
fleet areas. Roughly two-thirds are bombers and air-
to-surface missile carriers assigned to reconnoiter
or attack surface targets. ASW aircraft, including
both helicopters and fixed-wing airplanes, make up
the other one-third of the force.
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-"Tz3r-s'L-?42x.x.
No major changes in the size of the Soviet Naval
Air Force (SNAF) TU-16 Badger force occurred during
the past year, although the AS-5 Kelt is believed
to have replaced all or virtually all of the AS-1
Kennel missiles previously deployed and has also been
deployed with one regiment previously equipped with
the AS-2 Kipper. Earlier it was believed that one
regiment still equipped with the bomber version of
the TU-16 might be converting to the AS-5 system,
but this has not as yet taken place.
Totals for the TU-16 force include about six
reconnaissance aircraft based in the UAR in support
of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. These air-
craft carry UAR markings, but are operated by SNAF
crews under direct Soviet control.
Other SNAF bomber forces include two regiments
of IL-28 Beagle light bombers assigned to the Baltic
Fleet Air Force. These aircraft are used for various
reconnaissance and light strike missions, including
some ASW operations.
The SNAP received a few TU-22 Blinder medium
bombers during the past year. These aircraft are
assigned to two regiments in the Baltic and the Black
Sea Fleet Air Forces. There has been no indication
of the assignment of TU-22s to the Northern Fleet
or the Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Forces.
There is no evidence that either of the SNAF
TU-22 units has received the AS-4 Kitchen missile.
Both units continue to perform reconnaissance mis-
sions, including some overflights of NATO surface
forces, and to engage in practice bombing activity.
Production of the reconnaissance variant of the
TU-95 Bear continues at a rate of about one a month.
These aircraft are deployed only with the Northern
Fleet and Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Forces.
The SNAF also receives some support from Long
Range Aviation (LRA) for operations against surface
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forces. LRA aircraft continue to engage in reconnais-
sance missions directed against NATO (primarily US)
surface forces, and LRA also participates in some
joint exercises. Although this is only a secondary
mission for LRA, which is oriented primarily to stra-
tegic attack, it is evident that the LRA is prepared
to support SNAF operations if required. This support
might include strikes by a few of LRA's long-range
ASM-equipped TU-95 heavy bombers.
Soviet naval aviation is expected to change in
the next ten years to a force about evenly divided
between bomber types and ASW aircraft (see Table 3,
page 30). The bomber force, which has seen relatively
little change in recent years, probably will decline
slowly through attrition of old aircraft. In con-
trast, the ASW forces are growing both in size and
capability through the addition of the three new
types of antisubmarine aircraft--Mail, May, and Hor-
mone--which have entered service in the past five
years.
The total number of naval combat aircraft is ex-
pected to decline from about 950 at present to about
750 by 1979, but the introduction of new electronic
systems, weapons, and tactics will improve the naval
air forces' overall capabilities, especially against
submarines.
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Table 1
Soviet General
Total Numbers, Selected
Purpose Submarines
Years at Midyear
1969 1970 1971
1975
1979
Total General Purpose
313
306
300
242
224
Cruise Missile Submarines
61
6159
51
49
Nuclear
33
33
33
33
33
E-I class a/ .
5
5
5
5
5
E-II class
28
28
28
28
28
Diesel b/
28
28
26
18
16
W conversion class
12
c/
12
10
2
0
J class
16
16
16
16
16
Attack Submarines
252
245
241
191
175
Nuclear
22
28
38
81
115.
N class
15
15
15
15
15
C class d/
3
5
9
25
40
V class
4
6
8
19
25
402-j class e/
_
0
1
3
11
20
196-13 class e/
_
0
1
3
11
15
Diesel b/
226
210
193
95
45
F class (long range)
45
45
45
43
33
Z class (long range)
21
21
21
5
0
R class (medium range)
14
14
14
14
12
W class (medium range) .f/
135
120
105
30
0
Q class (short range)
11
10
8
3
0
Propulsion Unknown
B class
4
7
10
15
15
Note: Projections reflect current production rates of existing
classes and estimated rates of new classes expected in the mid-
Seventies.
d. At least three EI class submarines may be undergoing an SSGN
to SSN conversion.
b. The overall reduction in diesel-powered submarines through 1979
results from projected retirements and transfers to other
countries.
c. Includes seven Long Bin and five Twin-Cylinder.
d. The C-class submarine is believed to be fitted with a new weap-
on. tt could be either an antisubmarine or an antiship weapon.
e. The propulsion systems in these classes have not been determined,
but they are probably nuclear powered.
f. These figures include five radar picket conversion units (Canvas
Bag).
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"Tor-tE-GR.E.4
Table 2
Soviet General Purpose Large Combatant Ships
Total Numbers, Selected Years at Midyear
'Iota' General Purpose
1969
_
244 _
Operational Surface Ships
216
SAM/SSM light cruisers
9
SAM light cruisers
1
SSM destroyers
11
SAM destroyers and escorts
21
Cruisers
11
Destroyers
55
Escorts
106
Helicopter cruisers
2
Reserve Surface Ships 28
Cruisers 5
SSM destroyers 0
Destroyers 13
Escorts 10
1970
1971
1975
1979
245-247
241-243
225-237
209-23
221-223
219-221
209-221
196-22
11-12
14-15
23-28
27-34
2
2-3
3-5
3-5
9
8
2
0
29-30
34-35
58-63
76-89
10
9-8
5-3
2-0
48
43
23
7
110
107
93
79
2
2
2-4
2-6
24
22
16
13
4-
5
5
1
0
0
2
4
12
11
4
3
8
6 ,
5
5
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Table 3
Soviet General Purpose Naval Air Forces
Total Numbers, Selected Years at Midyear
1969
1970
1971
1975
1979
Bomber Forces a/
615-665
605-675
565-645
430-515
300-390
TU-95 Beat
45-50
45-55
45-55
45-55
30-45
TU-16 Badger
460-490
460-490
430-470
325-390
225-290
TU-22 Blinder
60-65
60-70
60-70
60-70
45-55
IL-28 Beagle
50-60
40-60
30-50
0
0
ASW Forces a/
275-350
310-415
340-460
340-480
340-480
BE-6 Madge
35-25
25-15
5-10
0
0
BE-12 Mail
45-65
60-85
80-100
80-100
80-100
IL-? May
15-20
25-35
35-50
40-60
40-60
MI-4 Hound
120-140
110-140
100-130
20-40
0
KA-25 Hormone
60-100
90-140
120-170
200-280
220-320
a. About 15 TU-16 Badgers also are used in the ASW role, and
some I1-28 Beagles have a limited ASW function.
`1777-SEGIZEI.
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mist;
Table 4
Eastern European Naval Strength at Midyear 1969
Baltic Sea Area
Black
Sea Area
East Germany
Poland
Bulgaria
Romania
Destroyer types
3
3
2
Submarines
7
2
Guided missile
patrol boats
12
12
5
Motor torpedo boats
66
28
8
13
Submarine chasers
26
8
8
3
Miscellaneous
patrol boats
60
3
Fleet minesweepers
19
24
2
4
Small minesweepers
28
35
18
28
Amphibious shins
6
21
Amphibious craft
12
23
11
8
Total
232
161
51
64
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gp_ss vitro eZ
or,
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EO 12958 3.5(c)
EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
20 August 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of National Estimates
SUBJECT : Part I of OSR Contribution to NIE
11-14-69
Attached are three copies of Part I of OSR's
contribution to ME 11-14-69, "Soviet and East
European General Purpose Forces." It covers naval
and naval aviation general purpose forces of the USSR
and its Warsaw Pact allies. Part 11, covering general
purpose ground and air forces, will be forwarded later.
Copies are being sent to the other USIE agencies par-
ticipating in the estimate.
Attachment:
SR SP 69-10, Cys 5, 6, 7
Acting Director
'Strategic Research
Copy No.
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