WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO

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• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2010
• Case Number: F-2010-00390
• Publication Date: January 31, 1979

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume I=Summary Estimate
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RELEASE^ DATE:
16-Aug-2010
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 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State
and Defense, and the National Security Agency.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Top cret
 NIE 11-14-79
WARSAW PACT FORCES
OPPOSITE NATO
Volume I-Summary Estimate
 PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY
 PREFACE
This National Intelligence Estimate was prepared primarily to
satisfy the need expressed by US policymakers and planners for a
reference document that would record current estimates of Warsaw
Pact forces and intelligence judgments about the way these forces would
be employed in a war with NATO. It is intended to provide a baseline
for any further studies comparing NATO and Pact forces.
This NIE is the first comprehensive estimate of Warsaw Pact forces
opposite NATO since 1971. It is the first to attempt an analysis of Pact
campaign plans for the European theaters of military operations and
the first to integrate naval forces into these campaigns. It deals
primarily with conventional forces and operations; it describes nuclear
forces but provides only limited treatment of theater nuclear operations.
The NIE is in two volumes. This volume is a summary of the
Estimate. Volume II presents a detailed discussion of Pact doctrine,
theater forces, and operational concepts for war in Europe. It also
describes the main developments and trends in Pact theater forces and
discusses those issues which bear most directly on the capabilities of
Pact forces to perform their missions.
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 PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY
 CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE ................................................................................................. iii
SCOPE NOTE .......................................................................................................... vii
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................. 1
ISSUES ........................................................................................................................ 14
PART A. WARSAW PACT POLICY AND DOCTRINE FOR THEATER
WARFARE .......................................................................................................... 20
General Considerations .......................................................................................... 20
Military Policy ...................................................................................................... 20
Chemical Warfare ................................................................................................ 23
Biological Warfare ................................................................................................ 24
Electronic Warfare .............................................................................................. 24
PART B. TRENDS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES .................. 25
Ground Forces ...................................................................................................... 25
Airborne Forces ................................................................................................ 27
Equipment .......................................................................................................... 29
Air Forces .............................................................................................................. 30
Tactical Air Forces .......................................................................................... 30
Helicopter Forces .............................................................................................. 35
Military Transport Aviation ............................................................................ 35
NSWP National Air Defense Forces ............................................................ 35
General Purpose Naval Forces .......................................................................... 36
Major Wartime Tasks ...................................................................................... 36
Theater Nuclear Forces ...................................................................................... 41
Tactical Nuclear Forces .................................................................................. 44
Soviet Peripheral Strike Forces .................................................................... 47
Forces for Chemical Warfare ............................................................................ 47
Forces for Electronic Warfare .......................................................................... 47
Warsaw Pact Logistics .......................................................................................... 48
PART C. WARSAW PACT STRATEGY FOR INITIAL CONVENTIONAL
OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO .................................................................. 49
Warsaw Pact Command and Control .............................................................. 49
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 Page
The Initial Campaign in the Western Theater of Military Operations .. 54
The Ground Offensive .................................................................................... 54
The Air Offensive in Central Europe ........................................................ 57
Naval Operations in the Baltic ...................................................................... 60
Initial Campaigns Against NATO's Flanks .................................................... 63
The Southwestern Theater of Military Operations .................................. 63
The Northwestern Theater of Military Operations .................................. 68
Naval Operations in the North Atlantic .......................................................... 70
Potential Effectiveness .................................................................................... 72
PART D. THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ............................................ 75
Tactical Nuclear Operations .............................................................................. 75
Nuclear Strikes Against NATO by Soviet Strategic Forces ........................ 76
Factors Affecting Future Forces ...................................................................... 78
Soviet Perceptions of NATO's Military Capabilities ................................ 78
Soviet Leadership .............................................................................................. 78
Economic Considerations ................................................................................ 78
Demographic Factors ...................................................................................... 78
.......................................................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Technology 79
Sino-Soviet Relations .......................................................................................... 79
Implications for Future Pact Theater Forces ................................................ 79
Ground Forces .................................................................................................. 79
Air Forces .......................................................................................................... 81
General Purpose Naval Forces ...................................................................... 82
Theater Nuclear Forces .................................................................................. 84
Support Systems and Forces .......................................................................... 85
o
 SCOPE NOTE
National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79 is concerned with Warsaw
Pact forces that are available for use against NATO.* It assesses the
present and future capabilities of these forces for conventional,
chemical, and theater nuclear warfare. It generally covers a period of
five years in its future considerations but extends to 10 years where the
information allows..The Estimate does not provide detailed treatment
of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border, the Soviet Pacific Fleet, or
other forces in the Soviet Far East. Soviet military operations in distant
areas during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war are considered in an annex to
volume II.
The Estimate treats the following elements of the Pact's military
forces:
- Ground Forces. The ground forces (including airborne and
heliborne forces) of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and their organic air
defense and tactical nuclear systems.
- Air and Air Defense Forces. Soviet Frontal (tactical) Aviation,
Military Transport Aviation, and the bombers of Soviet Long
Range Aviation, as well as the tactical air and national air
defense forces (including ground-based systems) of the non-
Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries.
- Naval Forces. The general purpose submarines, surface ships,
aircraft, auxiliaries, and amphibious forces of the three western
Soviet fleets and the NSWP navies.
- Soviet Ballistic Missile Forces for Peripheral Attack. Those
Soviet land-based (MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs) and submarine-
launched (SLBMs) ballistic missiles which are available for use
against NATO in the European theater.
*For the purpose of this Estimate, Pact general purpose ground and air forces available for early use
against NATO include those located in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) nations and in the USSR's
Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus Military
Districts. Forces in the Moscow, Volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO
or elsewhere. Also included in this Estimate are Pact general purpose naval forces in the three western
Soviet fleets, including the Mediterranean Squadron, and the NSWP navies, as well as Soviet strategic forces
which could be employed against European targets in a peripheral attack role.
Vii
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 Too
- Support Functions. Those activities and organizations which
support and integrate Pact forces, such as command, control, and
communications systems and logistic services.
Other recently completed National Intelligence Estimates and
Interagency Intelligence Memorandums contain comprehensive assess-
ments of some issues that are given summary treatment in this
document.
- NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global
Power Arena, describes the broad strategic and political
considerations which shape the Soviet defense posture.
- NIE 4-1-78, Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going
to War in Europe: Implications for NATO Warning of War,
assesses Pact attack options in Central Europe and the
intelligence basis for our estimate of NATO's warning time
there.
- NIE 11-3/8-78, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear
Conflict Through the Late 1980s, and NIE 11-6-78, Soviet
Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack, contain detailed
estimates of Soviet strategic forces available for use against
NATO.
- NIE 11-10-79, Soviet Military Capabilities To Project Power
and Influence in Distant Areas.
- NI IIM 78-10018J, Indications and Warning of Soviet
Intentions To Use Chemical Weapons During a NATO-
Warsaw Pact War.
Viii
1?P ~L
 KEY JUDGMENTS
Warsaw Pact Policy and Doctrine for Theater Warfare
1. It is Soviet policy to acquire and maintain forces capable of
successfully fighting either a conventional or nuclear war in Europe and
to keep a clear numerical advantage over NATO in important military
assets. Soviet leaders stress the need for large, combat-ready forces to be
in place at the outset of hostilities. They intend any future European
conflict to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory. (I, 1-2) 1
2. The Soviet Union views control of its East European allies as vital
to its national interests. The East European members of the Pact
provide sizable forces and a territorial buffer between NATO and the
Soviet Union. (See figure 1.) The presence or proximity of large,
well-equipped Soviet forces gives the Soviets considerable leverage in
exerting control over these countries, thus safeguarding the integrity of
the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets also value their military strength as a
means of influencing European domestic and foreign policy decisions
and deterring political or military developments which might alter the
balance of power to their disadvantage. They do not, however, measure
the military balance in Europe in isolation from the larger, global
balance and, accordingly, are inclined to be very cautious in the use of
military force in Europe. (I, 2-3)
3. Our analysis of Soviet nuclear policy and doctrine has led us to
the following judgments:
- The Soviets believe that the initial stages of a conflict probably
would be conventional, and they would prefer that a NATO-
Pact conflict remain nonnuclear, but they expect that it would
eventually involve the use of nuclear weapons. (I, 10)
- There is evidence that the Soviets now have a more flexible
policy for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, but they
apparently have not sought to match NATO's capacity for
accurate and selective use of very low yield nuclear weapons,
and they remain profoundly skeptical of the possiblity of
controlling escalation. (I, 12)
' References are to chapters (Roman numbers) and paragraphs (Arabic numbers) in volume II of the
Estimate.
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 - We cannot predict how the Soviets would respond to a limited
and selective NATO use of nuclear weapons or the conditions
under which the Soviets might initiate nuclear operations in a
NATO-Pact war. (I, 13-14)
- Preemption continues to be a feature of Soviet nuclear doctrine.
(I, 15)
- Improvements in the USSR's forward-based nuclear forces would
permit the Soviets to fight a tactical nuclear war at relatively
high levels of intensity without having to use USSR-based
systems. Nonetheless, the Soviets' continued modernization of
USSR-based peripheral strike systems and the constant participa-
tion of these systems in exercise scenarios argues that they still
expect to have to resort to the use of these weapons at some stage
of theater nuclear war. (I, 16)
4. The Soviets are clearly planning against the contingency that
chemical weapons might be used in a war between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. They have a continuing, vigorous program to equip and
train Pact forces for operations in a toxic environment and have
produced a variety of chemical agents and delivery systems. We are
divided, however, on the question of Soviet policy for the first use of
chemical weapons. Some believe 2 that it is unlikely that the Warsaw
Pact would initiate offensive chemical warfare before the advent of
nuclear war, but that the Pact's first use under these circumstances
cannot be entirely excluded. Others believe 3 there is a strong possibility
that the Soviets would initiate chemical warfare in a conventional
conflict. Chapter I of volume II contains the rationale underlying these
views. (I, 18-29)
Trends in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces
5. The past decade was marked by vigorous modernization of
Soviet theater forces facing NATO. This modernization was accompa-
nied by some increase in the manpower of the forces-especially in the
late 1960s and early 1970s-as the number of weapons in units was
increased and as support requirements grew to accommodate more,
increasingly sophisticated hardware. Modernization of the Soviet
theater forces is evidently continuing at much the same pace, along with
modest, commensurate growth in manpower. The non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact (NSWP) forces have shared in the Soviet buildup, although at a
2 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State.
'The holders of this view are the Director, Defense' Intelligence Agency; the Director, National
Security Agency; and the Senior Intelligence Officers of each of the military services.
3
TCS - Tjr5e
 slower pace and with uneven results, especially in the more expensive
tactical air and missile forces and in ground force armor replacement
programs. (VI, 1)
6. Motivated by the prospect of a nonnuclear phase of hostilities
and their recognition of a need for strong conventional forces even in
the event of nuclear war, the Soviets have especially sought to improve
their conventional force capabilities. Since the late 1960s they have
significantly increased manpower, tanks, artillery, armed helicopters,
and air defense. They have been equipping their tactical air forces with
aircraft having increased performance and load-carrying capacity.
During this period the flexibility and conventional war potential of
Soviet naval forces also have been improved by the acquisition of more
capable ships, submarines, and aircraft. (I, 37)
7. At the same time, the Soviets have continued to increase the size
of their theater nuclear forces and improve their flexibility. Since the
early 1970s they have introduced nuclear-capable artillery systems,
increased their surface-to-surface tactical missile launchers in Central
Europe, assigned nuclear missions to additional tactical aviation units,
and are deploying a new-generation intermediate-range ballistic missile
and a new bomber. The Soviet Navy has also added systems which
improve its capability to wage theater nuclear war. (I, 39)
8. Pact theater forces have emerged from a decade of change with
their fundamental orientation on the tank intact, but with a more
balanced structure for conventional war and with both conventional
and nuclear firepower greatly increased. These changes, along with an
infusion of more modern technology, have made Soviet theater forces
competitive with leading Western armies in sophistication of organiza-
tion and equipment. (I, 43)
9. Our analysis of these developments permits the following
additional conclusions:
- The Soviets are aware of the improved technology and growing
numbers of NATO antitank weapons, but this awareness has not
led to any diminution of their tank forces or any major change in
the way they see these forces performing. Indeed, they have
made even further increases to their tank strength and have
begun producing new tank models. (II, 7)
- The Soviets are pursuing a vigorous program to increase the
effectiveness of their air munitions to-exploit the enhanced
capabilities of their newer aircraft. The role of Frontal Aviation
for delivering tactical nuclear weapons clearly is expanding. (II,
89 and 158)
4
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 - The Soviet Navy in the past decade has significantly improved
its capability to participate in a Pact-NATO war and now can
undertake combat operations at greater distances from home
waters. The introduction of new classes of submarines, Backfire
bombers, and new missile systems has especially improved the
Soviet Navy's strike capability against NATO surface forces. (II,
100)
- Since the late 1960s the Pact has adopted a unified command
and control doctrine and has begun to modernize its command
and control procedures and equipment. ((I, 41)
- Pact ground force logistic capacity has also been improved,
notably by large additions to motor transport and the
development of improved support organizations and equipment.
(I, 42)
10. We have also identified the following significant weaknesses
which could adversely affect the performance of Pact theater forces :4
- Pact tactical air pilots are not as effectively trained-by US
standards-as they should be to exploit fully the capabilities of
the airframes and weapon systems of the third-generation
aircraft currently in operation. (II, 69)
- Lack of automated equipment, or other means for timely and
accurate location and reporting of mobile or semimobile targets,
is believed to be a current weakness of Soviet aerial reconnais-
sance. (II, 86)
- The USSR's antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities on the
whole are such that its forces in most wartime situations would
probably be unable to detect the presence of US and most other
NATO submarines before attacks on Soviet surface ships. Crucial
shortcomings are lack of long-range submarine detection devices,
high radiated noise levels of Soviet submarines relative to those
of the West, and lack of seaborne tactical air cover to protect
deployed surface ship ASW forces. (II, 128)
Warsaw Pact Strategy for Initial Conventional Operations
Against NATO
11. The USSR has developed contingency plans for military
operations on all Pact land frontiers. The Soviets clearly expect Central
Europe to be the decisive arena in a war with NATO and assign it the
' Additional weaknesses which some agencies have identified can be found in the "Issues" section on
pages 14-19 and in the discussions of those issues in the body of the Estimate.
Top
 highest priority in the allocation of military manpower and equipment.
The Soviets also have plans for offensive action in other NATO regions,
but we have little direct evidence on the Pact's view of the timing of
these flank offensives in relation to an offensive in Central Europe. We
judge, however, that the Pact would be unlikely to start a war by
mounting major ground offensives against all NATO sectors simulta-
neously. To do so would unnecessarily extend available Pact forces,
airlift, and air and logistic support and would complicate command and
control at the General Staff and Supreme High Command levels.
Moreover, there would be political considerations that would lead the
Soviets to defer attacks on some NATO countries in the hope of
encouraging their nonbelligerence. (IV, 2-4)
12. We believe that the need for unfettered naval operations from
their Northern Fleet bases would almost certainly cause the Soviets to
strike NATO facilities in northern Norway, and probably to attempt to
occupy some territory there, and that the urgency of this need would
lead them to do so concurrently with starting an attack in Central
Europe. We would also expect concurrent attacks on US naval forces in
the Mediterranean. None of the other potential flank offensives appear
to have that degree of urgency, although the Pact would be likely to
move against the Turkish Straits early in a war. (IV, 5)
13. The Warsaw Pact's success in achieving its wartime objectives
would depend on its ability to control and coordinate multinational,
joint-service operations of great complexity. We have never seen the
Pact's command and control system exercised in its entirety, but our
assessment of the system's strengths and weaknesses leads us to judge
that it is adequate to alert forces and control mobilization, and to
control combat operations. This assessment is discussed in detail in
chapter III of volume II. (III, 1-31)
14. The ultimate authority for the direction of the Soviet military
rests with the Politburo and the Soviet General Staff, but we believe
that should a war occur between the Warsaw Pact and NATO,
theater-level commands would be established and exercise direct
operational control over fronts and fleets and at least some degree of
control over those strategic assets allocated to support theater
operations. Unlike NATO, the -Warsaw Pact does not have theater
headquarters in being in peacetime, although hardened command posts
have been constructed for at least some Pact wartime headquarters. (III,
4-6)
15. Arrangements for exercising control of Pact forces within what
the Soviets call the Western (or European) Theater of War have been
evolving over the last few years. We now have evidence that indicates
6
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 Top ecre
the commander in chief of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw
Pact would control all Pact forces in this theater in wartime. The Soviets
plan to divide the Western Theater of War into three land Theaters of
Military Operations (TVDs) in which they expect Pact and NATO
forces to come in conflict. These would include a Northwestern TVD
(the Leningrad Military District and the Scandinavian Peninsula); a
Western TVD (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the western
USSR in the east and West Germany, the Benelux countries, Denmark,
and possibly France in the west); and a Southwestern TVD (Greece,
Turkey, and probably northern Italy and Austria). An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
(G-I-UK) gap probably would be designated a Maritime TVD, and
would include the Northern Fleet. The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control of the
Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-often called High
Commands by the Soviets. The senior field command would be the
front, an organization which is similar to a NATO army group in size,
level of command, and function and which consists of three to five
ground armies and an air army of 600 aircraft. (III, 7-10)
16. Our consideration of likely Pact operations in the Western TVD
during the initial phase of a conventional war has resulted in the
following key findings:
- Soviet military strategy calls for a massive and rapid ground
offensive into NATO territory in Central Europe to defeat
NATO forces, disrupt mobilization, and seize or destroy ports
and airfields to prevent reinforcement. (IV, 7)
- Except in extraordinarily urgent circumstances, the Pact would
prefer to prepare at least a three-front force before initiating
hostilities in Central Europe. We believe the Pact would begin to
organize at least five fronts for use in Central Europe from the
time of the decision to go to full readiness. There is virtually no
chance the Soviets would attack from a standing start.5 (IV, 10-
22)
- Pact planners regard early attainment of air superiority and
destruction of much of NATO's tactical nuclear forces to be
critical to the Pact's chances for victory in the theater. The Pact
plans to achieve these objectives by conducting a large-scale,
theaterwide conventional air offensive during the first several
days of hostilities. (IV, 43-85)
' NIE 4-1-78, Warsaw Pact Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications for NATO Warning
of War, provides the detailed rationale for these conclusions.
7
TCS - o~j Se~
 - The broad objectives of Pact naval operations in the Baltic would
be to gain complete control of the Baltic Sea and access to the
North Sea to sever NATO's lines of communication in the North
Sea, and deprive NATO of potential launch areas for carrier
strikes against Pact air and ground forces in the Central Region.
Failure to obtain air superiority and sea control probably would
force the Pact to reconsider its planned amphibious operations in
the western Baltic. (IV, 86-111)
17. As for operations in the Southwestern TVD, our conclusions are
as follows:
- The Pact would confine its initial ground operations to the
Turkish Straits area, Austria, and possibly eastern Turkey. In
addition, at the onset of a war, air and naval attacks would
almost certainly be mounted against NATO forces in these areas
and in the Mediterranean. (IV, 116-125)
- The Pact views early seizure of the Turkish Straits as crucial to
the success of its maritime strategy in the Southwestern TVD.
(IV, 113)
- While the Soviets might launch a limited offensive into eastern
Turkey, we have no evidence that they would undertake
operations against Iran during an initial phase. (IV, 123)
- Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean would begin at the
start of a war and would be aimed primarily at the destruction of
Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and aircraft
carriers. (IV, 131)
- While the most immediate threat would come from Soviet ships
and submarines already deployed in the Mediterranean,
numerically the most sizable threat to NATO's naval forces there
would come from missile-equipped Soviet strike aircraft, despite
the fact that they would be operating without fighter escort. (IV,
135)
18. We have good evidence that as part of the offensive by the
Pact's Maritime Front, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet would attempt to
secure control of the Black Sea, support the movement of Pact ground
forces along the western littoral, and assist in seizing the Turkish Straits.
To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force, the Soviets probably would retain in the Black Sea at
least some of their available larger combatants equipped for ASW and
with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)-such as Moskvas, Karas, Kashins,
and Krivaks. There is disagreement in the Intelligence Community on
the numbers of large surface combatants which would be retained in
8
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 the Black Sea rather than deployed to the Mediterranean before the
outbreak of hostilities. (IV, 126 and 142-144)
19. In the Northwestern TVD our information indicates that:
- Initial Soviet objectives in the Northwestern TVD center on
ensuring freedom of action and uninhibited access to the open
ocean for Soviet naval ships and aircraft and on maintaining the
forward defense of the extensive complex of naval bases and
strategic installations located on the Kola Peninsula. (IV, 145)
- Initial operations by Soviet land forces probably would be
limited to northern Norway. We have no evidence indicating
that the Soviets plan for a general offensive against Finland or
Sweden early in a war. (IV, 150-153)
- Soviet amphibious ships carrying up to a regiment of Soviet
naval infantry probably would attempt to seize limited objectives
along the northern Norwegian coast. Initial amphibious oper-
ations probably would be confined to the coast of Finnmark,
under conditions suitable for an early linkup with the ground
forces. (IV, 148)
- The Soviets probably would not attempt a large-scale airborne
assault in northern Norway, because the demands for air
transport elsewhere against NATO probably would preclude
early use of a formation as large as a complete airborne division.
(IV, 154)
20. Soviet strategy in the North Atlantic calls for the early
establishment of control of the Norwegian and Barents Seas and their
approaches. Implementation of such a strategy probably would involve
most of the Northern Fleet's submarines and virtually all of the surface
forces and aircraft in an effort to exclude NATO forces from the area.
The Soviets probably also plan some submarine operations farther into
the North Atlantic to prevent transit of NATO carriers and amphibious
task groups and to divert NATO naval strength. The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea before they could launch their missiles. To this end they
probably would initiate submarine and air operations against NATO
naval forces as they exit their bases in Europe and possibly against
SSBNs from US bases as well. In addition, at least some submarines
would attack shipping engaged in resupply and reinforcement of
Europe early in a war. There is disagreement in the Intelligence
Community over the extent to which the Soviets would wage an
interdiction campaign and over their capabilities for doing so. (IV,
157-200, and II, 142-149)
9
TC ~ I o
 Theater Nuclear Operations
21. The primary objective in Soviet tactical nuclear planning
appears to be the destruction of military targets, particularly NATO's
means for waging nuclear war. Limiting collateral damage does not
appear to be a main concern because the numbers of weapons
incorporated in Soviet nuclear strike plans have increased over time and
the yields of these weapons, particularly for tactical missiles, have
increased significantly. (V, 5)
Prospects for Warsaw Pact Theater Forces
22. In this Estimate we do not provide a detailed analysis of the
factors that motivate the Soviets' military policy toward Europe and the
development of their theater forces. These factors are discussed in detail
in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power
Arena. We proceed from the premise that the developments we
currently observe in Warsaw Pact theater forces opposite NATO
represent the sorts of activities necessary to maintain and gradually
improve the capabilities of these large standing forces. They are the
activities necessary to replace obsolete or wornout equipment and to
incorporate new weapons and tactics which flow from a vigorous Soviet
research and development program. They portend no large, short-term
change in the general size or character of these forces. (VI, 2)
23. Although we believe this to be a valid premise, we have
examined a number of factors which conceivably could alter it:
- Nothing in NATO's current or foreseeable defense programs is
likely to precipitate any major change in the level of Pact efforts.
Over the longer term, however, a large-scale deployment by
NATO of a new theater nuclear delivery system (such as a
ground-launched cruise missile) could cause an upswing in Pact
efforts, especially in air defense. (VI, 4)
- New Soviet leaders will undoubtedly emerge from the ranks of
the present group, which is responsible for creating current Pact
forces and is committed to maintaining Soviet military strength
in Europe. The new leaders will likely seek to avoid moves that
would antagonize large segments of the military. (VI, 5)
- Despite the decline in Soviet economic growth and the economic
difficulties of such NSWP countries as Poland and Czechoslova-
kia, we find no evidence that suggests the Soviets will cut back
resources for theater forces. Indeed, we have reliable evidence
that some NSWP countries plan modest increases in defense
spending. (VI, 7)
 Ton
- During the next decade the number of young people reaching
draft age each year will decline in most Pact countries, a trend
that will complicate the allocation of manpower between the
armed forces and industry, but this manpower squeeze is not
expected to produce any decline in military personnel strength.
(VI, 8-10)
- Despite continuing scientific advances we foresee no technologi-
cal breakthrough that could lead to a major change in either the
size or character of the Pact theater forces. (VI, 11)
24. Although the expansion in manpower which characterized Pact
theater forces during the mid-1960s and early 1970s has slowed, we
expect some gradual increase in manpower in Pact ground and air
combat units opposite NATO over the next decade as ongoing programs
are implemented. The overall number of ground and air combat units
opposite NATO is expected to remain at or near its current level, while
a modest decline is anticipated in the number of general purpose naval
ships and submarines. (VI, 14)
25. Warsaw Pact nations will continue to improve the weapons and
equipment in their theater forces opposite NATO. Major weapon
production and deployment programs which are clearly in midstream
are expected to continue. In addition, the Soviets will no doubt seek to
develop some entirely new weapons and support systems. Certain of
these systems, such as laser or television-guided munitions, are already
in testing. Still other Pact weapons-such as enhanced radiation
weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may emerge in reaction to
NATO weapons programs or force improvements. (VI, 15)
26. Ground Forces. Barring an agreement on mutual and
balanced force reductions (MBFR), the number and disposition of Pact
ground force divisions opposite NATO are likely to remain stable
during the period of this Estimate, although expanded divisional
organizations and the formation of new nondivisional units probably
will account for moderate increases in manpower and equipment. We
foresee no development over the next several years which would
appreciably alter the basic Pact strategy of an armor-heavy offensive
against NATO in Central Europe. Despite NATO's substantial and
growing capability for antitank warfare, Pact planners will continue to
regard the tank as the backbone of their ground assault forces. (VI, 17)
27. Tactical Air Forces. We believe that the number of fixed-wing
aircraft in Soviet Frontal Aviation opposite NATO will remain
essentially unchanged over the next decade. Efforts to improve the
quality of Soviet tactical aircraft and munitions are likely to continue,
although the rate of new aircraft deployment is expected to slow as the
 Soviets meet their current force objectives. Furthermore, we expect the
Soviets to continue improving their support and subsidiary systems such
as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais-
sance data link systems. We expect in the next decade that several
additional Soviet and NSWP combat helicopter regiments, primarily for
ground attack, will be formed. No major changes are expected in the
number of fixed-wing aircraft in the NSWP air forces. NSWP
equipment modernization will continue to proceed gradually and be
driven largely by economic considerations. (VI, 34)
28. General Purpose Naval Forces. During the next decade,
developments in the Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved
capabilities to perform its peacetime and wartime missions. The Soviets
will have mixed success with programs to correct shortcomings in
submarine detection, fleet air defense, logistic support, and communica-
tions. Developments over the past decade have been so rapid that a
period of time may be required to integrate and consolidate advances
and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a
modest decline in the overall number of Soviet general purpose naval
ships and submarines but newer and more capable units will be
replacing older and less effective ones. (VI, 55)
29. Theater Nuclear Forces. Over the next decade the Soviets will
continue their ongoing programs to improve their peripheral strategic
strike forces and to eliminate the imbalance in battlefield nuclear
capabilities they perceive in the European theater. Force improvement
carried out to date and ongoing deployment of new systems are
increasing the flexibility with which the Soviets can employ their
theater nuclear forces. The introduction of nuclear-capable artillery will
provide low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems with
sufficient accuracy to permit employment in close proximity to Pact
forces. (VI, 90)
30. Command, Control, and Communications. We estimate that
about one week currently would be required before the Pact's wartime
communications links could be established to theater-level headquarters
and to supporting strategic commands. Communications, between
Moscow and the fronts and within the fronts, to control combat
operations by divisions and armies could be effectively established
within a few days. However, the Pact has two programs under way-
the creation of a centralized command structure and the establishment
of a unified communications system-which, during the period of this
Estimate, could shorten the time required by the Pact to get its
command and control system prepared for war. The two programs are
intended to establish in peacetime the theater-level (High Command)
op S~re.~
 resources needed to control Pact forces once they are released from
national control. We estimate that the centralized command structure
could be complete by the early 1980s. The unified communications
system could begin to improve the Pact's command capabilities by the
mid-1980s, but it is not scheduled for completion until 1990. (VI, 101)
 ISSUES
During the preparation of this Estimate disagreements among NFIB
agencies arose on a number of issues-some key, most secondary-gists
of which are contained in this section. Parenthetical references at the
end of each gist are to chapters (Roman numbers) and paragraphs
(Arabic numbers) in volume II of the Estimate.
a. Likelihood of Soviet Initiation of Chemical Warfare in a
Conventional War. All agencies are agreed that, once widespread
nuclear war began, the Warsaw Pact would not be constrained in its use
of chemical weapons. With respect to the question of Soviet policy on
the first use of chemical weapons before the advent of nuclear war,
there are two views. CIA and State judge that it is unlikely the Pact
would initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely
excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force believe that there is a
strong possibility of such use. (I, 24-29)
b. Number of Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRDs) That
Have an Independent Tank Battalion (ITB). NSA, Army, and Air
Force believe that all MRDs in Eastern Europe have an ITB.
Army and Air
Force further believe that an ITB with an MRD would be standard in
wartime. DIA and CIA estimate that two-thirds of the Soviet MRDs in
Eastern Europe have ITBs but that few, if any, in the western USSR do.
c. Success of Soviet Career Noncommissioned Personnel Pro-
grams. All agencies agree that the Soviets are seeking to induce
conscripts to serve as career noncommissioned personnel upon
completion of their mandatory service. CIA, NSA, and State conclude
that the Soviets have had little success because of the harsh conditions of
military service. DIA, Army, and Air Force believe that there is
insufficient evidence to support conclusions about the planned scope of
the Soviets' recruiting programs or their success in implementing them.
They also believe that, with a combination of incentives on the one
hand and pressure from the political organization on the other, the
Soviets should be able to overcome any difficulties in recruiting career
enlisted personnel. (II, 44-45)
14
'l CS 2 Top
 d. Amount of Combat-Related Training in Soviet Air Units
Stationed in East Germany.
The exact nature of much of this
activity is unclear. Flights which can be definitely categorized as
combat training amount to about 25 percent of the total. CIA believes
that no other training is combat related. DIA, NSA, and Air Force
believe that some of the other training activity may involve combat
training and that combat training in the Soviet air units thus should not
be viewed as being only 25 percent of flight activity. (II, 70)
e. Soviet Capability To Activate Reserve Submarines. CIA
estimates that no reserve submarines with their crews could be brought
to combat readiness in less than 90 days. DIA and Navy estimate that six
to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status in 30
days and a total of 25 to 30 submarines in 90 days. (II, 106)
f. Soviet Long-Range Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
Capability. CIA and NSA estimate that the TU-142 Bear-F aircraft has
an operational radius of about 2,050 nautical miles with three hours of
on-station time and about 2,500 nm with no on-station time. DIA, Navy,
and Air Force hold that. the maximum radius with three hours of
on-station time is 3,150 nm. (II, 131-132)
g. Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC).
CIA, NSA, and State judge that the Soviets would not likely attempt a
serious SLOG interdiction campaign unless they had previously
defeated NATO carrier and amphibious forces without losing their
submarines. NSA further believes that the extent and degree of an anti-
SLOC campaign is largely scenario dependent and that in a prolonged
crisis, where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOG
interdiction in advance of a conflict goes up. DIA and Navy conclude
that the Soviets consider SLOG interdiction of such significance, and
their submarine inventory of sufficient size, as to warrant use of
substantial numbers of attack submarines in this effort while
accomplishing their other missions. (II, 142-146)
h. Soviet Capabilities To Execute a SLOC Interdiction Cam-
paign. CIA and State estimate that the USSR's ability to attack
merchant ships in the open ocean would be significantly constrained by
submarine torpedo loads, lack of replenishment opportunities, turn-
around time, long transits, combat attrition, and limited target
information. DIA and Navy judge that these limitations are sensitive to
the timing, manner, and level at which hostilities begin, but in any
event are not sufficient to prevent the Soviets from mounting a
significant SLOG threat. (II, 147)
 i. Torpedo Capacities of Soviet Attack Submarines. In support of
its position that Soviet SLOG interdiction capabilities are constrained by
submarine torpedo capacities, CIA has produced a table (table 11-9)
which assumes that all submarines carry torpedoes 53 centimeters in
diameter (7.8 meters long). DIA believes that two 40-cm torpedoes (4.5
m long) probably could be substituted for each of up to six of the longer
torpedos in most classes, thereby substantially increasing wartime
torpedo loads. (II, 147)
j. Role of the Backfire Bomber. CIA, State, NSA, and Navy
estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns,
training programs, and exercise participation of the Backfire, as well as
Soviet statements concerning this aircraft, point to peripheral strike as
its primary mission. DIA, Army, and Air Force estimate that the
Backfire is a long-range bomber with the capability to strike US targets
on unrefueled range and radius missions. They agree that it will have
significant peripheral missions but note that the Soviets have the option
to use the Backfire's intercontinental capabilities. Thus, in their view,
the Backfire poses a significant threat to the contiguous United States as
well as to areas on the Soviet periphery. The reader is referred to NIE
11-3/8-78 for information on performance data. (II, 178-179)
k. Capabilities of Soviet Motor Transport in Wartime. CIA and
State believe that the peacetime shortage of cargo vehicles in Category
II and III divisions and in army- and front-level motor transport units
and the heavy reliance in wartime on mobilized civilian trucks and
reservist drivers point to potential weaknesses in the wartime logistic
system, particularly in the early stages of a conflict. DIA and Army
believe that the Estimate understates the capability of wartime Soviet
motor transport. In support of this position they point out that the
mobilization system provides for filling out lower category units with
vehicles and drivers for war, that civilian trucks are often identical to
those in military service, that Soviet vehicles designated for mobilization
are inspected by military teams, that reservist drivers would be
performing duties related to their civilian occupation, and that the
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany already has a lift capability that
exceeds its requirements. (II, 220-221)
1. Warsaw Pact Personnel Replacement System in Wartime.
CIA, State, and NSA judge that unit replacement is the Warsaw Pact's
preferred system for replacing combat personnel. DIA and Army
believe that the Pact would use both an individual and a unit
replacement system and that the system used in a particular case would
depend upon the situation. They further believe that individual
replacement would be used primarily in cases of steady, attrition-type
 losses, while unit replacement would be used primarily in cases of large,
sudden losses. (II, 231-232)
m. Pact Initiation of War From a Two-Front Posture After Four
Days of Preparation. All agencies agree that, because four days would
allow only minimal preparations, which would entail serious risks, the
Pact would initiate war from this posture only in extraordinarily
time-urgent circumstances. CIA and State believe that the Pact would
take such action only if it perceived the threat of an imminent NATO
attack. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets
might choose to attack with the two-front force in a variety of urgent
contingencies. A broader treatment of this issue is given in NIE 4-1-78.
(IV, 13-18)
n. Likely Effectiveness of a Warsaw Pact Air Offensive (the "Air
Operation") in Central Europe. CIA and State conclude that a massive
Pact air offensive at the outset of a war would do considerable damage
to NATO's air and air defense forces, but probably would not be so
effective as to prevent NATO's air forces from being able to deliver
nuclear weapons on a large scale. DIA and Air Force believe that no
judgment with any useful level of confidence on the effectiveness of an
air operation is possible at this time because we lack adequate analysis
of the factors involved which apply to both NATO and the Pact and of
the interaction of the forces of both sides. (IV, 85)
o. Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea. CIA, NSA, and State
conclude that the allocation of most Pact tactical and LRA bomber
aircraft to a large-scale Air Operation in West Germany and the
Benelux countries would severely reduce the probability of the Pact's
achieving air superiority over the Baltic in the initial stage of a war.
Also, Pact ASW forces would be unable to prevent NATO submarine
attacks against Pact amphibious forces. DIA and Air Force believe that
there has been insufficient analysis of the factors and assumptions
which would support such a conclusion. Navy believes that the
achievement of air superiority is but one of a number of factors which,
taken together, will determine the outcome of the Pact's Baltic
campaign. (IV, 109-111)
p. Augmentation of Soviet Naval Forces in the Mediterranean
by Black Sea Surface Combatants During a Period of Tension Prior
to Hostilities. CIA and State estimate that the Soviets would deploy
few, if any, combatants to augment their Mediterranean Squadron
because the ships are needed more in the Black Sea for fleet air defense
and ASW in support of Pact operations against the Turkish Straits. DIA,
NSA, and Navy conclude that the Soviets would augment with at least a
17
TCS op~Se~e#-
 few, and possibly up to 12, modern Black Sea surface units because they
would be of greater value in the Mediterranean than in the Black Sea.
(IV, 142-144)
q. Number of Submarines Soviets Would Employ in the North
Atlantic SLOG Interdiction Role. CIA, NSA, and State judge that
about 10 submarines would be dispersed in North Atlantic shipping
lanes for reconnaissance and attacks against shipping and naval targets
of opportunity. Some of these submarines might alternatively have
missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling off major
NATO naval bases to report on NATO movements and attack major
warships. DIA and Navy believe that, in a typical initial wartime
deployment, some 20 submarines would be positioned astride NATO's
sea lines of communication to attack warships and ships carrying critical
materiel to Europe in the initial phase of a war. The number of Soviet
submarines dedicated to this effort would be scenario dependent. (IV,
168-169)
r. Potential Effectiveness of Soviet Naval Operations in the
North Atlantic. Paragraphs 191-197 of chapter IV consider that the
evident technical limitations of the weapons and sensors on Soviet ships,
submarines, and aircraft could impact significantly on Soviet efforts to
control the Norwegian and Barents Seas, although the mutually
supportive aspects of some operations may offset certain technical
weaknesses. DIA and Navy believe that these paragraphs should convey
a more balanced appraisal of potential effectiveness and that, as now
phrased, they tend to overstress the weaknesses of Soviet platforms; they
tend to give inadequate consideration of strengths, including the
operation of these platforms as a mutually supportive force; and they
tend to assess effectiveness in tactical contexts which are unrealistic.
(IV, 191-200)
s. Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges that, under certain circumstances,
nuclear operations at sea would not await employment of nuclear
weapons on land. All other agencies estimate that the USSR would be
unlikely to initiate the use of nuclear weapons at sea while a war was
being fought with only conventional weapons against NATO in Europe.
(V, 10-11)
t. Speed of New Soviet Nuclear-Powered Attack (SSN) and
Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile (SSGN) Submarines. DIA and Navy
estimate that the maximum speeds for some of the new SSN and SSGN
classes could reach 37 knots. CIA estimates that these submarines will be
capable of speeds up to 33 knots. (VI, 63)
 u. Effectiveness of the Soviet Aircraft Carrier Kiev and Its
Impact Upon the Evolution of Soviet Naval Missions. CIA and State
believe that a few ships of this class do not represent a significant
improvement in Soviet capabilities to fight a war with NATO. They,
and NSA, believe that, although it may constitute a major turning point
in the development of the Soviet Navy, it is premature to judge the
impact of the acquisition of carriers upon the evolution of naval
missions. DIA and Navy hold that the introduction of the Kiev
constitutes a major watershed in the development of the Soviet Navy,
has influenced the acquisition of other future ships, and has already
exerted a significant influence on naval operations. (VI, 69-70)
v. Propulsion of Large Combatant Being Fitted Out in Lenin-
grad. CIA believes that the evidence is too ambiguous to classify the
ship as to propulsion. DIA and Navy hold that this ship probably is
nuclear powered. (VI, 71)
 WARSAW PACT POLICY AND DOCTRINE FOR THEATER WARFARE
General Considerations
1. It is Soviet policy to acquire and maintain forces
capable of successfully fighting either a conventional
or nuclear war in Europe and to keep a clear numeri-
cal advantage over NATO in important military as-
sets.' Soviet leaders stress the need for large, combat-
ready forces to be in place at the outset of hostilities.
They intend any future European conflict to take
place on Western, not Eastern, territory.
2. The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro-
pean allies as vital to its national interests. The East
European members of the Pact provide sizable forces
and a territorial buffer between NATO and the Soviet
Union. The presence or proximity of large, well-
equipped Soviet forces gives the Soviets considerable
leverage in exerting control over these countries, thus
safeguarding the integrity of the Pact. The Soviets also
value their military strength as a means of influencing
European domestic and foreign policy decisions and
deterring political or military developments which
might alter the balance of power to their disadvantage.
They do not, however, measure the military balance in
Europe in isolation from the larger, global balance
and, accordingly, are inclined to be very cautious in
the use of military force in Europe.
3. Soviet expenditures for general purpose ground,
air, and naval forces, as well as for those strategic
attack forces directed primarily at Eurasian targets,
are an important indicator of the USSR's emphasis on
developing and maintaining its theater force capa-
bilities. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates
that, of total Soviet defense spending during the period
1967-77, almost 40 percent was devoted to procure-
ment and operation of theater forces. (See figure 2.)
Roughly three-fourths of these outlays can be directly
attributed to those theater forces arrayed opposite
NATO. During this period, procurement of weapons,
equipment, and spare parts accounted for more than
three quarters of the USSR's outlays for theater forces.
Military Policy
4. A strong, in-depth defense of the homeland is
basic to Soviet military doctrine. Moscow's war-fight-
ing strategy also dictates that Warsaw Pact forces
protect the Soviet homeland and lines of communica-
tion so that an offensive or counteroffensive could be
successfully carried out. We find no evidence of an
intent on the part of the Soviets merely to defend
territory. On the contrary, the hallmark of Soviet
military doctrine is offensive action. It provides the
motive force behind the Soviet emphasis on high
combat readiness, the desire to seize the initiative, and
the requirement for substantial numerical superiority
in the main battle areas, backed by strong reserves, to
ensure the momentum of the attack. Pact theater force
developments over the past decade reflect a systematic
effort to meet these doctrinal requirements for con-
ducting conventional and nuclear offensives in the
European theater.
5. Soviet leaders conclude that the initial stages of a
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict probably would be
fought with conventional weapons. We believe that
they would prefer that such a conflict remain nonnu-
clear in order to avoid the catastrophic consequences
of nuclear war and to take advantage of their superior-
ity in conventional ground forces in Central Europe.
Nevertheless, they see a high probability that war
would involve the use of nuclear weapons initiated
either by NATO to avoid defeat in Europe or by the
USSR if the war were going badly for the Pact. We
believe that Soviet doctrine emphasizes counterforce
rather than countervalue strikes.
' For an expanded discussion of Soviet military policy in Europe,
see NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global
Power Arena.
6. In the 1960s it was Soviet policy to retaliate
against any NATO nuclear initiative with a thea-
terwide strike. By 1970, however, the Soviets had
20
Top e
 Estimated Soviet Expenditures for Defense, 1967-77
A. Estimated Total Expenditures
Billion 1970 Rubles
Peripheral Attack Forces
Announced Defense Expenditures (current prices) 39' General Purpose Forces
I 1 1 I I 1 I I I I I
1967 69 71 73 75 77
Estimate defined for comparison with US accounts. Expenditures shown in charts B and C represent spending
B. Index of Growth of Estimated Total Expenditures
for Procurement and Operation of Peripheral Attack
and General Purpose Forces
Calculated in 1970 Rubles
1967=100
C. Percentage Distribution
of Estimated Total Expenditures,1967-77
Calculated in 1970 Rubles
Figure 2
Research, Development, Testing, and
Evaluation
Strategic Attack and
Defense Forces
on investment for and operation of general purpose, periph-
eral attack, strategic, and support forces. These expenditures
are derived from our latest estimate of order-of-battle data on
deployed forces and the costs associated with these forces.
The expenditures shown here differfrom the breakdown given
in NIE 11-3/8-78, which includes expenditures for peripher-
al attack forces within expenditures for strategic forces. Not
200 included in expenditures for general purpose and peripheral
attack forces shown in charts B and C are:
I I I I I I I I I I
0 1967 69 71 73 75 77
? Outlays for military research, development, testing, and
evaluation relating to general purpose or peripheral at-
tack force weapon systems.
? Costs of nuclear weapons allocated to general purpose
and peripheral attack forces. Because most of the nu-
clear weapons are utilized by the strategic forces, all
nuclear weapons costs have been included with those
forces. Nuclear weapons total about 2 percent of esti-
mated Soviet expenditures.
? Costs of support forces associated with general pur-
pose and peripheral attack forces.
21
TC Top 'dZM+
 Too ecS~r'Rf
adopted a policy of more flexible use of nuclear
weapons against NATO. Alternative responses that
have at least been examined include:
- Delayed responses to NATO's first, small-scale
use of nuclear weapons.
- Responses at the lower end of the nuclear spec-
trum with small-scale strikes by forward-based
systems rather than with theaterwide strikes in-
volving USSR-based systems.
- Escalation of the intensity of nuclear strikes over
time.
7. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for
the more flexible use of tactical nuclear weapons, and
notwithstanding the impressive improvements they
have made in forward-based tactical nuclear capa-
bilities, they have not sought to match NATO's capac-
ity for accurate and selective use of very-low-yield
nuclear weapons. Although they have evidently been
working on nuclear artillery for at least 20 years and
have nuclear-capable artillery units in the western
USSR, they do not appear to have given high priority
to fielding it in Central Europe. Also, their armory of
tactical nuclear warheads has shown a strong trend
toward higher rather than lower yields. Moreover, we
note that Pact exercise scenarios have not evidenced
abandonment of the massive response option. Al-
though the Soviets now have the necessary forces and
employment doctrines to conduct limited nuclear war
in Central Europe, we believe that they remain skepti-
cal of the possibility of controlling escalation.
8. In sum, we cannot predict how the Soviets might
respond to a limited and selective NATO first use of
nuclear weapons or to their perception of NATO's
preparations for the imminent use of nuclear weapons.
They might conceivably continue purely nonnuclear
operations, or they might respond with small-scale
nuclear strikes of their own. They might also launch a
9. Neither can we be certain of the circumstances
under which the Soviets might themselves initiate
nuclear operations in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
theater nuclear doctrine,
11. We have considered whether the Soviets have
adopted a strategy of "decoupling" nuclear war in
Central Europe from the employment of peripheral
systems. We have found no direct evidence of such a
strategy in recent Soviet military writings or informa-
tion from other human sources. However, the substan-
tial increases in the number and quality of Pact
tactical nuclear systems in Central Europe have pro-
vided the Pact with a capacity to conduct nuclear war
there at relatively high intensities without having to
resort to USSR-based systems.
Nonetheless, the
Soviets' continued mo ernization o USSR-based pe-
ripheral strike systems
~rgues that they
still expect to have to resort to the use of these
weapons at some stage of theater nuclear war. Their
uncertainty about their actual ability to deter the West
from launching strategic nuclear strikes against Soviet
territory in the face of a successful Soviet conventional
assault-which is complicated by the existence of
independent French and British nuclear systems tar-
geted against the USSR-further argues against the
likelihood that the Soviets would anticipate much
success in achieving a decoupling strategy.
12. In both classified and open-source writings,
Soviet military theorists still warn that escalation to the
intercontinental level would be likely and could occur
at any point during a theater conflict, conventional or
Top 2z t-
 nuclear, although restriction to the threater level is not
ruled out. The Soviets probably see an advantage in
limiting the use of nuclear weapons to the theater
level, but they continue to plan and prepare against
the likelihood that theater nuclear war would involve
strikes on the USSR and escalate to intercontinental
conflict.'
Chemical Warfare
13. The Soviets are clearly planning for the contin-
gency that toxic chemical agents might be used in a
war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They have
a continuing, vigorous program to equip and train Pact
forces for operations in a chemical, biological, or
radiological (CBR) environment. In addition, they
have produced a variety of modern nerve agents and
have the delivery systems and tactics necessary for the
large-scale offensive use of these agents, but we do not
know the size or the composition of the Soviet stock-
pile of chemical agents and filled munitions.
14. The Soviets categorize chemical weapons-as
they do nuclear and biological weapons-as "weapons
of mass destruction" whose initial use must be autho-
rized at the highest political level. All of the Pact's
operational stocks of chemical weapons and agents are
believed to be under Soviet control in peacetime.
Some are stored in Central Europe. The control and
release procedures for chemical weapons are not
necessarily the same as for nuclear weapons, and there
is some evidence that, once released, chemical weap-
ons would be subject to fewer restrictions on subse-
quent use than nuclear weapons. In addition, peace-
time security over chemical weapons appears less
rigorous than for nuclear weapons and is believed to
be as much to prevent hazardous exposure as to
prevent unauthorized use.
15. In the extensive body of available Pact writings
dealing with the likely nature of a future war in
Europe and addressing the broad strategic and oper-
ational considerations for conducting conventional,
nuclear, and chemical warfare, there is no discussion
of Pact intentions or plans to initiate chemical warfare
during a nonnuclear conflict. In other writings which
deal with tactical and technical problems of combat
'The potential effect of improvements in USSR-based strategic
systems for peripheral attack, in concert with improvements in
Soviet intercontinental strike systems, on the possibility of decou-
pling theater nuclear war from intercontinental conflict is treated in
NIE 11-3/8-78, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict
Through the Late 1980s.
without explicit reference to the overall situation, Pact
writers do treat the use of chemical weapons exten-
sively. Pact field training for offensive and defense
chemical operations continues,
16. Whatever the circumstances of initial use, once
offensive chemical warfare had been authorized, the
Pact's employment doctrine would lead it to attempt
to achieve surprise and to employ chemical weapons
on a large scale in the hope of catching NATO troops
unprotected. Prime objectives, for example, would be
to disable airfields, nuclear and logistic depots, and
command and control facilities. Other important ob-
jectives might include reduction of NATO's antiarmor
capabilities and air defenses or stopping amphibious
landings.
17. Once widespread nuclear warfare had begun,
the question of whether to use chemical weapons
would be largely tactical. Pact writings on theater
nuclear war usually assume that chemical weapons
would be used also. In such circumstances, chemical
weapons are thought to be a valuable complement to
conventional and nuclear weapons because their ef-
fects can be more widespread than conventional weap-
ons and they present fewer troop safety problems and
produce fewer obstacles to friendly troop maneuver
than do nuclear weapons.
18. With respect to the question of Soviet policy on
the first use of chemical weapons, there are two views
within the Intelligence Community. Some believe 3
that it is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact would initiate
offensive chemical warfare before the advent of
nuclear war, but that the Pact's first use under these
circumstances cannot be entirely excluded. Others
believe' that there is a strong possibility that the
Soviets would initiate chemical warfare in a conven-
tional conflict. (For the rationale underlying these
positions, see chapter I, volume II.)
' The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State.
' The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Senior
Intelligence Officers of each of the military services.
23
TCS - op ec
 Toa Secre
Biological Warfare
19. All Warsaw Pact countries have signed the
Biological Warfare Convention prohibiting the pro-
duction, storage, and use of biological weapons. There
is no evidence that any of them have violated the
treaty. The Convention permits defensively oriented
BW programs which the Soviets are known to have.
available evidence do not
treat offensive use of biological weapons. We assume,
however, that the Soviets are continuing research on
biological agents, and that they have facilities which
could be used to produce biological weapons if a
decision were made to do so.
Electronic Warfare
20. The Soviets have a broad-based policy concern-
ing electronic warfare-"radioelectronic combat" in
the Soviet lexicon-and have made it a fundamental
part of their battle planning at the tactical and
strategic level. The Soviet concept of radioelectronic
combat is considerably broader than the US concept of
electronic warfare. It encompasses jamming, camou-
flage, concealment and deception, and operations to
destroy NATO's intelligence and electronic control
systems, especially those for nuclear forces, while
protecting the USSR's own systems and forces. Soviet
radioelectronic combat also includes reconnaissance
and signal intelligence efforts to identify and locate
NATO's electronic control systems and to determine
their vulnerabilities. In the Soviet view, radioelec-
tronic combat is to be integrated into all phases of
warfare, and we expect that NATO's intelligence and
electronic control systems at all levels would be subject
to concerted electronic and physical attack.
 21. Warsaw Pact forces are predominantly Soviet,
but non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces make a
significant contribution and indeed are critical to
Soviet strategy for conflict in Europe. Pact forces
opposite NATO can best be described in terms of
major groupings:
- Ground, tactical air, and air defense forces in
Eastern Europe and in the military districts of
the USSR opposite NATO, and possibly these
types of forces in the Moscow, Volga, Ural, and
Turkestan Military Districts.
- Naval forces of the three Soviet European fleets
and the NSWP countries.
- Most medium- and intermediate-range and some
intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Soviet
Strategic Rocket Forces.
- Most intermediate-range and some long-range
bombers of Soviet Long Range Aviation.
Warsaw Pact Ground and Air Forces
Opposite NATO*
January 1979
Ground Forces:
Manpower
Tank and motorized rifle
divisions
103
51
154
Medium tanks
30,500
14,500
45,000
Armored personnel carriers
20,500
11,000
31,500
Artillery pieces
13,000
5,200
18,200
Air Forces:
Tactical aircraft
3,020
1,175
4,195
Combat and support helicopters
1,910
705
2,615
NSWP air defense interceptors
1,210
1,210
NSWP surface-to-air missile
(SAM) sites
-
Soviet medium and heavy
transport aircraft (VTA)
665
This part of volume I summarizes the current status
and trends of Warsaw Pact ground, air, naval, and
theater nuclear forces opposite NATO. Volume II of
the Estimate contains additional details of current Pact
equipment acquisition programs for these forces,
weapons characteristics, logistic capabilities, and
forces for chemical and electronic warfare.
Ground Forces
22. Warsaw Pact ground forces opposite NATO
number about 1.9 million men. The Soviet Union
accounts for roughly half of the total or just over 1
million men. About-half of these Soviet forces are
stationed in Eastern Europe and half in the military
districts of the USSR that are opposite NATO. (See
table 1.)
23. Although the number of Pact divisions opposite
NATO has remained stable since the late 1960s, the
units have received additional men, weapons, and
support equipment. Forces in Central Europe-where
*Includes Soviet and East European forces in the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) and Soviet forces in the
Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, North
Caucasus, and Transcaucasus Military Districts of the USSR. De-
tailed order-of-battle information for Pact ground and air forces is
contained in tables B-1, B-2, and B-3 in annex B of volu a II.
SEC~ET
our information is best-have increased more than
forces opposite NATO's flanks. For example, Pact
ground forces manpower in the area has increased by
some 140,000 men since 1969. Figures 3 and 4 depict
several of the more important trends in Pact ground
forces in Central Europe (East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia).
24. Tank and motorized rifle divisions are the basic
tactical units of Pact ground forces.s The Pact main-
tains a grand total of 217 active tank and motorized
25
TC - ~'Seerei:-
 Too Secre
Trends in Warsaw Pact Ground Forces
in Central Europe, 1969 and 1.979
Light Tanks and
Major Antitank Weapons Armored Fighting Vehicles
1969 1979 1969 1979
Includes all ATGMs, and all Includes the PT-76 and the
antitank guns and recoilless BMP.
rifles with maximum effective
ranges greater than 500 meters.
Does not include BMP-mounted
weapons.
Includes all artillery pieces and Includes medium and heavy
multiple rocket launchers tanks.
greater than 100 mm.
rifle divisions (166 Soviet and 51 East European) at
varying strengths in its peacetime ground forces. The
number of such divisions opposite NATO stands at
154. (See figure 5.) Besides those forces earmarked for
use against NATO the Soviets have an additional 16
tank and motorized rifle divisions in the Moscow,
Volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts which
could be used against NATO or elsewhere.
25. In peacetime, Pact divisions are maintained in
various states of readiness suitable for the conduct of
limited combat operations on short notice and for
generating large forces through rapid mobilization.
We classify Pact ground force divisions according to
our estimate of their peacetime manning and equip-
ment levels. All divisions in the Soviet Groups of
Forces in Eastern Europe and eight NSWP divisions
26
TCS - Top ecr
 Too Secre
Cargo and POL Lift Capacities
of Soviet Divisions,
1969 and 1979
Cargo Capacity
Tons
POL Capacity
Thousand Liters
ground units with personnel and equipment from the
civilian economy. These systems have not been tested
on a broad scale, although local tests occur often. The
base of trained personnel and equipment in the Pact
countries is adequate to support Pact mobilization
plans. Organizations and elements at army and front
level, particularly rear service units, require longer to
mobilize than the combat units which they support. In
addition, significant portions of the Soviet and other
Pact rear services required for wartime operations do
not exist in peacetime. Major elements, such as some
medical and transport units, would have to be mobi-
lized from the civilian economy.'
27. Pact armed forces depend heavily on universal
conscription to meet military manpower require-
ments. In the USSR, conscripts make up roughly 75
percent of total active strength. Terms of service vary
by nation and branch of service but generally are two
to three years. The Soviets induct their conscripts
semiannually, usually for a two-year term of service.
The Soviets have upgraded their ground force training
in recent years as a result of two factors. The increas-
ing amount of complex equipment entering the inven-
tory usually requires a more highly trained soldier to
operate or maintain it. Because the conscript's term of
service is now two years, the Soviets are faced with the
requirement to provide more training in less time for
their largely conscript army. This has prompted the
Soviets to modify their training system to include
increased emphasis on preinduction training, individ-
ual specialist training, and intensified unit training.'
are manned close to wartime strength, have a full
complement of combat equipment, and can be
brought up to strength and ready to move within 24
hours. Other active Soviet and NSWP divisions have
lower manpower and equipment levels, and can be
mobilized and begin movement for combat within 72
hours.
26. All Pact countries have well-organized mobili-
zation systems that can rapidly fill understrength
Motorized
- Rifle
Divisions Tank
Trailers Divisions
Trailers.
28. In addition to tank and motorized rifle divi-
sions, the Pact also maintains large airborne forces.
These forces, which have remained relatively constant
in numbers over the past decade, include eight Soviet
divisions (one is a training division), one Polish divi-
sion, and smaller units in each of the other non-Soviet
countries. Soviet airborne divisions are centrally con-
trolled by Airborne Troops Headquarters in Moscow
and are considered strategic reserves of the Supreme
High Command (VGK). Soviet airborne divisions
could be used in a variety of wartime situations
'Volume II presents differing agency views concerning Pact
motor transport capabilities.
I Volume II discusses training, morale, and discipline in the Pact
ground forces in greater detail, as well as agency differences
concerning the success of Soviet career noncommissioned person-
nel programs.
27
opt
 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Ground Force Divisions Opposite NATO
SWEDEN
WEST
GERMANY
Two Category III MRDs are off this map
in the eastern Transcaucasus MD.
TURKEY
28
o-
A
BALTIC
O
BULGARIA
Motorized rifle
division
Category I
Category II
Category III
Tank division
Category I ? A
Category 11 Category III A L
Airborne division
Category I
Category III 0
ENTRAL
ASIAN
 ranging from operations under the direct control of
the VGK to tactical-level missions. The Soviet divisions
also have important potential uses other than war in
Europe, such as intervention in Third World areas.8
Equipment
29. Pact ground forces are well equipped with
weapons either of Soviet origin or patterned after
Soviet models. The equipment inventory is being
continually modernized with the introduction of new,
improved combat vehicles, support equipment, and
weapons designed to increase mobility and provide
greater, more accurate firepower. Despite impressive
modernization programs, however, Pact ground forces
retain a mixture of old and new equipment. Although
Pact forces are considerably more standardized than
NATO's, items such as T-34 and T-54/55 tanks, the
BTR-152 and earlier models of BTR-60 armored
personnel carriers, and various older models of field
artillery and antiaircraft guns, are still operational and
contribute to diversity within the Pact weapons inven-
tory. Although most Pact equipment is of Soviet
production and design, the share produced by the
NSWP countries is increasing.
30. Tanks. Armor continues to dominate Pact
ground forces. In all, Pact forces opposite NATO have
about 45,000 medium tanks at their disposal.' While
the Soviets are aware of the improved technology and
growing numbers of NATO antitank weapons and
have demonstrated this awareness in modifying their
forces and tactics, such adjustments have not led to
any diminution of the tank forces or any major change
in the way they see these forces performing. In recent
years two new tanks, the T-64 and the T-72, have been
introduced into the ground forces. Both tanks incorpo-
rate better armor protection, a 125-mm smoothbore
gun, an automatic loading system, and an electro-op-
tic, possibly laser, rangefinder. The T-72, or an im-
proved version, will probably be the main production
tank well into the 1980s. The T-55 remains the main
battle tank of the NSWP forces.
31. Artillery. Pact artillery is still predominately
towed, but is being improved by the addition of four
new self-propelled models and a new multiple rocket
launcher. The Soviets are replacing the towed 122-mm
A See NIE 11-10-79 for details of Soviet capabilities for projecting
military power and influence in distant areas.
'Differing agency views regarding the number of Soviet motor-
ized rifle divisions which have an independent tank battalion are
contained in chapter II of volume H.
howitzers with self-propelled models in their motor-
ized rifle regiments, while the new 152-mm self-pro-
pelled howitzer has replaced towed pieces in the
artillery regiments of several motorized rifle and tank
divisions. A new 203-mm self-propelled gun and a new
240-mm self-propelled mortar, both nuclear capable,
are being deployed in the USSR. We estimate that
they will be deployed eventually with Soviet forces in
Eastern Europe. In addition to equipment moderniza-
tion, Soviet artillery units in both tank and motorized
rifle divisions are being expanded. Modernization and
some expansion are under way in NSWP artillery
units, but at a much slower pace.
32. Armored Personnel Carriers and Other
Combat Vehicles. Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe
have their full complement of armored personnel
carriers. Significant shortages remain in Soviet divi-
sions in the USSR, however, with some lacking as
much as two-thirds of their APC complement. One-
half to two-thirds of the 20,500 Soviet APCs opposite
NATO are now modern amphibious models. The rest
are older models with relatively poor cross-country
mobility. The Soviets continue to replace these APCs
with improved models-the BTR-60PB and the BMP.
The BTR-60PB is an amphibious, wheeled APC which
provides good mobility and armor protection from
small arms and shell fragments. The BMP is an
amphibious, tracked vehicle designed to operate
closely with tanks and has greater armor protection
than the BTR-60PB. It is equipped with a maahine-
gun, a 73-mm gun, and the Sagger antitank guided
missile launcher. It also has a CBR protective system to
allow operations in a toxic or radioactive environment.
The NSWP ground forces, on the whole, are still
predominantly equipped with older APCs.
33. Ground Force Air Defense Systems. Pact
ground forces opposite NATO are equipped with a
variety of tactical surface-to-air missile (SAM) and
antiaircraft (AA) gun systems. A program to replace
gun systems and older SAMs with more mobile SAM
systems was begun in the late 1960s and continues,
with Soviet units in Eastern Europe and along the
Sino-Soviet border receiving highest priority. Upgrad-
ing of the remaining Soviet units and of the NSWP
forces is proceeding more slowly.
34. Antitank Weapons. The Soviet arsenal of anti-
tank weapons includes both guided missiles and artil-
lery. Antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) are heliborne,
vehicle mounted, and man portable. Improved models
of the radio-controlled AT-2 Swatter and wire-guided
29
TCS Top
 AT-3 Sagger with semiautomatic guidance are
mounted on modified scout cars and helicopters. The
Sagger can also be mounted on the BMP and BMD
and is available in a manpack version. Some first-gen-
eration Swatters and Saggers are still in service. Three
new ATGM systems are also being deployed with
Soviet forces. The AT-4 Spigot man-portable ATGM,
the AT-5 Spandrel vehicle-mounted system, and the
AT-6 Spiral heliborne system have all been observed
recently with Soviet forces in East Germany. Antitank
(AT) guns and recoilless guns have not received the
priority in development and deployment that the
ATGM has in recent years. NSWP forces have a wide
variety of antitank weapons, including recoilless guns,
AT guns from 57-mm to 100-mm, and ATGMs.
Except for a few Czechoslovak-produced weapons, all
are of Soviet origin. NSWP forces are gradually
improving their antiarmor capabilities by acquiring
more ATGM launcher vehicles and manpack ATGM
sets.
35. Surface-to-Surface Missiles and Rockets.1?
The Pact arsenal of rockets and surface-to-surface
missiles includes free rockets over ground (FROGs)
and short-range ballistic missiles. All Pact ground
forces are equipped with FROGs and SS-1 Scuds,
which are capable of delivering conventional, as well
as chemical and nuclear warheads. The poor accuracy
of these systems would make them relatively ineffec-
tive in a conventional role against point targets. Soviets
forces also have the SS-12 Scaleboard and its follow-on,
the SS-22. A new missile, the SS-21, is being deployed
to Soviet units as a replacement for the FROG. The
FROG, SS-21, and possibly the SS-22 also can carry a
cluster-munition warhead.
Air Forces
36. The Soviet Air Forces are divided into three
functional components: Long Range Aviation (LRA),
Frontal (tactical) Aviation, and Military Transport
Aviation (VTA)." The primary missions of LRA are
intercontinental nuclear strikes and conventional or
nuclear strikes in support of theater forces. Frontal
Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack,
reconnaissance, electronic warfare (EW), and helicop-
"For a more detailed discussion of Pact tactical rockets and
missiles, see paragraphs 83 and 84.
11 Details of the role and capabilities of LRA and Soviet Naval
Aviation in theater war are discussed in volume II (chapters II, IV,
and V). Soviet strategic air defense forces are discussed in NIE
11-3/8-78.
ter ground attack and troop lift. The primary mission
of VTA is the transport of airborne assault forces.
37. All NSWP countries have air forces for national
air defense. In addition, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Bulgaria have tactical air forces. East Germany has
one ground attack unit and Romania has two. None of
the NSWP air forces have sufficient transport aircraft
to support other than small-scale airlift operations. The
current personnel strength of the Soviet air forces
opposite NATO is estimated to be about 500,000 and
that of the NSWP air forces stands at about 200,000.
Figure 6 shows the current geographic disposition of
Pact air forces opposite NATO.
38. There are about 4,600 fixed-wing combat air-
craft in Soviet Frontal Aviation and another 1,175 in
NSWP tactical air units. Although there was sizable
growth in Soviet Frontal Aviation during the late
1960s, primarily because of the buildup against China,
the size of Pact tactical air forces opposite NATO has
been relatively stable since the early 1970s at approxi-
mately 4,200 fixed-wing combat aircraft.
39. The Pact began reequipping its air forces in
1969, with fighter units receiving initial priority. Late-
model MIG-21 Fishbed and MIG-23 Flogger B aircraft
were introduced to replace earlier model Fishbeds in
these units. Modernization of the fighter-bomber
forces began four to five years later, with SU-17 Fitter
C/D, MIG-27 Flogger D, and some late-model
Fishbed aircraft replacing the MIG-17 Fresco and
SU-7 Fitter A. Light-bomber units also began reequip-
ping in the mid-1970s by acquiring the SU-24 Fencer
A as a replacement for the YAK-28 Brewer B/C.
Modernization has progressed more rapidly in Soviet
than in the NSWP air forces. Newer aircraft now
account for about 80 percent of the Soviet force, 20
percent of the NSWP force, and two-thirds of total
Pact tactical air strength opposite NATO. (See figure
7.)
40. One of the most significant developments in
Warsaw Pact tactical air forces in recent years has
been their modernization through the introduction of
new aircraft. The new aircraft have greater ranges,
can carry greater payloads, are equipped with better,
more advanced avionics, and are armed with better,
more effective munitions. These attributes combine to
give the Pact's air forces the capacity to deliver more
30
t-
 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO
Norwegian
Sea
WEST
GERMANY
SWEDEN
ROMANIA
~_ LENINGRAD
Soviet NSWP
Tactical fighter/ ?
fighter-bomber unit
Tactical A A
reconnaissance!
electronic warfare
unit
Helicopter. unit
National Air Defense
fighter unit
Long Range Aviation ^
unit
Military District boundary
` ODESSA
A
31
oTSTre+-
TURKEY
ENTRAL
ASIAN
 Modernization Trends
in Warsaw Pact Tactical Air Forces
Opposite NATO, 1969-1979
and 40 percent of the force is equipped with the
Flogger B, which has an all-aspect intercept and
limited lookdown/shootdown capability. In 1969 all
Pact fighter-bombers relied on ground-based naviga-
tion aids or dead reckoning, which would have forced
them to navigate over NATO territory at vulnerable
medium altitudes. At that time Beagle and Brewer
light bombers provided the Pact's only autonomous
adverse weather bombing/navigation capability. To-
day there are about 45 percent fewer aircraft (Brewers
and Fencers) possessing this capability, but the fewer
numbers have been more than offset by an increase in
the number of fighter-bomber units. Now also, some
30 percent of the aircraft in Pact fighter-bomber units
can navigate accurately at lower altitudes in adverse
weather using only onboard avionics, although they
still have to acquire their targets visually for precise
weapons delivery.
Percent of Total Force
Soviet
effective firepower under a greater variety of
conditions.
41. In 1969 some 30 percent of the Pact's tactical
fighters were unable to conduct aerial engagements
under adverse weather conditions, all attacks had to be
performed from the rear hemisphere, and the fighters
had virtually no capability to intercept low-flying
aircraft. (See figure 8.) Today, nearly 95 percent of
Pact fighters are able to operate in adverse weather,
42. In 1969 the Pact, with its short-range, low-pay-
load aircraft, had only a few tactical aircraft capable
of conducting air-to-air or ground attack missions west
of the Rhine. Today, large numbers of Pact tactical
aircraft can operate well into France and the Benelux
countries with larger payloads. Figure 9 depicts the
payload and operating radius of selected Pact tactical
aircraft.
43. Although recent improvements have signifi-
cantly enhanced the capability of the Pact's tactical air
forces to conduct long-range offensive operations, the
basic role of these forces remains unchanged. The
Pact's tactical air forces continue to have two primary
missions-air defense and ground attack support of
the Pact's ground armies. The continuing emphasis on
air defense is indicated by the high priority in equip-
ment modernization accorded fighter units.
44. Pilot Training and Proficiency. By US stand-
ards the Soviet Frontal Aviation flight training pro-
gram is more conducive to perfecting a pilot's basic
flying skills than to preparing him for combat. A
typical Soviet pilot spends four years in a flying school
and an additional three to four years training in an
operational combat unit before he is considered quali-
fied, by Soviet standards, to carry out the full range of
combat missions assigned to his unit. In conducting
operational training, a Soviet tactical pilot flies ap-
proximately the same number of sorties per year as his
US counterpart, but the sorties are less than half as
32
TC o
 Avionics Trends in Warsaw Pact
Tactical Aircraft Opposite NATO,
1969 and 1979
Fighter-Bomber and Light Bomber
Bombing/Navigation Avionics
Sret
Limited Navigation,
Visual Bombing
Autonomous
Navigation,
Visual Bombing
Autonomous
Bombing and
Navigation
long in duration and involve far fewer combat-related
training events."
45. Despite increases in the number of pilots as-
signed to Soviet units in the forward area, the overall
"Chapter II of volume II contains a discussion of differing
agency views on the amount of combat-related training received
by Soviet tactical air pilots.
combat capability of these units continues to be
hampered by those pilots-25 to 35 percent of the
total available-who are not qualified to conduct night
or all-weather combat missions. Moreover, pilot profi-
ciency has not progressed sufficiently to exploit fully
the capabilities of the airframes and weapon systems
of the third-generation aircraft currently in operation.
The Soviets acknowledge that their combat pilots are
not trained as effectively as they should be, but, for
reasons that are not clear to us, they do not appear to
be taking major corrective measures to enhance the
quality of training significantly. Such steps would
include devoting a greater share of training time to the
performance of combat-related tasks and introducing
more realism by exposing these pilots to enemy tactics
and simulated hostile air defense environments.
46. Base Structure. The Warsaw Pact has an ex-
tensive airfield network from which to launch and
sustain military air operations. In the USSR west of the
Urals there are some 230 active military airfields; the
Soviets also operate 40 military airfields in the NSWP
countries. Eighty-four airfields operated by the NSWP
air forces complement the Soviet base structure. There
are hundreds of other airfields-civil, factory flyaway,
and unoccupied (including dispersal) fields, highway
strips, and fields with temporary surfaces-which
could be used by military aircraft.
47. Since 1970, the Pact nations have completed
construction of at least 11 new military airfields,
started construction of at least nine others and signifi-
cantly improved the runway capability at 62 military
airfields in the NSWP countries and the USSR west of
the Urals. All major military and most civil airfields in
the Pact countries have been or are being equipped
with modern lighting, improved navigational aid
equipment, more adequate and improved refueling
systems, and other ancillary support facilities. Installa-
tions for the storage, testing, and handling of air-to-air
(AAM) and air-to-surface (ASM) guided missiles have
been identified at most military airfields which have
aircraft equipped with these weapons. Approximately
3,400 shelters (hangarettes) have been built since the
late 1960s to protect aircraft at main Pact operating
bases in the USSR west of the Urals and in the NSWP
countries. Other defensive improvements include
hardening and increasing POL and ammunition stor-
age facilities, hardening command and control facili-
ties, and establishing pipeline systems to service air-
craft in shelters.
33
TC I TTo Sec eL
 Ton
Radius and Payload Capabilities of Selected Pact Tactical Aircraft*
MIG-21 Fishbed D (IOC-1962)
MIG-21 Fishbed J (IOC-1969)
MIG-23 Flogger B (IOC-1972)
M
I One air-to-air missile
MIG-17 Fresco A (IOC-1952)
SU-7 Fitter A (IOC-1 960)
SU-17 Fitter C (IOC-1973)
SU-24 Fencer A (IOC-1974)
I I I I I I I I I
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Flight Radius (nm)
i One metric ton of bombs
I I I 1 I I I I I
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Flight Radius (nm)
*Flight radii shown for air-to-air missions were calculated using maximum missile loads
and external fuel tanks. Flight radii shown for ground attack missions were calculated
using maximum bomb loads which do not permit use of external fuel tanks.
34
 48. This airfield development program has
achieved four specific objectives. First, the Soviets
have expanded their pilot and navigator training
capability by building new training airfields and
improving existing ones. Second, they have improved
their airfield capability within the Soviet Union to
support their new, longer range, higher performance
ground attack fighter aircraft and the Backfire
bomber. Third, all Pact nations have increased the
survivability and sustainability of their combat air
forces. Fourth, they have increased their capability to
conceal and protect large numbers of aircraft in
bunkers. The overall net effect of the Pact military
airfield development since 1968 is a greater capability
to conduct both offensive and defensive air operations.
Helicopter Forces
49. Warsaw Pact helicopter forces have two pri-
mary missions: combat and combat support. Combat
helicopters include those assigned to units responsible
for attacking ground targets or transporting assault
troops. Opposite NATO, the Pact has assigned some
1,700 combat helicopters to this mission. Of these,
about 300 helicopters have as their primary mission
the attack of ground targets; the remaining 1,400
helicopters have a primary mission of transporting
assault forces. An additional 900 helicopters are as-
signed to Pact units opposite NATO for various com-
Increase in Warsaw Pact
Helicopters Opposite NATO,
1969 and 1979
Combat Helicopters
Support Helicopters
bat support roles, including rescue, communications
relay, airborne command posts, artillery spotting, elec-
tronic warfare, and liaison. A significant development
in recent years has been the introduction of heavily
armed helicopters. Figure 10 shows the increase in the
number of Pact helicopters opposite NATO since.
1969.
Military Transport Aviation
50. VTA operates some 665 medium and heavy
transport aircraft. Most of these aircraft are based in
the western USSR. The primary mission of VTA is to
lift Soviet airborne forces but other missions include
the movement of troops, equipment, supplies, and
nuclear weapons. A mission which has been expanded
recently is the delivery of economic and military
assistance material to Soviet client states in the Third
World. Although the total number of VTA transports
has remained relatively stable since the late 1960s, the
overall capabilities of the force have clearly bees
improved through the introduction of new aircraft.
Civil aircraft from Aeroflot provide supplemental
support to VTA and include about 1,300 medium- and
long-range transports.
51. The movement of all unit equipment and the
7,300 personnel assigned to an airborne division would
require the entire lift capacity of VTA. Assuming an
aircraft serviceability rate of about 85 percent, VTA's
total serviceable fleet probably would prove inad-
equate for a full division lift. In combat operations,
however, airborne units would probably leave behind
their administrative personnel and some equipment
such as trucks. We calculate that VTA could lift the
assault elements of two airborne divisions simulta-
neously, including combat and combat support equip-
ment with some transport, supplies, and support ele-
ments. With nearly all VTA airlift assets and Soviet
airborne divisions deployed in the western USSR,
VTA's airborne assault potential is clearly targeted
toward Central Europe and NATO's flanks.
NSWP National Air Defense Forces 19
52. Each of the NSWP countries maintains a nation-
al air defense force consisting of fighter-interceptor
units, surface-to-air missile units, and a radar network.
'S For a discussion of Soviet strategic air defense capabilities, see
NIE 11-3/8-78.
35
L
 In effect, these forces constitute a forward extension of
Soviet strategic air defenses. The SAM units are pre-
dominantly equipped with SA-2s, but some countries
also have SA-3s. The interceptor components number
about 1,200 fighter aircraft, which, in addition to their
primary mission of defense of the national airspace,
could provide limited support to ground forces.
General Purpose Naval Forces
53. The Soviet Navy has in the past decade or so
significantly improved its capability to participate in a
Pact-NATO war. In addition to providing support to
the Pact's ground forces and defending the Pact's
maritime frontiers, the Soviet Navy can now under-
take combat operations at greater distances from home
waters.
54. Soviet general purpose naval forces opposite
NATO are from the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea
Fleets. (See figure 11.) The Northern Fleet carriers the
major burden of operations in the Barents and Norwe-
gian Seas and in the Atlantic. The fleets in the Baltic
and Black Seas, together with navies of four NSWP
countries, are tailored primarily for control of those
two seas and for the support of land operations against
NATO along the shores of and at the entrances to
these seas. For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the surface ships
and the Northern Fleet the submarines.
55. Warsaw Pact general purpose naval forces in-
clude submarines, surface ships, and aircraft. (See
table 2.) The general purpose submarine force consists
of cruise missile and torpedo attack submarines. The
principal surface combatants are about equally divid-
ed between frigates and larger ships of missile frigate,
destroyer, and cruiser size. The role of sea-based
aircraft is clearly emerging in the Soviet Navy with
the construction of three Kiev-class aircraft carriers,
following the two Moskva-class helicopter ships which
entered the inventory in the late 1960s. Smaller
surface combatants include mine warfare ships, sub-
marine chasers, and missile-armed patrol craft. Soviet
Naval Aviation (SNA) has three principal combat
components distinguished by roles: antiship strike,
reconnaissance and electronic warfare, and antisub-
marine warfare (ASW). Trends since 1969 in the
composition of Pact general purpose naval forces
opposite NATO are shown in figure 12.
Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces
Opposite NATO a
January 1979
General purpose submarines
Cruise missile
43
-
43
Torpedo attack
135
8
143
Aircraft carriers
1 c
-
1
Helicopter ships
2
-
2
Cruisers
26
-
26
Destroyers
49
1
50
Missile frigates
19.
-
19
Frigates
102
4
106
Selected minor surface combatants d
278
85
363
Amphibious ships
66
34
100
Selected support ships e
85
4
89
Naval aircraft r
Reconnaissance/EW
84
10
94
Strike
254
-
254
Tankers
56
-
56
Fighter/fighter-bomber
71
52
123
ASW fixed-wing
105
-
105
ASW/reconnaissance helicopters
164
48
212
a The NSWP navies and the Soviet forces assigned to the North-
ern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets. Detailed order-of-battle data for
these and Soviet Pacific Fleet naval forces are contained in tables
B-4, B-5, and B-6 in annex B of volume H.
b Figures exclude some 100 attack submarines and 30 principal
surface combatants kept in reserve status. Chapter 17 of volume II
discusses differing agency views on Soviet capabilities to activate
reserve submarines.
e A second Kiev-class aircraft carrier is operational in the Black
Sea, but we believe it will deploy to the Pacific Fleet.
d Patrol combatants, mine warfare ships, and missile-equipped
coastal patrol craft.
e Oilers, replenishment oilers, missile tenders, repair ships, and
submarine tenders.
f In addition, there are about 120 transport aircraft and 105
transport helicopters which support Soviet Naval Aviation.
SECIET
Major Wartime Tasks
56. The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control
in waters from which NATO's sea-based air and
ballistic missile strike and amphibious forces can reach
the Soviet Union, to support and protect Soviet ballis-
tic missile submarines, to exercise sea denial in the sea
lanes necessary for resupply and reinforcement of
36
 Operating Bases of the Three Western Fleets of the USSR
NORWAY,
Barents Sea
Area of
inset
..f .. '\ 'I-,T ~--\
U.S.S.R.
Black Sea Fleet
t Surface ship base
(f Submarine base
t Naval air base
400 kilometers
Sec
577629 1-79 CIA
J T( )Sevastopoj' '
Fleet
headquarters Black Sea
TURKEY
37
~p~ctet
 Top ecre
Soviet Naval Forces
Opposite NATO, 1969 and 1979
1969
Major Surface Combatants
1969 1979
Tonnage of Major Surface Combatants
614,500
97 1 Aircraft Carrier
Cruisers
Cruisers
aExcludes reserve units.
bCombatants over 3,000 tons, excluding reserve units.
Europe from the United States, and to project power
ashore in support of Pact ground forces., Although the
relative emphasis that would be placed on each of
these missions in a conflict would depend upon the
way hostilities were initiated and the course of the
war, the Soviets in their major exercises have focused
on ASW and attacks on carriers, cruisers, and amphib-
ious task forces.
57. Antiwarship Capabilities. Soviet Navy re-
sources capable of acting to counter NATO's surface
naval forces include missile-equipped bombers, sub-
marines, and surface combatants which are supported
by ocean surveillance systems, including ELINT and
radar satellites and aircraft, for detecting, identifying,
and tracking potential surface targets. The major
weakness of the Soviet ocean surveillance system is its
heavy reliance on electronic emissions from potential
targets. When NATO forces implement emission con-
trol (EMCON) conditions, which occur during NATO
exercises, Soviet surveillance capabilities are impaired,
sometimes drastically.
58. The Soviets have 43 antiship cruise missile
submarines in their western fleets for deployment in
the Atlantic and European theater area. Four submar-
ine-launched antiship cruise missile (ASCM) systems
are operational, each capable of delivering either
conventional or nuclear warheads. Deployed units
probably carry an equal mix of high-explosive and
nuclear warheads. They probably also carry at least
two nuclear torpedoes.
59. In addition to cruise-missile submarines, the
Soviet western fleets include 30 nuclear-powered and
some 59 long-range F-, Z-, and T-class diesel-powered
attack submarines. Most Soviet nuclear attack subma-
rines are fast-27 to 32 knots-and, despite relatively
high noise radiation, could be effective in antiship
operations. Soviet long-range diesel submarines are
much slower than the nuclear units. They are particu-
larly susceptible to detection when snorkeling, but can
remain submerged for extended periods. In addition
there are medium- and short-range diesel units which
would likely be employed in areas closer to the Soviet
Union.
60. The Soviet Navy has some 215 missile-equipped
bomber aircraft opposite NATO for antiship attacks.
They include about 175 TU-16 Badgers and some 40
Backfires. These aircraft carry four types of missiles
with various flight profiles and speeds and maximum
ranges of from 80 to about 200 nm (150 to 370 km).
38
TCS 2 Top
 There are also about 40 TU-22 Blinder A's which
could be used for bombing and mining. Naval TU-16
Badgers, which first entered service in 1957, are
relatively large and slow-moving by current standards.
They are highly vulnerable to modern air defenses
such as those of well-defended aircraft carrier task
groups. The improvements in their missile and elec-
tronic warfare systems, however, have maintained
them as firstline strike aircraft.
61. The introduction of some 40 Backfire bombers
into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
has significantly improved the strike capability of the
Soviet Navy against NATO surface forces." Because of
the modern, higher speed air-to-surface missile it
carries, its variable flight profiles, its maneuverability,
and its high-speed capabilities, the Backfire has a
higher probability of penetrating NATO naval air
defenses and attacking targets in the open ocean than
does the Badger. Also, it is far more capable than the
Badger of crossing potentially hostile land areas, such
as Turkey and Greece, and operating over the
Mediterranean.
62. In the antiship role, wartime operational consid-
erations probably would tend to dictate the use of
Backfires for strikes against important NATO warships
in certain key areas. These areas would include the
North Atlantic at least as far south as the Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom (G-I-UK) gap, the North
Sea, and the Mediterranean. The operational con-
straints tending to limit the use of Backfires include
mission planning allowances for combat maneuvering,
and requirements for routing around and penetrating
NATO air defenses. Aerial refueling could add flexi-
bility for the employment of Backfires, however.
63. The three Soviet western fleets have 14 princi-
pal surface combatant ships armed with antiship
cruise missiles. Six of these ships have long-range (160
to 300 nm, or 300 to 550 km) missiles. To fire these
missiles accurately to their maximum range requires
that these ships obtain external targeting support.
Other Soviet surface combatants opposite NATO
which are equipped with antiship cruise missiles in-
clude some 90 missile patrol boats. Except for the
SS-N-2 series, all current Soviet antiship cruise missiles
are believed capable of carrying a nuclear or a
"See NIE 11-3/8-78, NIE 11-6-78, and volume II, chapter II, of
this Estimate for details of the differing agency views of the
Backfire's capabilities.
conventional warhead. The surface-to-air systems
aboard some 75 Soviet principal surface combatants
can also be used against surface ships.
64. The Soviet naval air forces opposite NATO have
in the past few years added some 40 shore-based
SU-17 Fitter C/D and some 35 carrier-based YAK-36
Forger V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing)
aircraft which improve their overall capabilities
against NATO naval surface forces. There is insuffi-
cient evidence to judge how the Soviets would use
either of these aircraft against ships at sea or how
effective they might be in wartime. Most Forger
training thus far has been-of the kind useful for attacks
against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of which
are based in the Baltic, are probably intended for
ground attack in support of amphibious operations and
antiship attacks.
65. Although the Soviets have a large inventory of
ships, submarines, and aircraft capable of conducting
attacks on NATO ships, the successful accomplishment
of such strikes under wartime situations depends on a
variety of factors. Among the most significant are: the
effectiveness of Soviet ocean surveillance and elec-
tronic warfare, the number of launch platforms avail-
able for antiship use, the achievement of strategic or
tactical surprise, and whether nuclear weapons are
used by the Soviets or NATO. With accurate targeting
and the use of nuclear weapons in surprise attacks, the
Soviet naval forces normally deployed in peacetime
would constitute a severe threat to NATO carriers and
amphibious task groups in European waters. Timely
warning of a Soviet attack, however, would allow
NATO task forces to take action which could enhance
their survivability.
66. Antisubmarine Warfare Capabilities. In a
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflictrthe Pact's antisub-
marine warfare tasks would be varied and extremely
difficult. The Pact navies must seek out Western
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and counter West-
ern attack submarines. Attacks on Western SSBNs
would have to be undertaken in their worldwide
patrol and base areas. The task of countering attack
submarines would be markedly different for protect-
ing Pact forces in the approaches to the USSR, on the
one hand, and for the protection of Soviet naval
operations in more distant waters, on the other.
67. Pact ASW capabilities on the whole are ex-
tremely limited. The crucial Soviet shortcomings are
lack of long-range submarine detection devices, the
39
 Top Secre
high radiated noise levels of Soviet submarines relative
to those of the West, and the lack of seaborne tactical
air cover to protect deployed surface ship ASW forces.
Nonetheless, virtually all modern Soviet surface com-
batants carry ASW weapons and sensors, and large
numbers of Soviet aircraft and helicopters are fitted
for ASW operations.
68. The forces opposite NATO which are most
capable of ASW operations beyond coastal waters
include about 50 Soviet principal surface combatants,"
30 nuclear-powered torpedo attack submarines, and
about 45 fixed-wing ASW aircraft.16 The 16 ships with
helicopters (those of the Kiev, Moskva, Kara, and
Kresta-II classes) and the Krivak frigates are equipped
with long-range (15 to 30 nm, or 28 to 56 km) ASW
weapons. Only the Kiev- and Moskva-class units com-
bine these features with a long-range (typically less
than 10 nm) active sonar and more than one helicop-
ter. Soviet ASW helicopters, however, are limited in
their ASW operations at night and in bad weather.
69. Other Soviet forces opposite NATO-desig-
nated primarily for coastal ASW-are much more
numerous, but their individual capabilities are gener-
ally poorer. These include about 155 minor surface
combatants with sonars, about 45 short- and medium-
range diesel submarines, nearly 60 short-range fixed-
wing ASW aircraft, and about 100 shore-based ASW
helicopters. In addition, the Polish, the East German,
and, to a lesser degree, the Bulgarian and Romanian
Navies have a variety of units which are trained for
coastal ASW defense and are being integrated into the
combined Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
70. The quietness of Western submarines, the tech-
nical characteristics of the Pact equipment, and Pact
signal-processing capabilities combine in most cases to
restrict severely the range
at which Western submarines can be detected.
Locating data could be provided at greater ranges
through detection of periscopes or other masts with
surface search radars (especially in low sea states) or
through HF/DF (high-frequency direction finding) of
radio transmissions in the cases in which they occur.
71. In waters beyond the Pact's coastal regions,
Soviet ships and submarines, including those best
15 Ships of the Kiev, Moskva, Kresta-II, Kara, Kashin, Mod-Kashin,
and Krivak classes.
16 IL-38 Mays ancLTU-142 Bear-F's. Chapter 11 of volume 11
outlines differing agency views on the combat radius of the TU-
142 Bear-F long-range ASW aircraft.
equipped for ASW, are vulnerable to attack by NATO
submarines.
72. Nevertheless, there are situations, particularly
in their own coastal waters and ocean areas over which
they have temporary control, in which Pact ASW
forces might be able to prevent NATO submarines
from disrupting key maritime operations. Soviet and
combined Pact amphibious and convoy exercises often
include substantial numbers of units employed as ASW
screening forces, and in wartime such tactics could
well be effective-especially in areas accessible to
Soviet air forces, or in operations against the less
capable NATO submarine forces.
73. Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in
the Sea Approaches to the Soviet Union. In theater
hostilities in Europe, a high-priority task of the Pact
navies would be to ensure that their sea approaches
were secure and open to Pact use. Pact strategy calls
for establishing sea control in the Norwegian and
Barents Seas and in the closed seas-the Baltic and
Black Seas-thus denying these waters to the enemy.
The Pact navies maintain the bulk of their naval forces
in these areas, including some principal combatants,
and large numbers of smaller combatants, submarines,
and ASW aircraft. These forces continue to receive
new ships with the latest attack and air defense
missiles, sonars, torpedoes, and mine-warfare equip-
ment. They can be supported by fighter and attack
aircraft of the Soviet Air Defense Forces and Frontal
Aviation. The Pact has also concentrated coastal de-
fense missile and artillery batteries to defend ports,
bases, and otherrcritical facilities.
74. In addition to using the forces described above
to attack approaching NATO naval forces, the Pact
would probably lay defensive minefields, particularly
in key areas. Although there is little specific evidence
from exercises or military writings, the large number
of ships for mining-as well as the submarines and
aircraft capable of laying mines-suggests that the
40
ot~
 Soviets probably plan to conduct mine warfare on a
considerable scale. Additionally, naval exercises indi-
cate that the Pact expects to conduct countermine
operations against NATO mining in approaches to
Pact countries.
75. Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in
NATO Sea Lines of Communication. In wartime,
the Soviets probably would attempt some sea denial
operations in NATO's sea lines of communication by
attacking noncombatant ships-merchant vessels and
naval auxiliaries-on the high seas, striking ports and
harbors, and mining heavily traveled waters. The
extent of the commitment of forces to an interdiction
effort would depend on a number of factors such as
the emphasis on operations against carriers, amphib-
ious ships, and SSBNs; the course of the conflict; the
level at which it is initiated; Soviet expectations as to
the degree and pace of escalation; and the extent of
Pact and NATO mobilization. See the inset on pages
42 and 43 for a discussion of differing agency views of
Soviet intentions and capabilities for exercising sea
denial in NATO's sea lines of communication.
76. Amphibious Capabilities. The Soviets have
some 6,000 men in their Naval Infantry forces oppo-
site NATO. The basic unit is the naval rifle regiment,
totaling about 1,900 men in three infantry battalions, a
tank battalion, and supporting units. Three regiments
have been identified, one in each western fleet area.
The Naval infantry depends heavily on its tanks and
armored vehicles, but is constituted primarily for
mobility rather than for firepower. Its tasks are to
spearhead amphibious assualts against mainland and
island beachheads and to attack in the rear of enemy
formations-in both cases in support of the ground
campaign. In some cases, Naval Infantry units would
be immediately reinforced from the sea by ground
forces trained for followup amphibious landings.
77. The amphibious elements of NSWP countries
would be available to augment the Soviet Naval
Infantry forces. In the Black Sea area, the combined
strength of the Soviet, Bulgarian, and Romanian am-
phibious forces total some 4,400 men. However, the
Bulgarian and Romanian elements are not nearly as
well trained as their Soviet counterparts and do not
have sufficient lift capacity to carry all of their men
and equipment in a single assault operation. These
countries do not usually engage in combined amphib-
ious exercises with the Soviets. In the Baltic, however,
where large combined operations recently have oc-
curred, the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans have the
equivalent of four naval infantry regiments totaling
some 8,000 men. Although the Polish and East Ger-
man Navies are capable of transporting less than half
of their assault troops in a single lift, turnaround time
for subsequent lifts could be rapid.
78. Control of the airspace over an amphibious
landing area in Europe would be a prerequisite for
establishing a beachhead. Because the majority of
likely Warsaw Pact amphibious objectives would be
within the range of Soviet or East European airfields,
land-based tactical aircraft could be made available to
support the assault forces. The Soviet Fitter C/D
regiment in the Baltic Fleet Air Force and some 50
MIG-17 Fresco aircraft of the Polish Navy probably
would support amphibious operations in the Baltic
Sea.
Theater Nuclear Forces
79. Pact nuclear weapons which could be employed
in a theater war against NATO are of two distinct
types: tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of Soviet
general purpose forces and Soviet strategic nuclear
weapons. (See table 3.)
Table 3
Warsaw Pact Theater Nuclear Forces
Opposite NATO
January 1979
Tactical forces: a
Aircraft
2,505
135 2,640
Missile launchers
850
310 1,160
Artillery
288
- 288
Land-based missile launchers 490-508 c - 490-508
Long Range Aviation bombers 525 - 525
Submarine-launched ballistic
missiles
a Includes Soviet and East European forces in the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) and Soviet forces in the
Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, North
Caucasus, and Transcaucasus Military Districts of the USSR.
b Includes only those Soviet strategic forces for peripheral strike
which are chiefly intended for use against NATO.
c Range reflects uncertainty about the operational status of two
SS-20 bases.
41
TCS Top
 INTERDICTION OF NATO'S SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION:
SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES
Successful attacks on noncombatant ships at sea would
depend primarily on the availability and capability of Soviet
attack submarines for this mission. The combat radii of
Soviet ASM-equipped naval aircraft would rule out their
use-if operating out of Soviet bases-over most of the
length of the more southerly sea lanes to Great Britain and
France. They have some capability near Great Britain, but
unless air defenses there were destroyed, such strikes could
be more costly than the expected results might warrant.
The Soviets currently maintain an active inventory of
about 180 cruise-missile and torpedo attack submarines in
their western fleets. Of these, the some 115 long-range units
based in the Northern Fleet, the only fleet in the western
USSR with largely unrestricted access to the North Atlantic
sea lanes, form a potential strike force for interdiction. The
demands placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other
missions would limit the number of submarines available for
interdiction because large numbers of Soviet naval forces
would have to be devoted to controlling the Baltic Sea, the
Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian Sea, as well as their
approaches, against incursion by Western carriers, amphib-
ious forces, and submarines, and because a portion of the
Soviet attack submarine force probably would be committed
to operations against NATO naval bases and in the open
ocean.
There is disagreement within the Intelligence Community
concerning the extent, emphasis, and timing of the interdic-
tion campaign. Some believe a that the Soviets would com-
mit some of their submarine fleet to an interdiction cam-
paign, but not a large portion unless they had earlier
defeated NATO carrier and amphibious forces without
losing many of their submarines. Others believe b that the
Soviets would regard interdiction of US reinforcements to
Europe to be of such significance and their submarine
inventory of sufficient size to warrant use of substantial
numbers of attack submarines in this effort while still
accomplishing their other missions.
dependence on long sea lines of communication unless
attrition-or Western strategy-reduced the threat from
NATO's nuclear strike and projection forces. According to
this view, the presence of NATO carriers in or near areas
like the Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas would cause the
Soviets to commit large forces in counteraction, heavy losses
.would result, and the Soviets would lack the submarines to
engage simultaneously in strong antifleet and antishipping
operations. Those holding the latter view believe that the
timing and extent of Soviet interdiction operations depend
more upon the disposition and tactics of NATO naval forces
and upon Soviet intentions and expectations as to the course
of the conflict, than upon the prior achievement of other
naval tasks. According to this view, circumstances such as an
early stalemate in Central Europe or a NATO decision not to
deploy carrier and amphibious forces immediately into the
Norwegian Sea would lead the Soviets to mount a substantial
interdiction effort during the early phase of a conflict when
NATO would be convoying critical war material, including
elements of US divisions and their equipment, to Europe.
There are also disagreements over Soviet capabilities to
execute an interdiction campaign, irrespective of the Soviet
commitment to interdiction. These disagreements stem from
different judgments and interpretations of evidence regard-
ing: torpedo loads, replenishment opportunities, turnaround
time, transit distance, combat attrition, and target
information.
- Torpedo Loads. According to the first view, Soviet
naval strategy stresses the likelihood of a short nuclear
war and the importance of striking a few high-value
targets. The torpedo capacities of Soviet submarines
are consistent with this strategy, but would severely
limit the number of attacks against merchant ships the
submarines could make while on station during an
interdiction campaign. Soviet cruise missile subma-
rines, which constitute nearly one-third of the USSR's
fleet of long-range general purpose submarines, carry
Those holding the former view believe that the Soviets
would be deterred from seriously trying to exploit the West's
a The holders of the first view are the Central Intelligence Agency; the
Director, National Security Agency; and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State. The Director of NSA. further believes
that the extent and degree of a campaign against sea lines of communica-
tion is largely scenario dependent and that, in a prolonged crisis, where the
outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of interdicting sea lines in
advance of a conflict goes up.
b The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy.
few
torpedo reloads.
view holds that the Soviet long-range attack subma-
rines most likely to participate in such a campaign
(principally the N-class, F-class, and T-class) clearly
42
TC o
 carry sufficient torpedoes to conduct a significant
number of attacks on Western shipping. Additionally,
the loading of individual submarines would be contin-
gent on assigned missions; submarines would not neces-
sarily have a mix of different weapon types in wartime
as is customary in peacetime.
Replenishment Opportunities. The first view holds
that Soviet submarines would have to return to home
waters for resupply, that Soviet naval support ships
probably would not operate outside Soviet-controlled
waters because they would be vulnerable to attack, and
that any Soviet merchant ships at sea when war began
probably would not be available by the time the
submarines exhausted their torpedoes. According to
the second view, Soviet long-range attack submarines
can operate for periods of weeks without having to
refuel and, conceivably, could take on fuel from Pact
merchant ships, and an individual submarine would
probably have sufficient time to attack its targets
before having to return to base for torpedo reloading.
Turnaround Time. All agree that Soviet submarines
would have to spend some time in port between
patrols. The first group believes it might be as long as
25 days, which was the German experience in World
War II. The second believes the time could be com-
pressed to less than 25 days, especially in a period of
intense conflict.
Transit Distance. Holders of the first view believe that
the effectiveness of Soviet submarines would be im-
paired by the distance between the Northern Fleet
submarine bases and the North Atlantic sea lanes. They
point out that, if NATO convoys were routed south-
ward to reduce the danger from Pact aircraft, Soviet
submarines would have to travel 2,500 to 3,500 nm;
nuclear-powered submarines traveling at 12 knots
would spend about 22 days in a round trip (6,000 nm)
to the sea lanes, while diesels averaging 5 knots would
spend 54 days in transit. The others note that, despite
the long transit distances, Soviet long-range attack
submarines have the range to undertake patrols in the
North Atlantic sea lanes of sufficient duration to have
ample opportunity to attack a number of Western
ships.
- Combat Attrition. All agree that Soviet submarines
based in the Northern Fleet would have to travel
through the Norwegian Sea and the G-I-UK gap, areas
which favor NATO ASW efforts, and that, even when
these submarines are on station, their operating areas
would be continuously within range of NATO's land-
based ASW aircraft, as well as of other ASW plat-
forms. The first view is that the resultant combat
attrition would be prohibitive. The second is that,
although Soviet submarines would be particularly open
to attack by Western ASW forces at several points, this
threat would be reduced by Soviet attacks against
NATO ASW aircraft and bases, on SIGINT facilities,
and on facilities of the US sound surveillance system
(SOSUS).
Target Information. The first group believes that it
would be difficult for attack submarines to identify
high-value ships in ocean traffic containing many ships
of low value. This group notes that, under North
Atlantic combat and weather conditions, attacks on
merchant ships would be likely to result in little more
than random success at destroying ships loaded with
military cargoes instead of ships loaded with civilian
industrial or other goods. The second group judges that
the Soviets probably would have clandestine reporting,
including detailed information on cargoes and ship
departure times, as well as locating data from technical
collection, including radar and ELINT ocean recon-
naissance satellites and long-range HF/DF. According
to this view, the combination of these assets would
likely provide the intelligence necessary to direct
attacks on the more valuable convoys and-with great-
er difficulty-individual ships.
All agree that, in a conventional war, the Soviets could
attempt to disrupt port operations in Western Europe by a
bombing offensive. The large and repetitive bombing attacks
necessary for such an offensive would reduce the availability
of aircraft for other missions. Most bombers would be
required for the battle for air superiority and the destruction
of NATO nuclear delivery systems. Thus the Pact would
probably commit few bombers against port facilities early in
a war. If the Pact achieved air superiority in Western
Europe, and if a large part of its bomber force remained, a
systematic bombing campaign against ports could be initiat-
ed. In a theater nuclear war, the Soviets also would interdict
shipping by missile and air strikes on ports in Western
Europe and, in an intercontinental war, those in North
America as well.
Pact intentions for using mines to interdict merchant
shipping are not clear. While some Soviet submarines may
have a wartime mission to lay mines in restricted waters such
as in the approaches to a few key NATO ports, they would
not have the capability to mine large areas of the North
Atlantic littoral densely and still perform other missions.
Soviet surface ships and aircraft would be unable to lay and
replenish minefields effectively in areas of NATO air
superiority.
43
opet-
 80. Since the late 1960s the tactical nuclear forces
especially have experienced important changes in both
size and capabilities. (See figure 13.) These changes
have included:
-Significant increases in the inventory of tactical
nuclear delivery systems in Europe. The expan-
sion has already included about a one-third
increase in the number of tactical surface-to-sur-
face missile launchers and a tripling of nuclear
delivery aircraft in Central Europe since 1970.
- Increases in the number of tactical nuclear weap-
ons the Soviets plan to use in Central Europe.
Nuclear weapons allocations
critical en ra
Front have tripled.
- Increases in the warhead yields of tactical sur-
face- to-surface missiles. The motivation for the
larger yields is unclear, but the ,Soviets may
perceive a requirement for greater areas of de-
struction to compensate for the relatively poor
accuracy of their current missile systems and the
lack of timely, accurate reconnaissance data on
small, mobile targets.
- Development and deployment of a new genera-
tion of tactical nuclear delivery systems with
characteristics superior to those of their predeces-
sors. Newer models of Soviet tactical aircraft
have greatly improved range and payload capa-
bilities, and more effective tactical surface-to-
surface missiles are being deployed.
81. The Soviets have a variety of tactical nuclear
delivery systems in their ground and tactical air forces
deployed opposite NATO. Nuclear weapons are also
carried by many of the Soviet Navy's general purpose
ships, submarines, and aircraft. The Soviets have given
their East European allies reason to believe that they
will be provided nuclear weapons in wartime. The
NSWP national commands, particularly the Polish and
Czechoslovak commands, evidently train and plan for
the eventuality that they will receive nuclear war-
heads in wartime.
n a i ion, we have m orma-
tion that NSWP war plans may include procedures for
the transfer of Soviet nuclear warheads to NSWP
missile units. Thus, while we have no direct evidence
regarding Soviet intentions, we judge that NSWP
Warsaw Pact Tactical Nuclear
Forces Opposite NATO,
1969 and 1979
Tactical Tactical Nuclear-
Aircraft Missile Capable
Pieces
1979
tactical aircraft and missiles, as shown in table 3, are
likely to be used for nuclear operations in Europe.
82. Tactical Aircraft. Numerically, the most im-
portant nuclear delivery systems in Eastern Europe
are Soviet tactical aircraft. Virtually all Soviet fighter-
bomber units in Eastern Europe conduct training and
exercise activities which indicate a mission of deliver-
ing nuclear bombs. As of 1975, however, only about
one-third of the pilots in these Soviet units were
qualified by Soviet standards to drop nuclear bombs.
We expect that the number of Soviet tactical air units
in the USSR which have nuclear missions will increase
as the Soviets continue to reequip units with new,
nuclear-capable aircraft. The role of Frontal Aviation
for delivering tactical nuclear weapons is exnandinix.
83. Tactical Missiles. Ground force nuclear deliv-
ery systems consist mainly of the FROG, Scud, and
Scaleboard missiles. The Soviets have 31 FROG battal-
ions with some 124 launchers and 11 Scud brigades
 with 150 launchers in Eastern Europe. They have
another 65 FROG battalions (260 launchers) and 20
Scud brigades (240 launchers) in their military districts
opposite NATO. The Scud has a range of about 300
km and the FROG about 70 km. No Scaleboard
launchers (900-km range) are believed to be located in
Eastern Europe, but we estimate that six Scaleboard
units with 72 launchers are part of the forces in the
USSR earmarked for use against NATO. NSWP forces
have 310 FROG and Scud launchers.
84. The Soviets are improving the quality of their
tactical ballistic missile forces. The SS-21, a new
missile (range 120 to 130 km) roughly comparable to
the US Lance, is now with at least one division in the
western USSR. It offers major improvements in range
and accuracy over the FROG, which it is replacing.17
The SS-21 evidently has a cluster-munition warhead in
addition to the standard nuclear, chemical, and con-
ventional high-explosive warheads. A cluster-munition
warhead would significantly improve the SS-21's util-
ity during conventional warfare against soft targets
such as personnel and equipment in the open or
NATO air defense and electronics installations. The
SS-22, a replacement missile for the Scaleboard, be-
came operational last year and probably has already
been issued to some Scaleboard units in the USSR. It is
similar to the Scaleboard missile in range capability,
but probably has improved accuracy and warheads.
85. Nuclear Artillery. The Soviets have 250 to 300
nuclear-capable artillery pieces in their forces in the
western USSR. Nuclear-capable 203-mm self-pro-
pelled gun howitzers and 240-mm self-propelled mor-
tars have been identified in two heavy artillery units
there. Five other heavy artillery units there are
equipped with obsolete 203-mm and 240-mm weap-
ons. No Soviet heavy artillery units have been identi-
fied outside the USSR. A few exercises in East Ger-
many, however, have had notional allocation of
203-mm nuclear rounds yielding 2 and 5 kt and
240-mm rounds with yields of 5 kt. These exercises
suggest that nuclear artillery units may be introduced
into Soviet forces in East Germany eventually. There
" The accuracy of the SS-21 is estimated as a circular error
probable (CEP) of 200 to 300 meters at two-thirds the maximum
range of 120 to 130 kilometers. This is a significant increase in
accuracy over the FROG-7, with a CEP of 400 meters at two-thirds
the maximum range of 70 kilometers. CEP is a conventional index
of accuracy defined as the radius of the circle centered on the
intended target with in which there is a 50-percent probability that
an arriving missile warhead will fall.
is no reliable evidence that the Soviets have nuclear
rounds for their 152-mm artillery pieces-the largest
now in the forces in Central Europe.
86. Naval Forces. All fleets in the Soviet Navy are
also equipped with nuclear-capable weapon systems
for use in theater warfare. Virtually all of the USSR's
operational submarines carry at least two nuclear
torpedoes, and at least half of the missiles aboard
Soviet cruise-missile submarines are equipped with
nuclear warheads. This loading reflects the Soviet
belief that, although war could begin conventionally in
Europe, it would be fought under constant threat of
escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. For example,
the theater-dedicated submarines in the Northern
Fleet, loaded with their normal complement of con-
ventional and nuclear weapons, alone would carry
collectively about 400 tactical nuclear warheads.
87. Soviet Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites in
Eastern Europe. There are 23 Soviet storage sites in
Eastern Europe at least some of which almost certainly
contain nuclear weapons. Eleven of them are located
at Soviet tactical airfields, and 12 are isolated installa-
tions for the storage of warheads for tactical missiles
and rockets. (See figure 14.) We do not believe that the
NSWP countries operate or control any of the nuclear
storage sites in Eastern Europe.
88. Depending on the type stored and storage prac-
tice, the storage sites in Eastern Europe could hold a
total of 370 to 1,070 tactical nuclear bombs, and 1,700
to 2,900 FROG and Scud warheads. Missile warhead
storage capacity in Central Europe appears adequate,
provided the higher estimates of capacity are correct,
but bomb storage capacity appears to be insufficient to
satisfy the requirements for tactical nuclear operations
The
Soviets are estimated to have storage capacity for only
200 to 505 nuclear bombs in East Germany, 70 to 185
in Poland, and 30 to 95 in Czechoslovakia. They
probably plan to move additional bombs and war-
heads into the forward area from the numerous
tactical nuclear weapons storage sites in the western
USSR before or during hostilities. We have identified
bunkers at 12 Soviet tactical airfields in Eastern
Europe which may be intended for nuclear bomb
storage during a crisis or in wartime. Although these
facilities do not appear to be active in peacetime, they
probably could be readied within hours to receive
nuclear bombs transferred from the USSR.
45
or SMre+_
 Soviet Nuclear Storage Sites in Eastern Europe
Nuclear warhead
storage site
? Nuclear bomb
storage site
o Temporary storage
site
U.S.S.R.
Top ec
577634 1-79 Cu TCS 886263/78
Belgrade *
YUGOSLAVIA
46
L
 Top Secre
Soviet Peripheral Strike Forces 18
89. Elements of all the Soviet strategic attack
forces-Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), Long Range
Aviation (LRA), and the Soviet Navy-have the mis-
sion of carrying out nuclear strikes against NATO
targets. These include 490 to 508 medium- and inter-
mediate-range ballistic missiles (SS-4 MRBMs and SS-5
and SS-20 IRBMs), 525 LRA bombers (Badger, Blind-
er, and Backfire), and 11 ballistic missile submarines
(G-class and H-class). Only a relatively small portion
of Soviet ICBMs and modern ballistic missile subma-
rines is likely to be used to strike targets in NATO
Europe, and the 150 strike-configured Bear and Bison
bombers in LRA are intended mainly for intercontin-
ental missions.
90. For strategic forces the most significant devel-
opments have been the deployment of the Backfire
bomber and the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic
missile. The Backfire is well suited for the peripheral
strike mission and greatly improves the payload and
penetration capabilities of Soviet bomber forces tar-
geted against NATO. The mobile SS-20 force, when
fully deployed, will have greater survivability and
destructive power than the present peripheral missile
force. We expect that eventually the SS-20 will replace
the Soviets' older SS-4 and SS-5 peripheral missiles and
that, by the early 1980s, it will be the mainstay of the
land-based ballistic missile force for peripheral use.
Forces for Chemical Warfare
91. The Soviets have had a broad-based R&D pro-
gram for chemical warfare (CW) since World War II,
and they remain in the forefront in CW technical
knowledge. Pact forces generally are well equipped
and trained to operate in a CBR environment. Pact
ground forces have a variety of systems capable of
delivering chemical agents which would enable them
to cover large areas of the combat zone from the
forward edge of the battle area to at least 300
kilometers beyond. Airdropped munitions provide the
potential for large-scale strikes against NATO, espe-
cially against enemy nuclear delivery targets. Naval
weapon systems also provide a theater chemical war-
fare capability against ships at sea, points of embarka-
tion, forward storage sites, and amphibious landing
operations.
11 A detailed description of the deployment patterns and technical
characteristics of these systems is contained in NIE 11-6-78, Soviet
Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack, and in volume II, chapters
II, IV, and V of this Estimate.
92. No facilities in Warsaw Pact countries have
been postively identified as currently producing toxic
CW agents in militarily significant quantities, al-
though several in the USSR and in some NSWP
countries have historical association with CW agent
production and may still be engaged in this activity.
The nature of CW agent production is such that
postive identification of production facilities within an
industrial chemical complex is virtually impossible
without knowledgeable human sources.
93. There is no question that the Soviets and some
East Europeans either have produced or are capable of
producing toxic agents, inasmuch as their chemical
plants are already handling most of the raw materials
required to produce these agents. We believe that the
Soviet chemical industry can easily handle production
sufficient to maintain current Soviet reserves of bulk
chemical agents, plus whatever additional quantities
are required to replace agents consumed by training
and deterioration. The quantities involved are rela-
tively small, and large-scale production of agents
would not be necessary.
94. At the present time there are 10 major installa-
tions in the USSR believed to be associated with the
storage of CW toxic agents, filled munitions, or both.
A lack of evidence precludes determining the size or
composition of the Soviet CW agent stockpile, howev-
er. Because we know that the Soviets have developed a
range of toxic agents and delivery systems, and tactical
doctrine for their use, and because we have fragmen-
tary evidence on some field depots for chemical
storage, we do not doubt that they have operational
stocks, including some in Eastern Europe. We believe
these include nerve agents such as GB (sarin) and GD
(thickened and unthickened soman), as well as older
types of agents such as hydrogen cyanide, mustard,
and the mustard-lewisite mixture. Research relating to
incapacitating agents, such as the hallucinogen BZ and
agents closely related to it, is also continuing, but there
is no evidence that any agents of this type are
stockpiled.
Forces for Electronic Warfare
95. In the Soviet concept, electronic warfare is a
fundamental part of overall planning and must be
integrated into all phases of combat operations. In the
early 1970s, a radioelectronic combat (REC) depart-
ment was created within the Staff of the Combined
Armed Forces of the Pact to promote electronic
47
T -
 warfare and to ensure standardization of equipment
and procedures among the Pact armies. REC depart-
ments were also created within the Soviet General
Staff and in some of the military districts opposite
NATO. By the mid-1970s, REC staffs patterned after
the Soviet model had also been established in the East
German, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian forces.
96. Over the past decade the Soviets have initiated
a broad series of programs to modernize and expand
their already significant offensive and defensive capa-
bilities for REC in the European theater. Some of
these programs are still at an early stage of develop-
ment, however, and will not be completed before the
mid-to-late 1980s. In addition, the Pact is seeking to
improve the organization, procedures, and perfor-
mance of REC units, and the abilities of Pact ground,
air, and naval forces to operate under jamming
conditions.
97. Pact ground force elements for REC include
SIGINT collection units and active jamming units.
SIGINT units are found at division, army, and front
level, whereas jamming units are found only at the
front level but may be assigned to army commands to
support specific operations. In the Soviet air forces
opposite NATO, transport and combat aircraft have
been specially equipped to conduct electronic warfare
missions. The Soviet Navy has deployed electronic
collection and jamming equipment on combatants,
intelligence collection ships, and naval aircraft.
98. We are unable to determine the extent to which
the equipment of Pact jamming units meet Soviet
standards, but the Soviets have stated that production
of newer systems is lagging. The bulk of the jamming
equipment currently deployed represents technology
of the 1950s and the early 1960s. More modern
equipment first appeared in the early 1970s, but
representative models of this more advanced equip-
ment are only now appearing in the Pact,. primarily in
Soviet units. Several types of new equipment will not
be deployed fully until the mid-1980s. While the
Soviets do not have sufficient jamming equipment to
support electronic warfare on the scale called for in
their doctrine, even selective use could be a problem
for NATO.
Warsaw Pact Logistics
99. Warsaw Pact exercises, classified writings, and
other evidence indicate that the Pact is planning
logistic support for a series of short campaigns of high
intensity, involving the rapid achievement of a break-
through and advance to strategic objectives in the
NATO rear. Warsaw Pact logistic planning factors are
evidently based on Soviet World War II experience,
and updated in accordance with changes in tactics,
force structure, and equipment. Our information in
this regard dates from the early 1970s. We have no
way to judge the soundness of these Pact planning
factors in a future war as they relate to the attrition
rates for equipment and the consumption rates of
Our estimates of the levels of Pact ground an
air ammunition and POL supplies are based on calcu-
lations of the capacities of identified storage facilities,
adjusted to take loading factors into account. These
calculations and a discussion of Soviet naval logistic
capabilities are contained in volume II, chapter II, of
this Estimate.19
"Volume II also outlines differing agency views on the Pact's
wartime personnel replacement practices.
 WARSAW PACT STRATEGY FOR INITIAL
CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO
100. In this part of volume I we summarize our
understanding of Warsaw Pact command and control
and of likely Pact objectives and operations during the
initial conventional phases of a war with NATO.
Volume II of the Estimate contains additional, sup-
porting intelligence information and judgments, and
our estimates of the likely allocation of Pact forces to
campaigns in Central Europe, against NATO's flanks,
and in the North Atlantic.
101. We do not have access to the Pact's war plans,
but we can deduce their general nature, at least for the
opening phases of a war, from military exercises, from
Pact writings on military tactics and strategy, and
from the current disposition of Pact forces. The USSR
has developed contingency plans for military oper-
ations on all Pact land frontiers. Our information on
Soviet concepts for military operations is best for
offensive operations that would be directed against
NATO, especially in Central Europe. The Soviets
clearly expect Central Europe to be the decisive arena
in a war with NATO and assign it the highest priority
in the allocation of military manpower and
equipment.
102. We have considered the question of whether
the Soviets could rely on their Warsaw Pact allies to
participate willingly and effectively in hostilities
against NATO and have concluded that no categorical
answer is possible. The extent of reliability in non-
Soviet Warsaw Pact countries would depend chiefly
upon the circumstances under which NSWP forces
became engaged in war with NATO. The period of
tension before hostilities would allow the Soviets to
manipulate popular attitudes and political leaders. In
addition, the Pact's mobilization would be set in
motion and its momentum would carry military prep-
arations forward. Refusal on the part of an NSWP
country to participate at this stage could be dealt with
by force. In sum, the East Europeans would feel they
had little choice but to fight on behalf of the Pact.
Warsaw Pact Command and Control
103. The Warsaw Pact's success in achieving its
wartime objectives would depend on its ability to
control and coordinate multinational, joint-service op-
erations of great complexity. In peacetime, the War-
saw Pact headquarters does not control the armed
forces of member states. Each state controls its armed
forces through its national command authority, which
is made up of key party, government, and military
leaders. Operational control of national forces is exer-
cised by each country's general staff. Overall Pact
defense planning is coordinated among Pact members,
but the process is clearly Soviet dominated. Establish-
ment of the Pact wartime command system is not
automatic. It entails authoritative release of forces
from national control and their subordination to the
Pact's high command. Political and military consulta-
tions between senior Pact leaders would be necessary
to coordinate preparations for war.
104. The ultimate authority for the direction of the
Soviet military rests with the Politburo. The wartime
role of the Politburo is unclear, but its involvement as
a group would probably be limited to only the most
crucial decisions. A subset of the Politburo, the De-
fense Council, establishes military policy and makes
fundamental decisions regarding the employment of
military forces. We believe that the Defense Council
would form the nucleus of a largely civilian national
defense command organ. This body would consider all
defense issues and provide broad guidelines for the
conduct of military operations.
105. Brezhnev, predesignated as Supreme Com-
mander in Chief, would lead a Supreme High Com-
mand (Verkhovnoye Glavnokomandovaniye-VGK)
drawn from elements of the Ministry of Defense. (See
figure 15.) This command would constitute the mili-
tary-strategic leadership over all Pact military oper-
ations against NATO. The VGK probably includes at
least the three first deputy ministers of defense and
49
L
 Primary Option for Operational Control of Warsaw Pact Forces
Soviet Supreme
High Command (VGK)
General Staff
High'Command?of the
Combined Armed Forces
of the Warsaw Pacts
Assigned Strategic
Assets;;
I
' High Corrthfaltd, l~tothwestern
i "Theater;of Military Operationsb ?i
Leningrad Front:'
Operational control
Coordination
a. This headquarters may also function,
in the Soviet context, as the High
Command of the Western Theater of War.
b. A Soviet TVD. Could be directly
subordinate to the Soviet General Staff.
c. Front could be used in more than one
theater of military operations.
d. Northern Front assumes control
of an East German army under certain
contingencies.
et UMBRA
Baltic FrontC
Carpathian Fronts
High Command, Western
Theater of M.,ilitary Operations
Central (Soviet East-German)
Front
East European National
Defense ; Councils
High Command, Southweste n
Theater o MilifaryOperat onsi.."
Balkan; (Bulgarian) Front
National Defense
Ministries:
Romanian Front
Odessa Front
ret
 the commanders in chief of the five components of the
Soviet armed forces. One of the Soviet first deputy
ministers of defense (currently, Marshal Kulikov) is
the commander in chief of the combined armed forces
of the Warsaw Pact member states. The Soviet Gen-
eral Staff is the executive agent of the VGK and, as
such, is the focal point for operational control of Soviet
armed forces and those of the Pact in wartime.
106. We believe that should a war occur between
the Warsaw Pact and NATO, theater-level commands
would be established and exercise direct operational
control over fronts and fleets and at least some degree
of control over those strategic assets allocated to
support theater operations. Unlike NATO, the Warsaw
Pact does not have theater headquarters in being in
peacetime. Hardened command posts have been con-
structed for at least some Pact wartime headquarters,
however.
107. Arrangements for exercising control of Pact
forces within what the Soviets call the Western (or
European) Theater of War have been evolving over
the last few years. Although ultimate control of all
Pact operations continues to be the VGK and the
Soviet General Staff, we now have evidence that
indicates the commander in chief of the combined
armed forces of the Warsaw Pact would control all
Pact forces in this theater in wartime. We are less
certain of how he would do this-whether the High
Command of the Warsaw Pact would become a
component of the Soviet High Command with the
responsibility for operational control over forces with-
in the Western Theater or whether it would form a
separate command entity.
108. In considering a future war with NATO,
Soviet strategists envision widespread combat oper-
ations encompassing all of Europe and extending into
the North Atlantic. Accordingly, they plan to divide
the Western Theater of War into three land Theaters
of Military Operations (TVDs) in which they expect
Pact and NATO forces to come in conflict. (See figure
16.)
- The Northwestern TVD. Based on the Soviet
Leningrad Military District, this theater would
encompass the Scandinavian Peninsula and im-
mediately adjacent waters.
- The Western TVD. This theater would include,
on the Pact side, Soviet and East European forces
in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
and Soviet forces in the western USSR and, on
the NATO " side, West Germany, the Benelux
nations, Denmark, and possibly France and
northern Spain. Pact operations in the western
Baltic Sea also would be included in this TVD.
- The Southwestern TVD. Soviet planners envi-
sion military operations against Greece and Tur-
key and probably northern Italy and Austria.
This theater would also include the Black and
Mediterranean Seas.
109. The Soviets also expect major naval operations
against NATO in the North Atlantic to occur in
conjunction with a conflict in Europe. The equivalent
of the TVD in Soviet maritime strategy is the MTVD,
the Maritime Theater of Military Operations. We are
less certain about the approximate boundaries of
MTVDs than we are about those of TVDs. Operations,
exercises, and documentary evidence suggest that the
Soviets would regard an area in the Norwegian Sea
north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
(G-I-UK) gap as an MTVD.
110. The Pact's commander in chief would control
the Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-
often called High Commands by the Soviets-which
would in turn exercise direct control over assigned
fronts, flotillas, separate armies, and those strategic
forces allocated to support TVD operations. We are
unsure whether a TVD command would be formed to
control operations against NATO's northern flank or,
if established, whether it would be under the control
of the Pact's commander in chief or directly subordi-
nate to the Soviet General Staff. In any case, Soviet
members of the Pact's military hierarchy have pro-
posed that the control organs for TVD High Com-
mands-commanders, staffs, communications, and
command centers-be established in peacetime.
111. Regardless of what echelons of command are
created to integrate wartime theater-level and strate-
gic operations, the senior tactical command would be
the front. Although not directly comparable to any
Western organization, the front would be similar to
the NATO army group in size, level of command, and
function. A front would usually consist of three to five
ground armies, each including three to five tank or
motorized rifle divisions, and an air army of as many
as several hundred tactical aircraft. A front operating
in a maritime sector might also control any naval
elements which were chiefly devoted to that front's
mission. The ground forces of the front would also
 Possible Warsaw Pact Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs) in Europe
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52
 include numerous separate combat and combat-sup-
port elements such as tank, artillery, missile, and air
defense units. Large service-support elements would
provide the front with transport, maintenance, engi-
neering, supply, and medical support. The Soviet front
in East Germany could total more than 500,000 men
after full mobilization; a more typical front would
have some 300,000 to 400,000 men.
112. In wartime, the Pact would have two com-
bined fleets opposite NATO: the Baltic and Black Sea
Combined Fleets, both under Soviet command. The
Combined Baltic Fleet would consist of elements from
the Soviet Baltic Fleet and from the Polish and East
German Navies. The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the
Romanian and Bulgarian Navies. The Soviet Northern
Fleet and the Soviet 5th Squadron (Eskadra) in the
Mediterranean would support Pact operations under
the control of the Main Naval Staff in Moscow,
although in some cases control might be exercised by
continental theater-level commands.
113. We believe that the Pact's command and
control system is adequate to alert forces and control
mobilization and to control combat operations. In a
rapidly developing crisis, deploying and activating the
Pact's entire wartime command and control system
would require about a week. The system for theater
operations has important strengths:
- Soviet dominance of the Pact allows the USSR to
control almost all aspects of Pact operations.
- The Pact has a standardized command and
control doctrine.
- The Pact has a significant degree of flexibility in
the resubordination of ground armies and divi-
sions from one command to another, including
resubordination of these units from one nation to
the command of another.
- Each echelon of command has the capability to
control both its immediate and second-echelon
subordinates.
The Pact command and control system is charac-
terized by redundancy, hardening, mobility, and
dispersal. As such, the system provides a high
degree of survivability.
Pact forces have a high degree of communica-
tions security, both in operating practices and in
security devices.
- The Pact is demonstrating an increasing degree
of interoperability in communications equip-
ment.
- Pact mobile signal units have backup communi-
cations equipment to replace that damaged or
destroyed.
114. Our judgments regarding these strengths are
tempered by information from Soviet classified writ-
ings-as well as from defectors and emigres-which
illuminates Pact views of some problem areas within
elements of the system. Problems noted include in-
stances of poor-quality staff and communications per-
sonnel; low Russian-language proficiency on the part
of some Pact staffs; shortcomings in quantity, capacity,
interoperability, maintainability, and security of com-
munications equipment; and failure to fulfill doctrinal
requirements for camouflage and distance between
communications centers and command posts.
115. Because command, control, and communica-
tions are essential in modern warfare, any serious
degradation of these functions would have an adverse
impact on the effectiveness of combat operations.
Systematic analyses are under way to determine the
degree of susceptibility of the Pact command and
control system to destruction and degradation. Al-
though detailed results are not available, we can make
several important judgments about Pact vulnerability.
- Because of Pact efforts at hardening and redun-
dancy, serious degradation of Pact command and
control functions probably would not occur as a
result of collateral damage from weapons di-
rected at other targets.
- Although the destruction of all major command
and control targets would require hundreds of
weapons, selective and repeated attacks on im-
portant facilities could reduce Pact combat effec-
tiveness and possibly stall current or future com-
bat operations.
- The effect of destroying different command
posts would vary according to the echelon at-
tacked. For example, destruction of the front's
main or rear command posts, where most plan-
ning occurs, may not have as great an impact on
current operations as on subsequent operations.
Destruction of army and division forward com-
mand posts or regimental command posts, how-
ever, would likely have an immediate disruptive
impact on operations.
53
 The Initial Campaign in the Western Theater of
Military Operations
116. Soviet military strategy calls for a massive and
rapid ground offensive into NATO territory in Central
Europe to defeat NATO forces, disrupt mobilization,
and seize or destroy ports and airfields to prevent
reinforcement. Because this strategy envisions a highly
fluid battlefield and high rates of advance, Pact
planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO
forward defenses rapidly to prevent the Western
Alliance from strengthening its defenses and using the
time gained for mobilization and reinforcement. They
recognize that this strategy would be complicated by a
period of political crisis and tension that almost cer-
tainly would precede a war and provide impetus to
NATO preparations.
117. To achieve the force ratios deemed necessary
to accomplish its objectives, the Pact has evolved
mobilization and attack concepts that are intended to
maximize initial combat power, on the assumption
that a war in Europe would be short, and therefore
decided largely by forces in being or quickly available.
Accordingly, the Soviets plan against the contingency
that Pact forces based in Central Europe, about half of
them East European, might be required to initiate a
Pact offensive campaign and, bypassing strong resist-
ance, carry the campaign well into NATO territory
before reinforcements would arrive from the western
USSR.
118. Pact planning for the Western Theater of
Military Operations evidently envisions initial offen-
sives along axes of advance in three destinct areas-
central, northern, and southwestern. (See figure 17.)
The Pact probably would seek to organize its initial
attack forces in this TVD into three fronts which
would correspond to these areas of responsibility. In
NIE 4-1-78 (Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities
for Going to War in Europe: Implications for NATO
Warning of War), we evaluated various attack options
which the Warsaw Pact might consider for launching
offensives in the Western TVD, should it decide to
start a war with NATO. These options defined alterna-
tive ways in which the Pact might organize the 58
Soviet and NSWP divisions in Central Europe and the
29 Soviet divisions in the three western military
districts of the USSR. A summary of the conclusions of
that evaluation, and a discussion of Pact concepts for
breaking through NATO's defenses and subsequent
ground operations in Central Europe, are contained in
volume II of this Estimate.
119. While the Soviets regard most of their allies
with habitual distrust-and at one time or another
most of them have merited distrust by rebellion or
political instability-the Soviets have nevertheless en-
trusted their allies to carry out wartime functions
potentially critical to the Pact's prospects for success in
a conflict with NATO. The East Europeans provide
more than half the Pact combat divisions in Central
Europe, and the Soviets count on attacks by Polish
units in the north and Czechoslovak units in the south
to tie down large NATO forces and permit the
concentration of Soviet and East German forces in the
critical central sector. The major lines of communica-
tion from the USSR run through Poland, East Ger-
many, and Czechoslovakia, and nationals of these
countries are chiefly responsible for operating and
maintaining them. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces are
intended to provide forward air defense for the west-
ern USSR and to protect the Pact's logistic and rear
area support. All of this suggests that the Soviets have
reconciled themselves to whatever reliability problems
they envision and have made a calculated decision to
rely on effective NSWP performance in the contin-
gencies for which they plan military operations.
120. Concepts for the Offensive. The tactics em-
ployed by the Pact to overcome NATO defenses will
be based on its perceptions of how strong those
defenses are. The Pact would prefer to employ forces
on multiple axes, moving in tactical march columns to
54
- Toprat
T C S 2
-76
 Illustrative Warsaw Pact Ground Force Campaign in the Western TVD
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
FRANCE
111
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echoslovak-
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 Tnn SF+~r
penetrate defense positions through gaps, weak points,
and open flanks, relying heavily on speed and maneu-
ver. In areas where the Pact believed that it must
penetrate strong, continuous NATO defenses, it would
mount breakthrough operations on each principle axis
of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis
of advance to the overall theater offensive plan and
the strength of the defense, a breakthrough attempt
might involve the major forces of either a front or an
army.
123. The Soviets place considerable stress on efforts
to anticipate NATO's intention to use nuclear weapons
on a large scale in time to launch a Pact preemptive
attack. To this end, they expect to keep their own
nuclear delivery systems in a high state of readiness
and to conduct a vigorous reconnaissance and intelli-
gence collecting campaign against NATO's nuclear
units and facilities, as well as its communications
networks, to detect signs which might presage the
imminent use of nuclear weapons.
121. The Dilemma of the Nuclear Transition.
Soviet military writings confirm that Warsaw Pact
planners see a dilemma in the prospect that a war with
NATO could be nonnuclear in the beginning and
escalate rapidly to large-scale nuclear war. On the one
hand, if faced with strong, continuous NATO defenses,
the Pact planners would have to mass large concentra-
tions of forces in places of their choosing to attempt
breakthroughs. On the other hand, they fear that
NATO might take advantage of their vulnerability
while massing for an attack and launch a nuclear
strike. The dilemma has led the Soviets to plan a
large-scale nonnuclear air attack on NATO's air and
nuclear facilities-to which they would commit the
bulk of the Warsaw Pact tactical air force and much of
the Soviet LRA bomber force-in an attempt to
eliminate most of NATO's theater nuclear potential at
the very outset of hostilities.
122. The Pact's plans to reduce the vulnerability of
its attacking ground forces during breakthrough efforts
call for dispersed units to converge rapidly near the
point of contact with NATO forces, attack, achieve a
breakthrough, and then disperse, continuing the ad-
vance or exploitation along a number of different axes.
This tactic is designed to minimize the time during
which Pact forces would be exposed to nuclear strikes.
It is also intended to complicate NATO's use of
nuclear weapons by having the Pact units come
together for the assault at a point as close as possible to
NATO lines so that NATO cannot effectively employ
nuclear weapons without endangering its own troops.
The Soviets recognize, however, that the breakthrough
operation is a complex and risky maneuver. This is
apparent from the considerable attention Soviet plan-
ners continue to devote to the coordination and com-
munications problems associated with moving large
attacking forces covertly, committing them from the
march, dispersing them, and providing replacements
and reinforcements for them.
124. Tanks Versus Antitank Weapons. Because
the type of offensive the Pact planners envision in
Central Europe is highly dependent on the mobility
and shock effect provided by large numbers of tanks,
the Pact is concerned that the proliferation in NATO
forces of improved antitank weapons has greatly in-
creased NATO's capability to stop Pact armor. As a
result, the Pact has modified its tactics and initiated
several force improvement programs in an effort to
cope with NATO's antitank threat.
125. Pact doctrine has traditionally stressed the role
of artillery on the conventional battlefield, and the
Pact now has in Central Europe more than twice as
many artillery pieces as NATO. Pact artillery doctrine
stresses preplanned, massed barrages, which provide
the high volume of fire required in nonnuclear break-
through operations against relatively static defenses,
especially against forward antitank defenses. The large
number of multiple rocket launchers deployed with
Pact forces could be particularly effective in this role.
126. Work to reduce the vulnerability of tanks to
antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) has been under way
in the Soviet Union since at least the early 1960s, most
of it directed at defeating the high-explosive antitank
(HEAT) warheads which virtually all infantry anti-
tank weapons in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact
employ. To provide better protection, particularly
against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo-
rated composite or laminated armor arrays in their
new T-64 and T-72 tanks. The additional tanks which
the Soviets have assigned to their divisions in the past
decade may be intended to compensate for the heavier
losses that Soviet planners expect to sustain from
improved antitank defenses and to enable assaulting
units to overwhelm these defenses by sheer numbers.
The addition of an independent tank battalion to a
motorized rifle division provides the division com-
mander with an additional maneuver force to commit
at a critical point in the battle.
 127. Subsequent Operations. If a major break-
through were accomplished by the forces of the
Soviet-East German Front, the three tank armies of
this front probably would launch rapid thrusts-
perhaps aided by airborne assaults-in an attempt to
secure crossings over the Rhine near Essen, Frankfurt,
and similar points, and continue the advance to at least
the French border. The Polish Front, upon breaking
through initial defenses in its area, would be respon-
sible for advancing both into Denmark and across
northern Germany into the Netherlands. The So-
viet-Czechoslovak Front would move into southern
West Germany, and advance toward crossings over the
Rhine south of Mannheim.
The Air Offensive in Central Europe
129. Pact planners also consider NATO's tactical air
forces in Central Europe a formidable threat to Pact
ground, air, and nuclear forces during the initial,
conventional phase of war, and one of NATO's princi-
pal means for delivering nuclear strikes in Europe.
Consequently, they regard the early attainment of air
superiority and destruction of much of NATO's tacti-
cal nuclear forces to be critical to the Pact's chances
for victory in the theater. The Soviets regard air
superiority as a condition in which NATO's air and air
defense forces would cease to pose a serious threat to
the operations of Pact ground, air, and naval forces.
The Pact plans to achieve these objectives by conduct-
ing a large-scale, theaterwide conventional air offen-
sive during the first several days of hostilities. The
Soviets refer to this offensive as the Air Operation.
(See figure 18.)
- The Pact would commit most of its tactical
aircraft and a large number of its Long Range
Aviation bombers to a series of air assaults de-
signed to achieve tactical surprise at the outset of
hostilities and lasting for the first two to four
days of combat.
- Each assault, consisting of two to three waves of
aircraft, would begin with a concerted effort to
destroy or suppress air defenses in corridors
through which attacking aircraft would proceed
to strike airfields, nuclear-weapons-associated fa-
cilities, and command, control, and communica-
tions facilities.
- LRA bombers would constitute the primary force
for attacking airfields. Most tactical air forces
would be used to suppress air defenses, especially
HAWK missile batteries. They would also be
expected to provide fighter cover for attack
aircraft, to provide reconnaissance and REC
support, and to attack surface-to-surface missile
units and some NATO airfields. NSWP national
air defense fighters would escort Soviet bombers
over Pact territory and provide strategic air
defense of their homelands.
- Some fighter-bomber and bomber aircraft would
be withheld for use in nuclear operations, and a
small number of tactical aircraft would be avail-
able for direct support of the ground forces.
131. Pact planners would regard attacks against
NATO airfields as the principal way of gaining air
superiority. They would intend such attacks to damage
runways and other airfield facilities and thus degrade
NATO's ability to operate its air forces effectively. In
its effort to achieve nuclear superiority, the Pact
would probably concentrate its attacks on those bases
from which NATO nuclear delivery aircraft would
operate.
132. The Pact has approximately 3,000 tactical
aircraft, 775 national air defense fighters, and 525
LRA bombers available for use in Central Europe.
Pact writings and exercise scenarios lead us to estimate
that, of these aircraft, about 350 LRA bombers and
about 1,200 to 2,100 tactical aircraft would be made
available for use in the Air Operation. The remaining
aircraft would be used to defend Pact territory and to
provide direct combat support to Pact ground forces.
 Illustrative Penetration Corridors for a Warsaw Pact Air Operation
Against the NATO Central Region .
4 NATO airbases
HAWK missile belt
Penetration corridor
e ret-
58
TC L t_
 Some of the remaining aircraft would also be kept in
readiness for the transition to nuclear war. The num-
ber of aircraft available for the initial assault of an Air
Operation would vary according to the extent to which
the Pact mobilized and moved additional tactical air
133. We have no direct evidence of Pact expecta-
tions regarding aircraft losses during the Air Opera-
tion. We believe, however, that the Pact probably
would not measure the success of the Air Operation in
these terms. Substantial Pact losses might be viewed as
tolerable to Pact planners contemplating a short, deci-
sive conflict, even if the Air Operation managed only
to keep NATO's air forces preoccupied with fending
for their own survival during the first few days of
hostilities. With their attention so diverted, NATO's
air forces could have difficulty countering Pact ground
forces during the most critical phases of their initial
operations-the breakthrough and penetration of
NATO's forward defenses. How the Pact would meas-
ure the degree to which the Air Operation would
contribute to Pact nuclear superiority is less clear. Pact
strategists may regard this objective as being subsumed
under that of air superiority because they view
NATO's air forces as the principal component of
NATO's theater nuclear capability.
134. The ability of the Pact's air forces to reduce
significantly the effectiveness of NATO's air and
theater nuclear forces would be affected by a variety
of factors. Chief among them are Pact capabilities to
achieve surprise, effectively coordinate the employ-
ment of large numbers of aircraft, suppress NATO's
air defenses, and destroy aircraft and crater runways
and taxiways at NATO's airfields. Other important
factors include the proficiency of Pact aircrews and
the ability of Pact air forces to perform their primary
missions in poor flying weather. Our assessment of
these factors is contained in volume II, chapter IV.
Some in the Intelligence Community believe
that, on balance, a Pact Air Operation would do
considerable damage to NATO's air and air defense
forces, but probably would not be so effective as to
prevent NATO's air forces from being able to deliver
nuclear weapons on a large scale.21 This conclusion is
based on the evaluation of Pact deficiencies and
weaknesses contained in volume II, key points of
which are summarized below:
- The Pact is unlikely to achieve strategic surprise
because of the extensive preparations that it
would feel compelled to make in order to en-
hance the prospects for success of a general
offensive in Central Europe.
- The Pact's ability to orchestrate an Air Operation
requiring precisely timed, multiple sorties by
Soviet bombers flying out of the USSR and the
tactical and national air defense forces of several
different nationalities operating from within
Eastern Europe is open to question.
- The Pact will have difficulty suppressing
NATO's air defenses because the tactical aircraft
assigned this responsibility are currently
equipped mainly with direct attack weapons-
which means that NATO's HAWK surface-
to-air-missile sites would have to be visually
identified by Pact aircrews before they could be
attacked.
- The Pact capability to destroy aircraft protected
by shelters and to break up runways is judged to
be limited because of the size of the force the
Pact apparently intends to commit to this task,
and the tactics it apparently intends to employ.
- Pact tactical aircrews generally are not well
trained-as measured by US standards-for
combat in the hostile environment they would
likely encounter in executing the Air Operation.
- Pact tactical aircraft generally are not equipped
to navigate at low altitude nor are they able to
attack targets in poor weather, so visibilities in
excess of several thousand meters would be im-
perative for the success of the Air Operation.
136. Others believe that no judgment with any
useful level of confidence on the effectiveness of an
Air Operation is possible at this time.22 They believe
that a conclusion such as expressed above should of
" The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State.
PO Illustrative deployment options and a discussion of likely Pact "The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
preparations for and combat operations during an Air Operation are Agency, and the Assistant Chief of staff, intelligence, Department
contained in volume II, chapter IV, of this Estimate. of the Air Force.
59
TC I Top et
 necessity be based on a rigorous analysis of the factors
involved which apply to both NATO and the Pact, and
the interaction of the forces of both sides. They
observe that no such analysis has been offered to
support the conclusion. They further believe that the
sensitivity of any such analysis to assumptions which
have to be based on meager evidence-Pact weapon
allocation and delivery tactics, for example-would
make the validity of such an analysis open to question.
Naval Operations in the Baltic
137. Warsaw Pact naval operations in the Baltic
would be conducted in the context of the overall
campaign in the Western Theater of Military Oper-
ations in Central Europe, and would conform with the
timing and objectives of the Pact's ground and air
forces, in particular those of the Polish, or Northern,
Front of that TVD. This front, composed primarily of
Polish forces, but with the support of the Combined
Baltic Fleet, would be responsible initially for captur-
ing northern West Germany and Denmark. (See figure
19.)
138. The broad objectives of Pact naval operations
would be to gain complete control of the Baltic Sea
and access to the North Sea to sever NATO's lines of
communication in the North Sea, and deprive NATO
of potential launch areas for carrier strikes against Pact
air and ground forces in the Central Region. Control
of the Baltic Sea would also facilitate subsequent
amphibious operations against Denmark and West
Germany, act as a defensive buffer for Pact territory,
and defend Pact sea lines of communication from
NATO attack. The major Pact forces involved would
consist of the Soviet Baltic Fleet reinforced by the
naval forces of East Germany and Poland, the Soviet
Baltic Fleet Air Force, Long Range Aviation, and
elements of the Pact's national air defense and tactical
air forces.
Illustrative Warsaw Pact Naval and Amphibious Operations
in the Western TVD
J:(
North
Sea
SWEDEN
denial'
' perations,,
J T_4ID
bENI(ARK;
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WEST
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Berlin.
EAST
GERMANY
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Bornht+tm
Sea
Amphibious
''"assaults
Polish (Northern
Front
Warsaw
POLAND- *
60
TCS oprel-
 139. A main objective of the Pact's initial naval
operations in the Baltic would be to destroy NATO
submarines, fast patrol boats, and mine warfare units
because they could interfere with Pact ship move-
ments, especially west of Bornholm Island, and with
amphibious operations. Pact planners recognize that
the elimination of these forces in the Baltic would be a
difficult task. According to operational availability
information reported to NATO, the Danes and West
Germans probably would have 23 diesel-powered
submarines and 40 fast patrol boats, 23 of the latter
missile armed, after two to four days of preparation.
Obviously, it would be preferable for the Pact to
destroy these ships at their bases, but a period of
tension would provide time for them to deploy and
disperse, obliging the Pact to locate and destroy them
at sea or in concealed anchorages. This would require
effective coordination of all Pact forces, an undertak-
ing which Pact planners acknowledge would be
difficult.
140. Air superiority would be a critical ingredient
to Pact Baltic Sea operations. As part of the effort to
gain overall theater air superiority at the outset of a
conflict in Central Europe, initial Pact air operations
in the Baltic would be directed against West German
and Danish naval bases and airfields and against
NATO naval units already present in the area in an
attempt to establish sea control and air superiority for
the protection of subsequent Pact amphibious oper-
ations. Pact air forces probably would also operate
against NATO naval forces in the North Sea. Initial
strikes by Baltic Fleet bombers against NATO air
defenses in Denmark and northern West Germany
might be part of air operations in Central Europe or at
least would be coordinated with those operations. Such
strikes would facilitate the overflight of Soviet naval
aircraft en route to NATO naval targets in the North
Sea. Achievement of air superiority over the Baltic
would depend largely on the success of the Pact's
critical offensive Air Operation in Central Europe.
141. The Soviets probably would find it difficult to
deal with West German and Danish submarines in the
Baltic, particularly if these forces were well coordi-
nated. NATO boats have good shallow-water operat-
ing capabilities, are quiet, and have well-trained
crews. Moreover, the Soviets would find it difficult to
conduct antisubmarine warfare operations without air
superiority. Under the difficult hydrological condi-
tions that generally characterize the Baltic, we believe
that Pact ASW sensors would be inadequate to detect
submarines at useful ranges except possibly in harbor
entrances and a few close-in coastal areas. Efforts to
use moored acoustic buoys have had little success thus
far. Furthermore, Soviet shipborne and airborne ASW
forces in the Baltic have been unsuccessful in their
attempts to follow up contacts.
we believe that it initial sea control and air
superiority operations were successful, Pact forces in
the Baltic would then concentrate on supporting the
Polish (Northern) Front's offensive across northern
West Germany and into Jutland. Combined amphib-
ious and airborne landings are planned against the
Danish islands. The Soviets consider seizure of these
islands, especially Zealand, to be necessary to prevent
naval use of the Baltic by NATO, to permit passage of
Soviet naval forces to and from the North Sea, and to
be able to carry out subsequent amphibious operations
against southern Norway. Early airborne or amphib-
ious operations are also planned against Bornholm
Island to neutralize NATO intelligence collection fa-
cilities there and prevent its subsequent use by NATO
combat forces.
143. Amphibious operations in the Baltic would
involve ships from the Soviet, Polish, and East German
Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces
would be drawn from the Soviet Baltic Fleet naval
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing division, and
a specially trained regiment of an East German motor-
ized rifle division. A Polish mechanized division which
has received some amphibious training and Soviet
motorized rifle divisions from the USSR could be
included in follow-on landings. The amphibious land-
ings would be coordinated with the ground offensive
in Jutland and with airborne landings by a Polish
division and perhaps Soviet airborne troops. Because
of a shortage of NSWP landing craft, some Polish and
East German amphibious assault forces probably
would use Soviet transport forces in the initial assault.
144. Pact planners recognize that the amphibious
operation would require the multinational integration
of a variety of forces, including tactical aircraft and
mine warfare, ASW, gunfire support, and logistic
ships. This continues to be a problem for the Pact in its
combined Baltic Sea amphibious exercises. We con-
clude that failure to attain air superiority and sea
control of the western Baltic, especially during a
conventional war, would almost certainly cause the
Pact to reconsider the feasibility of its planned
61
TCSL
 ___r
7111
amphibious operations. If the amphibious assaults
were canceled, Pact planners would also have to
decide if any airborne operations could be conducted
independently.
145. Pact planners believe that a key element in all
Baltic operations would be to thwart NATO minelay-
ing operations by destroying mine stockpiles and
minelaying ships before they deploy. We have reliable
evidence that Pact planners would consider NATO
minefields off the Danish and German coasts to be a
serious threat to their amphibious operations. The task
of clearing paths through large fields of contact and
influence mines, particularly if opposed by NATO air
and naval forces, would be viewed by the Pact as
extremely difficult and potentially quite costly. In
addition, Pact mine-clearing forces have not demon-
strated a high level of proficiency in exercises or other
peacetime operations such as in the Gulf of Suez.
Nonetheless, Pact naval forces in the Baltic have
approximately 175 mine warfare ships and craft of all
types and routinely train in mine-clearing operations.
146. According to one view in the Intelligence
Community, the allocation of most Pact tactical and
LRA bomber aircraft to a large-scale Air Operation in
West Germany and. the Benelux countries would
severely reduce the probability of the Pact's achieving
air superiority over the Baltic in the initial stage of a
war with NATO.23 Without air superiority the Pact
would have a low probability of sweeping NATO's
mines or of successfully defending the amphibious
force against NATO missile-armed fast patrol boats. It
is further believed that Pact ASW forces probably
would be unable to prevent NATO submarine attacks
against the amphibious forces. This conclusion is based
on the judgments contained in paragraph 141.
147. An alternative view holds that the Warsaw
Pact's achievement of air superiority over the Baltic
would depend on many factors, including the alloca-
tion of Pact naval aviation aircraft to suppression of
NATO air capabilities in the Baltic area, the degree of
success the Pact forces might achieve in these air
operations, and the speed with which they achieved
it.24 The holders of this view believe that the conclu-
22 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency;
the Director, National Security Agency; and the Director, Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
" The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence; Department
of the Air Force.
sions expressed above would be highly sensitive to a
number of additional factors, including assumptions
about the interaction of NATO and Pact surface and
subsurface forces, as well as about the timing and
urgency which the Pact attached to prosecution of the
amphibious operations. They observe that analysis of
all these factors has not been sufficient to support any
conclusions, explicit or implied, as to the probability of
success or failure of Pact amphibious operations, or the
degree to which the Pact could defeat NATO subma-
rine operations, in the Baltic.
148. A third view holds that the achievement of air
superiority is but one of a number of key factors
which, taken together, will determine the outcome of
the Pact's Baltic campaign.25 The holder of this view
considers that allocation of considerable air assets to
the Pact's Baltic campaign is likely but believes that
other factors of equally critical importance include the
extent of Pact success in countering NATO mining and
submarine operations in the approaches to the Danish
Straits.
149. In addition to the initial naval operations in
the Baltic itself, other operations would be conducted
in the North Sea to destroy important NATO maritime
targets, especially aircraft carrier or amphibious
forces, to prevent NATO naval reinforcements from
entering the Baltic, and to sever the lines of communi-
cation through the North Sea to the European conti-
nent. Evidence indicates that air operations against
surface ships in the North Sea and its approaches
would be conducted primarily by missile-equipped
aircraft of the Baltic Fleet and possibly some from the
Northern Fleet. Pact planners envision that operations
from Baltic airfields probably would require the estab-
lishment of safe flight corridors-probably using some
of these same missile-equipped aircraft-across Den-
mark or northern West Germany. They also probably
believe that airstrikes by way of the Norwegian Sea
would require suppression of Norwegian- and UK-
based air defenses. If the Pact's initial air defense
suppression operations were successful, those surviving
strike aircraft not on nuclear alert would then be
available to attack NATO forces in the North Sea.
Initially, in a period of conventional warfare, as much
as one-third of the Baltic and Northern fleet naval
aircraft probably would be withheld for nuclear
operations.
"The holder of this view is the Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy.
62
oJ_
 1501 he Soviets
intend to deploy a few Baltic an Northern Fleet
submarines to the North Sea before the outbreak of
hostilities to complement the antiship operations of
Pact aircraft. A deployment from the Baltic, however,
would provide warning indications to NATO. We
believe that deployment of surface ships into the
North Sea prior to hostilities would be unlikely be-
cause the Pact would lack air cover there early in a
war.
Initial Campaigns Against NATO's Flanks
151. The Soviets also have plans for offensive action
152. We have little direct evidence on the Pact's
view of the timing of these flank offensives in relation
to an offensive in Central Europe. We judge, however,
that the Pact would be unlikely to start a war by
mounting major ground offensives against all NATO
sectors simultaneously. To do so would unnecessarily
extend available Pact forces, airlift, and air and logistic
support and would complicate command and control
at the General Staff and Supreme High Command
levels. The planned Pact air offensive in Central
Europe would tie up the bulk of the Pact's tactical air
forces and Soviet intermediate-range bomber forces
for at least the first week, and the Soviet airlift could
not simultaneously support two major airborne oper-
ations such as those contemplated against the Danish
and Turkish Straits. Moreover, there could be political
considerations that would lead the Soviets to defer
attacks on some NATO countries in the hope of
encouraging their nonbelligerence.
153. We believe that the need for unfettered naval
operations from their Northern Fleet bases would
almost certainly cause the Soviets to strike NATO
facilities in northern Norway, and probably to attempt
to occupy some territory there, and that the urgency
of this need would lead them to do so concurrently
with starting an attack in Central Europe. We also
would expect attacks on NATO naval forces in the
Mediterranean to occur at the onset of hostilities in
Central Europe. None of the other potential flank
TC
offensives appear to have this degree of urgency,
although the Pact would be likely to move against the
Turkish Straits early in a war. Even if the Pact did not
begin ground offensives immediately in some flank
areas, it would almost certainly make feints or conduct
holding actions intended to keep NATO from shifting
forces from the flanks to Central Europe, compel
commitment of NATO reserves, and weaken NATO
forces on the flanks in anticipation of further
operations.
The Southwestern Theater of Military Operations
154. We have good evidence that the Soviets are
concerned about the sizable groupings of NATO forces
in the south and especially the threat of air and
nuclear strikes which they expect would be launched
against Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th
Fleet during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. Accordingly,
the Soviets assign high priority to the destruction of
Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and air-
craft carriers in the Mediterranean early in a war.
They also place great importance on capturing the
Bosporus and the Dardanelles.
155. The Pact views early seizure of the Turkish
Straits as crucial to the success of its maritime strategy
in the Southwestern TVD for the following reasons:
- It would be necessary for wartime augmentation
of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean by
naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
permit the return of ships to the Black Sea for
repairs and resupply.
- It would deny entry into the Black Sea of
additional NATO ships and submarines.
- It would deny NATO use of the Straits area for
launching any attacks against the USSR or Pact
forces in the Black Sea, and permit Pact use of
the area to support attacks into the Medi-
terranean.
156. In addition, Soviet writings stress the strategic
importance of Austria as a link between the Western
and the Southwestern TVDs and cite the importance
of being prepared to counter any NATO threat
launched across Austrian territory. There is also evi-
dence that the Pact has plans for a major attack on
northern Italy and deep offensives into Greece and
Turkey. Pact theater exercises in the Southwestern
TVD have depicted the launching, in response to
NATO attacks, of multifront Pact offensives against all
op t_
 the aforementioned objectives simultaneously with the
Central European campaign. We believe that to
achieve its more important objectives, however, the
Pact would confine its initial ground operations to the
Straits area, Austria, and possibly eastern Turkey. In
addition, at the onset of war, air and naval attacks
would almost certainly be mounted against NATO
forces in these areas and in the Mediterranean.
the Pact has contingency plans for offensive
operations in the south directed against Austria and
possibly northern Italy, the Bosporus, the Dardanelles,
Greece, eastern Turkey, and possibly Iran.
ugoslavia as neutral in a NATO-Pact
war, but conceivably the Pact might attempt to ad-
vance through Yugoslavia to attack northern Italy. The
success of such a move would depend primarily on the
attitude and political position of the Yugoslav Govern-
ment. If the government authorized the transit of Pact
forces through Yugoslav territory, the Pact would have
shorter and quicker access to northern Italy. If Yugo-
slavia remained neutral, any Pact incursion probably
would prompt armed resistance and defense of the
homeland by the Yugoslav armed forces, which could
seriously detract from the Pact's main efforts in
Central Europe. On balance, we judge it unlikely that
Yugoslavia would grant the Pact permission to use its
territory or that the Pact would use force to advance
through Yugoslavia to attack northern Italy. This
judgment is qualified, however, by our uncertainty
concerning future political attitudes and developments
in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era.
158. In wartime, four Soviet divisions in Hungary
and the six divisions of the Hungarian Army would be
subordinate to the Danube Front. (See figure 20.)C
this front would move into
Austria to protect the flank of the Western TVD and
to destroy any NATO forces that might have entered
Austrian territory. this invasion is pre-
ceded by either a West German or an Italian incursion
into Austria. In any case, we believe that the Pact
would invade Austria at the start of a war to secure the
southern flank of the Western TVD.
159. the Pact
expects that it would take about two weeks to defeat
the main bodies of Austrian and NATO forces in
Austria and be in a position to advance into northern
Italy. Given this timing, we believe that the Pact sees
an invasion of Italy primarily as a possible followup
operation and not essential to the success of the initial
campaign against NATO. Moreover, an early move
toward Italy could present a difficult problem for Pact
commanders, inasmuch as the main objective of the
Danube Front, at least during the first week of the
war, would be to protect the flank of the Western
TVD.
. 160. Before initiating an assault against the Turkish
Straits, the Soviets plan to move ground and air forces
from the Odessa Military District into Bulgaria, with
most of these forces transiting Romania. These forces,
probably augmented by Bulgarian and Romanian
forces, would form the Odessa Front, consisting of as
many as 12 divisions. This front's objectives would be
to destroy Turkish forces in eastern Thrace, to break
through the fortifications protecting the land ap-
proaches to the Turkish Straits, and to seize the Straits.
Amphibious and airborne operations, using primarily
Soviet forces-probably one motorized rifle regiment
and one naval infantry regiment-and a Bulgarian
naval infantry battalion, would probably be conducted
to support a forced crossing of the Bosporus by
elements of the Odessa Front. The Pact would coordi-
nate the timing and location of amphibious landings
with both airborne operations and the movement of
the Odessa Front along the southwestern littoral of the
Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces would almost
certainly be used to establish sea lines of communica-
tion to augment the relatively poor landlines support-
ing the Maritime Front.
161. Timing the seizure of the Straits would present
Pact planners with special problems:
- Operations to seize the Straits would require
Soviet ground forces from the Odessa Military
District. Once these forces were mobilized we
estimate that they would require about a week to
be in position to launch an attack from Bulgaria.
If they were to move before the start of a war,
this movement would provide warning to NATO
in the Southwestern Theater and elsewhere as
well.
- The ground campaign to seize the Straits would
be difficult and time consuming and would
provide NATO time to obstruct the Straits and
thus deny their immediate use after seizure.
- The Soviets probably would consider that the
airborne division and naval infantry regiment
which would be available for joint amphibious
64
Top
 Illustrative Warsaw Pact Operations in the Southwestern TVD
North
Sea
C,1 GERMANY
WEST
GERMANY L~~...f1
ITALY
ROMAN
Odessa
Front
12 divisions
Balkanyront
4-6 divisions
3 brigades
(544280)
and airborne assaults would not be large enough
to overcome Turkish defenses and secure the
area without timely linkup with the Maritime
Front. Airborne operations in this theater would
also compete for lift resources with operations
planned in the Western TVD-which has prece-
dence-and would therefore have to await the
accomplishment of these operations.
162. On the western flank of the Odessa Front, the
remaining Bulgarian forces, consisting of four to six
motorized rifle divisions and three tank brigades,
would form the nucleus of the Balkan Front. This
Kiev Front's
1 divisions
(reserve)
Kiev MVMD
Amphi'ous
assaults
if Black Sea
orth Caucasus'
Front
divisions (reserve)
Trans6aucasus ?
Front
12'd A 1 hs
o
front might also include some Romanian forces, al-
though it is more likely that the Romanians would
constitute their own national front in the TVD's
second echelon. the mission of the
Balkan Front is to break through. Greek fortifications
and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
the main part of Greece. However, considering the
size of the Balkan Front and the questionable commit-
ment of Romanian forces to the offensive, we believe
that the Balkan Front would probably confine its
actual wartime operations to engaging Greek forces in
the Thrace area and to defending the western flank of
65
TCS o Secce,L
 Tnn _ errs
the Maritime Front's forces attacking the Turkish
Straits.
the Soviets might launch a limited offensive into
eastern Turkey, we do not believe that they would
undertake operations against Iran during the initial
phase of a war.
164. There are important constraints on initial Pact
ground operations in the Southwestern TVD:
- The Pact probably would not be able to achieve
general air superiority or cripple NATO's nu-
clear war-fighting capability in the theater dur-
ing conventional conflict. In the Balkans the Pact
lacks sufficient ground attack aircraft for simul-
taneous air attacks against aircraft carriers,
NATO airfields, and important air defense, nu-
clear, and command and control targets.
- The Pact would also face difficult terrain in most
of the Southwestern TVD which would impede
rapid force deployment and resupply and facili-
tate NATO defense. Soviet writers question the
Pact's ability to overcome the region's mountains,
water obstacles, limited transportation network,
and prepared NATO fortifications.
- Soviet forces are at a considerable distance from
their wartime areas of operation. Prehostilities
deployment of forces would alert NATO and
permit defensive preparations, not only in this
secondary theater, but in Central Europe as well.
- Romanian forces, as well as Romanian operation
and defense of lines of communication, would be
vital to sustaining Pact offensive operations
against Greece and western Turkey. Romanian
reliability is thus a key to sustained Pact offen-
sive operations in the area.
165. Nevertheless, Pact land operations in these
areas, if successful, would offer potential benefits.
Seizure of the Straits would give the Pact flexibility in
committing units from the Black Sea Fleet and pro-
vide a more secure line of communication for the
Mediterranean Squadron. A Pact advance into Austria
would threaten NATO forces in southern Germany
and northern Italy, while an offensive into eastern
Turkey would tie down Turkish forces in the area.
166. Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea.
We have reliable evidence that as part of the offensive
by the Pact's Odessa Front, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet
would attempt to secure control of the Black Sea,
support the movement of Pact ground forces along the
western littoral, and assist in seizing the Turkish
Straits. Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact's capability
to provide air and ASW defense for the amphibious
force designated to aid in seizing the Turkish Straits.
To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority
and to protect the amphibious force, the Soviets
probably would retain in the Black Sea at least some of
their available larger combatants equipped for ASW
and air defense-such as Moskvas, Karas, Kashins, and
Krivaks. If none of these newer and more capable
Soviet units were available to support Pact naval
operations in support of the ground offensive, Pact
capabilities to defend these operations against NATO
might prove inadequate.
167. Initial Air and Naval Operations in the
Mediterranean. An important initial mission of Pact
tactical air forces would be to suppress NATO's
forward air defenses in southern Europe, thus permit-
ting the overflight of Long Range Aviation and naval
aircraft heading for the Mediterranean. The Pact may
also have plans to conduct a conventional Air Opera-
tion using tactical and LRA aircraft against NATO
airfields in the Mediterranean area, but its ability to
conduct such an operation would be constrained by
the concurrent requirement for LRA bombers to
conduct an air offensive in Central Europe and by the
limited number of Pact fighter-bombers in the South-
western TVD. Pact air support of the ground forces
would probably be confined largely to key areas, such
as the Turkish Straits.
168. Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean
would begin at the start of a war and would be aimed
primarily at the destruction of Western SSBNs and
aircraft carriers. Forces used would consist of surface
and submarine units in the Mediterranean at the
outset of hostilities, as well as Soviet naval and perhaps
LRA aircraft operating from bases in the Soviet Union
and possibly from NSWP countries.
169.1 Soviet naval deployment pat-
terns indicate that the Soviets expect most activity by
66
TC - ToFSeL
 their surface forces to be concentrated in the Mediter-
ranean east of Sicily
the initial attacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
the Mediterranean Squadron almost certainly would
not occur before Pact operations began in other areas
of the theater. The Black Sea Fleet Air Force would
follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs)
while tactical aircraft and Soviet naval free-fall bomb-
ers were suppressing NATO air defenses. Some LRA
aircraft, especially missile-armed Blinders and Back-
fires, might participate in raids against carriers, al-
though most of LRA probably would be committed
against Central Europe.
170. While the most immediate threat would come
from Soviet ships and submarines already deployed in
the Mediterranean, numerically the most sizable
threat to NATO's naval forces there would come from
missile-equipped Soviet strike aircraft, despite the fact
that they would be operating without fighter escort. In
a conventional war the USSR-based Black Sea Air
Force could sortie about 40 ASM strike aircraft,
carrying as many as 80 missiles, which could attack
throughout the eastern Mediterranean. The Soviets
would probably hold another 20 ASM strike aircraft
with 40 missiles in reserve as a hedge against escalation
to nuclear war. Backfire strike aircraft can cover
virtually the entire Mediterranean from Black Sea
airfields. Badger aircraft can carry out attacks in most
of the eastern Mediterranean from Black Sea or NSWP
airfields.
171. The Soviets normally keep eight to 10 subma-
rines, including two cruise missile units, in the Medi-
terranean in peacetime. The cruise missile submarines
probably would be in a position to
attack at the outset of hositilities. In wartime the other
submarines probably could monitor Western naval
movements near major choke points and possibly near
some of the main NATO naval bases. By itself,
however, the submarine force normally deployed in
the Mediterranean is not large enough to attack all
Western aircraft carriers and other potential NATO
naval targets there at one time. Reinforcement from
the Northern Fleet would take almost two weeks for
nuclear-powered submarines (more than three weeks
for diesels) and provide NATO with warning indica-
tions if conducted before war broke out. Because of
competing tasks elsewhere, limitations on the avail-
ability of submarines, and logistic constraints, we
estimate that the submarine formation in the Mediter-
ranean probably would not be reinforced before the
outbreak of hostilities.
172. There is evidence that Soviet submarines in
the Mediterranean would expend torpedoes only in
self-defense or against high-value targets, especially
aircraft carrier task groups, amphibious task groups,
and US nuclear-powered submarines. Soviet subma-
rines, because of their lack of survivable replenish-
ment points, would probably not, as a matter of
course, fire their torpedoes against merchant ships in
the Mediterranean until they had succeeded in their
attacks on high-value targets or were returning to base.
173. Soviet surface forces normally in the Mediter-
ranean consist of seven to nine combatants and 25
auxiliaries. These forces would conduct ASW oper-
ations, and serve as target spotters and trackers for
strikes by submarines, aircraft, and other surface ships.
They would also provide command and control sup-
port for Soviet submarines and aircraft. These ships
almost certainly would be operating in an environ-
ment in which NATO had air superiority, however,
and, along with Soviet submarines, would be the
targets for some 30 NATO submarines.
174. There are divergent views within the Intelli-
gence Community on whether or the extent to which
the Soviets would augment their surface forces in the
Mediterranean during a period of tension preceding
the outbreak of hositilities. All agree that the intelli-
gence evidence and other considerations which bear
on this question include the following:
- We have no evidence from Pact military writings
of plans to augment the surface force in the
Mediterranean during a period of tension before
the outbreak of hositilities. One reference relat-
ing to augmentation of the Mediterranean force
suggests that it would occur after Pact seizure of
the Turkish Straits. Other Soviet writings, in
stressing the importance of ASW and anticarrier
operations at the outset of a war, imply that the
introduction of additional surface ships into the
Mediterranean before a war began would be a
logical step.
- Of some 60 principal surface combatants typi-
cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
nine are normally deployed to the Mediterra-
nean.
- The Soviets have sortied major surface warships
from the Black Sea to augment the Mediterra-
67
_T_op_7eTMq-
 nean Squadron during major fleet exercises and
in times of crisis. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli
war, for example, the Soviets almost doubled the
size of the Mediterranean force and demon-
strated the capability to augment the force
quickly.
- Such an act would be a clear warning indicator,
and it could be counterproductive, depending on
NATO's reaction. On the other hand, it might be
viewed by the Soviets as a way to demonstrate
their resolve during a crisis.
- The Soviets recognize NATO's capability to
block the Turkish Straits, and must consider that
such operations could occur early in a war.
Consequently, Soviet planners could not count on
unobstructed passage to or from the Mediterra-
nean after the outbreak of hostilities.
175. Some believe 26 that the Mediterranean Squad-
ron. probably would be augmented by at least a few,
and possibly up to 12, of the large surface combatants
in the Black Sea-such as Moskvas, Karas, Kyndas, and
Kashins-before the outbreak of hostilities. Others
believe 27 that the Soviets would deploy no more than a
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea
before the outbreak of hostilities. The difference in
judgment turns on whether the main purpose of the
Black Sea Fleet is to provide air and ASW defense for
operations against the Turkish Straits, or whether it is
to augment the Mediterranean Squadron. The holders
of the first view believe the Fleet is in excess of
requirements for the defense of local waters in the
Black Sea and offensive operations against Turkey and
judge that, in any event, augmentation of the Mediter-
ranean Squadron would not jeopardize an assault on
the Straits. They argue that the time required to seize
and clear the Straits and general uncertainty attending
such an operation militate against the Pact's holding its
forces in the Black Sea, risking their exclusion from
use in the Mediterranean. Holders of the second view
point out that naval units sortied during periods of
tension could be trapped in the Mediterranean, where
they would be highly vulnerable to attack. They judge
that Pact planners would view seizure of the Straits as
more important than a modest augmentation of the
Mediterranean Squadron.
26 The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Director
of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy.
2' The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State.
The Northwestern Theater of Military Operations
176. Initial Soviet objectives in the Northwestern
TVD center on ensuring freedom of action and unin-
hibited access to the open ocean for Soviet naval ships
and aircraft and on maintaining the forward defense
of the extensive complex of naval bases and strategic
installations located on the Kola Peninsula. (See figure
21.) Initial operations by Soviet land forces probably
would be limited to northern Norway. We have no
evidence indicating that the Soviets plan for a general
offensive against Finland or Sweden early in a war.
177. Naval Operations. Soviet exercises suggest
that, with the opening of hostilities, the Northern Fleet
would attack Western submarines, aircraft carriers,
and amphibious task forces detected approaching the
Barents and Norwegian Seas.28 Some LRA bombers
and Frontal Aviation fighter-bombers-supplemented
by naval bombers, when available-probably would
strike NATO naval facilities, airbases, communications
sites and surveillance posts in northern Norway. Soviet
amphibious ships carrying up to a regiment of Soviet
naval infantry probably would attempt to seize limited
objectives along the northern Norwegian coast. After
the naval infantry had secured a suitable port, follow-
up Soviet ground forces from the Pechenga area could
be landed from merchant vessels.
178. We do not anticipate any large-scale amphib-
ious operations because the Soviets are limited in their
assault lift capacity and their capability to overcome
determined resistance from the beach. Initial amphib-
ious operations probably would be confined to the
coast of Finnmark, under conditions suitable for an
early linkup with the ground forces. The Soviets
probably would, however, commit a large number of
smaller combatants to an escort role in support of
operations in northern Norway.
179. Ground Operations in Northern Norway.
Because of the limited availability of ground forces
and tactical aircraft in the northern Leningrad Mili-
tary District and the high priority given to naval
missions against NATO naval strike forces, we believe
an initial Soviet ground offensive would be limited to
the Finnmark area. Potentially strong NATO resist-
ance beyond Finnmark and the risk of drawing in far
greater forces than exist in the Kola Peninsula area
would probably deter major Soviet ground offensives
2e The section beginning at paragraph 184 discusses Soviet naval
operations in these areas.
68
TCS 79/i Top t
 Illustrative Soviet Operations in the Northwestern TVD
Probable area for amphibious assaults
Possible airborne
or amphibious raids
and air attacks
Sec
SWEDEN
T, MW RWAY
in the north until an acceptable outcome in Central
Europe had been achieved. Moreover, the better
defended-and more defensible-Norwegian territory
south of Finnmark is at the extreme limits of Soviet
tactical air coverage.
180. Soviet exercises indicate that initial ground
operations against northern Norway probably would
be made by elements of the two Soviet divisions at
Pechenga and Kandalaksha. We believe that subse-
quent operations could extend as far south as Tromso
and Narvik. Seizure of Norwegian bases in the Tromso
area early in the war would be important to the
Soviets because it would provide greater flank security
for their naval forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially,
we could expect small-scale airborne or amphibious
raids against these bases in an attempt to disrupt
NATO operations. We would also expect bombing
irvik
attacks against them by available LRA and Navy
bombers. But we would not expect initial large-scale
airborne or amphibious assaults in this area because of
the lack of adequate air cover or air and amphibious
lift, and the doubtful ability of ground forces advanc-
ing across Finnmark to effect early linkup.
181. The Soviet motorized rifle regiments from the
two northern divisions are specially structured and
equipped for operations in the Arctic, Although these
units can easily traverse the terrain in northern Nor-
way, lines of communication over land would be
difficult to maintain because only one major road runs
through the area. There is some evidence indicating
that the Soviets plan to alleviate this shortcoming by
resupplying ground forces by sea. We do not believe
that the Soviets would attempt a large-scale airborne
assault in northern Norway because the demands for
?'Ground
operations
U.S.S.R..
69
TCS Top
 air transport elsewhere against NATO probably would
preclude early use of a formation as large as a
complete airborne division. The Soviets might attempt
to insert small teams to sabotage transportation, com-
munications, and intelligence facilities, however.
182. Air Operations. Air support for the Soviet
ground forces in Finnmark would come primarily
from the some 120 Frontal Aviation ground attack and
reconnaissance aircraft in the Leningrad Military Dis-
T ere are no Frontal
Aviation fighter regiments in the Leningrad Military
District, although fighters from three regiments of the
Soviet strategic air defense forces on the Kola Penin-
sula could provide air cover to a distance of about 200
kilometers over Norway.
183. We have some evidence that the Soviets would
use LRA bombers in an attempt to destroy or suppress
land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and
central Norway, probably to clear a path for naval
strike, reconnaissance, and ASW aircraft flying against
NATO carrier forces and submarines in the Norwe-
gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
based air defenses, they would route transiting aircraft
north of North Cape and then down the center of the
Norwegian Sea. Such routing would reduce the expo-
sure of the aircraft to land-based air defenses, but it
would decrease significantly the combat radius of the
aircraft, the time they could spend in their operating
areas, and the promptness of anticarrier strikes. It
seems unlikely that many LRA bombers or even
tactical aircraft would be made available for strikes
against Norwegian air defenses, given the requirement
for large numbers of these aircraft in the Central
Region.
Naval Operations in the North Atlantic
184. In wartime the Soviets evidently expect NATO
to deploy aircraft carriers, ballistic missile submarines,
and large numbers of attack submarines against Soviet
surface and submarine forces operating in the North
Atlantic. In addition, the Soviets
elieve NATO would attempt amphib-
ious landings in northern Norway and use the Norwe-
gian Sea as a launch zone for carrier-based strikes
against the USSR. They also expect NATO to establish
antisubmarine barriers in the Greenland-Iceland-
United. Kingdom gap and off northern Norway to
prevent passage of Soviet submarines. The Soviets'
concern for penetrating NATO naval barriers is re-
flected in
185. The Norwegian Sea, especially its southern
half ending at the G-I-UK gap, is central to Soviet
naval strategy in the North Atlantic. While the Soviets
clearly expect naval engagements throughout the
North Atlantic, they reckon that by far the heaviest
combat would occur near and inside a maritime
theater of miltary operations (MTVD) which they
evidently would establish north of the G-I-UK gap.
Soviet operations in this MTVD would be intended to
prevent NATO naval incursions into an ocean area the
Soviets consider critical to successful defense of their
homeland, especially the Kola Peninsula.
186. Soviet strategy calls for the early establishment
of control of the Norwegian and Barents Seas and their
approaches. Operations farther into the North Atlantic
to prevent transit of NATO carriers and amphibious
task groups and to divert NATO naval strength are
probably also planned. The Soviets would attempt to
neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea before they could launch their missiles.
187. The establishment of control of the Norwegian
and Barents Seas and their approaches probably would
involve most of the Northern Fleet's submarines and
virtually all of the surface forces and aircraft in an
effort to exclude NATO forces from the area. The
Soviets probably also plan submarine and air oper-
ations against NATO naval forces as they exit their
bases in Europe and possibly against SSBNs from US
bases as well. In addition, at least some submarines
would attack shipping engaged in resupply and rein-
forcement of Europe early in a war.29
188. Soviet plans for controlling the Norwegian and
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist
of a deployment in depth. (See figure 22.)
the Soviets plan to weaken 'or defeat
NATO's naval forces in the Norwegian Sea or ap-
proaching the area from the United States and the
United Kingdom by successive and coordinated as-
saults by submarines, strike aircraft, and surface com-
batant ships.
29 See the inset on pages 42 and 43 for differing agency views on
Soviet plans and capabilities for interdiction of sea lines of
communication.
70
TCS - Top
 Initial Soviet Operating Areas in the North Atlantic
ents
ea
Havana.
Less intensive
sea denial
Atlantic
Ocean
189. Because of range and time-on-station con-
straints on naval strike aircraft and the vulnerability of
Soviet surface combatants when operating out of area,
the Soviet attack submarine force would be the princi-
pal element for sustained operations in the North
Atlantic. The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
missile and torpedo attack submarines in the Northern
Fleet, but about 40 percent are in various stages of
repair or workup at any one time. Thus, about 80
submarines (with varying degrees of combat effective-
ness) would be available for operations at the outset of
hostilities. If about 10 of these submarines continued
to be committed to operations in the Mediterranean
and the Soviets did not augment their forces there
Emden
Chatham
during a period of rising tension, some 70 submarines
would be available for operations in the Atlantic. This
force would be subjected to heavy demands in war-
time, and the Soviets probably would not have as
many attack submarines as they deem necessary to
perform all important naval missions.
190. We do not know precisely how the Soviets
would apportion their naval forces among their several
tasks in the initial stages of a war with NATO.
Information available regarding Soviet objectives, ex-
ercises, and force deployments does, however, provide
the basis for estimating likely initial force allocations.
We recognize that Soviet naval deployments could be
G~I-UK
;Gap f
Plymout
Brest
Rota-
71
T o t
 Too
largely contingent on NATO operations at the outset
of hostilities. If the Soviets were to perceive that
NATO did not intend to send aircraft carriers into or
near the Norwegian Sea, for example, large numbers
of submarines could be dedicated to missions else-
where. Even if NATO carriers deployed into or near
the Norwegian Sea, Soviet force allocations could shift,
depending on the outcome of the initial engagements.
For example, successful Soviet attacks early in a war
on NATO carriers and amphibious task groups operat-
ing north of the G-I-UK gap might encourage them to
take a more active subsequent role in the Atlantic
south of Iceland. On the other hand, should Soviet
forces suffer a serious reverse, they would be likely to
continue to concentrate their efforts in the Norwegian
and Barents Seas.
191. Submarines. In conducting these operations,
Soviet submarines would be present in large numbers,
but they would be limited by their poor detection
capability against Western ballistic missile and attack
submarines. This makes it unlikely that Soviet subma-
rines would be able to solve the initial ASW problem
of target location and would make it difficult to
protect themselves from NATO submarines.
192. The Soviets consider that a key but difficult
task for their attack submarines during the conven-
tional phase of a war would be the protection of Soviet
SSBNs from NATO ASW forces, particularly nuclear
attack submarines (SSNs). The Y-class, for example,
not only is much noisier than Western nuclear subma-
rines, but also, in order for its SS-N-6 missiles to reach
targets in the United States, must operate in areas
where it is subject to detection by the US sound
surveillance system (SOSUS) and where it would have
little or no support from other Soviet forces. They
therefore probably would assign a few of their best
attack submarines to provide escort for Y-class SSBNs.
Because Western SSNs can launch torpedoes outside
the detection envelope of Y-class submarines, the
Soviets probably could not prevent at least some of
their SSBNs from being destroyed.
193. For anticarrier warfare, the Soviets' reliance
on external targeting support could effectively restrict
'See paragraphs 198-200, setting forth an alternative view of
the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of
Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, concerning para-
graphs 191-197.
the operating areas of their long-range missile subma-
rines, such as the E-II and the J-class, to areas within
range of the Bear D aircraft. In addition, these
submarines must surface to launch their missiles and
hence would be vulnerable. The more modern C-class
would pose a more serious threat in distant waters, but
these submarines probably would not be able to keep
up with fast-moving carrier strike forces. Moreover,
Soviet cruise-missile-armed submarines normally carry
a mixed load of nuclear and conventionally armed
missiles, thereby reducing the number available for
conventional strikes.
194. Aircraft. The success of antiship attacks by
naval or LRA aircraft would hinge primarily on the
capabilities of the aircraft and their cruise missiles to
penetrate a series of NATO land-based and fleet air
defenses. These defenses include land- and ship-based
aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, and electronic
countermeasures systems to confuse, decoy, or disrupt
Soviet strike aircraft successfully penetrated or avoid-
ed NATO land-based air defenses, they then would
have to deal with formidable fleet air defenses.
195. The first line of fleet air defense typically
would be an outer zone defended by carrier-based
early warning aircraft and interceptors. It could ex-
tend more than 400 nautical miles from the fleet, well
beyond the 200-nm maximum missile launch range of
the best Soviet air-to-surface missiles. A Soviet airstrike
against a NATO task group including two US aircraft
carriers, for example, might have to confront more
than 30 carrier-based interceptors. Soviet strike air-
craft, especially the TU-16 Badgers, would be highly
vulnerable to attacks by interceptors as they maneu-
vered to launch their ASMs. Although individual
Badgers would be vulnerable because of their slow
speed and lack of extensive electronic countermeas-
ures (ECM) equipment for self-defense, one or more
Badger ECM aircraft probably would be part of each
attack formation. The Backfire'would be better able to
survive because of its high-speed capability-near
Mach 2 at high altitude-and modern ECM equip-
ment, although both the Badger and the Backfire have
large radar cross sections which would make them
 73
lC. Top t
 easily detectable. Cruise missiles, flying at speeds of
Mach 2.5 to 3.5 and launched by aircraft which
successfully penetrated the interceptor zone, would
face shipborne SAM, gun, and ECM systems.
196. Surface Forces. The effectiveness of Soviet
surface combatants in the Norwegian Sea would be a
function not only of their capabilities as individual
ships, but also of their cooperation with each other and
with submarines and aircraft. As individual units,
Soviet surface ships would be particularly weak in
providing area air defense against US and UK attack-
ing aircraft and protection against low-flying aircraft
and cruise missiles. Their ASW capability suffers
particularly from a limited sensor range. The ranges at
which they can reliably detect attacking submarines
are less than the range at which the submarines can
detect and attack the surface ships. ASW sensor range
is also less than that of such primary ASW weapons as
the SS-N-14, making it extremely difficult for an
individual Soviet ship without ASW helicopters to
exploit the potential of such weapons fully.
197. The weaknesses of individual ships are over-
come to some extent when ships, submarines, and
aircraft operate in concert, as they presumably would
in the Norwegian Sea, supporting and complementing
one another with sensor and weapons coverage. The
presence of a Kiev, with its multiple sensors, weapon
systems, and command and control capabilities, would
provide a significant addition to the capability of the
other surface forces. For example, operations by the
Kiev's V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing)
aircraft would be valuable in thwarting fair-weather
attacks from slower NATO aircraft such as the P-3 and
in limiting the operations of AWACS (airborne warn-
ing and control system) aircraft.
198. According to an alternative view, paragraphs
191-197 should convey a more balanced appraisal of
potential effectiveness, in substance as well as in
tone.31 The holders of this view believe these para-
graphs tend to overstress weaknesses inherent in Soviet
platforms, such as the relative noisiness of submarines,
without offsetting consideration of inherent strengths,
such as their relatively high speeds. They further note
that any assessment of the potential effectiveness of
Soviet submarines, naval aircraft, and surface ships
should include consideration of their operation as a
mutually supportive force; that this is only partially
achieved in paragraph 197.
199. According to this view, paragraphs 191-197, in
addition to an essentially negative treatment of Soviet
platforms, assess their effectiveness in tactical contexts
which convey an impression of NATO capabilities that
ness of Soviet strike aircraft should be measured in
terms of a radar coverage, as well as fighter coverage,
that would have suffered some degradation in the
early stages of hostilities. Likewise, the US sound
surveillance system
ou be expected to suffer early
egra anon, especially in view of the detailed Soviet
knowledge of and concern about its capabilites. In-
deed, even during peacetime, important links of the
SOSUS have, on a number of occasions, been cut and
temporarily disabled by unknown shipping.
200. Finally, the holders of this view note that these
paragraphs reflect insufficient regard for evidence of
31 The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
Navy.
 201. Pact nuclear operations against NATO in the
European theater could involve:
- Tactical nuclear weapons assigned to Soviet
ground and air forces in Eastern Europe and in
the USSR and to Soviet naval forces in the three
western fleets.
- Soviet strategic systems (mainly medium- and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, bombers of
Long Range Aviation, and some ballistic missile
submarines) which are based in the USSR and
intended chiefly for use against NATO.
I on Soviet concepts for nuclear operations
against NATO. Although almost all of our information
pertains directly to Soviet nuclear operations in Cen-
tral Europe, we believe that the general operations
described below also would apply to Soviet nuclear
warfare on NATO's flanks. In any case, for both
tactical and strategic systems the primary mission
would be the destruction of NATO's nuclear forces.
203. The scope and specific targets of Pact nuclear
operations would depend on Soviet campaign objec-
tives, the scale of NATO's nuclear use, and other
circumstances. The following discussion is confined to
the likely general characteristics of large-scale theater
nuclear operations by the Pact.
Tactical Nuclear Operations
204. The Pact tactical nuclear arsenal consists of
aircraft, missiles, artillery, submarines, and surface
ships. Although nuclear weapons are normally carried
aboard Soviet submarines and some surface ships
during peacetime deployments, the Soviets do not
maintain nuclear-armed tactical missiles or aircraft on
alert during peacetime. During the period of tension
that probably would precede a war in Europe, howev-
er, and during any initial conventional phase of such a
war, the Pact would take steps to ready its tactical air
and missile delivery systems for nuclear operations.
Warheads and bombs probably would be dispersed
from storage sites to delivery units. Nuclear warheads
probably would be mated to most tactical ballistic
missiles at the start of a war and up to one-fourth of
Soviet tactical aircraft probably would be withheld
from conventional operations as a nuclear alert force.
205. Once the decision to use nuclear weapons was
made, all tactical systems probably would come into
play and the timing and targeting of tactical strikes
would be planned to take advantage of the special
characteristics of each system. The primary objective
in Soviet tactical nuclear planning appears to be the
assured destruction of military targets. Limiting collat-
eral damage does not appear to be a main concern
because the numbers of weapons incorporated in
Soviet nuclear strike plans have increased. over time
and the yields of these weapons, particularly for
tactical missiles, have increased significantly.
206. The higher yields and greater numbers of
weapons appear consist-
ent with the Soviets' targeting philosophy, which calls
for multiple strikes against high-priority fixed targets,
mobile targets, or those that are not precisely located.
The Soviets may perceive a requirement for greater
areas of destruction to compensate for the relatively
poor accuracy of their missile systems.
208 we are able to
make tentative judgments about how the Soviets
would plan to destroy NATO targets during an initial
theaterwide strike. Very high yields, in some cases
totaling more than 1,000 kilotons, would be delivered
by all types of ground and air systems against individ-
75
T o
 Tom.. C .. -WlEF
ual NATO tactical nuclear units such as Pershing
missile battalions. Typically eight to 12 tactical air
strikes would deliver 1,100 to 1,300 kilotons against a
NATO ground force division. Fighter-bombers and
bombers would often be used in this role. Smaller
numbers of tactical missiles, often only five or six,
could deliver an additional 800 to 900 kilotons against
a NATO division. One to four warheads would gener-
ally be allocated against smaller targets such as com-
mand posts, air defense systems, airfields, and depots.
209. During a coordinated, large-scale initial strike,
many tactical missiles probably would be targeted
against air defense systems. Tactical missile strikes
could precede strikes by tactical aircraft by 15 to 20
minutes. the Soviets
would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close
proximity to Pact forces, presumably because tactical
aircraft are more versatile and better able to locate
mobile targets than missiles and because the Pact
currently does not have nuclear artillery in Eastern
210
the USSR would be unlikely to initiate the use of
nuc ear weapons at sea while a war was being fought
with only conventional weapons against NATO in
employment of nuclear weapons on land. Should the
Soviets perceive a major threat to their security inter-
ests or military objectives from NATO carrier forma-
tions, they might launch a nuclear attack at sea in the
expectation that it could be confined to the sea
campaign and would not precipitate the employment
of tactical nuclear weapons in the ground campaign.
ventional phase of a war, the Soviets probably would
withhold one-fourth to one-third of their naval aircraft
for use in the event of nuclear conflict. Although we
have little insight into Soviet concepts for antisubmar-
ine warfare using nuclear weapons, such weapons are
known to be carried by some Soviet ASW ships,
submarines, and aircraft.
213. Although our knowledge of the Soviet Navy's
antiship nuclear targeting plans is very limited, we do
have good evidence that multiple attacks on NATO
naval task groups are planned. Soviet writings of the
early and mid-1960s indicate that four to six cruise
missiles with nuclear warheads or nine nuclear-tipped
torpedoes would be necessary to ensure destruction of
a task group consisting of an aircraft carrier and
Europe
predilection of Soviet military policymakers to focus
decisions on the developing situation in Central Eu-
rope and to avoid actions elsewhere that would
jeopardize the campaign there or that would cause an
escalation to nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, Soviet
general purpose naval forces are normally armed with
nuclear weapons during peacetime deployments and
would be prepared at the outset of hostilities to
conduct nuclear operations if a decision were made to
do so. Once authorized, these operations would be
directed mainly against important NATO surface
ships, submarines, and possibly selected land targets.
211. An alternate view s2 maintains that Soviet nu-
clear operations at sea would not necessarily await
"The holder of this view is the Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy.
Nuclear Strikes Against NATO by
Soviet Strategic Forces
76
oro SeefeL
 215. The prime objective of Soviet nuclear forces in
wartime would be to destroy NATO's. means for
waging nuclear war. Accordingly, a typical target list
for the Soviet strategic forces would include NATO
nuclear missile sites; airfields used by nuclear delivery
aircraft; nuclear weapons storage sites; and command,
control, and communications facilities. Other airfields,
air defense facilities, large troop concentrations, and
conventional storage depots probably are also targeted,
as well as some political and economic centers. In all
instances, strikes by the strategic forces would be
coordinated with those by the Pact's tactical nuclear
forces.
216. In Europe there are several thousand military,
political, and economic targets in these categories
which the Soviets might wish to cover. Military targets
range from those that have been extensively hardened
to those that are highly vulnerable. We estimate that
there are fewer than 300 hardened targets of signifi-
cant military value in the European NATO countries.
About half of these are slightly hardened installa-
tions-such as nuclear weapons storage facilities, some
POL storage facilities, and ground force depots. The
remainder are moderately hard installations such as
command posts and the French IRBM silos. The great
majority of potential targets in Europe are soft area
targets, including NATO airfields, ports, and air de-
fense facilities.
217. The Strategic Rocket Forces would have a key
role during large-scale nuclear operations. Although
Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic mis-
siles would be assigned a variety of strategic targets,
some sources have indicated they would be primarily
used to destroy NATO airfields, air defenses, and
command and control facilities beyond the reach of
the Pact's forward-based tactical systems. In addition
to the MRBMs and IRBMs, some of the Soviet ICBMs
might be used against NATO targets in Europe.
Ballistic missiles launched from the G- and H-class
submarines are not as accurate as most of the land-
based missiles and probably would be used against
large targets such as ports.
218. The Long Range Aviation bomber force would
also be used both during the initial nuclear strike and
for followup strikes against targets not already de-
stroyed or attacked. As much as one-third of the LRA
bomber force would be withheld from use in conven-
tional operations in anticipation of escalation to nucle-
ar conflict. All LRA bombers based in the western
USSR could reach most potential NATO targets direct-
ly from their home airfields carrying either bombs or
air-to-surface missiles. For most of these targets, the
unrefueled combat radius of the LRA bombers is
sufficient to permit the use of indirect routing and
low-level flight profiles to evade NATO air defenses.
 Factors Affecting Future Forces
219. In this Estimate we do not provide a detailed
analysis of the factors that motivate the Soviets' mili-
tary policy toward Europe and the development of
their theater forces. These factors are discussed in
detail in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations
in the Global Power Arena. We proceed from the
premise that the developments we currently observe in
Warsaw Pact theater forces opposite NATO represent
the sorts of activities necessary to maintain and gradu-
ally improve the capabilities of these large standing
forces. They are the activities necessary to replace
obsolete or wornout equipment and to incorporate
new weapons and tactics which flow from a vigorous
Soviet research and development program. They por-
tend no large, short-term change in the general size or
character of these forces.
220. Although we believe this to be a valid premise,
we have examined a number of factors which conceiv-
ably could alter it. This examination is summarized in
the following paragraphs.
Soviet Perceptions of NATO's Military Capabilities
221. The Soviets have a keen perception of NATO's
forces and military programs and regard its capabili-
ties as substantial and technologically challenging. We
believe that they will see current developments in the
Western Alliance as portending a continuing strong
NATO defense posture, with good prospects for im-
provement, especially in the critical Central European
area. The Soviets are likely to be especially concerned
about expected improvements in NATO's precision
weapons and nuclear systems. Nothing in current or
near-term NATO defense programs, however, is likely
to precipitate any major change in the level of Pact
efforts. Over the longer term, the large-scale deploy-
ment by NATO of a new theater nuclear delivery
system, such as ground-launched cruise missiles, could
cause an upswing in Pact efforts, especially in air
defense.
Soviet Leadership
222. Change in Soviet leadership within the period
of this Estimate is inevitable. At least in its early phase,
however, the change is unlikely to alter the priority
given to theater forces. The new leaders, whoever they
may be, will undoubtedly emerge from the ranks of
the present leadership which are responsible for creat-
ing current Pact forces and which are committed to
maintaining Soviet military strength in Europe. The
new leaders will likely seek to avoid moves that would
antagonize large segments of the military.
223. Since 1970, total Soviet defense spending,
which accounts for 11 to 13 percent of the USSR's
gross national product, has grown,at an average annual
rate of 4 to 5 percent. Spending for Soviet theater
forces opposite NATO has grown at roughly the same
rate and probably will continue to grow into the 1980s.
This judgment is supported by several trends in Soviet
defense programs, the increasing costs of new, more
complex military hardware, the large number of
weapon development programs currently under way,
and the continuing capital investment in defense
industries.
224. We have taken note of the decline in Soviet
economic growth and the economic difficulties of such
non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries as Poland and
Czechoslovakia. Despite these difficulties, we find no
evidence that suggests the Soviets anticipate cutbacks
in allocating resources to theater forces. Indeed, we
have good evidence that some NSWP countries plan
modest increases.
Demographic Factors
225. In every Warsaw Pact country the military
manpower procurement system depends on conscrip-
tion. Conscripts provide up to 75 percent of the
manpower assigned to the regular armed forces, the
border guards, and some elements of the internal
78
TC Tap t
 security forces. During the next decade, however, the
number of young men reaching draft age each year
will decline in most Pact countries, a trend that will
complicate the allocation of manpower between the
armed forces and industry.
226. Pact military manpower requirements are ex-
pected to increase only modestly in the next 10 years.
Even so, there may be shortfalls in available military
manpower. The Pact countries could meet such short-
falls by changes in their manpower procurement
systems. They might also attempt to persuade more
conscripts to extend their service.
227. We do not believe that the manpower squeeze
will lead to any decline in future Pact military
manpower. We expect that most Pact countries, the
USSR included, will meet their projected military
manpower needs by some combination of available
options. Some are already calling reservists who had
previously been exempted to active duty for up to six
months. Fewer deferments are being granted, and the
grounds for medical exemption have been defined
more clearly and strictly. In a few Pact countries,
those persons found unfit for combat duties are being
placed in sedentary military positions rather than
being exempted.
Technology
228. We foresee no technological breakthrough that
could lead to a major change in either the size or
character of the Pact theater forces during the period
of this Estimate. New technology, whether developed,
purchased, or illegally acquired, is expected to lead to
improvements in individual Pact systems and help
redress major deficiencies, but no one development or
even a combination of technological developments in
the foreseeable future is expected to revolutionize
modern warfare or provide a decided advantage to
Pact forces.
defense in the west, or a war with China, which
would, at a minimum, absorb much of the Soviet troop
and logistical reserves in the western and central
USSR, we believe the Soviets can continue to support
both efforts at present or even modestly greater levels.
Implications for Future Pact Theater Forces
230. Although the expansion in manpower which
characterized Pact theater forces during the
mid-1960s and early 1970s has slowed, we expect some
gradual increase in manpower in Pact ground and air
combat units opposite NATO over the next decade as
ongoing programs are implemented. The overall num-
ber of ground and air combat units opposite NATO is
expected to remain at or near its current level, while a
modest decline is anticipated in the number of general
purpose naval ships and submarines.
231. Warsaw Pact nations will continue to improve
the weapons and equipment in their theater forces
opposite NATO. Major weapon production and de-
ployment programs which are clearly in midstream
are expected to continue. In addition, the Soviets will
no doubt seek to develop some entirely new weapons
and support systems. Certain of these systems, such as
laser or television-guided munitions, are already in
testing. Still other Pact weapons-such as enhanced
radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may
emerge in reaction to NATO weapons programs or
force improvements,
232. As the modernization of the Pact's theater
forces equipment progresses, we expect continuing
standardization problems. For example, the Soviets are
currently producing three different medium tanks
while retaining older models in the inventory. This
situation leads to other problems in that the mix and
growing technical complexity of models in the forces
require additional mechanic and operator training and
more elaborate logistic arrangements.
229. The size of the Soviet forces opposite China-
nearly 25 percent of the total theater forces-suggests
a potential for some impact on the forces facing
NATO. There is no evidence, however, that the
burden of maintaining forces against China has seri-
ously constrained Soviet military posture in the west in
recent years, and we do not anticipate such an effect
in the foreseeable future. Short of a rapprochement
with China, which could release some resources for
Ground Forces
233. Barring an agreement on mutual and balanced
force reductions (MBFR), the number and disposition
of Pact ground force divisions opposite NATO are
likely to remain stable during the period of this
Estimate, although expanded divisional organizations
and the formation of new nondivisional units probably
sa More complete discussions of specific Pact ground, air, naval,
and theater nuclear systems which are likely to enter service over
the next decade or so are contained in volume II, chapter VI.
79
TC o t
 will account for moderate increases in manpower and
equipment. We foresee no development over the next
several years which would appreciably alter the basic
Pact strategy of an armor-heavy offensive against
NATO in Central Europe. Despite NATO's substantial
and growing capability for antitank warfare, Pact
planners will continue to regard the tank as the
backbone of their ground assault forces. Considerable
emphasis will be placed throughout the 1980s on
modernizing the tank forces.
234. Improvements in other areas probably will also
be stressed over the next decade to give Pact armored
forces a better chance to survive on the modern
battlefield. These almost certainly will include new
artillery and air defense weapons. The increased use of
smoke and aerosols to interfere with optical and
electro-optical surveillance and tracking devices of
NATO antitank weapons is also expected. Against
antitank helicopters the Pact probably will enlarge its
use of tactical SAMs, antiaircraft artillery, and other
helicopters.
235. We are monitoring one development in par-
ticular with potentially significant implications for the
Soviet ground forces during the coming decade. Over
the past year the Soviets have reconfigured two divi-
sions, each of which has three tank regiments that
have been augmented with organic infantry and artil-
lery battalions. The divisions' motorized rifle regi-
ments have been disbanded, and other subordinate
units have been modified. The changes will improve
the combined-arms capabilities of the tank regiments
and increase their firepower. The overall personnel
requirement for the new structure probably will not
greatly exceed that of the 9,500 men in a standard
Soviet tank division.
236. We have no evidence regarding the extent to
which the Soviets intend to so restructure additional
divisions. We also note that the Soviets are engaged in
a program to expand some standard tank divisions by
adding infantry and artillery to the tank regiments,
but without disbanding the division's motorized rifle
regiment. At best, therefore, our evidence thus far
indicates only that the Soviets are experimenting with
different ways of improving the tank-infantry-artillery
balance in their tank divisions but have not yet settled
on which alternative, or combination thereof, will be
emphasized during the 1980s.
237. We expect Soviet production of the T-55 and
T-64 tanks to end within the next few years. Produc-
tion of the T-72 is expected to continue. A new tank,
the T-80, is expected to enter service by the early
1980s, but our evidence on its current status is frag-
mentary. The NSWP armies will remain largely stand-
ardized on the T-55.
238. Pact concern with increasing conventional
firepower in general and with the neutralization of
NATO antitank defense in particular is expected to
result in continued increase in numbers of artillery
pieces as well as improvements in weapons, target
acquisition capabilities, and ammunition. The upgrad-
ing of the artillery battery in the Soviet motorized rifle
regiment to an artillery battalion-a measure already
well under way-has improved the regiment's
capability to suppress or neturalize antitank weapons
as well as other targets. As towed artillery is replaced
by self-propelled (SP) models, this capability will grow
further because the new systems have better mobility,
are more responsive, and provide better crew
protection.
239. The new SP heavy artillery (203-mm guns and
240-mm mortars) will continue to replace older towed
weapons in Soviet heavy artillery brigades and may
supplement or replace lighter weapons in army artil-
lery regiments and in artillery divisions. NSWP artil-
lery improvements will lag behind those of the Soviets.
The number of SP guns in the East German, Czecho-
slovak, and Polish Armies will increase, but towed
models will continue to predominate.
240. We have fair evidence that the Soviets are
working toward development of improved conven-
tional munitions (ICMs) for their tube artillery sys-
tems. We estimate that by the mid-1980s they will
field ICMs with their larger caliber weapons.
241. Soviet R&D programs for antitank weapons
are being directed toward development of missile
systems incorporating semiautomatic or automatic
guidance to relieve the gunner of guidance responsibil-
ity, thereby increasing hit probabilities and reducing
gunner vulnerability. These programs are expected to
result in the fielding of a short-to-medium-range,
man-portable system incorporating remote guidance
by the mid-1980s and a similar heliborne system
somewhat earlier.
242. The Soviets are likely to continue the advances
which they have made in air defense weapons over the
last decade. Existing systems will no doubt undergo
modification and improvements. A follow-on to the
80
TCS - of
 ZSU-23-4 is expected in the next decade, but probably
not before the mid-1980s. We also expect deployment
of a successor to the SA-6, the SA-X-11, probably
within the next year. Its main improvements over the
SA-6 will be the integration of the target-tracking
radar and missile launcher in a single unit, greater
mobility, better capabilities for electronic counter-
countermeasures (ECCM), and a multiple target-han-
dling capability.
243. Surface-to-surface ballistic missiles are expect-
ed to play an increasingly important role in Warsaw
Pact planning for conventional combat during the
period of this Estimate. New missiles such as the SS-21
have characteristics which give them a significant
conventional capability. The SS-21, for example, could
be used effectively with ICM in an air defense
suppression role. Near the end of the period of this
Estimate, tactical ballistic missiles equipped with ter-
minal guidance and conventional, earth-penetrating
submunitions will pose a serious threat to NATO
airfields.
244. Tactical Air Forces. We believe that the
number of fixed-wing aircraft in Soviet Frontal Avi-
ation opposite NATO will remain essentially un-
changed over the next decade. Efforts to improve the
quality of Soviet tactical aircraft and munitions are
likely to continue, although the rate of new aircraft
deployment is expected to slow as the Soviets meet
their current force objectives. Furthermore, we expect
the Soviets to continue improving their support and
subsidiary systems such as command and control,
radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnaissance
data link systems. No major changes are expected in
the number of fixed-wing aircraft in the NSWP air
forces. NSWP equipment modernization will continue
to proceed gradually and be driven largely by eco-
nomic considerations.
245. Production of the MIG-23 Flogger probably
will continue well into the 1980s. A variant of the
Flogger with an improved radar designed to give it a
better low-altitude intercept capability is being devel-
oped and could be deployed with the Soviet tactical
air forces by the early 1980s. Production of MIG-21
Fishbed variants is also expected to continue at least
into the early 1980s. NSWP tactical fighter units are
expected to receive mainly Floggers and late-model
Fishbeds over the next decade.
TCS
246. Longer term improvements in Soviet fighter
capabilities could arise from the introduction of a
totally new aircraft. The Soviets are testing at least
three new or highly modified fighter-type aircraft, one
of which is intended for deployment with the Soviet
strategic air defense forces. Should either or both of
the other aircraft be deployed with the tactical forces,
they would not be available in significant numbers
before the mid-1980s.
247. We expect deployment of a new ground attack
aircraft-designated the SU-25-with the Soviet Air
Force by 1980 and believe that it will be purchased by
some NSWP countries. The SU-25 is a twin-engine,
subsonic, heavily armored aircraft, presumably de-
signed for close air support of ground forces. The
aircraft apparently does not incorporate advanced
technology and is considerably slower and has a lesser
combat radius than the SU-17 Fitter C/D and MIG-27
Flogger D. But it will be armed with guns, rockets,
bombs, and tactical air-to-surface missiles, and will
almost certainly handle better at low speeds than the
other Pact fighter-bombers.
248. Soviet ground attack units opposite NATO will
be totally equipped with newer aircraft-SU-25, Flog-
ger D, Fitter C/D, and Fencer-by the early 1980s.
Within five years over one-half of the aircraft in
NSWP ground attack units probably will be more
modern types. The SU-25 and Flogger will be the
main ground attack aircraft in NSWP air forces by the
end of the next decade.
249. Military Air Transport. Soviet Military
Transport Aviation (VTA) will continue to be modern-
ized with newer aircraft, but the size of the force will
not appreciably change. Although overall lift capacity
will increase, the Soviets do not appear to be building
a force capable of simultaneously lifting much more
than one airborne division or the assault elements of
two divisions.
250. The AN-12 Cub medium-range transport will
remain the mainstay of the airlift force, at least into
the mid-1980s, although its numbers will continue to
decrease as the IL-76 Candid enters the force. The
Soviets will continue to rely on the AN-22 Cock, which
is no longer in production, to lift outsized military
equipment. We also expect the Soviets to continue
relying on Aeroflot for airlift augmentation, and this
capability will increase as the civil air fleet is
modernized.
 Top ecre
251. A new transport, the AN-72, will probably be
operational in Frontal Aviation units in the early
1980s. This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul
operations from unimproved airfields, will enable
cargo and personnel to be delivered close to deployed
field forces.
252. NSWP National Air Defense." We have
good evidence that non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries
plan to under take a major program to reequip their
national air defense forces. The program is scheduled
to run into the mid-1980s and is designed to remedy
what the Pact considers to be the growing obsolescence
of its surface-to-air missile and interceptor forces.
Though intended primarily to improve defense against
low-altitude targets, the modernization effort would
also entail the introduction of systems that would
extend the range and ceilings at which targets could be
engaged.
253. The Pact's early warning network is scheduled
to be reequipped with newer radars having improved
capabilities for target information handling and data
transmission and greater resistance to electronic coun-
termeasures. Some Pact countries might also receive
radar-equipped ships or possibly aircraft to extend
early warning coverage over water approaches to Pact
territory. NSWP SA-2 and SA-3 systems are to be
upgraded with equipment more resistant to electronic
jamming and possessing better capabilities to engage
targets with small radar cross sections. The SA-5, a
long-range SAM system that has heretofore been de-
ployed only in the USSR, is also being considered for
deployment in some NSWP countries. The most nota-
ble development affecting Pact interceptor forces
would be the continued introduction of Floggers
equipped with a fire-control radar providing a limited
lookdown/shootdown capability. While this aircraft
and late-model Fishbed will be the mainstay of the
force, Pact planners are also considering equipping
some NSWP interceptor units with the MIG-25
Foxbat.
254. Our evidence of Pact plans to deploy the
Foxbat and SA-5 with the NSWP air defense forces
indicates that both would be intended primarily to
counter the growing capabilities of NATO's air forces
for standoff air-to-surface missile attack. The evidence
also suggests that these systems might be used to
engage such NATO aircraft as the E-3A AWACS.
" See NIE 11-3/8-78 for a discussion of the Soviet strategic air
defense forces.
General Purpose Naval Forces
255. During the next decade, developments in the
Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved
capabilities to perform its peacetime and wartime
missions. The Soviets will also press forward with
programs to correct shortcomings in submarine detec-
tion, fleet air defense, logistic support, and communi-
cations. Indeed, developments over the past decade
have been so rapid that a period of time may be
required to integrate and consolidate advances and
ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We
expect a modest decline in the overall number of
Soviet general purpose naval ships and submarines but
newer and more capable units will be replacing older
and less effective ones.
256. We expect the Soviet Navy within the next
decade to continue concentrating on the missions
outlined in volume II. We also anticipate that its
current roles of sea control in limited areas and
support of Soviet overseas policies will continue to
evolve. Improvements in antiship, amphibious, and
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities are also
likely. Moreover, we foresee that by the mid-1980s the
Soviets will have made some progress in such current
problem areas as logistic support and the ability to
conduct sustained operations. The result of this process
will be a somewhat more capable Navy which will
remain an integral element of Pact planning for war in
Europe. We believe, however, the Soviets will contin-
ue to have problems in detecting enemy submarines,
in defending their surface ships against air attack, in
providing targeting assistance for the effective use of
many ASW and antiship weapons, and in replenishing
ships at sea.
257. The Soviet Navy will also continue to devote
resources and develop tactics for preventing the ap-
proach of NATO's carrier task forces or other major
surface ship formations into waters contiguous to the
European theater. As new cruise-missile-equipped
ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable
units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced,
we expect the Soviet capabilities against those NATO
forces to improve. Reliance on external targeting will,
however, remain a serious deficiency in beyond-the-
horizon attacks.
258. Antisubmarine warfare will remain a serious
concern of the Soviet naval leadership. Soviet ASW
capabilities will improve somewhat with the acquisi-
tion of new classes of surface ships, submarines, and
82
TC P.t
 Too Secre
aircraft and as new technology and better operating
techniques take hold. These capabilities will continue,
however, to be greater in areas closer to the Soviet
homeland than in the open ocean. Although there are
gaps in our knowledge of Soviet ASW developments,
we have no evidence of any major breakthrough that
would give the Soviets confidence in their ability to
neutralize Western submarines in the open ocean.
259. The Soviets are also committed to protecting
their own submarines from NATO naval forces, par-
ticularly their D-class SSBNs operating in the Barents
and Norwegian Seas and other areas. This mission has
their capabilities to support and protect their SSBNs.
260. Support for ground forces in the context of a
general European war will continue to be an impor-
tant mission of the Soviet Navy's general purpose
forces. In addition to protecting the seaward flanks of
the ground forces from attack by enemy sea-based air
or naval forces or by enemy amphibious assaults, the
Navy has the role of providing gunfire support for
ground forces and launching amphibious operations
against enemy flanks. This role will have some influ-
ence, albeit limited, on the future composition and
force levels of the fleets. Some older units will be
retained and some new systems, including air-cushion
vehicles and hydrofoils, will be allocated to these flank
support missions.
261. Soviet capabilities to interdict NATO's sea
lines of communication (SLOG) by attacking ships at
sea and by mining and airstrikes against European
port facilities probably also will improve. This will
result from the increased capabilities that will likely
exist in future Soviet general purpose submarines,
mine warfare ships, and naval aircraft. Some agencies
believe, however, that Soviet capabilities to perform
this mission will nonetheless remain limited. Other
agencies believe that Soviet capabilities for SLOG
interdiction currently are and will continue to be
significant.35
For a discussion of differing views on Soviet intentions and
capabilities to interdict NATO's sea lines of communication, see
volume 11 (paragraphs 142 through 149 of chapter II and 168 and
169 of chapter IV) and part B of this volume. Volume II also
discusses differing agency views on the likely maximum sub-
merged speeds of some future Soviet submarines and on the
propulsion of a new combatant under construction at Leningrad.
262. We have considered what the acquisition of
aircraft carriers portends for the future of the Soviet
Navy and can arrive at no agreed estimate. Two
Kiev-class carriers are operational, and a third has
been launched and will probably become operational
in 1981. A fourth carrier of this class is being built. We
also have some information suggesting that upon com-
pletion of the Kiev-class program the Soviets will begin
construction of a new and larger class of aircraft
carrier, possibly incorporating an arrested landing
capability.
263. The Kiev clearly has capabilities in ASW and
in other areas of naval warfare such as antiship strike,
area air defense, and perhaps support for amphibious
attack. We do not know how the Soviets assess the
overall value of the Kiev inasmuch as the capabilities
of its aircraft are limited. It will take a lengthy period
of time for Soviet crews to become proficient in the
complex procedures of carrier flight operations and to
,develop appropriate tactics for carrier operations in
conjunction with other ships. It is apparent that the
Soviets have made a commitment to the construction
of aircraft carriers, although general purpose subma-
rine construction will absorb well over half of what the
Central Intelligence Agency projects will be total
Soviet expenditures for general purpose ships and
submarines through the mid-1980s.
264. There is disagreement within the Intelligence
Community, however, regarding the extent to which
the Kiev enhances current Soviet military effectiveness
and regarding the impact of Soviet acquisition of
carriers upon the evolution of naval missions. Accord-
ing to one view,36 the introduction of the Kiev may
constitute a major turning point in the development of
the Soviet Navy, but it is premature to judge the
impact of the acquisition of carriers upon the evolu-
tion of naval missions. Some holders of this view 37
further believe that one, two, or three ships of this
class, because of their limited capabilities to detect
NATO submarines beyond torpedo attack range and
to defend against NATO air attack, do not by them-
selves represent a significant improvement in Soviet
capabilities to fight a war with NATO. They also
believe that the Soviet naval leadership has chosen an
"The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency;
the Director, National Security Agency; and the Director, Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
"The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State.
83
 Too Secre
option which is more significant for the future of the
structure of the Navy than for the enhancement of
current military effectiveness.
265. According to an alternate view,38 the acquisi-
tion of carriers with the introduction of the Kiev
clearly constitutes a major watershed in the develop-
ment of the Soviet Navy. The holders of this view
further believe that the Kiev already has influenced
the acquisition of other future surface combatants, and
enhances Soviet antiship, ASW, and other capabilities
to an extent that could have significant influence on
Pact naval operations in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
The construction of the Kiev class and possibly a larger
carrier class in the 1980s will provide added impetus
to the Soviet Navy's gradually expanding role in
achieving sea control and in providing support to
amphibious operations.
266. Over the next decade the Soviets will continue
their ongoing programs to improve their peripheral
strategic strike forces and to eliminate the imbalance
in battlefield nuclear capabilities they perceive in the
European theater. Force improvements carried out to
date and ongoing deployment of new systems are
increasing the flexibility with which the Soviets can
employ their theater nuclear forces. In particular, they
are acquiring low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and
delivery systems with sufficient accuracy to permit
employment in close proximity to Pact forces.
267. Tactical Nuclear Forces. The Soviets will
continue to improve the quality of their tactical
ballistic missile forces by deploying new missiles,
introducing improved guidance systems, and increas-
ing the number of weapons in tactical units. Deploy-
ment of the SS-21, the replacement for the FROG
division-level weapon, will continue at least through
the mid-1980s; its deployment with Soviet forces in
Eastern Europe could occur at any time. The deploy-
ment of the SS-22 as a replacement for the SS-12
front-level missile system also is probably under way
and will continue until all 12 SS-12 brigades are
reequipped.
268. Increases in Soviet tactical missile forces oppo-
site NATO are expected over the next several years.
se The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
Navy.
Three Soviet Scud brigades in East Germany have
already been increased from 12 to 18 launchers. If all
Soviet Scud brigades in Eastern Europe are similarly
augmented-as probably will be the case-the force
will have an additional 66 launchers, bringing the total
there to 198 Scud launchers. We are unable to predict
whether Scud brigades in the USSR will also be
expanded. We have recent evidence that the Soviets
plan to increase the number of tactical missile launch-
ers in their divisions from four to six as the SS-21
replaces the FROG system. The increases in both Scud
and SS-21 launchers would provide the Soviets with
greater firepower and flexibility during conventional
and nuclear operations.
269. A probable replacement for the Scud, the
SS-X-23, is in an early stage.of development. The first
flight test of this missile was observed in October 1977.
This system, which is expected to have improved
accuracy and reduced reaction time over the current
Scud systems, could reach operational status by 1982.
270. In the Pact tactical air forces, the potential for
nuclear delivery is expected to grow as the aircraft
modernization programs progress over the next dec-
ade. In addition, the availability of low-yield warheads
and improved air-to-surface missile guidance systems
could induce the Soviets to field an air-delivered
tactical missile with a nuclear capability during the
latter part of the 1980s.
271. The number of pilots in Soviet units qualified
to drop nuclear bombs is also expected to grow,
particularly in the fighter-bomber regiments, as the
level of pilot experience and proficiency increases and
nuclear delivery training is broadened. We do not
expect the number of such pilots in the NSWP units to
grow, however, because nuclear delivery training
probably will continue to be confined to a few special-
ly designated units.
272. The Soviets are expected to continue reequip-
ping their heavy artillery brigades in the USSR with
the nuclear-capable 203-mm self-propelled guns and
240-mm self-propelled mortars. All six such brigades
opposite NATO are expected to complete the reequip-
ping process within the next several years. It also
seems likely that the Soviets will deploy some nuclear
artillery to Eastern Europe during the period of this
Estimate. The Soviets probably have the technological
capability to develop a 152-mm nuclear artillery
round, but we have no reliable evidence that they
intend to develop and field such a weapon.
84
Top ~
 273. Peripheral Strategic Forces. The Soviets will
continue to rely heavily on land-based ballistic missiles
to conduct strategic nuclear strikes in the areas sur-
rounding the USSR. Some intercontinental ballistic
missiles probably will continue to have peripheral
missions, but the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic
missile will be the backbone of the peripheral force.
There is evidence that in late 1975 the Soviets were
considerin a plan to field a force of up to 28 SS-20
regiments.
eventually
there be at least nine SS-20 launchers per regi-
ment. We project a total force of 250 to 300 launchers,
and we estimate that such a force could be fully
deployed by the early 1980s. We also project that the
Soviets will begin fielding a modified version with a
more flexible payload and improved accuracy shortly
thereafter. As a result, we project a total force of about
300 mobile IRBM launchers from 1984 onward. About
200 of these will be deployed in areas opposite NATO.
(See table 4.)
Table 4
Projected Soviet Peripheral Strike Forces
Opposite NATO a
1979, 1983, and 1988
MRBMs and IRBMs
SS-4 Launchers
384
140
0
Silo
64
56
0
Aboveground
320
84
0
SS-5 Launchers
61
51
0
Silo
27
27
0
Aboveground
34
24
0
SS-20
45-63
171
27
SS-20 Mod B
0
9
171
Bombers of Long Range Aviation
TU-16 Badgers
325
300
250
TU-22 Blinders
155
140
100
Backfires
45
115
160
Ballistic Missile Submarines/ Launchers b
SS-N-4 (G-I)
1/3
0
SS-N-5 (G-II)
6/18
3/9
SS-N-5 (H-II)
4/12
0
a For a more detailed treatment of the peripheral strike forces,
the implications and possible constraints of a SALT agreement, and
alternative projections of future peripheral strike forces, see NIE
11-6-78, Soviet Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack.
b Some of the modern Y-class submarines probably have contin-
gency missions for peripheral strike. As the number of older ballistic
missile submarines with peripheral missions declines, some of their
target coverage may be assumed by modern ballistic missile
submarines.
274. Our force projections assume that the size of
the Long Range Aviation bomber force with a periph-
eral attack mission will remain about the same as at
present. Some aging Badgers and Blinders probably
will be retired as Backfires are assigned to LRA in
increasing numbers. By the late 1980s about 270
Backfires could be in service with LRA if the rate of
production increases as projected. One constraint be-
ing considered at the strategic arms limitation talks
(SALT) is a limitation on the rate of Backfire produc-
tion. If this enters into effect, LRA could have almost
200 Backfires in 1988, of which about 160 would be
deployed opposite NATO. In the near term, we expect
Backfires to be deployed primarily with LRA units in
the European USSR, enabling some Badgers, especially
those capable of delivering both bombs and air-to-sur-
face missiles, to be transferred to the Soviet Far East.
275. The number of older ballistic missile subma-
rines for peripheral strike probably will decline during
the period of our projections. The Soviets probably
will continue to convert their G-I submarines to attack
or special-purpose submarines or retire them. We
estimate that some of the G-II submarines, which are
targeted against the peripheral areas, will be in the
force until the mid-1980s, but the last G-II probably
will be deactivated before 1988. The future of the
H-II submarine as a ballistic missile system is in doubt
because of the constraints of a prospective SALT
agreement.
276. As the number of older ballistic missile subma-
rines with peripheral missions declines, some of their
target coverage may be assumed by modern ballistic
missile submarines. The range of the missiles carried
by these modern SSBNs gives them greater targeting
flexibility than the G- or H-classes.
Support Systems and Forces
277. Command, Control, and Communications.
We estimate that, currently, about one week would be
required before the Pact's wartime communications
links could'be established to theater-level headquarters
and to supporting strategic commands. Communica-
tions, between Moscow and the fronts and within the
fronts, to control combat operations by divisions and
armies could be effectively established within a few
days. However, the Pact has two programs under
way-the creation of a centralized command structure
and the establishment of a unified communications
system-which, during the period of this Estimate,
85
TCS 1 oTp geere
 could shorten the time required by the Pact to get its
command and control system prepared for war. The
two programs are intended to establish in peacetime
the theater-level (High Command) resources needed
to control Pact forces once they are released from
national control. We estimate that the centralized
command structure could be complete by the early
1980s. The unified communications system could be-
gin to improve the Pact's command capabilities by the
mid-1980s, but it is not scheduled for completion until
1990.
278. While the Pact is expected to achieve a more
centralized command system through the creation of
permanent theater commands, the Soviets probably
will not control the day-to-day peacetime operations
of NSWP forces. The centralized control structure
would, however, enable them to assume more quickly
wartime control of Pact forces, once authorized by
NSWP leaders. The theater commands would also
plan wartime operations and control forces during
exercises. Hardened command and communications
centers which could be used by theater commands
have already been constructed, and more are planned.
279. The Pact made the decision in 1974 to create
by 1990 an integrated communications system to
provide high-capacity communications for Pact forces,
to include theater commands. This new system-
referred to by the Russian acronym VAKSS-is a
civilian network which also will provide the Pact with
its first integrated communication system with the
increased communications capability and connectivity
necessary to support the developing centralized com-
mand structure. The VAKSS program is an ambitious
one, however, and may meet some resistance from
NSWP countries-particularly Romania-which
could delay completion, even though most of the
developments specified for VAKSS probably are with-
in the Soviet and NSWP technological capabilities.
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