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COO175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 57 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 1 Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Language: Report Volume: Dissemination:FOU0 FULL T$%T OF ARTICLE: 1. YYYY/TS84-010 2. Report Date: 03 Feb 84 3. SOVIET TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN SINCE NOVEMBER 1980 4. The treatment accorded an American president in Soviet authoritative statements and media commentary is a sensitive barometer of Soviet expectations for relations with Washington. Historically, Soviet efforts to promote an improved climate of relations with the United States have been accompanied by corresponding restraints on public criticism of the President and his policies. 5. Since President Reagan's election in November 1980, Moscow has twice significantly modified its propaganda line to test the prospects for reduced bilateral tensions. In the immediate aftermath of the elections, Soviet media pictured the new Administration in positive terms suggesting that it would reverse the deterioration in bilateral relations and that President-elect Reagan h anti-Soviet views he had expressed during the campaign. This early period of professed optimism quickly gave way to strident low-level media criticism of the Administration and to direct, if less strident, attacks on the President himself. Soviet political leaders continued to abide by their normal strictures against attacking a U.S. president directly even though already by May 1981 they were strongly indicting President Reagan's policies. These respective media and leadership practices were followed until Brezhnev's death, with the exception of a brief interlude of more moderate comment in late 1981 between the time when the Administration agreed to begin arms control talks in Geneva and the imposition of U.S. sanctions in response to martial law in Poland. 6. Andropov's accession to power brought a second, more tentative Soviet effort to promote an improved U.S.-Soviet climate. Soviet leaders and prominent Soviet specialists on the United States muted their attacks on Washington, which had become particularly harsh in the last months of the Brezhnev regime, and expressed receptivity to any U.S. gestures for improved relations. This selective restraint on criticism--routine Soviet propaganda was little affected--lasted only until early spring 1983, when the contention over INF deployments and other issues took its toll. 3tI FOUO UNCLASSIFIED Approved for Release Joi C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 58 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 2 7. In the aftermath of the shooting down of the Korean airliner last September Moscow gave what is almost surely the most abusive Soviet treatment of an American President at least since Brezhnev became CPSU general secretary in 1964. Moscow has reduced the sharpness of its criticism only marginally since then in its routine propaganda. The leadership, on the other hand, a more sensitive indicator of changes in approach, has offered one significant indication of a desire to lower the decibel level of its polemics directed against the President: Andropov's 25 January PRAVDA interview, responding to President Reagan's 16 January speech expressing interest in U.S.-Soviet dialogue, avoided stridency while expressing Moscow's unaltered assessment of U.S. policy. 8. Within this broad chronological framework, the attached Soviet leadership statements and media commentaries reveal the varied treatment accorded to President Reagan and his Administration by three different elements in the Soviet Union at three different levels of authority--the leadership itself, political commentators with close ties to the leadership, and the routine media commentators. The pattern of behavior of each of these groups is distinctive: 9. o While obviously authorizing media attacks on the President, the leadership until 1983 conspicuously avoided direct personal attacks on the President. Even in Brezhnev's most strident criticism of U.S. policy, such as in his 27 October 1982 speec -to a meeing o ov-let military leaders, he attacked U.S. "ruling circles," "Washington," and "the line of the United States and those who follow it" without naming President Reagan. The Soviet leadership broke this pattern in the wake of charges by the President and other Administration officials that the Soviet Union had deliberately and knowingly shot down a passenger airliner last September. Andropov's January PRAVDA interview suggests that the Kremlin prefers the more moderate role traditionally assumed by the Soviet political leadership, according to which the top Soviet leader, at the very least, stands aloof from the excesses of the polemical fray. 10. o Well-connected political commentators, such as Aleksandr Bovin, Georgiy Arbatov, Vadim Zagladin, and Nikolay Shishlin, have been less restrained in discussing the President's responsibility for the U.S. policies they have so sharply condemned. They have also been the most sensitive indicator of changing perceptions about the direction of U.S.-Soviet relations. It was in the comments of these officials about the Administration that fluctuations in Soviet expectations for U.S.-Soviet cooperation were most clearly registered. 11. o Routine commentary has been the least sensitive barometer of changes in the atmosphere for U.S.-Soviet relations. When President FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 59 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 3 Reagan was elected, it was more optimistic than some Soviet political observers. When the outlines of Administration policy toward the Soviet Union became clear, the low-level commentary assumed a hostile tone that it has periodically intensified but from which in general it has not since departed. 13. Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, October Revolution anniversary speech (PRAVDA, 7Nov 80) 14. Regarding our relations with the United States of America, just as with any other country which belongs to a different social system, they can only be built up on the basis of equality, noninterference in internal affairs, not causing harm to the security of one another. 15. I would like to express the hope that the new Administration in the White House will manifest a constructive approach to questions or relations between our countries. 16. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Kremlin dinner speech (PRAVDA, 18 Nov 80) 17. Much in the development of the international situation wilh_of course, depend on the position of the United States. A new President has now been elected there. I shall not dwell on what was said by him and his supporters and opponents in the heat of the election struggle. I can only state with full responsibility that any constructive steps by the U.S. Administration in the field of Soviet-American relations and urgent world problems will meet with a positive response on our part. 18. TASS statement (PRAVDA, 3 Feb 81) 19. Soviet leading circles have taken note of a new anti-Soviet hostile campaign being unfolded in the United States. This time they ascribe to the Soviet Union involvement in "international terrorism." Such inventions could be simply ignored as a new primitive trick by professional anti-Soviets if not for the fact that this campaign was started by high-ranking officials of the American Administration including U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig. His statements, made at a press conference on 28 January this year, and subsequent additional comments made by another official representative of the U.S. State Department, clearly indicate that this is not a matter of some occasional unhappy expression but a deliberate political subversion. 20. Soviet leading circles would like to hope that they in FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 60 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 4 Washington will give serious thought as to what the continuation there of the campaign hostile to the Soviet Union can lead and will take measures to stop it. 21. Soviet Minister of Defense Dmitriy Ustinov (PRAVDA, 21 Feb 81) 22. The new U.S. Administration is making increasingly clear attempts to adopt an absolutely futile "position of strength" with regard to the USSR. It is perfectly obvious that such an approach is fundamentally at variance with the interests of both the American and the Soviet peoples and with the interests of all mankind. 23. Brezhnev, speech to 26th CPSU Congress (PRAVDA, 24 Feb 81) 24. Unfortunately, the previous Washington Administration by no means considered the development of relations, mutual understanding. Attempting to exert pressure on us, it began to destroy all the positive results which had been scored with no little difficulty in Soviet-American relations over the preceding years. . . . 25. Even after the change of leadership in the White House, candidly bellicose calls and statements are being heard from Washington, calls and statements which seem to be specially intended to poison the atmosphere of relations between our countries. In any case, we would like to hope that those who now determine U.S. policy will ultimately be able to look at things more realistically. . . . 26. The present state of relations between us and the sharpness of international problems demanding solution dictate the need for dialogue at all levels and, what is more, an active dialogue. We are ready for dialogue. Experience shows that the decisive link here is meetings at the highest level. 27. Brezhnev, speech in Kiev (PRAVDA, 10 May 81) 28. There are quite a few sober-minded people among those who today shape the policy of capitalist countries. They understand that the emphasis on strength, the emphasis on war in relations with the socialist world is madness in our day and age, that there is only one reasonable road--peaceful coexistence, mutually advantageous cooperation. 29. But there are also such statesmen in the bourgeois world who, judging by everything, are accustomed to thinking only in terms of strength and diktat. They actually regard the attainment of military superiority over the Soviet Union as their main political credo. The solution of international problems by way of talks and mutually advantageous agreements appears to be way down their list of priorities, if they give serious thought to this at all. FOLIO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 61 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 5 30. Among them there are also those who openly state that peace is not the most important matter, that there are things more important than peace. 31. Just think, comrades: Can one imagine a more horrendous position, a more cynical disregard for the destinies of peoples, including one's own people, for the lives of hundreds of millions of people! . . . 32. This is not to mention how absurd are any plans which are intended by means of threats, economic blockade or military aggression to impede the development of socialist countries or the struggle of peoples for national freedom and social justice. . . . 33. As for the Soviet Union, it is not the first time that we are hearing inventions about our policy, slander, and threats. But we do not give in to intimidations. 34. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, First Deputy Minister of Defense, and Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Nations (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Jun 81) 35. If you look at the statements of the leaders of the present U.S. Administration, you cannot help noticing in them a similarity with the aims set by the Hitlerite leadership in attacking the Soviet Union. Speaking at Notre Dame in June, R. Reagan said: "The West will outlive communism. . . . We will write it off as a sad, unnatural chapter in the history of mankind." 36. Ustinov (PRAVDA, 25 Jul 81) 37. The ruling circles of Washington have decided to overturn all the positive elements in Soviet-American relations achieved during the seventies and to break down the approximate equality in the military sphere between the USSR and the United States. 38. Without putting forward any positive initiatives the Reagan Administration has taken a standpoint of unconcealed anti-Sovietism. At the same time it is grossly interfering in the affairs of other states and is high-handedly dictating its demands to them. Washington has launched a broad offensive against the national-liberation movements in Africa, Asia and particularly in Latin America, is giving every sort of support to antipopular regimes, and is putting arms, equipment, military advisers and money at their disposal. . . . 39. The ruling circles of the United States are intensifying international tension and exacerbating Soviet-American relations. FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 62 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 6 40. The present American Administration is elevating to the rank of state policy interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and the open attack against national liberation movements. . . . 41. Washington, once again, as a decade ago, is trying to speak to the Soviet Union in the language of "cold war." At the same time, its disregard for agreements which were reached between our two countries in the field of arms restriction is demonstrated. A. Haig states: "We are not very concerned about the understandings of 1972, although they were agreed by both sides." 42. Brezhnev, interview with DER SPIEGEL (PRAVDA, 3 Nov 81) 43. There is no quiet in the world today. 'Hot spots' are emerging in different parts of the world. The race of death-carrying weapons is continuing. New types of them are created, which are particularly dangerous because they, as experts say, lower the threshold of nuclear war, i.e., make its outbreak more probable. Under these conditions the speculation of some strategists and politicians in the West on the admissibility of some 'limited' nuclear war and the possibility to win a victory in it looks particularly insidious. . . 44. So, those who possibly hope to. set fie to nuclear power keg, while themselves sitting snug aside, should not entertain any illusions. . . . 45. Unfortunately, the leading powers of the West, above all, the NATO bloc, do not show so far a serious interest in talks on all of these questions that are vital to mankind and its peaceful future. Some people there are by far more willing to speak not on detente, but on confrontation; not on peaceful mutually beneficial cooperation, but on the use of trade to military-strategic ends; not on agreements on the basis of equality and equal security, but on diktat from the positions of military supremacy; not on the elimination by joint efforts of seats of conflicts, but on the creation of ever new military bases, on the buildup of their military presence in various parts of the world; not on curbing the arms race, but on 'rearmament'; not on a limitation or prohibition of some or other types of weapons, but on the creation of ever new, even more destructive means of mass annihilation of people. 46. This way, unfortunately, they not only speak, but also act in practice. You, certainly, understand that I have in mind, above all, the policy of the present U.S. Administration, the way it was manifest both in statements by high-ranking statesmen of that country and, which is even more important, in their practical deeds. FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 63 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 7 47. All of it is actually an opposite to detente, blunt disregard for the striving of all peoples for lasting peace. And it is, certainly, profoundly deplorable that the leaders of one of the world's biggest powers have deemed it possible to build their policy on such a basis. . . . 48. President Reagan has recently expressed the readiness of the United States to discuss with the Soviet Union also other problems, which cause differences between the two countries. We welcome such readiness, as we have always considered talks to be the most appropriate method of resolving international problems. The main thing, of course, is that appropriate practical deeds should be matched to correct words. 49. And it would be better to abandon dreams of ensuring military supremacy over the USSR. 50. Minister of Defense Ustinov, October Revolution anniversary speech (PRAVDA, 7 Nov 81) 51. Washington is accelerating the buildup of the might of the NATO military machine and is seeking an expansion of the field of action of that aggressive bloc, spreading the system of its military bases to new territories. . . . 52. The Washington Administration is with increasing frequency resorting to frankly inflammatory language. High-ranking U.S. representatives, with cynical disregard for the fate of the peoples, state that there are allegedly some things more important than peace. 53. The preservation of peace is inseparable from the curbing of the arms race--from stage-by-stage disarmament. Important steps in that direction were taken in the seventies. But the present U.S. Administration is intent on casting doubt on all the positive things that have been jointly achieved in the field of Soviet-U.S. relations. It openly declares its intention to speak to the Soviet Union from positions of strength. 54. TASS statement on U.S. Stance on Poland (PRAVDA, 14 Jan 82) 55. The United States and its NATO allies are continuing attempts at crudely interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state--the Polish People's Republic, at whipping up international tensions. This has been most clearly revealed also in the statement, which was issued on 11 January by the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance. FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 64 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 8 56. It is well known that the whole of this disgraceful farce has been initiated by the U.S. Administration. Its style is felt both in the impudent distortion of facts, the high-handed tones, and excessive political ambitions. 57. Yes, Washington makes no little effort to try to bring abut a turnaround in international politics from detente to confrontation between blocs. Why is it done? It is not too difficult to answer this question. 58. What it amounts to is above all an attempt at crowding socialism and impairing the positions of the USSR and other socialist countries on the European and world scene. Certain figures of the imperialist camp are day and night beset by nightmares because socialism is growing stronger. The international positions of socialism rely on the existing balance of forces in Europe and in the world, and are guaranteed by the might of the socialist community. 59. Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff (ALWAYS IN READINESS TO DEFEND THE HOMELAND, Moscow: Voenizdat, approved for publication 26 Jan 82) 60. World imperialism, and particularly U.S. imperialism, is seeking to extend its tentacles into every part of the world. Militant U.S. circles have openly adopted a course of polite aimed at undermining__ detente, engagement in a massive arms race, and vigorous jaktivnuyul preparations for nuclear war. The various actions and acts of sabotage against the USSR and the other nations of the socialist community and against progressive forces throughout the world which they are presently conducting are of a coordinated nature and are joined together by a. common scheme. The main goal which the U.S. imperialists have set for themselves is gradually and sequentially to weaken and undermine socialism as a system, using any and all methods and means, and ultimately to establish their world domination. 61. This is not a new phenomenon. History has seen many claimants to world domination. Napoleon persistently sought to achieve world domination, as did Hitler at a later time. The outcome of their ambitions is well known. An even harsher outcome may await these latter-day claimants. 62. Brezhnev, Soviet Trade Union Congress speech (PRAVDA, 17 Mar 82) 63. The newly fledged devotees of cold war and dangerous balancing on the brink of a real war would like nothing better than to tear up the legal and ethical norms of relations between states that have taken shape over the centuries and to cancel their independence and sovereignty. They are trying to retailer the political map of the world, and have declared large regions on all continents as zones of FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 65 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 9 their "vital interests." They have arrogated the "right" to command some countries, and to judge and punish" others. Unembarrassed, they publicly announce, and try to carry out, plans for economic and political "destablization" of governments and states that are not to their liking. With unexampled cynicism they gloat over difficulties experienced by this or that nation. They are trying to substitute "sanctions" and blockades for normal communications and international trade, and endless threats of armed force, not short of threats to use nuclear weapons, for contacts and negotiations. 64. It is simply astonishing to see it all. And you cannot help asking yourself: What is there more of in this policy--thoughtlessness and lack of experience in international affairs, or irresponsibility and, to say it bluntly, an adventurist approach to problems crucial for the destiny of mankind? Not in our country, but in the columns of respectable organs of the U.S. bourgeois press this policy was described as "a course to political disaster." It is hard to deny the validity of this description. 65. Brezhnev, PRAVDA interview (PRAVDA, 18 Apr 82) 66. I already spoke on the value of an active dialogue with the United states at all levels, especially emphasizing that the decisive link here is summit level meetings. Today we also support such meetings. It is understandable that a meeting between the_U.S. President and myself must be well-prepared and conducted properly, not just in passing in connection with some international forum or other. 67. Yuriy Andropov, Politburo member and Chairman of the KGB, Lenin anniversary speech (PRAVDA, 23 Apr 82) 68. The imperialist bourgeoisie, frightened by the upsurge of the antiwar movements, is making ever-wider use of the weapons of lies and sophisticated deception. What is Washington doing now? One hysterical propaganda campaign replaces the other. People are at one moment being persuaded of a Soviet military threat, then lied to unscrupulously about the lagging behind of the United States, intimidated with international terrorism, fed cock-and-bull stories about events in Poland, Central America, South and Southeast Asia. 69. Attempts are made to make use of diplomatic talks themselves in order to deceive the public, among them talks on the limitation of arms and on disarmament. The impression is created that often they are entered into only to create illusions and, by lulling public vigilance, continue the arms race. . . . 70. But certain governments as well as people are inclined, as is FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 10 apparent, to forget the experience and lessons of history. It would seem that this is now happening to the Washington Administration, which is trying to steer the entire development of international relations onto a dangerous path. Of course the United States will not be successful in this. But we must not ignore the fact that such policies on the whole worsen the situation and increase the danger of war. 71. The only answer to this can be increased vigilance and, at the same time, a still more stubborn struggle to preserve peace. 72. Brezhnev, Komsomol congress speech (PRAVDA, 19 May 82) 73. President Reagan, on his part, has now declared that the United States is ready for the resumption of the talks. In our opinion, this is a step in the right direction. It is , however, important that the talks should begin immediately in the right key. 74. In the same speech the President said that the United States at the talks would be in favor of substantial reductions. Well, we have always been in favor of substantial reductions of strategic arms, there is no need to persuade us in this respect. 75. But if one looks at the essence of the ideas voiced by the U.S. President on such reductions, one notes unfortunately that the American position is absolutely unilateral in nature. Above all, because the United States would like in general to exclude from the talks the strategic arms it is now most intensively developing. 76. Brezhnev speech at Kremlin meeting of military commanders (PRAVDA, 28 Oct 82) 77. The ruling circles of the United States of America have launched a political, ideological, and economic offensive on socialism and have raised the intensity of their military preparations to an unprecedented level. . . . 78. The masses of people on all continents angrily protest against Washington's aggressive policy which is threatening to push the world into the flames of a nuclear war. The adventurism, rudeness, and undisguised egoism of this policy arouse growing indignation in many countries, including those allied with the United States. . . . 79. The line of the United States and those who follow it is a line for deepening tension and aggravating the situation to a maximum. They are dreaming of isolating politically and weakening economically the USSR and its friends. They have unfolded an unprecedented arms race, especially a nuclear arms race, and are trying to attain military superiority. Having stepped on this road, imperialism is FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 11 irresponsibly playing with the destinies of the peoples. 80. TASS report of 15 November 1982 meeting between General Secretary Andropov and Vice President Bush (PRAVDA, 16 Nov 82) 81. In this respect Yu. V. Andropov stressed that the Soviet Union, consistently carrying out a policy of peace, is prepared to build relations with the United States on a basis of full equality, noninterference, mutual respect in the interests of the peoples of both countries, and normalization [ozdorovleniye] of the international situation. 82. Tikhonov, Kremlin dinner speech to U.S. trade delegation (PRAVDA, 19 Nov 82) 83. We are meeting with you at a time which is not the best for Soviet-American relations. Their climate has considerably cooled and to be frank, not through our fault. 84. The official stand taken in the United States towards the Soviet Union, naturally, is also reflected in trade between our countries. All sorts of discriminatory measures, attempts to use various sanctions, embargoes, etc., against our country do not, of course, inspire kind feelings, but rather undermine the confidence of Soviet foreign trade organizations in the American market. . . . 85. The Soviet Union has been and is for normal, and even better, friendly relations with the United States. There were such relations in the past, and they can again become a reality. This would meet the interests of our countries and the interests of universal peace. I am confident that this is precisely what our peoples wish. They wish lasting peace and mutually beneficial cooperation. 86. Andropov, speech at CPSU Central Committee plenum (PRAVDA, 23 Nov 82) 87. All are equally interested in preserving peace and detente. Therefore, statements in which the readiness for normalizing relations is linked with the demand that the Soviet Union pay for this with preliminary concessions in different fields, do not sound serious, to say the least. We shall not agree to this and, properly speaking, we have nothing to cancel: We did not introduce sanctions against anyone, we did not denounce treaties and agreements that were signed, and we did not interrupt talks that were started. I should like to stress once more that the Soviet Union stands for accord but this should be sought on the basis of reciprocity and equality. 88. In our opinion the point of talks with the United States and other Western countries, primarily on questions of restraining the FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 68 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 12 arms race, does not lie in the statement of differences. For us talks are a way of joining efforts by different states in order to achieve' results useful to all sides. The problems will not disappear by themselves if the talks are held for the sake of talks, as it unfortunately happens not infrequently. We are for the search on a healthy basis, acceptable to the sides concerned, for a settlement of the most complicated problems, especially of course, the problems of curbing the arms race, involving both nuclear and conventional arms. But let no one expect unilateral disarmament from us. We are not naive people. 89. We do not demand unilateral disarmament from the Vest. We are for equality, for consideration for the interests of both sides, for honest agreement. We are ready for this. 90. Ustinov, TASS interview (PRAVDA, 7 Dec 82) 91. [President Ronald Reagan) said in his speech of 22 November that the Soviet Union now has a clear margin in practically any type of military power. Such assertions are not in keeping with reality. They are calculated at deceiving the public and have the purpose of justifying the United States' unprecedented military programs and aggressive doctrines. It is regrettable that such attempts to convince people of the existence of what does not exist in nature, are made by the leader of a great power whose very position presupposes realism and responsibility in assessing rea y. .-.--- 92. At the same time, the President's speech contains an attempt to sow distrust in the Soviet Union's stand. He stated that the Soviet Union violates the unilateral moratorium it announced on the deployment of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR. I state quite definitely that the USSR is true to its word. 93. Andropov, PRAVDA interview responding to President Reagan's Open Letter (PRAVDA, 2 Feb 83) 94. I must say quite definitely that there is nothing new in President R. Reagan's proposal. What it is all about--and this all the world's news agencies have immediately taken note of--is the same "zero option." That it is patently unacceptable to the Soviet Union now is already generally recognized. Really, can one seriously speak about a proposal according to which the Soviet Union would have to scrap unilaterally all its medium-range missiles, while the United States and its NATO allies would retain all their nuclear weapons of this category? 95. It is precisely this unrealistic position of the United States that has blocked, and this is well known, progress at the talks in Geneva. That now the U.S. President has reiterated again this FOUO UNCLASSIFIED 000175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 69 of 92, Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 13 position indicates one thing: The United States does not want to look for a mutually acceptable accord with the Soviet Union and thereby deliberately dooms the Geneva talks to failure. . . . 96. We have believed and still believe that summit meetings have special significance to resolving complicated problems. This determines our serious approach to them. 97. For us this is not a matter of a political or a propaganda game. A meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions to urgent problems and at developing relations between our countries, would be useful both to the Soviet Union and to the United States of America, to Europe, and to the whole world. 98. But when the U.S. President makes the meeting conditional on the Soviet Union's consent to the patently unacceptable solution to the problem of nuclear armaments in Europe, proposed by him, this by no means testifies to the seriousness of the American leadership's approach to the whole of this issue. This can only be regretted. 99. Andropov, PRAVDA interview (PRAVDA, 27 Mar 83) 100. The President pretends that almost a thousand medium-range nuclear systems of the United States and it_s_ NATO allies da not ostensibly exist in the zone of Europe, and that it is unknown to him that NATO has a 1.5-1 advantage over the USSR in the aggregate number of nuclear warheads on those systems. 101. The President not only keeps silent about all that. He tells a deliberate untruth [on govorit zavedomuyu nepravduj, asserting that the Soviet Union does not observe its own unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles. . . . 102. The incumbent U.S. Administration continues to tread an extremely perilous path. The issues of war and peace must not be treated so flippantly. All attempts at achieving military superiority over the USSR are futile. . . . It is time they stopped devising one option after another in search of the best ways of unleashing nuclear war in the hope of winning it. Engaging in this is not just irresponsible, it is insane. 103. Andropov, speech to CPSU Central Committee plenum (PRAVDA, 16 Jun 83) 104. This period is marked by a confrontation, unprecedented in the entire post-war period by its intensity and sharpness, of two diametrically opposite world outlooks, two political courses--socialism and imperialism. A struggle is going on for the FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 70 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 14 minds and hearts of billions of people in the world. And the future of mankind depends in no small measure on the outcome of this ideological struggle. ...It is no less important to skillfully expose the lying, subversive nature of imperialist propaganda. . . . 105. On the one hand, as has already been said, the aggressiveness of ultrareactionary forces led by U.S. imperialism has sharply increased. Attempts are being made to reverse the course of events at all costs. Of course, this policy will not bring imperialists success but, being adventuristic, it is extremely dangerous to mankind. This is why it is meeting with powerful opposition on the part of the peoples, which, undoubtedly, will grow even further. 106. In the present-day capitalist world, however, there are also other trends and other politicians who take a more realistic account of the international situation. 107. Gromyko, TASS interview (PRAVDA, 22 Jun 83) 108. Naturally, a [summit] meeting which could produce major results for both bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations and the international situation would be useful. 109. Quite a few words are now being said in the Vest, particularly in Washington, about a Soviet-American summit. An outsider can even get the impression that Washington is indeed giving serious thought to such a meeting. But if we look into the crux of the matter, the situation, regrettably, is different. 110. Obviously, proper preconditions are needed to hold a meeting of the top leaders of the two major powers. First, it is necessary to have a certain degree of mutual understanding on major issues which are fundamental to the state of relations between the two countries and the overall international situation. There also is a need for the desire of both sides actually to strive for positive developments, or even better, for a breakthrough in their mutual relations. 111. If we consider the state of affairs from this point of view, it becomes clear that the discourses of American figures on a meeting are not backed by anything. U.S. policy on relations with the Soviet Union does not pursue any constructive goals at all, of which American leaders make no secret. Moreover, it is oriented in the totally opposite direction. 112. When there appear in American politics real signs of a readiness to conduct affairs in a serious and constructive manner, the question of the possibility of a summit will appear in a different light. FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 71 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 15 113. TASS statement on Korean airline incident (PRAVDA, 3 Sep 83) 114. The intrusion into the air space by the aforementioned plane cannot be regarded in any other way than a preplanned act. It was obviously thought possible to attain special intelligence aims without hindrance using civilian planes as a cover. - 115. More than that, there is reason to believe that those who organized this provocation deliberately desired a further aggravation of the international situation striving to smear the Soviet Union, to sow hostility towards it and to cast aspersions on the Soviet peace-loving policy. 116. This is illustrated also by the impudent, slanderous statement in respect to the Soviet Union that was made instantly by President Reagan of the United States. 117. USSR Government statement on Korean airliner incident (PRAVDA, 7 Sep 83) 118. The assertion of the U.S. President that Soviet pilots knew that it was a civilian aircraft are absolutely not in keeping with reality. . . . 119. It is the sovereign right of every state to protect its borders. . . . So the U.S. President makes himself out as an ignoramus saying, as he did in his address on 5 September, that the Soviet Union "arbitrarily proclaims" its borders in the airspace [sic]. 120. But the point here, of course, is not the ignorance of one U.S. official or another. The point is a deliberate preplanned action in an area that is strategically important to the Soviet Union. The instigators of that action could not help realizing what its outcome could be, but vent ahead with a major intelligence operation with the use, as is now becoming clear, of a civilian plane, deliberately exposing its passengers to mortal danger. . . . 121. This conclusion is confirmed by all subsequent actions of the U.S Administration. Its leaders, including the U.S. President, launched a malicious and hostile anti-Soviet campaign over a very short time, clearly using a prearranged script. Its essence has been revealed in its most concentrated form in the televised speech of U.S. President R. Reagan :on 5 September--to try to blacken the image of the Soviet Union and discredit its social system, to provoke a feeling of hatred toward the Soviet people, to present the aims of the USSR foreign policy in a distorted perspective, and to distract attention from its peace initiatives. FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 72 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 16 122. The entire responsibility for this tragedy rests wholly and fully with the leaders of the United States of America. 123. Ogarkov article (IZVESTIYA, 23 Sep 83) 124. The struggle for peace in our times has acquired special significance. That is due primarily to the sharply enhanced aggressiveness of international imperialism, Zionism, and reaction headed by the United States. In recent years their actions have been significantly reminiscent of fascism's actions in the thirties. Having adopted flagrant lies and slander, the United States and its allies have launched a global offensive against socialism on all fronts, initiating, as they openly assert, a new "crusade" against us. The Washington Administration is nurturing sinister plans. Expatiating on its alleged adherence to peace, the U.S. Administration, through its defense secretary, blasphemously states that "the path to peace is marked by preparation for war." The "directive in the defense field for fiscal 1984," drafted on instructions from the U.S. President, is evidence of how far the U.S. "hawks" have gone. This official document sets as its main aim "the destruction of socialism as a sociopolitical system." That's allt There is no need to explain this gibberish. Commentary is superfluous, as they say. We can only marvel at the sheer ignorance and self-sufficiency of the transatlantic strategists, so infinitely far removed from a knowledge of the elementary ou-n atfons an "w----- of the development of human society. 125. Andropov statement (PRAVDA, 29 Sep 83) 126. The Soviet leadership deems it necessary to inform the Soviet people, other peoples, and all who are responsible for determining states' policy of its assessment of the course pursued in international affairs by the current U.S. Administration. 127. In short, it is a militarist course that represents a serious threat to peace. Its essence is to try to ensure a dominating position in the world for the United States of America regardless of the interests of other states and peoples. . . . 128. When the U.S. President bombastically declares from the UN rostrum his commitment to the cause of peace, self-determination, and sovereignty of the peoples, these rhetorical declarations can convince no one. 129. If anyone has any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the present American Administration's policy, recent events have dispelled them once and for all. The Administration is going so far for the sake of achieving its imperial FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 73 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 17 objectives that one cannot help doubting whether any restraints [tormoza] at all exist for Washington to prevent it from crossing a line before which any thinking person ought to stop. 130. The sophisticated provocation organized by the U.S. special services using a South Korean plane is also an example of extreme adventurism in policy. . . . 131. In their endeavor somehow to justify their dangerous, misanthropic policy, they are heaping mountains of slander on the Soviet Union and socialism as a social system, and the tone is being set by the U.S. President himself. It must be frankly said that it is an unseemly spectacle when, having set themselves the aim of denigrating the Soviet people, the leaders of a country like the United States resort to what is virtually foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on morality and humanity. . . . 132. Now Washington, in addition to morality, is also flouting elementary rules of decency, displaying disrespect not only for statesmen and states but also.for the United Nations. . . . 133. Of course, malicious attacks on the Soviet Union arouse in us a natural sense of indignation, but we have strong nerves, and we do not build our policy on emotions. It is founded on common sense, realism, and profound responsibility for the destiny of peace. 134. Report of Politburo meeting (PRAVDA, 8 Oct 83) 135. [The 28 September Andropov] statement gives a clear-cut class analysis of the situation that has taken shape in the world, a principled appraisal of the militarist course stirred by the present U.S. Administration in international politics, and a fitting rebuff to wanton fabrications and malicious attacks of President Reagan against the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community. 136. Ustinov article (PRAVDA, 19 Nov 83) 137. The aggressiveness of ultrareactionary imperialist forces increased sharply when the R. Reagan Administration came to power in the United States. They have declared a "crusade" against socialism. 138. The R. Reagan Administration, in blatant contradiction with this commitment, is now stating its "right" to inflict a first nuclear strike in the hope of victory. . . . 139. The Washington Administration's war preparations are accompanied by shameless anti-Soviet hysteria. Discarding all FOUO UNCLASSIFIED 000175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 74 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 18 decency, top U.S. officials are slandering the USSR, its people and policy, and the socialist way of life. Lies, disinformation, juggling with facts, and provocations are being brought into play. It is'with the aid of such methods that Washington figures, heating up the international situation, are counting on ensuring the unobstructed implementation of their course aimed at an unrestrained arms race. This policy on the part of the White House leaders does not consist solely of emotions or rhetoric. It is a consciously and coldly and deliberately implemented long-term strategy aimed at broadening confrontation and thus increasing the danger of war. 140. Andropov statement (PRAVDA, 25 Nov 83) 141. The leadership of the Soviet Union has already apprised Soviet people and other peoples of its assessment of the present U.S. Administration's militarist course and warned the U.S. Government and the, Western countries which are at one with it about the dangerous consequences of that course. . . . 142. The Soviet leadership appeals to the leaders of the United States and of the states of Western Europe to weigh up once again all the consequences with which the implementation of the plans for the deployment of the new U.S. missiles in Europe threatens their own peoples and all mankind. 143. We are already living, even now, in a peace that is too fragile. Responsible statesmen must therefore evaluate what is taking place and make a rational decision. Only human reason can and must safeguard mankind from the awesome danger. We call upon those who are nudging the world along the path of an ever more dangerous arms race to renounce the unrealizable calculations of achieving military superiority by such a path with the aim of dictating their will to other peoples and states. 144. Gromyko speech at Conference on Disarmament in Europe (PRAVDA, 19 Jan 84) 145. Instead of conducting talks and displaying a desire to work for accord, the U.S. Administration has chosen a course of breaking the existing alignment of forces. . . . 146. The incumbent U.S. Administration is an administration thinking in categories of war and acting accordingly. . . . 147. What is needed is deeds and not verbal equilibristics, the resort to which has been made particularly often in Washington lately. They clearly are a sign of short-term considerations, and people already know sufficiently well the worth of such tricks. No matter how hard one tries to lie--be it a crude lie or a virtuoso FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 75 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 19 one--this will change nothing in the actual state of affairs. What is needed is a turn of substance in policy--from the policy of militarism and aggression to a policy of peace and international cooperation. 148. Andropov interview (PRAVDA, 25 Jan 84) 149. Interstate relations have found themselves in an atmosphere of dangerous tension. The leaders of the United States, the U.S. Administration bear full responsibility for this turn of events. 150. So, one may ask, why is the present situation in the world being deliberately distorted in the statements of. American leaders? First of all to try to dispel the concern of the peoples, which has been mounting with every day, over Washington's militaristic policy and to undercut the growing resistance-to this policy. . . . 151. There is no need to convince us of the usefulness and expedience of dialogue. This is our policy. But the dialogue should be conducted on an equal footing and not from a position of strength, as it is proposed by Ronald Reagan. The dialogue should not be conducted for the sake of dialogue. It should be directed at the attainment of concrete accords. It should be conducted honestly and no attempts should be made to use it for_sefi~aims 152. The American leadership, as all signs indicate, has not given up its intentions to conduct talks with us from positions of strength, from positions of threats and pressure. 154. Oleg Anichkin, CPSU Central Committee official (Soviet domestic radio, 14Nov 80) 155. Reagan is in favor of stepping up American military might and the achievement of U.S. military supremacy. . . . 156. At the same time his advisers direct attention to such points. The nearer Reagan has approached the White House, the more moderate have been his enunciations. One can suppose that this process will continue. 157. Aleksandr Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer and reputed adviser to Presidents Brezhnev and Andropov (Soviet domestic radio, 7 Dec 80) 158. Reagan, of course, realizes that he cannot get away from continuing talks with the Soviet Union. But, by all accounts, it FOLIO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 76 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 20 seems to me, in general, that a harder line U.S. policy is at hand, particularly where it concerns, for example, the problems of disarmament and military detente. It seems to me that soon we will have to confront a harder line of this kind and preparations for this should be made, although in general I do not exclude the possibility that after a while everything may return to the beaten track, as we say. 159. Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USA and Canada Institute (Soviet television, 29 Nov 80) 160. It has become clear in any case that both Reagan and many in his entourage have come to some serious conclusions during the course of this campaign. The shift to the center has begun. This is generally typical of U.S. political life. Whichever candidate stands away from the center will shift. If he is left of center, he will drift to the right. If he is right of center, he will drift slightly to the left remaining at some distance, but even so will approach the center. Reagan is a rather experienced man in this respect. I would like to say that I have heard and read in the foreign press that as a film actor he is a man without much experience. However, it is difficult to judge from the past. There were excellent presidents who were former loggers.. 161. The fact itself that moderate statements are made s important to me, because quite a few obstacles were left over from the election campaign. This certainly does not mean that we will be rancorous and will not let anything pass, including what was said in the heat of the election struggle. We have already said publicly that we will not act like that. However, even words are deeds to a certain extent at present, because they influence atmosphere and climate. Atmosphere and climate are rather important in politics and any beginnings depend on them. 162. Vitaliy Kobysh, CPSU Central Committee official (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 1Jan 81) 163. Reagan, with his reputation for being a politician belonging to the extreme right wing of the Republican Party, has formed his cabinet from people of basically moderate views. . . . 164. "When taking over," every new administrator strives to show that it is different from the previous one and that its policy will meet the country's interests to a greater degree. Statements by Reagan and some of his closest assistants indicate that they consider the status to which the Carter-Brzezinski administration has reduced Soviet-U.S. relations to be abnormal and that they see the normalization of these relations as the next U.S. Government's foremost priority. At the same time they stress that they will FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 77 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 21 pursue a "tough policy," in other words, they will act from a "position of strength." We will see how all this will appear in practice. 165. TASS report on President Reagan's 29 January press conference (PRAVDA, 31 Jan 81) 166. Referring to the Soviet Union's policy, the U.S. President permitted a number of premeditated distortions in his assessment of the aims-and character of the USSR's international activities. He said, in particular, that up to now detente has been a one-way street which the Soviet Union has used for the achievement of its own aims, and that detente is more favorable to the Soviet Union than to the United States. . . . 167. In an unworthy manner Reagan went on to talk about some sort of insidiousness in the Soviet Union's policy which allegedly aims to establish a worldwide socialist or communist state. . . . 168. Referring to a most important problem, the SALT II treaty, the President permitted obvious misinterpretations [perederzhki] of the treaty's essence. He alleged that in its present form the treaty would lead not to strategic arms limitation but to their buildup. He called for the holding of new negotiations. However, it followed from Reagan's statement that the principal function of such negotiations will not be the discussion of conditions for limiting the arms race, but the linking of this problem to other questions which are not relevant to this topic. 169. Anichkin (Soviet domestic radio, 6 Feb 81) 170. On the whole President Reagan [at his press conference on 29 January] said nothing new in comparison with what he said during the election campaign. He attributed to the Soviet Union designs to establish world domination and to set up a worldwide socialist or communist state. Then he declared that the Soviet Union is using detente for its own ends and has allegedly turned it into a one-way street. All of this is untrue. . . . 171. It is one thing when minor politicians are talking in this spirit; it is another when such words are being pronounced by the President. After all, it is a question of the deliberate distortion of Soviet policy.... 172. In the words of the WASHINGTON POST, Reagan had adopted a tone which is very strikingly different form the Republican and Democratic administrations of the 60's and 70's. The President, the same newspaper writes, spoke of the Soviet Union in terms that recall the most difficult times of the cold war. FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 78 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 22 173. "I. Aleksandrov," pseudonym used in officially inspired articles (PRAVDA, 25 Mar 81) 174. Regretfully, from their very first public statements and practical steps the leaders of the new U.S. Government appear to be bent not on rectifying but on multiplying the errors of the previous administration, on facilitating not a lessening of international tension but its growth. . . . 175. The leaders of the Washington Administration and some hawkish lawmakers are now engaged in a competition of belligerent phraseology, are trying to outdo one another by the hugeness of military programs. 176. Bovin (Soviet television, 29 Mar 81) 177. I now think that the essential outlines of the new foreign policy course, of Reagan's foreign policy, have now become sufficiently visible. It is a harsh, conservative, power policy, it is a policy whose cornerstone comprises extremely primitive anticommunist concepts. In general the views of Reagan and his supporters on world developments are extremely simple: Anything they do not like, anything that is contrary to the interests of imperialism, they say is all the result of the insidious actions of the Soviet Union. From this primitive package a simple conclusion is drawn: The time for playing at detente is over, it is necessary to rearm immediately, it is necessary to strive for military strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, and on this basis impose the will of America the Great on the whole world. 178. Well, this is approximately the philosophy. Let us now examine the practice. We all know that during the past decade, let us say, despite all the difficulties and complexities, between the Soviet Union and the United States there became established a fairly well-developed structure of mutual relations which was formulated in dozens of different agreements. Nov the new Administration is beginning to break up this structure and deal a mean blow to its foundation, the process of strategic arms limitation. 179. Arbatov (PRAVDA, 4 May 81) 180. Most observers agree that, even by late April, no in any way coherent U.S. foreign policy has emerged--at any rate when it comes to actions. There have been plenty of words and rhetoric--so much that the Administration itself has more than once had to backpedal. But can words and rhetoric be regarded as policy? 181. They probably can be, in some respects. FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 79 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 23 182. First of all, they can shed light on political views and intentions. In this light the "noises" from Washington are almost unambiguous: They indicate a desire to accelerate the arms race in every possible way and to secure military superiority, a wish to switch relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries onto the road of confrontation and power struggle, to rule according to whim the fate of the countries that have liberated themselves from colonialism, to dictate unceremoniously to the allies. The very fact that the people who have come to power in the United States talk at length and insistently of these desires and intentions cannot be left out of account. The fact must be viewed as an objective reality. But another fact remains no less a reality--the fact that intentions and wishes alone are not enough to constitute a policy. Politics has been and will remain the art of the possible. And the possibilities, the realities of the modern world certainly do not leave a great deal of room for the imperial ambitions which people in Washington are today going on about with new force. 183. The question whether the new U.S. Administration has formulated its foreign policy should be left'open, I think. Some may hope that it has not been formulated yet, others may think differently. It is clear, however, that the continuation of the existing situation would itself pose grave dangers, particularly the attempts to transform bombastic propaganda slogans into practical policy premises. All this is dangerous not only for other countries United States itself and for its national interests, which need more than ever before a realistic, sober analysis. 184. Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Information Department (Soviet television, 16 May 81) 185. On many questions the foreign policy concept of the new Reagan Administration has already been formulated. . . . 186. On the basis of speeches, although at times you could say they are quite saturated with anti-Soviet rhetoric, and on the basis of documents which have already been published, it can be definitely concluded that the new U.S. Administration has chosen a sharp whipping up of the arms race as its course. The new Administration considers that opposition to the Soviet Union--as its leaders, the leaders of the United States, say--in the economic, political, and other fields is its main foreign policy concept. Besides, they maintain that this opposition must be on a global scale. 187. Reagan recently said: I do not wish to live in a world where the Soviet Union is first. What does this mean? If these words of Reagan's are translated into another language--into the language of politics from everyday language--this means that the United States FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 80 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 24 has chosen military supremacy over the Soviet Union as its political concept; that it is rejecting the policy of peaceful coexistence, the policy of detente; and that it is making a stake on sharply raising the military presence of the United States in various parts of the world, including along the perimeter of Soviet borders. It is also attempting, by increasing its military potential, to put pressure on the Soviet Union. 188. Arbatov (Soviet Television, 31 Oct 81) 189. If we are to speak about American policy, then of course we can say that the most extremist views have prevailed in the question of military spending, and generally in American behavior in the international arena. Well, of course, many say that maybe these people bark more than they bite. It is still difficult and too early to judge. But they do in fact bark a lot, and a lot of militaristic talk can be heard coming from Washington every day. This is not just talk. There are military appropriation decisions on military programs, certain U.S. positions and actions on various continents, and interference into the affairs of a number of countries--all of this has become a reality. Therefore, we are undoubtedly seeing a period which gives cause to remember the cold war and to suspect that quite a lot has been done to sweep aside all the positive things that were accumulated at the expense of great labor in international relations and thus a big step has been taken toward a cold war. . . . 190. So things in the economy are not turning out quite the way the President figured, and to a certain extent this can be a limiting factor for many far-reaching American plans. . . . 191. All of these realities are just beginning to appear--after all this government has not been in power very long--and these political and social mechanisms, which demand some kind of accommodation on the part of the Administration, have just been set in motion. 192. Of course, there are people there who . it is difficult to imagine that they can reform. But overall--and we have seen this in history more than once--even the most conservative politicians have been sufficiently pragmatic in understanding what can be done and what cannot be done. . . . 193. Even in America, they are beginning to somehow understand that the question is becoming extremely acute, that some kind of reaction to it is necessary, that in Europe and the world as a whole--and even in the United States, as a matter of fact--some sentiments are appearing. 194. Bovin, Soviet domestic radio, 29 November 1981 FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 81 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 25 195. In fact, what did this Reagan speech of 18 November mean? Does it, to some degree. . . . signify a reassessment of the U.S. position, or . . . is it an attempt to gain a political alibi with respect to the pressures being exerted by America's allies in Europe? As for which of these elements was more evident in the speech, this is an open question both for us and for Europe. We will find out when the talks begin. 196. Nikolay Shishlin, CPSU Central Committee official, Soviet television, 5 December 1981 197. Regarding the fact of an alteration in the U.S. foreign policy course taking place, an alteration in the U.S. foreign policy course beginning to become perceptible--this is true. . . . It seems that in this respect in particular we are right in talking neither of a cosmetic operation nor of a break with,past policies, but rather of a certain alteration in course, a certain adaptation of American policies to reality. 198. Bovin, Soviet domestic radio, 20 December 1981 199. One of the main problems for Europe at the moment is the problem of the so-called Eurostrategic weapons. . . . One can view these [INF] talks in different ways. On the one hand, the talks have a specific object--medium-range weapons. But their principal significance is the fact that after a woe year of-a -zion-an---- alarm and hysterical kinds of statements by Washington, generally speaking things there are quietly beginning to stabilize. 200. TASS report on U.S. sanctions after the imposition of martial law in Poland (PRAVDA, 30 Dec 81) 201. The U.S. Administration has taken a provocative step the purpose of which is to poison the international climate even more, to exacerbate tensions, to worsen confrontation and toughen the militarist foreign policy course. . . . 202. President R. Reagan has published a statement, announcing the introduction of a whole number of unilateral discriminatory measures with regard to the Soviet Union, ranging from a suspension of Aeroflot service to the USA to a review of bilateral Soviet-U.S. agreements in trade and scientific-technical cooperation, agreements signed by the Government of the United States. 203. To justify this crude diktat with regard to a sovereign state unprecedented and absolutely inadmissible in universally accepted international practice, the head of the U.S. Administration has resorted to direct forgery and lies, maintaining that the Soviet Union allegedly "interfered" in Polish affairs and bears "direct FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database responsibility" for the situation in Poland. 204. Arbatov (PRAVDA, 1 Jan 82) Page: 82 of 92 Page 26 205. "Seeking a crisis" is precisely how Washington's stance regarding Poland can be described. . . . Attempts are being made to "internationalize" the crisis and to exploit the events to still further exacerbate the international situation and relations with the USSR in particular. 206. The question naturally arises of the true motives and true aims of the campaign unleashed by the United States over the events in Poland. . . . 207. I want immediately to stipulate that in mentioning the present leaders, I mean not only the President and his most influential ministers but also a broader stratum of the Washington bureaucracy, above all the stratum comprising the deputy and assistant cabinet members, the President's chief advisers and entourage, the heads of a number of departments, and so forth. . . . And with the utmost responsibility I would venture to claim that as a group, this "second echelon" is in considerable part composed of extremists representing the far right wing, extreme militarist flank of the U.S. ruling class. . . . A whole series of conclusions can be derived from all that is known of these people. One is that they are people who rose to prominence on a wave of crisis and feel e s u- of-water-- - outside a crisis. . . . 208. A certain circle of American figures now needs a crisis as a condition of its political success, even political survival. And it is apparently prepared to go to any lengths for the sake of that. 209. Aleksandr Kaverznev, Soviet television political observer (Hungarian domestic radio, 18 Feb 82) 210. We are of the opinion that the coming years will be difficult. In the beginning, when the Reagan Administration came to power in the United States, we had certain hopes that the President would not implement the policy he announced during his election campaign. We hoped that life would oblige him to see many things in a different way. But now we are forced to conclude that for the entire duration of the Reagan Administration we can hardly expect a different U.S. policy. 211. Shishlin (Soviet domestic radio, 11 Apr 82) 212. Reagan, it must be said, has garnished these rather bellicose statements with the somewhat curious assertion that he, the President of the United States, is willing to meet Leonid Ilich Brezhnev in the FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 83 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 27 summer at the second special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament. And there is a rather strange contradiction here. Actually, the idea of a summit meetinj=-a Soviet-American summit meeting--was proposed over one year ago from the platform of the 26th party congress. In that time, the Soviet Union has covered a considerable part of the distance toward finding ground for mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of improving Soviet-American relations. We saw nothing of the kind from the American side. And now into the midst of these rather definite statements, which can only be called militaristic, he inserts the claim that he is ready for a Soviet-American summit meeting. 213. Ernst Genri, prominent journalist (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 14 Jul 82) 214. Consequently, has the failure of Hitler's blitzkrieg against the USSR taught the U.S. militarists nothing? By all accounts, this is exactly the case and must be taken into account. It is not hard to understand what is guiding the Pentagon's thinkers. 215. They are not taking the failure of the Hitlerite adventure into account simply because there has been a revolution in military hardware since then. It is now proposed to deliver a surprise strike against the USSR not by means of tanks and conventional aircraft, but by nuclear missiles and other "super weapons" whichcan__fly_thousands of kilometers in a few minutes. 216. Arbatov (PRAVDA, 16 Jul 82) 217. U.S. policy would be good to the extent to which it is not allowed to be bad, safe (not only for us but also for America itself and its allies) to the extent to which it is not allowed to become dangerous. It will not be allowed to evolve in those directions by economic and political realities, by the policies of other countries, by the Americans' common sense and by the striving of the peoples for self-preservation. I hope that these factors will be enough for the continued political processes to bolster the realistic principles and to return American policy to an understanding of not only the existing contradictions but also of very serious and vitally important common interests, the interests of peace and survival, which require not only talks but also agreements as well as the overall improvement of relations between the two countries. What if this does not come to pass? I personally would find solace in the thought that a time will come and it will be possible to say: It is not with this Administration that history began, and it is not with it that it has ended. 218. Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department (Czechoslovak domestic radio, 30 FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 84 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 28 Jul 82) 219. Reagan and his Administration--and I deliberately do not say the United States since there are various internal groupings--Reagan and his Administration represent that part of the capitalist world of monopoly capital, which is convinced that the solution of questions of the future, of problems of mutual relations between the two systems, can be achieved only by means of force. Circles currently in the leadership of a substantial part of European countries take a completely different viewpoint. It is not easy for them but they give preference to a peaceful development of relations and to solving questions by competition in a peaceful atmosphere. . . . 220. Extreme views exist; there are people who say that the situation is so complex and difficult that there is no way out, that only the worst can be expected, that we are on the very threshold of war. That of course is an extreme view and is incorrect because there are a number of positive factors; the head-on struggle and existing equilibrium of forces is a guarantee that we can advance and not allow imperialism to realize its plans. 221. On the other hand there are some people who say that there have been all kinds of crises; this will pass, too. We are strong; we have the strength of the Soviet Union, the strength of the socialist countries; it will all pass of its own accord. It will not pass of its own accord; of course that, too, is nc ro rect. 222. Yes, without doubt we are capable of defending ourselves, of rebuffing the imperialist wave, but that depends on us, on the situation of our countries and in our countries, on the unity of our countries and their joint activity in the international arena. 223. Bovin (IZVESTIYA, 6 Aug 82) 224. In general it is hard to deal with the Americans now. They dissemble, twist and turn, say one thing and do another. They have many ambitions and a great deal of self-esteem. They have little responsibility. But what can you do? We do not choose our partners, they are given us by destiny, by history. We have to talk and negotiate with them although, to be frank, I do not believe that any serious agreement can be reached with the Americans as long as Reagan is in the White House. 225. Vladimir Ostrogorskiy, commentator (Moscow radio in German, 22 Aug 82) 226. If Reagan knew history better and made its lessons his own, he would not harbor any illusions, since there were people before him who, like Hitler, had a special liking for using the miraculous FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 Page: 85 of 92 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 29 weapon of inflammatory propaganda on the air. It is typical for aspirants to world domination to rely on miraculous weapons. It is, however, well known how they usually have ended. 227. Bovin (IZVESTIYA, 5 Nov 82) 228. Nov let us allow the skeptic to have his say. He is bound to ask: Are we not overestimating our own strength? Can international security and international cooperation seriously be expected when the world is divided into opposing sociopolitical systems? Is the "Reagan phenomenon" an accident? The questions are not farfetched. The difficulties are indeed huge. Militarism and aggressiveness are inherent in imperialism. We do not choose our partners; fate, history hands them to us. 229. All that is true. Nonetheless, the hope is realistic. The hope is realistic because the forces advocating that detente get a "second wind" represent a real, weighty factor in world politics. The Soviet Union is a mighty power. People across the Atlantic cannot help but take this into account--whatever team is assembled in the White House, it is still not a suicide team. The socialist community and the communist and workers' parties are with us. Dozens of nonaligned states advocate detente and disarmament and oppose the division of the world into military-political blocs. The antinuclear, antiwar movement is gaining unprecedented scope and its social and political spectrum is becoming ncrea ing . . - 230. I repeat, we would like to reach agreement, even with Reagan. What if this does not happen? We will wait. 231. Shishlin (Soviet domestic radio, 21 Nov 82) 232. Actions for the benefit of peace would carry a lot more weight than conciliatory words. If we were to see a real shift in the American position at the talks that are being held on strategic armaments, on European armaments, on conventional armaments in Central Europe--that would surely be more substantial than the words spoken by the American statesmen. So the situation remains pretty difficult. . . . 233. PRAVDA editorial (PRAVDA, 21 Nov 82) 234. Judging by international reactions, Andropov's meetings with foreign delegations gave new impetus to people's hopes for the maintenance and development of the detente process. The Soviet Union is always ready for honest, equal, and mutually advantageous cooperation with any state which wishes it, particularly with the United States. Normal, or better still, friendly Soviet-American relations would accord with the interests of both peoples and of FOUO UNCLASSIFIED 000175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 86 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 30 world peace. 235. Gennadiy Gerasimov, Novosti deputy chairman (Soviet television,. 28 Nov 82) 236. The events of the last weeks in Moscow, by the very nature of things, have caused a certain pause in international relations. The world has been watching Moscow to see what will happen and, in its turn, Moscow has been watching the world attentively, too. American Senator Robert Dole, a prominent figure in the Republican Party--Reagan's party--has been in Moscow during these days. He stated that he observes an advancement by the Reagan Administration toward a new beginning--that is how he expressed himself. Some observers have begun cautiously seeking signs of a thaw, even a weak one, in American-Soviet relations. 237. Arbatov, speech to U.S. trade delegation (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 8 Dec 82) 238. In the last few days many people's hopes regarding the prospects of Soviet-American relations have revived. The dramatic nature of the moment, when events are prompting reflection on the most serious problems perturbing people, may even have helped in a way. . . . 239. Something seems to be beginning to c a~iigor the Tietfer- - Something has happened and something positive too. I think it is a good thing that ASTEC has met. It seems to me that it is an important event and shows that many Americans (and Soviet people, too, of course) understand the fundamental interests of their countries and "gas for pipes" deal. We assessed positively the American leaders' expression of condolences on the death of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev and the fact that the U.S. President personally visited the Soviet Embassy and sent the U.S. vice president and secretary of state to Moscow. We have carefully followed the words spoken in this connection, and the positive [khoroshiye) words we have greeted positively. 240. But if I were asked if I could assess these facts as evidence of the abandonment by the United States of a policy that in our country--I must be frank with you--is seen as a policy of cold war and as a course of a headlong arms race and of unbounded--mortal, as the saying goes--enmity? [sentence as published) Or is what has happened in the last few days merely a maneuver aimed at reassuring the public at large and the allies so that they do not prevent this policy of total enmity from being pursued in the future? If I were asked those questions, I would honestly say that as yet I have no answer. FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 87 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 31 241. Bovin (Soviet television, 30 Dec 82) 242. It is difficult to escape the impression that the opponents of detente in Washington are gradually beginning to give ground. I would even risk making the following conclusion: The isolation of Reagan and his policy is growing both within the United States and outside it. Evidently, we can assume that this will force the White House to intensify its maneuvering. But at the moment it is difficult to say whether this will affect the essence of the foreign policy course or only its form, as has already been the case. 243. Commentators Aleksandr Korshunov and Oleg Blinov (Soviet domestic radio, 12 Jan 83) 244. At the end of his [latest radio] speech, Reagan stated the readiness of the United States--and I quote--to sit down at the conference table with the Russians to discuss practical measures capable of resolving the problems and leading to a more durable and genuine improvement of relations between East and Vest. If this is really so, then one can only welcome the U.S. President's utterances. The Soviet Union believes that the path toward mutual talks is open and that our two countries could make an important contribution to the cause of creating a climate of mutual trust, mutual understanding and cooperation in the world. 245. His Holiness Pimen, Patriarch of lfioscow--arid ~Yl Russia fTf1SE, Apr 83) 246. It is with bitterness and grief in my heart that I read your belligerent calls which sow the seeds of hatred and hostility against my motherland and threaten peace all over the world. These calls are the more sinful as they are wrapped in the attire of Christian morals. . . . 247. But you, Mr. President, teach war in your remarks; you teach war against my nation and my motherland. Can one really be faithful to the commandment thou shalt not kill and at the same time speak about the possibility of a limited nuclear war, about total nuclear war, first nuclear strike, victory in a nuclear war and other criminal and sinful conceptions? War, war, war. . . and where is the place for thou shalt not kill, Mr. President? 248. Valentin Zorin, Soviet television political observer (Moscow radio [in English] to North America, 3 Apr 83) 249. But the leaders in Washington are not only rude and tactless in their political styles, they also break another unwritten rule of statesmanship. It is unfortunate when the mass media juggles with facts but it is inexcusable when leaders in positions of utmost FOUO UNCLASSIFIED 000175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 88 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 32 responsibility resort to overt lies. There have been many instances when the current leaders in Washington have flagrantly distorted the truth and deliberately lied to the public. That was the case in the most recent statements made by President Reagan about Soviet policy. 250. Kobysh (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 6 Apr 83) 251. [In his] 1 April speech and in previous speeches, R. Reagan cast aside all Easter rhetoric and explained quite clearly and bluntly that the Administration that he heads, far from intending to renounce its military preparations on a monstrous scale and its hegemonist aggressive course, actually contemplates something still more sinister. Playing with words, he presented to the public in the guise of "ABM defense" the announcement that the United States is embarking on the implementation of a vast new, purely aggressive program of military preparations, mainly covering space. This announcement was further evidence that the present U.S. Government is not simply preparing for nuclear war, but has set a course toward unleashing such a war. 252. Valentin Falin, IZVESTIYA political observer (IZVESTIYA, 14 Aug 83) 253. And what does the U.S. leadership think now? It links the maintenance of peace between our states to the United States' acquisition of military superiority in addition to Lhe USSR renunciation of a socialist social system. In other words, the Soviet Union must learn to be at the United States' beck and call or it will only have itself to blame. It is perfectly obvious that this view has nothing in common with the "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the USSR and the United States" which the U.S. leader sealed with his signature in May 1972. . . . 254. True, for some time now representatives of the present administration have been going in for soft-pedaling. They have been transforming R. Reagan from a dashing mindless horseman into a soft-hearted "peace champion." A broad stream of misinformation is being broadcast in which they want to whitewash the U.S. stance at the talks on nuclear arms in Europe and on strategic arms limitation and reduction. 255. Arkadiy Sakhnin (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 5 Oct 83) 256. Under pressure from the peoples, imperialism seemed to accept the incipient detente. But it could not keep it up. What do you mean, detente?1 So much power! Must rule the world! 257. A familiar turn. We heard it from the madman [Hitler]. It was also heard by a smart master of ceremonies, an actor from the FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 Page: 89 of 92 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 33 "General Electric Theater" television program. He was advertising washing machines and detergents. He got it into his head: A career can be built round this tune. He selected the words to the tune and rehearsed the pose of sovereign. He uttered: "I will not end the ideological 'drama.'" Those who write with pain at the sound of the word "peace" liked the pose. They liked the words, too. They decided to give it a try and brought the actor in for a test. They hauled him off the theatrical and onto the political stage. On the small stage, to start with. The familiar tune sounded louder, the words more threatening. The test was successful. On to the big stage. 258. This is how the second plenipotentiary of imperialism to lay a claim to world domination appeared on earth in our days. He picked a team worthy of himself and settled into the White House. 259. Today the Second Pretender holds in his hands not a bomb but a nuclear missile. He is waving it about on land, on the water, under the water, and in the sky, and is carrying it into space. . Take the plugs out of your ears, Reagan. Time to think about God. That is what religious people would say. But we are realists: Think about Nuremberg. 260. Aleksandr Yakovlev, director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute (IZVESTIYA, 7 Oct 83) 261. There can be no doubt that the current U.S. President is exerting an extremely destructive influence on the international situation. His personal contribution to bringing the danger of war closer is great, and he bears the responsibility for the very rapid demolition of the structure of international cooperation built by the efforts of many countries on the platform of deepening and strengthening peace. But at the same time R. Reagan is also carrying out a social instruction. Reflecting the U.S. ruling oligarchy's present tasks, he has-been outstandingly assiduous in his post, as the whole world can see for itself. . . . 262. As THE LOS ANGELES TIMES notes, Reagan does not have an inquiring mind. Eyewitnesses invariably stress that he has more horses in his stables than books in his library. He believes in flying saucers, assiduously reads horoscopes, and believes in the actions of secret evil spirits. 263. A. Leontyev (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 Oct 83) 264. In an attempt to somehow justify their adopted course of war preparations, the new aspirants to world domination--in that sense too the heirs of the raving fuehrer--excel in slander against the Soviet Union and resort virtually to foul-mouthed abuse alternating FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 90 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 34 with hypocritical homilies about morality and human rights, with the White House incumbent himself setting the tone. 265. If we are to believe Reagan, America is ruled by "the most noble," "the most magnanimous," and "the most philanthropic" gentlemen. But there is no mention of the fact that each of these gentlemen possesses heaps of dollars in his bank account, acquired from the drudgery of modern-day slaves, taken from widows and orphans, and collected from the corpses of soldiers who have perished in the dirty wars and criminal adventures of the United States. 266. Commentator Oleg Kolesnikov (TASS report in English, 26 Oct 83) 267. The crude act of international terrorism elevated by Washington to the status of government policy is the assessment given by the world public of the occupation of Grenada by the U.S. Marines. The statements by President Reagan about the "peace-making" mission of the U.S. Marines sent by him to that tiny island in the Caribbean strike one as monstrous cynicism. . . . 268. Reagan's statements are mendacious from beginning to end, and even officials of the American Administration are forced to admit it. 269. Bovin (OTECHESTVEN FRONT, 1 Dec 84) 270. When the Americans agreed to detente and when they held constructive talks with us, this was an attempt to adapt their policy to the changes in life and in the world that had emerged. Now the reverse process is occurring--Reagan is trying to adapt the whole world to the interests of the United States as he understands them. Such an approach, however, again undermines the realistic basis for any constructive agreements. Evidence of this is the failure of the Geneva talks. 271. The dominance of a conservative, reactionary, and archaic ideology in the United States, an ideology which is being transformed to politics, is the main obstacle for regulating disputed problems. I think that Reagan cannot change himself. Romain Rolland has actually said that one can begin to understand something of life only when one comes upon its sharp corners. Reagan has already come upon such sharp corners but having in mind the way he understands life, I have not noticed that he has changed himself. Since Reagan will probably stay in the White House for another four years, it is my belief that for that period of time we will not succeed in reaching an agreement on anything meaningful. We will, of course, conduct negotiations, we will try to sign agreements and we will probably even succeed somewhere on the political fringes. However, I think that concerning the main and basic issues we will have to face a game of nerves, confrontation, and conflicts for another four years. This FOUO UNCLASSIFIED 000175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 91 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 35 is not a very optimistic prospect. I would very much like to be wrong but I can draw no other conclusion at present. 272. Fedor Burlatskiy, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA political observer and CPSU Central Committee official (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 4 Jan 84) 273. It is impossible to deny that a serious turnabout occurred in U.S. geopolitics on the threshold of the eighties, or that the United States has completely rejected the very idea of detente and has embarked on the path of global confrontation with the Soviet Union. . . . 274. It is well known that this shift is basically linked with the arrival of President Reagan in the White House, a man with extremely reactionary views representing the interests of the "iron triangle"--the military business, the Pentagon, and the militarist wing in the U.S. Congress. . . . 275. [Whether the present militarist course in the United States is irreversible] is a very complicated question. Much depends on whether R. Reagan manages to win the forthcoming U.S. election in the fall of 1984. Much also depends on the correlation of forces within the framework of the U.S. economic and political elite and on public opinion in that country. 276. R. Reagan is hastening to consolidate the basic foundations of militarism for the future. He is inflating the military budget and planning programs for new types of weapons. Nonetheless, political forces in the United States and the U.S. people still have not had their final say. I am convinced that ordinary people in the United States fear thermonuclear war no less than other people in the world. 277. TASS report on President Reagan's State of the Union Address (TASS, 26 Jan 84) 278. President Ronald Reagan made a traditional "State of the Union" address to a joint meeting of the two houses of Congress. His statement, made in a spirit of electioneering, was an attempt to picture in a favorable light the results of his three-year rule and justify his policy, marked by extreme aggressiveness in the international field and total disregard for the needs of the common people in the home policy field. 279. The foreign policy section of the President's State of the Union address was notable for demagogy and hypocrisy. The President was trying to justify his militaristic policy by claiming that "the United States is safer . . . and more secure in 1984 than before", albeit, in real fact, the threat to general security, including to the security of the United States itself, has increased. And the FOUO UNCLASSIFIED C00175645 UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Page: 92 of 92 Document 2 of 2 AGAL Concatenated Database Page 36 leaders of the United States bear all responsibility for such a turn of events. 280. Commentator Yuriy Kornilov (TASS, 30 Jan 84) 281. The U.S. Administration speaks a great deal about "the need of a dialogue." Yet, it deadlocks, disrupts and blocks all the talks on the problems of curbing the arms race. . . . 282. Our hands are clean, and we have never been aggressors, U.S. President R. Reagan pointed out recently at the Congress in the State of the Union message. This is an obvious lie. In the past 6 years alone the U.S. Administration resorted to armed actions or the threat of force against other states 38 times, . . . 283. The thing is that from whatever point of view we assess the situation, it is more than obvious: The allegedly "peace-making" tricks of Reagan and his team, brought about by the purely time-serving considerations, have nothing to do with the real foreign policy pursued by Washington, which is based today, the same as before, on the desire to make history reverse its course, to reshape the political map of the world. FOUO UNCLASSIFIED