THE ROLE OF INTERDICTION AT SEA IN SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005530564
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: May 1, 1978

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AR 70-14
The Role of Interdiction at
Sea in Soviet Naval
Strategy and Operations
An Intelligence Assessment
SR 71?-1n0Ogrx
May 1978
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'eefet.\
The Role of Interdiction at Sea in
Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
May 1978
Key Judgments
This study assesses the Soviets' ability to disrupt Western merchant
shipping in a war with NATO as well as the priority they are likely to assign to
that mission.' Major findings are:
? The Soviet Navy's principal wartime missions are strategic strike,
antisubmarine warfare, and anticarrier warfare; it would allocate most
of its forces to those missions.
? Interdiction is a secondary mission to which the Soviets would probably
allocate a small part (perhaps 10 percent) of their operational attack
submarine force. Selected attacks on shipping, over a wide area of
ocean, would in part be intended to disperse Western naval resources.
? In a protracted general war, the disruption of Western shipping would
assume more importance for the Soviets, and they would attack
Western ports and harbors, sink merchant ships at sea, and mine
heavily traveled waters. However, they would probably not assign the
submarine force to extensive interdiction operations until Western
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and carrier strike groups had been
neutralized.
? The Soviets probably would try to cut off NATO's shipping completely
in areas like the North Sea if such a move were directly relevant to the
land battle. This support of Warsaw Pact ground forces would
temporarily concentrate a wide variety of naval forces in a specific
area.
Soviet naval writers argue against assigning large forces to attack
merchant shipping in the open ocean. The Navy?especially its large fleet of
Soviet writings discuss interdiction in the context of a war with NATO. They almost never mention
antishipping operations during lesser conflicts, and that subject is not treated in this paper.
Secr-et.
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attack submarines?could do so, however, if ordered. Accordingly, with the
aid of a computer-based model, we examined the ability of the Northern Fleet
to cut the flow of merchant shipping between the United States and Western
Europe, using several possible scenarios. (The assumptions used in our model
and the results obtained are described in annex E.) We found that even if the
Soviets were to realign naval missions in favor of interdiction, they could not
reduce that flow by a militarily significant amount.
Several factors would limit a Soviet interdiction campaign at sea:
? Most classes of Soviet attack submarines carry relatively few torpedoes
and are subject to materiel deficiencies, while the inefficiency of the
Soviet logistic support system exacerbates the problems of resupply and
maintenance and limits the submarines' availability for operations.
? Crews are not well trained in attacking maneuvering targets screened
by escorts.
? Long transit routes through geographically constricted waters make the
submarines vulnerable during deployment and return to base.
? Soviet Naval Aviation is not well suited to operate at the ranges
necessary for interdiction of the major sea lanes.
? The West has so many merchant ships that moderate losses would be
militarily insignificant, and its commerce is so extensive and diverse
that the Soviets would have trouble identifying the militarily important
ships?those loaded with war. materiel.
Present trends in Soviet naval strategy probably will continue for at least
the next decade. As long as Western SSBNs and aircraft carriers remain a
credible threat to the USSR, the Soviets are unlikely to reorder their priorities
for force allocations. Additional older units may be assigned to interdiction as
more nuclear-powered units enter the force, but they would be few and would
not significantly change Soviet capabilities against Western shipping.
?
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CONTENTS
Key Judgments
Preface .
Soviet Intentions 1
Principal Wartime Missions .......... ............ ..................... ............ 1
Interdiction at Sea2
.....
Soviet Capabilities for Open-Ocean Interdiction in a General War ... 7
Capability of Soviet Attack Submarines ............. .................... 7
Capability of ASM-Equipped Aircraft 11
Capability of Surface Ships 14
NATOCapabilities ..................... ............. ......... .......... .................... 15
NATOSealift Resources ................. ....... ............ ............. ................ 15
US Plans for the Resupply of NATO ................. ................ ............. 15
Outlook 16
Annex A: The Role of Interdiction in Nuclear War: Soviet
Military Viewpoint 19
Annex B: Interpretations of Soviet Naval Exercises 23
Annex C: Weapons Carried by Soviet Attack Submarines ........... 29
Annex D: How the Soviets Would Carry Out Interdiction Operations 31
Annex E: Methodology for Estimating Soviet Interdiction Capabilities 35
Figures
1. The Soviet Attack Submarine Force, Midyear 1965 ? April 1978
(graph) 1
2. Endurance Limits for Soviet Northern Fleet Submarines (map) 6
3. Practical Limits for Initial Antiship Attacks by Soviet Naval Aircraft
in a NATO - Warsaw Pact War (map) 13
4. Cumulative Western Ship Losses (graph) 37
5. Cumulative Losses in Scenario 3 Using Different Modes of
Deployment (graph) 37
--Tiip-SecrAL
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roecr.et
Tables
2. Distribution of Attack Submarines Among Soviet Fleets,
April 1978
8
3. Maximum Combat Radii of Naval ASM-Equipped Aircraft
Under Optimum Conditions
12
4. Soviet Order of Battle of Naval ASM-Equipped Aircraft, January 1978
14
5. Merchant Ship Participation in Okean-75: Two Views
24
7. Western Merchant Ship Losses to Soviet Submarines in a 120-Day
Open-Ocean Interdiction Campaign in the North Atlantic ....... .... .
36
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PREFACE
A number of national security issues have recently focused US attention
on Soviet capabilities and intentions to disrupt Western shipping in a general
war. The USSR has the world's largest fleet of general purpose submarines,
which enables it to threaten the long sea lines of communication that the
United States and its allies depend on economically and militarily. US
intelligence analysts, however, have markedly different interpretations of how
many forces the Soviets would allocate to this mission.
For this paper, interdiction is defined as the disruption of merchant
shipping?of military or commercial cargoes?in the open ocean. Warships,
military logistic ships, and amphibious landing forces are excluded from this
definition.
The Soviets note that interdiction of sea lines of communication can be
accomplished by a variety of forces used in a variety of ways, including
disruption or destruction of ports of embarkation and destination, attacks on
ships at sea, and the mining of straits and narrows and approaches to ports and
harbors.2
The Soviets clearly believe that the most effective way to interdict an
enemy's shipping is to attack his ports and harbors. In a general nuclear war,
such attacks require the fewest forces, offer the highest probability of success,
are hardest to defend against, and permit other forces capable of interdiction
to be given higher priority tasks.
In a conventional war, on the other hand, the importance of attacking
ships on the open ocean probably would increase if war were prolonged,
partly because conventional strikes against ports are less effective than nuclear
strikes. Disrupting port operations would require frequent large bombing
attacks which would reduce the availability of the bombers for other missions.
This paper reviews the evidence bearing on the role of interdiction in
Soviet naval policy. It examines Soviet mission priorities and estimates the
composition and capabilities of the forces the Soviets would probably use for
interdiction.
Analysis of Soviet plans is complicated by the scarcity of information
dealing directly with interdiction. Detailed discussion of the subject in Soviet
This paper discusses only the Soviet ability to mount an open-ocean interdiction campaign.
o cret
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military writings is comparatively rare (except in a historical context), and the
Soviets seldom practice anticonvoy tactics except in amphibious landing
exercises.
Both classified and open-source Soviet and Warsaw Pact writings have
provided insight into Soviet war planning. These materials, however, have
certain limitations:
? Many of the classified writings were published before 1971. We
consider them valid, however, because they are largely consistent with
information from other forms of intelligence that continue to be
available.
? Much of the material is argumentative in nature?prepared by
advocates of one course or another?and may not necessarily represent
official doctrine and policy.
? Certain Russian expressions are not clearly defined and seem to differ
from Western usage. Thus, the Soviets sometimes use such terms as
interdiction, transports, and convoy in reference to naval support ships
and amphibious landing ships. They view these naval ships as impor-
tant elements of the enemy's fleet because such ships can directly
participate in offensive operations against the Warsaw Pagekn atli-
tion, the Soviets' use of the term naval blockade can -eeffipPa+Sjiii
geographically diffused interdiction operations of the kind employed
by Germany during World Wars I and II. These differences introduce
ambiguity into Soviet writings and occasionally appear to inflate the
importance of at-sea interdiction for them. Where appropriate, these
semantic difficulties are noted in this report.
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The Role of Interdiction at Sea in
Soviet Naval Strategy and Operations
Soviet Intentions
Soviet attack submarines, the main strike forces
for use against Western merchant ships, are also
needed to perform a variety of other important
naval missions. Priorities among these missions
reflect the level of effort that the USSR would
expend on interdiction.?
Principal Wartime Missions
The most specific information available on
Soviet naval priorities is contained in classified
Soviet and Warsaw Pact documents produced
efore 1971. During the 1970s we have seen few
ch statements, but information from other
sources shows no change in the main tasks. In
either a conventional or a nuclear war, these are
antisubmarine warfare (including protection of
Soviet SSBNs from Western attack submarines),
anticarrier warfare, and the deployment of Soviet
SSBNs to launch areas. Less critical missions
include:
? Support of the seaward flanks of the ground
forces.
? Interdiction of Western sea lines of commu-
nication.
? Coastal defense.
? Protection of Soviet shipping.
These secondary missions would have equal pri-
ority in the early stages of any war, but the
Soviets believe that interdiction could assume
? Annex A discusses Soviet military writings on naval mission
priorities.
'While Soviet military literature often distinguishes between
"main" and "secondary" missions, analysts must infer the ranking of
= missions within each category from the order in which tasks are
consistently listed and from rare explicit references made by
authoritative writers.
greater importance after Western strike forces
had exhausted most of their strategic weapons.
Military writings indicate that regardless of
how a war began, the Soviets would attempt to
direct their general purpose naval forces first of
all toward the destruction of enemy ballistic
missile submarines and aircraft carriers. Some
Western analysts, on the other hand, have sug-
gested that the Soviets might not do so in the
early stages of a conventional war. They postulate
that the Soviets might wish to avoid escalation to
nuclear war and so might avoid attacks on West-
ern SSBNs, which could provoke such escalation.
The Anti-SSBN Mission. Peacetime Soviet na-
val operations reflect the high priority of the anti-
SSBN mission. The Soviets have stationed intelli-
gence collection ships (AGIs) near Western SSBN
bases since 1964?and in more recent years have
attempted, apparently without success, to detect
and trail Western SSBNs with some of their
newer nuclear-powered attack submarines.
The Soviets consistently acknowledge the diffi-
culty of destroying Western SSBNs and recognize
that they may not be able to prevent them from
launching many missiles at the Soviet Union.
They assert that even after firing its missiles, the
SSBN should still be a priority target, because it
could be rearmed and reused. Soviet planners
evidently regard the SSBN force as a threat so
serious that even partial success would fully
justify the concentration of resources against it.
Soviet strategy is complicated by technological
difficulties. In addition to the unsolved problem
of detecting the SSBN in the first place, the
Soviets have only a limited ability to classify the
submarines they might detect?a critical defi-
ciency if they should wish to avoid sinking SSBNs
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-rdir-fierzet\
in a conventional war. Because of these difficul-
ties and the continuing threat posed by Western
SSBNs, strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
will probably continue to occupy major Soviet
naval resources for the foreseeable future.
Tactical Support for Soviet SSBNs. The Soviets
place a similarly high value on securing the
operating areas of their own ballistic missile units
and would probably assign some torpedo attack
submarines to that task in wartime. When Y-class
SSBNs began to enter the fleet in large numbers
in the late 1960s, some Soviet naval officers
argued that protection of strategic submarines
would be particularly important during the con-
ventional and limited nuclear phases of a general
war?when they would have to remain passively
on station awaiting the launch order. Naval oper-
ations, writings, and exercises since that time
continue to reflect that concern. The Soviets
frequently use their attack submarines to delouse
their SSBNs.5 Recently, they also have assigned
attack submarines to accompany SSBNs on patrol
on several occasions.
Anticarrier Warfare. The Soviets continue to
have great respect for the carrier's importance in
NATO military strategy. They regard it as the
key element of the general purpose naval forces,
as a reserve strategic nuclear force, and appar-
ently as an 'integral part of amphibious landing
forces. Most of the Navy's cruise missile subma-
rines and aircraft with air-to-surface missiles
(ASMs) were procured primarily to counter West-
ern aircraft carriers (although they could be used
against any ships).
As the United States began to deploy large
numbers of long-range strategic missiles, the stra-
tegic strike role of carriers declined. By the mid-
1960s the Soviets were focusing on the Polaris
submarine as the primary strategic naval threat to
the USSR. Their concern over US carriers and
other naval forces such as amphibious task groups
that could threaten the Pact has not diminished,
however. Soviet writings and exercises still indi-
cate that the Soviets plan to attack nearby carriers
In delousing operations, passing submarines check each other for
covert trailer submarines. '
2
and other naval forces as soon as possible after a
war begins.
This emphasis, plus the Soviet view that it takes
multiple hits with conventional weapons to sink a
carrier, suggests that few submarines and aircraft
armed with cruise missiles would be diverted
from anticarrier warfare to interdiction. Evi-
dence is mounting that Soviet cruise missile sub-
marines carry few, if any, torpedo reloads, and
this would limit their usefulness for interdiction
after they had completed their anticarrier
mission.
Protection of Soviet Peripheral Waters. In
addition to protecting Soviet territory from sea-
based missile and air attack, the Soviet Navy has
the mission of securing coastal waters from
enemy attack. Doctrinal literature devotes com-
paratively little space to this traditional mission,
which has been supplanted in Soviet debate by
the more difficult problem of fighting naval
strike forces farther away.6 Nonetheless, exercises
have
had defense of the homeland as a recurrent
theme in Soviet naval training since the mid-
1960s. Generally. these exercises include simu-
lated 1 amphibious and carrier task
forces, which are subjected to attack by Soviet
surface, submarine, and air forces, with missile-
equipped aircraft delivering the decisive attack.
These exercises suggest that in wartime large
forces, including diesel-powered submarines
armed with cruise missiles, would be held in or
near the Barents Sea?far from major shipping
lanes and from any interdiction activity.
Interdiction at Sea
Soviet military literature and exercises devote
much attention to antifleet operations and little to
interdiction. What information is available on
interdiction suggests that from the beginning of a ?
general war the Soviets would conduct some
attacks on shipping, primarily as a means of
Many of the forces devoted to countering SSBNs and carriers
would be deployed so as to fulfill both missions?those deployed to
the Greenland - Iceland - United Kingdom 6p and the Norwegian
Sea are examples.
'
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. dispersing and tying down Western naval assets
and forcing NATO shipping to take defense
measures that would reduce its efficiency. They
, would give somewhat more importance to cutting
the NATO-US lines of supply by attacking port
areas. In his book Sea Power of the State (1976),
Adm. Sergey Gorshkov states that the character
of interdiction operations has changed and that
interdiction is now subsumed in the "overall
system of naval operations against the shore.-
Our judgments on the status of interdiction rest
on evidence from a variety of Soviet sources?
chiefly on their writings and exercises and the
structure and capabilities of their attack subma-
rine and naval air forces.
Writings. Soviet opinion is far from unani-
mous, and classified and open-source Soviet writ-
ings indicate that as early as 1963 there were
differing points of view within the naval com-
mand. The authoritative view seems to strike a
balance between two extremes?that interdiction
has no significance, and that it would play an
.mportant, role in the initial period of war.7 One
writer stated that a part of Soviet naval forces,
particularly diesel-powered submarines, would
operate on the sea lanes to prevent NATO troops
from being reinforced or evacuated but added
that such an operation must not divert the main
force elements from attempting to engage enemy
carriers and SSBNs.
Military doctrine shifted in the late 1960s to
include the possibility, of a protracted war?
which some authors judged would increase the
importance of interdiction. No immediate shift in
emphasis occurred, however; as recently as 1970
some advocates of paying more attention to
interdiction believed that the USSR had not made
the preparations required for effective interdic-
tion operations.
.
Taken as a whole, Soviet writings suggest that
the USSR is hedging its bets on interdiction. Most
. Soviet planners do not expect to have to fight the
kind of war in which attacks against shipping
would be significant. They expect the opening
7 See annex A for discussion of the internal debateon the role of
interdiction.'
phases of a war to be brief and decisive, culmi-
nating in a nuclear exchange?which would de-
stroy the ports upon which shipping depends.
This belief relegates attrition-based strategies like
interdiction at sea to secondary importance.
The Soviets recognize that under certain less
likely circumstances?particularly a prolonged
war?cutting the sea lanes could become impor-
tant. They apparently believe that as such a war
progresses, forces may complete their primary
missions and become available for interdiction.
We consider it unlikely, however, that many
ASW forces could be reassigned during a conflict,
mainly because they could not find the SSBNs
and so could not complete their mission. Soviet
forces probably also would suffer heavy losses in
their attacks against Western aircraft carriers and
SSBNs; and Western attack submarines, ASW
aircraft, and mines probably would destroy many
Soviet submarines as they funneled through the
geographic chokepoints between their bases and
the open ocean.
Information from Soviet writings on mission
priorities became scarcer after 1970. We do have
recent Warsaw Pact documents which, with evi-
dence from other sources, suggest that no funda-
mental change has occurred. The mix of nuclear
and conventional weapons carried by attack sub-
marines 8 reflects the Soviets' continued belief
that conflicts at sea are likely to escalate,'
The Soviets would not lightly discard the basic
precepts that have guided their operational plan-
ning for the last two decades. To do so would
require a major break with past doctrine, a body
of military thought characterized by slow, evolu-
tionary change. Even more important, they could
not allocate more assets to interdiction at sea
without reducing their assets against Western
SSBNs and aircraft carriers?forces capable of
striking vital targets in the Soviet Union with
nuclear weapons.
Exercises and training. The Soviets rarely
practice attacks against convoyed merchant ships
'See annex D.
3
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except as part of amphibious landing exercises.
Soviet writings emphasize the importance of co-
ordinating air and submarine operations in any
campaign to interdict shipping,
L1 here is no
evidence, for example, of a Soviet torpedo attack
submarine conducting joint search-and-attack op-
erations with a TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance
airplane?the only reconnaissance aircraft with
sufficient range to fly over the North Atlantic sea
routes and locate targets for submarines. If inter-
diction were a priority mission, such joint oper-
ations would seem to be desirable, because sub-
marines on their own have a limited ability to
find merchant ships.
We have current, detailed information on
Soviet naval training activities and objectives,
which makes no reference to interdiction. This
omission confirms the precedence of naval over
nonnaval targets in Soviet thinking. Both naval
exercises and routine training have focused on
ASW and anticarrier warfare.?
exercises held in 1970 by the Warsaw
Pact
illustrated the antifleet orientation of the
Soviet Navy.
IThe 1970 exercise postulated a
tneater conflict with NATO in the eastern Medi-
terranean Sea and contiguous ?areas. It began
conventionally, for "training" purposes, and ac-
cording to the scenario the Pact could have
achieved its objectives without use of nuclear
weapons. After three days of fighting, however,
NATO was facing defeat and escalated the
conflict.
From the onset of the exercise, the Pact's
"main" naval forces were directed against West-
ern aircraft carriers and SSBNs operating in the
Mediterranean. (The scenario assumed a highly
optimistic view of the Pact capabilities.) They
"By contrast, Adm. Doenitz, architect of the German U-boat
campaign during World War II, believed that interdiction required
thorough and specialized training. He insisted that U-boat crews
undergo rigid training before being sent against Allied shipping. On
I September 1940, for example, only 27 U-boats were available for
Atlantic duty, partly because many others had been detailed for
training (Doenitz, Memoirs, pp. 107-9). Soviet naval officers appear
to agree with this assessment: their writings stress that open-ocean
Interdiction operations would be complex and difficult and criticize
the Germans for the decline in U-boat training that occurred late in
World War II.
4
also supported Pact ground forces, destroyed
enemy naval forces in the Black Sea, and helped
secure the Turkish Straits. The exercise appar-
ently did not simulate strikes against merchant
shipping.
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Trends in Force Procurement. The Soviets
have not structured their military forces to inter-
dict merchant ships in the open ocean.
? The size of the attack submarine force has
declined by nearly 30 percent since 1965, as
shown in the graph, figure 1. The loss in
numbers is offset somewhat, for interdiction
purposes, by the greater speed and range of
the newer submarines.
? The Soviets probably could not sustain their
submarines in the North Atlantic sea lanes
without returning them to base. Soviet offi-
cers write that distant submarine operations
need logistic support for resupply at sea in
wartime?but their submarine tenders are
easy targets for Western aircraft and subma-
rines. Indeed, the vulnerability of their logis-
tic support system has been noted repeatedly
in Soviet writings and is consistent with the
findings of Warsaw Pact exercises.
400
300
cp`"
C
200
100
? Most of their naval aircraft armed with
? ASMs lack the range to operate effectively
over the major sea lanes (see map, figure3).
? Finally, the Soviets have not mass-produced
submarines primarily intended for sinking
merchant ships, although they could have
done so.
The Soviets could, for example, have built
great numbers of submarines that combined sim-
plicity of design, high endurance, large torpedo
capacity, and relatively inexpensive diesel pro-
pulsion.12 Instead, they have concentrated
resources on fewer, more expensive submarines
with relatively small torpedo loads that are spe-
cialized for ASW and anticarrier operations.
12 The Soviets had unused construction capacity during the
production run for the diesel-powered long-range F-class submarine
the second most numerous class in the Soviet submarine force).
Production spanned more than a decade and averaged less than five
new units a year. By comparison, production of the medium-range
W-class submarine reached more than 60 units a year before the
program was canceled in the mid-1950s.
Figure 1
The Soviet Attack Submarine Force, Midyear 1965-April 1978*
/-345
---------....-----
Total
---....____
254?\
Diesel-Powered Long-Range Torpedo Attack Submarines
83--\
r57
1
1 1 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 1
1 1
1965
1970
"Excludes auxiliary, radar picket, and reserve submarines.
1975
1978
5
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Endurance Limits of Soviet Northern Fleet Submarines Figure 2.
,Vorw
See
United 4t1/44
4.7
States 4 4%, \;
to
- ? f3.'
4t
Norih Atlantic Ocean
NUCLEAR
20 DA Ys too m
South Atlantic Ocean
NAUTICAL MILES
SECRET
676027 4-70 CIA
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Classified writings of the mid-1960s indicated
that the Soviets' principal interdiction weapon
system would be the torpedo attack submarine
with diesel propulsion. Long-range diesels
(mostly of the F-class) make up about a third of
their attack submarine force, a percentage that
has been fairly stable in recent years. (Although
.the Soviets are slowly retiring obsolescent Z-class
submarines, they are building new long-range
diesels?of the T-class?at a near-replacement
rate of about two a year.)
This type of submarine would also be heavily
committed in wartime to antifleet operations, as
current submarine operations " and Soviet doctri-
nal writings and exercises indicate. The slow
underwater speed of the F- and T-class units
dictates that they lie in wait for targets or patrol
in relatively restricted areas; thus, many would be
positioned in geographic chokepoints where they
could intercept Western naval forces. This would
leave relatively few submarines available to inter-
dict shipping in the open-ocean sea lanes.
4111) Soviet Capabilities for Open-Ocean Interdiction
in a General War
The Soviets would try to hamper Western
shipping in a variety of ways. These include
making air and missile strikes against ports, sink-
ing merchant ships in the open ocean and in
coastal waters, and mining harbor entrances. This
assessment, however, deals only with Soviet capa-
bilities to destroy NATO shipping in the Atlantic
and contiguous seas.
Capability of Soviet Attack Submarines
The USSR currently maintains in its western
fleets an active inventory of 178 attack subma-
rines, most of which are based in the Northern
Fleet (see table 2). Of this total, 122 are long-
range units with the endurance to operate on the
major shipping lanes. Nuclear-powered subma-
rines (SSGNs and SSNs), capable of operating 20
"The F-class is used more extensively than other classes of Soviet
attack submarines. Normally, these submarines are deployed in the
Mediterranean, where they would be directed mainly against naval
ships of the US Sixth Fleet. The only other F-class units routinely
deployed out of area are in the Gulf of Aden and west of Africa.
411) Long-range diesel submarines rarely operate in the major sea lanes.
Secr41,
-Tor-53 met \
days on station with a 5,800-nm patrol radius,"
make up nearly one-third of the force. Long-
range diesel submarines, capable of operating 20
days on station with a 2,400-nm radius, constitute
another third. The rest are mostly medium-range
It- and W-class submarines, which have an en-
durance of 20 days on station when operating
within 1,200 nm of their bases in the USSR.
Without forward basing, these shorter range sub-
marines would not be effective against the major
shipping lanes to Europe and could be more
effectively used in defensive operations in areas
closer to the USSR. Submarines based in the
Baltic and Black Seas probably would be denied
access to the North and Mediterranean Seas?
Soviet plans to gain control of these areas
notwithstanding.
The focal point for a Soviet campaign against
Western shipping most likely would be the North
Atlantic, and the main threat would be the 107
long-range attack submarines based in the North-
ern Fleet, supplemented perhaps by a few long-
range units predeployed from the Baltic and
Black Sea Fleets. Although this force is large,
several factors limit its capability against the flow
of NATO merchant shipping.
Competing Mission Requirements. One of the
. most important factors limiting the effectiveness
of a Soviet interdiction campaign would be the
competing naval missions that would have a prior
claim on attack submarines. Even without divert-
ing forces to an interdiction campaign, the So-
viets do not have the submarines they believe
they would need to perform the critical naval
missions of strategic ASW and defense against
carrier strike forces.
Reliable evidence from Soviet discussions of
the strategic ASW problem suggests that the
Soviets estimate they would need some 80 to 100
nuclear submarines (they have 53 in the Northern
Fleet) or 320 to 400 diesels if they are to have a
70-percent probability of destroying the NATO
SSBNs in the Atlantic area. 's Our own analysis of
"The endurance limits of Soviet submarines are shown on the
map, figure 2.
"This assumes that they have located the SSBNs within 100-
square-mile areas. We believe they would have difficulty accom-
plishing this first step, however, because of the' poor quality of
Soviet sensors and the low noise levels of US and UK SSBNs
compared to those of Soviet submarines.
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Table 2
Distribution of Attack Submarines Among Soviet Fleets, April 1978
Range
CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES
Nuclear-Powered (SSGN)
Class/Missiles
long
C-II/8 SS-N-7 long
E-II/8 SS-N-3/12 long
P/10 launchers for an unknown
missile long
Total SSGN .... ...........
Diesel-Electric (SSG)
Class/Missiles
J/4 SS-N-3 long
W Long Bin3/4 SS-N-3 medium
W Twin Cyl.'/2 SS-N-3 ..... medium
Total SSG
Total Cruise Missile
Submarines
TORPEDO ATTACK SUBMARINES
Nuclear-Powered (SSN) Class
A3 long
E long
N long
V-I long
V-11 long
Total SSN
Diesel-Electric (SS) Class
B7 short
F long
G long
4 7 short
R ' medium
T long
W' medium
Z long
Total SS
Total Torpedo Attack
Submarines
Total long-range attack
submarines
Total short- and
medium-range
attack submarines
GRAND TOTAL ............ ..........
Estimated
Torpedo Loads
12
12
8
Unknown
Northern
Fleet
9
3
15
1
28
Baltic
Fleet
Black Sea
Fleet
Total in
Western Fleets
9
3
15
1
28
Pacific
Fleet
2
14
16
6
12
12
4
10
3
1
4
2
12
3
3
12
= ?-....?
34
_
19
.=
6
=
40
3
4
47
22
Unknown
8
? ? ?
...
5
18'
86
8
4
16'
12'
12
3
16 3
5
5
25
25
12
Unknown
1
2
3
1
22
36
5
41
19
6
..
...
2
8
...
2
2
4
14
10
2
12
22
3
...
5
8
12
5
15
10
30
15
22
3
4
1
8
5
58
?
26
-.?.
...
22
=.
106
=
42
..=.?-. -
?.
83
26
22
131
54
107
9
6
122
58
16
20
20
56
18
123
29
26
178
76
... Signifies zero.
Note: Numbers include submarines in repair, but not auxiliary, radar picket, or reserve units.
'Torpedo estimates assume that Soviet submarines are loaded wth standard 21-inch torpedoes. There is some evidence that submarines which
lack torpedo reloads, such as the J-class, could increase their loadings by carrying two small weapons in place of a large one
' Without forward basing, these medium-range submarines have too little endurance to be effective against Western shipping in the North
Atlantic.
' The Soviets have built five A-class SSNs. Of these, one has been dismantled, three are fitting out, and one is undergoing sea trials.
4N-class submarines can carry 20 torpedoes if they have after torpedo tubes.
'V-class submarines also carry two SS-N-15 rocket-assisted nuclear depth bombs for use against other submarines.
? Two SSNs, an N and a V-I, have been inactive for many years and are considered here to be in reserve.
Submarines suited only for coastal or Inland sea operations.
8
Staccp&'
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Soviet ASW capabilities indicates that even these
numbers would not suffice?but their planning
factors show the level of effort the Soviets feel is
necessary for that mission alone.
Similarly, the Soviets believe that mass forces
would be required to counter Western, aircraft
carriers. In addition to aircraft armed with ASMs,
they have estimated that three to four nuclear-
powered submarines or 12 to 15 diesels would be
required to detect and attack a carrier task group
in time to prevent the launch of aircraft. They
have estimated that they would need to salvo
eight submarine-launched cruise missiles in order
to penetrate the air defenses of a carrier task
force and that 12 to 15 hits with conventional
torpedoes would be required to sink an aircraft
carrier. In a nuclear conflict, one writer noted,
three SSNs?each armed with three torpedoes
with nuclear warheads?would be needed to
destroy a carrier group consisting of one strike
carrier, an antiaircraft guided missile cruiser, and
escorts. If submarines were unavailable, he noted,
the number of airplanes required to attack such a
*group would be two regiments?more than 40
aircraft?equipped with ASMs, six of which
would have nuclear warheads.
Some submarines probably would be posi-
tioned where they could attack a variety of
targets, especially those in the Norwegian Sea and
in the Greenland - Iceland - United Kingdom (G-
I-UK) gap. Others could attack merchant ships as
targets of opportunity, either While waiting for
NATO naval forces to cross their path or after
completing primary missions, such as attacking
carriers.
Availability for Operations. Soviet submarines
are often unavailable for duty?another factor
affecting the Soviet ability to carry out an inter-
diction campaign. This limitation stems from
poor quality control and inefficiencies in the
design, production, and maintenance of the sub-
marines and from block obsolescence of some
types. In addition, the Soviets have expanded the
nuclear, submarine fleet?with emphasis on
SSBNs?faster than they have built the facilities
and trained the personnel for repairing them.
Empirical evidence suggests that in an emer-
ency some 60 percent of the submarine fleet
et
could conduct operations with varying degrees of
effectiveness. The Soviets would find it difficult
to sustain the initial level of deployment, how-
ever?not only because of combat attrition, but
also because increased use could lead to more of
the materiel failures that have plagued their
submarines during routine peacetime operations.
Torpedo Reloads. Another limiting factor
would be the small number of torpedoes carried
by some classes of Soviet submarines. Units
armed with cruise missiles, in particular, would
be limited in carrying out a secondary role
against shipping because they carry few torpe-
does." (Nuclear weapons probably would not be
used against commercial targets.) In addition, all
deployed Soviet submarines, regardless of class,
apparently carry as part of their load at least two
nuclear torpedoes and some ASW torpedoes.
In a long conventional war, the Soviets would
have to return their submarines to home waters to
rearm them. In the Atlantic this would force
them to come and go through chokepoints where
they probably would be subject to heavy attrition.
The Soviets have not stockpiled naval weapons
near the Atlantic sea lanes. They do have a fleet
of submarine tenders and missile support ships,
which could transfer torpedoes at open anchor-
ages and cruise missiles at sheltered anchorages
and in port. If they left Soviet-controlled waters
in wartime, however, these resupply ships would
be vulnerable to attack, and the Soviets probably
would not count on them for replenishment.
Weapons Effectiveness. Soviet weapons reli-
ability apparently would not be a seriously limit-
ing factor. Tests performed on recovered Soviet
torpedoes suggest that they are technically reli-
able (about .85). Reliability, however, is only One
of several factors in the effectiveness of torpedo
attacks, and other factors tend to reduce that
effectiveness. The Soviets appear to be fairly
proficient in their routine torpedo firing exer-
cises?but those exercises are seldom realistic,
and they usually involve straight-running, unpro-
tected ships. When they expect the target to be
protected, Soviet submarines usually fire at long
ranges (often 10,000 yards). This practice?
See annex D.
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together with the available writings on attacking
surface ships with torpedoes?suggests that the
Soviets plan on firing from outside a convoy's
screen in wartime?a distance that would seri-
ously reduce effectiveness.
Primarily because of this practice, the Soviet
hit rate in wartime probably would be low. In
Western navies there evidently would be about a
.5 probability that a single nonhoming torpedo
would hit a straight-running surface ship at 2,000
yards (most known types of Soviet antiship torpe-
does lack a homing capability). This level of
proficiency would drop quickly against a fast-
moving, maneuvering target. Because of these
considerations, we estimate the Soviet hit rate in
wartime at no better than about 25 percent for
each torpedo fired (.85 technical reliability multi-
plied by an optimistic .3 probability of hitting the
target). Should the Soviets deploy an effective
homing torpedo for use against surface ships,
their accuracy might improve.
The Soviets might be diverted into firing some
torpedoes against escorts?fast, highly maneuver-
able, shallow-draft ships that are difficult targets.
They probably respect Western ASW ships. On
occasions when their submarines have been de-
tected by such ships they have found it difficult
to escape.
The difficulty of determining whether a mer-
chant ship is carrying important military equip-
ment or routine commercial cargoes would also
reduce effectiveness. Soviet writings stress the
importance of target selectivity, without indicat-
ing how it is to be accomplished. Reconnaissance
is difficult from a submarine; the major sea lanes
are crowded with ships; and NATO could com-
plicate target discrimination further by such
measures as flying neutral-country flags.
Submarines Committed to Interdiction. De-
spite the high priority and heavy requirements of
strategic defense and the difficulties inherent in a
large-scale interdiction campaign, the Soviets
probably would assign some submarines to attack
shipping from the outset of hostilities. They
apparently believe that a commitment of rela-
tively few submarines against shipping could tie
10
down a disproportionate number of enemy naval
forces, keeping them from combat with impor-
tant Soviet fleet components, particularly SSBNs.
Moreover, they expect that the threat of attack
will force NATO to adopt convoying, a practice
that alone, in Soviet estimates, could reduce the
effectiveness of shipping by some 20 percent."
The number of submarines earmarked for
interdiction missions is unknown. In the initial
stages of a war, however, we believe that the total
would be not more than about 10 percent of those
operationally available, because of other force
commitments. Many cruise missile equipped sub-
marines evidently would be positioned away
from the major sea lanes and in the principal
avenues of approach to the USSR to defend
against raids by carrier strike forces; those de-
ployed near the sea lanes might be prohibited
from attacking targets other than carriers. The
more capable ASW submarines (the V-class)
probably would be seeking enemy SSBNs and
protecting their own; and some of the rest would
be conducting barrier operations. If so, relatively
few submarines?mostly N-class SSNs and long
range diesels?would be in the major sea lanes,
assigned to engage merchant ships.
Torpedo Launch Capacity in the Sea Lanes. If
the Soviets gave at-sea interdiction about the
same priority as ASW and anticarrier warfare,
they could assign 21 long-range torpedo attack
submarines against shipping in the Northern At-
lantic. (This is 33 percent of the inventory of
general purpose submarines in the Northern
Fleet, at 60 percent availability.) Over a 120-day
period, these submarines under favorable operat-
ing conditions could sink or disable some 100
merchant ships, or about 1 percent of NATO-flag
shipping." Additional merchant ships flying Pan-
"Both Admiral Doenitz and Winston Churchill estimated that
the effectiveness of British merchant shipping was reduced by 33
percent during World War It because of defensive measures made
necessary by the U-boat threat.
"These numbers were derived using a set of assumptions general-
ly favorable to the Soviets. The attrition of forces per submarine
patrol was .2; each submarine withheld two torpedoes for self-
protection and expended all others against merchant ships; on-
station time was 15 days; the technical reliability for Soviet torpe-
does was .85; the probability of a hit per single firing was .3, and one
hit was sufficient to disable a target. (See annex E.)
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amanian and Liberian flags of convenience prob-
ably also would be available to the West for
sealift if necessary.
After the first interdiction patrol, the capabili-
ties of the attack submarines could be expected to
decline. To replenish their torpedo loads, they
would have to pass through the G-I-UK gap,
where they probably would be especially vulner-
able, and once rearmed they would have to
return through the gap. The older submarines are
the ones likely to be used in an interdiction
campaign, and the increased demands on them,
combined with minimal time in port for replen-
ishment and maintenance, would probably cause
significant materiel failures?which would seri-
ously reduce their combat effectiveness and/or
lengthen time between patrols.
The number of submarines the Soviets believe
they could maintain on station is unknown. In
World War II the Germans, operating new sub-
marines from forward bases in France and Nor-
0sway, were unable to keep more than 30 percent
and frequently far less) of their U-boats in the
ea lanes. The Soviet Northern Fleet, operating
from the Kola Gulf, would be unable to keep
even 30 percent of its submarines in productive
waters.
Deploying out of Northern Fleet bases at the
high average speed of 12 knots, Soviet nuclear-
powered submarines would spend 22 days in a
round trip to and from the sea lanes, while diesels
averaging five knots would spend 54 days." The
Soviets probably would be more limited by the
number of torpedoes they carry than by the
endurance of their submarines. Without help in
finding targets, however?particularly if they
intend to be as selective as their writings imply?
patrols by diesel submarines also might be limited
by the endurance of ship and crew.
Our estimate of the turnaround time for Soviet
submarines is also based on the German exper-
ience. German U-boats averaged 25 days in port
between patrols. If we assume that the Soviets
"This calculation assumes that convoys are routed southward to
avoid Soviet aircraft and that Soviet submarines must travel 3,200
nm from their Kola Gulf bases.
iiirr-SecaLt
spend 25 days between patrols and 15 days on
station, in a 120-day war their nuclear subma-
rines could operate on the sea lanes 25 percent of
the time and their diesels 12.5 percent. In a long
campaign, extra time would be required for
major repairs or overhaul?an area characterized
by poor Soviet performance in peacetime. (The
Germans?using simpler submarines, recently
built?had to make extensive repairs after seven
or eight patrols.) To guard against underestimat-
ing Soviet capabilities, we credit the Soviets with
the same level of efficiency in turning their
submarines around as that achieved in World
War II by the Germans and, generally, by the US
in the Pacific.
Alternative interdiction scenarios, analyzed
with the help of a model, are discussed in more
detail in annex E.
Capability of ASM-Equipped Aircraft
Naval Aviation. Soviet Naval Aviation?the
primary Soviet air force that would be involved
in antiship attacks?is not well suited for inter-
dicting most of the Western sea lines of commu-
nication. Soviet naval ASM-equipped aircraft
have relatively short combat radii, which rule out
their use over most of the major sea lanes in the
North Atlantic (see table 3 and map, figure 3).
They do have some capability near the United
Kingdom, but ground-based air defenses would
make strikes there particularly hazardous.
Naval Aviation has some 310 ASM-equipped
aircraft assigned to the four Soviet fleets (see
table 4). Most of these aircraft are aging medium-
range TU-16 Badgers, which are especially vul-
nerable to modern air defenses. About 67 Badger
tanker aircraft are assigned to Badger strike
regiments for refueling support. The supersonic
Backfire bomber was first introduced into Naval
Aviation in late 1974, and about 35 of these
aircraft are now operational in the Baltic and
Black Sea Fleets.
Some 200 ASM-equipped Backfire aircraft
probably will be in naval service in the mid- to
late 1980s. The Backfire can fly farther than the
Badger, and its high speed and ability to fly at
11
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low altitudes make it better able to penetrate air
defenses.
The map, figure 3, shows the practical limits
for antiship attacks by naval aircraft in a NATO -
Warsaw Pact war, at least in its early stages.
These practical limits are shorter than the maxi-
mum combat radii shown in table 3 because the
conditions would not be optimum?the aircraft
would have to penetrate Western land-based and
fleet air defenses, Unless Western air defenses
were eliminated, Soviet mission planners would
have to allow fuel for combat maneuvering, for
high-speed flight, and for indirect routing and
low-altitude flight to avoid detection of the air-
craft. These factors would reduce their range
considerably.
The limits shown on figure 3 are keyed to the
capabilities of the Backfire, but Badgers?with
aerial refueling?could also make some attacks at
those ranges. Long-range Badger strikes would be
limited by the tanker aircraft, which are few and
have only a small fuel-transfer capacity. Only
Table 3
Maximum Combat Radii of Naval
ASM-Equipped Aircraft Under Optimum Conditions
Weapon Unrefueled Radius With One
Load Radius Prestrike Refueling
Badger C 1 AS-2
Modified Badger C 2 AS-6
Badger G 2 AS-5
Backfire 1 AS-4'
1,450 nm 2,050 urn
1,050 nm 1,600 rim
1,150 nm 1,850 um
1,750- 2,700-
2,075 run 3,100 run
Note; These radii should be considered upper bounds. They
assume flight profiles optimized for maximum range, carrying only
a minimum fuel reserve, and they do not allow for loitering, low-
altitude flight, high speed, or combat maneuvering.
'The Backfire aircraft can carry two, or possibly three ASMs, but
only with significant reduction in combat radius.
* Intelligence estimates of the Backfire performance characteris-
tics differ. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Assistant Chief
of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, estimate the
unrefueled radius of the Backfire with a single AS-4 to be about
2,850 nm.
Naval Aviation currently has no tanker force to support Backfire
operations. However, there is some evidence that the Soviets are
'developing a tanker aircraft which could support the Backfire. With
one prestrike refueling under optimum conditions, the Backfire
radius could be improved by as much as 50 percent for some
. . ,
missions.
12
=Alio
Figure 3. Assumptions
1. Limits are based on the performance of the Backfire
bomber?the most capable naval strike aircraft?armed
with a single AS-4 ASM. 1
2. Flights originate from forward naval airfields in the
USSR or from airfields in other Warsaw Pact countries.
3. Flight routes are selected to avoid or minimize overflying
Western land-based air defenses.
4. Except where the aircraft encounters extensive land-
based air defenses for most of the flight, strike missions
are based on the following hi-lo-hi-lo-hi flight profile:
? The aircraft initially flies at its most efficient cruise
altitude and speed.
? As the aircraft approaches its target, it descends to low
altitude for 200 nm to avoid detection.
? The aircraft then climbs to high altitude to launch its
AS-4 missile
? After launch the aircraft reverses course and descends
to low altitude to escape.
? After 200 urn at low altitude, the aircraft climbs to its
most efficient cruise altitude and returns to its base.
5. Where it would confront extensive land-based air de-
fenses?such as the Baltic and eastern Mediterranea
regions?the aircraft is assumed to fly at low altitude for
most or all of its mission. e-
6. The Backfins will fly at sle0 ion speeds;1these?SieWef
Covk 044Sc5v%
speeds Qlf reduce their radius.
7. The Backfire aerodynamic design is assumed to be
optimized for subsonic flight. A less efficient design
would reduce the combat radius by some 15 percent.
8. The Backfires will not refuel in flight. Naval Aviation
currently has no tanker force to support Backfire oper-
ations. However, there is some evidence that the Soviets
are developing a tanker aircraft which could support the
Backfire. With refueling in the Norwegian Sea, the
Backfire range could be extended several hundred miles
into the North Atlantic, depending on where the aircraft
was refueled. Refueling in the Baltic and Mediterranean
regions is not considered feasible?except over friendly
territory?because of the hostile air defense environment.
Intelligence assessments of the Backfire's performance differ.
The performance characteristics used here are based on the CIA
appraisal of the Backfire
if the DIA and US Air Force higlier estimates of
the Backfire radius were used, the limits in the North Atlantic for
aircraft flying from the Northern Fleet would extend from northern
? France to just south of Greenland, and they would encompass some
of the northernmost shipping lanes. However, the Backfire still
would be unable to attack ships in the central North Atlantic.
---rdpsuc.12,411,
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?ratirS, esr.gt
ractical Limits for Initial Antiship Attacks by
? Soviet Naval Aircraft in a NATO -Warsaw Pact War
Figure
Greenland
(Denmark)
o
Reykjavik
Iceland
A Naval Aviation bases nearest Atlantic sea lanes
? 'Jan Mayan
Faroe Is.
Mon.)
Bergen
inburgh
Uni4d
Kingdo7
Arnsterd
London* "Um
o 400 Miles
0 400 Kilometers
eqi;AC---
.--?'' -rz,A.-s-7,...K\-,
AI
t'?
c
Arkangel.sk
\ Q-T--
? '\
De
Sweden 7
,Y
Finland
Helsinki s
Oslo* a_tockh .,./l \ r ' ') ? e' ?-Tam
...?
P)k
,,,,,,/ ? Gilleborg
' 1 12k- 1
'1a
nj.Riga
(
nrk'"7
a,. 5,7_,A,Co*rifilig.en - - \
,C7-101,LININ .v.i.ny.. U.S.S.R.
C
.Minsk
Leningrad
,,Germin
1 Berlin
Federal re Gem' Rep'
*Bonn
Republic Prag
of Germany
Munich.
Warsaw
Poland
?Wrociew
Vienna*
Austria
France
Lyon.
.Bordeaux
Italy
*Budapest
Hungary
Romania
Belgrade*
Yugoslavia
Bucharest*
.Nyev
Andorra
Marseill
latanbu
Corsica
Barcelona
Naples
0
't?-??4. ?
Gree e
Turkey
Sardinia
Mader
lee)
\ Sicily
Morocco
Algeria
Tunis
a
*Malta
Vs"eita c:
Crete
Boundary representation is
not nei.e5sarily authoritative
rThLib;..a
'S
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Table 4
Soviet Order of Battle of Naval
ASM-Equipped Aircraft, January 1978
Northern
Fleet
Baltic
Fleet
Black Sea
Fleet
Pacific
Fleet
Total
Backfire
14
20
...
34
Badger C'
33
21
22
23
99
Modified Badger C '
33
21
23
23
100
Badger G
22
10
45
77
Total
66
78
75
91
310
... Signifies zero.
The size of the Badger C modification program is unknown. We assume arbitrarily that half the
Badger C aircraft have been modified.
about six tanker aircraft are attached to each
strike regiment to refuel some 25 strike and
electronic countermeasure support aircraft. The
Soviets thus far have not pooled naval tankers
from several regiments to support large strike
formations. 20
Long Range Aviation. For the LRA, antiship
attack is a secondary mission. Some LRA aircraft
usually participate in major naval exercises, and
they practice reconnaissance and antiship strikes.
The intermediate-range bombers, similar in type
to those of Soviet Naval Aviation, could perform
antiship strikes in the nearer reaches of those
areas shown in figure 3. The LRA has only about
10 tankers for refueling the intermediate-range
bombers. Of its 190-odd heavy bombers, 70 TU-
95 Bears are equipped with ASMs. Attacks by the
TU-95s would be limited to nuclear strikes, since
they -carry only nuclear AS-3 missiles. (These
were designed for use against large-area targets
rather than for direct hits on ships.) 21
Capability of Surface Ships
The ability of Soviet surface combatants to cut
sea lines of communication is restricted not only
" There is some evidence that the Soviets are modifying some of
their ASM-carrying heavy bombers to carry the AS-6 ASM, which
has an antiship capability using either conventional or nuclear
warheads. They also may be improving the accuracy of the nuclear-
armed AS-3 ASMs. Either of these modifications would give the
LEA's ASM-carrying heavy bombers a capability for conventional
attacks on ships.
14
by the priority of other missions but also by the
risks inherent in any wartime attempt to operate
in open-ocean areas. Of particular importance is
the surface ships' vulnerability to NATO air
power, both carrier- and land-based, when they
are operating beyond the range of Soviet air
support. The Soviets are well aware of that
vulnerability?senior military officers have cau-
tioned naval planners that they could not count
on using their surface ships against Western
carriers in the Mediterranean after the second
day of hostilities.
Another drawback in the use of surface
combatants for interdiction would be the Soviet
inability to provide adequate logistic support.
Soviet combatants in the Atlantic would have to
either return to Northern Fleet bases for replen-
ishment or rely on logistic support ships deploy-
ing from those bases. Ships of one type or the
other would have to leave the Norwegian Sea
through the G-I-UK gap, where they would be
highly vulnerable to attack from Western aircraft
and attack submarines. Soviet support ships,
which are poorly armed and too slow to keep up
with warships, would be subject to very heavy
attrition. Moreover, they are adapted to oper-
ations in harbors and have little capability for
providing warships with underway replenish-
ment of munitions.22
Over half of the Soviet major surface combat--
tants are equipped with missiles designed for
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?
ASW and air defense rather than for use against
other surface vessels. In any case, Soviet writers
do not regard surface ships as important plat-
forms for strikes against merchant ships, except in
coastal waters. They regard surface ships as im-
portant for safeguarding the sea approaches to
the USSR, their own shipping, and the passage of
their submarines to and from operational waters.
Other writers have said that surface ships could
be used to keep slowmoving convoys continuously
under observation. We doubt that such a use
could be effective after the outbreak of hostilities,
however, except in areas where the Soviets had
air superiority.
NATO Capabilities
NATO Sealift Resources
A major Soviet interdiction campaign at sea
probably would founder on one of the same
problems that plagued the German U-boats: the
large number of merchant ships available to the
.
West. Western commerce rides on the keels of
thousands of ships. 23 Moreover, the construction
of merchant ships?and the potential replenish-
ment of the inventory?is high: Lloyd's Register
of Shipping reported that in 1976 over 1,000
merchant ships were constructed in the Free
World, totaling nearly 30 million tons. This was
down four million tons from the peak 1975 level,
and further reductions are expected, as a result of
overbuilding in the early 1970s, economic reces-
sion, and decreasing demand for new tankers.24
Nonetheless, these figures indicate considerable
capacity to replace losses in shipping even early
in a war.
" According to Lloyd's, in 1977 there were over 9,600 NATO-flag
merchant ships of more than 1,000 gross register tons. A recent
study by Headquarters, US Command in 'Europe, concluded that
over 5,000 of these would be suitable for sealift of supplies and
materiel to Europe. There are shortages of specialized merchant
ships, however, such as those having a roll-on/roll-off capability.
Additional Western-owned merchant ships flying Panamanian and
Liberian flags of convenience also would be available for sealift if
necessary. An older study estimated that about 11,500
merchant ships couis for the resupply of NATO. The
number we used in this study-5,832?comes from Lloyd's but
excludes ships of less than 6,000 gross register tons.
" See World Shipbuilding: Facing Up to Overcapacity, ER 77-
1068, November 1977, for details.
o cret
The Soviet emphasis on target selectivity prob-
ably reflects an awareness that random shakings
would achieve little among thousands of ships. In
practice, however, distinguishing ships carrying
military cargoes bound for NATO forces in West-
ern Europe from the large number of ships
loaded commercially would be difficult?some
3,200 Free World merchant ships are estimated
to ply the sea lanes of the North Atlantic on a
typical day. Time consumed in selecting the
target could itself reduce the effectiveness of
Soviet at-sea interdiction.
US Plans for the Resupply of NATO
The size of a likely US resupply effort, while
providing numerous targets for Soviet subma-
rines, would work against a Soviet interdiction
campaign. US plans for resupplying NATO in a
conventional war assume a large scale of support
shipping that would increase steadily during the
war.
Convoys totaling approximately 350 ships
could be en route during the first 30 days of
hostilities, and during the next 30 days more than
500 additional ships probably would depart for
Europe. US projections for later phases of a war
assume that over 1,000 more would sail, making a
total of 2,000 ships with military cargoes in the
first 90 to 120 days of war.
The European NATO countries have agreed to
allocate more ships to resupply in wartime, and
by the end of 1978 the pool of shipping resources
committed to this task should have increased
substantially. The earmarked NATO ships, iden-
tified by name, would be among the best avail-
able, and their status would be continuously
monitored. To reduce this pool appreciably (by,
say, 25 percent) among the thousands of ships
loaded commercially, the Soviets would have to
maintain large, continuously deployed strike
forces in the sea lanes. We believe that present
Soviet forces are inadequate for this task.
Because of the number of ships available, losses
in military cargo could be more significant than
losses in ships?if irreplaceable equipment is
concentrated in a few hulls that are identified,
attacked, and sunk.
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Outlook
Contemporary Soviet documentation, exer-
cises, and naval force trends indicate that for the
next decade or so there is unlikely to be any
militarily significant increase either in Soviet
willingness to allocate forces to interdiction or in
the interdiction capabilities of the forces them-
selves. This judgment is based on:
? The maintenance of strong Western SSBN
and carrier strike forces capable of attacking
targets in the USSR with nuclear weapons;
this threat requires the Soviets to commit
strong forces in counteraction.
? The maintenance of strong NATO air de-
fenses; these could and probably would deny
Soviet aircraft free access to the sea lanes in
wartime.
A key element in deterring the Soviets from
fully exploiting Western dependence on long sea
lines of communication in wartime is the credi-
bility of the carrier and SSBN threats to the
USSR. The specter of US carrier task groups in
areas such as the Norwegian Sea and the eastern
Mediterranean would almost certainly hold large
Soviet forces in those areas?well away from the
major sea lanes. If, on the other hand, the West
stationed high-value targets like carriers on the
major shipping routes, Soviet naval strike forces
would tend to be attracted to those targets and
thus be in a position to threaten Western convoys
as well.
Soviet ASW forces are ineffective against US
SSBNs. To improve their ASW defenses, the
Soviets would have to enlarge their forces and
solve the difficult problems of detecting and
classifying contacts. Confronted with persistent
failure, they could conceivably reallocate their
submarine forces to take advantage of easier
targets, including merchant ships. That change is
unlikely, however; all the available evidence sug-
gests that, rather than adapting their strategies to
their deficiencies in ASW, the Soviets are work-
16
ing to correct the deficiencies. Because of the
design and construction leadtimes required and
because of their considerable investment in pres-
ent forces, they could not easily change this
established course.
To some extent, Soviet naval mission priorities
are scenario-driven. Thus, any reallocation of
naval forces would depend on the outcome of the
initial battles, at sea and on land. If NATO
checked the Pact advance in Central Europe and
if the war were prolonged, Soviet interest in
interdiction probably would increase, because
cutting the sea lanes?particularly in waters adja-
cent to a theater of military operations?could
then affect the outcome of the war. This would
be particularly true if attrition or Western strat-
egy reduced the threat from aircraft carriers,
thereby freeing more forces to attack merchant
ships.
If a war in Europe were stalemated and West-
ern strike forces remained largely intact, how-
ever, the Soviets would face a hard choice: to
interrupt the US resupply of Europe or to concen-
trate their remaining naval forces against SSBNs
and carriers. The Soviet tendency to assign higher
priority to military targets suggests that under
these circumstances the Soviets would choose
continued concentration against NATO's offen-
sive naval forces. Should they elect to send most
of their surviving attack submarines and ASM-
equipped aircraft against merchant ships, they
would leave highly mobile Western attack carrier
forces free to strike important Pact ground and
naval targets.
The Soviets evidently would avoid the di-
lemma by directing other forces against what
they regard as shipping's most vulnerable point?
ports of embarkation and destination. They
would mine harbor entrances and systematically
attack the ports with bombs and missiles. Soviet
capabilities against US ports, however, probably
would be limited in the conventional phase of
war.
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?
-rorr-Ser..r..Lt
ANNEX A
THE ROLE OF INTERDICTION IN NUCLEAR WAR:
SOVIET MILITARY VIEWPOINT
in the late 1960s a number of classified articles
were written by senior officers of the Soviet Navy
and of the General Staff 25 who would be closely
involved in planning, coordinating, and executing
military operations in wartime. Those articles laid
down the basic principles of how the Soviets
expected to fight a modern war. The authors
regarded interdiction as secondary to the perfor-
mance of strategic missions, except possibly in the
final stage of a nuclear war. They believed that
from the outset of hostilities, however, some
attacks on merchant shipping should be made,
concurrently with strategic missions.
The officers' purpose in writing apparently
was to promulgate changes in Soviet strategy that
developed when the range of conflict possibilities
was broadened (after Khrushchev's ouster in
1964) to include wars fought partly or entirely
with conventional weapons. They wrote that by
the mid-1960s the US and USSR each had a
variety of forces that could be applied in various
sequences and combinations, depending on the
military situation. This statement acknowledged
the need for a "flexible response" doctrine. Their
view of flexible response, however, differed from
the US view in several important ways: they held
"The General Staff, referred to in the USSR as the "military
brain" of the state, is the most important military agency in
peacetime. In war it would be the executive agency for the Stavka
(the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command). Statements
by leading General Staff officials probably reflect actual Soviet
policy.
that the conventional phase of a war would be
brief (lasting from hours to a few days if war
began in Europe, and not much longer if it began
in a secondary theater) and that the possible
period of limited nuclear warfare would be brief
(if it occurred at all), as would the decisive
nuclear period.
The authors indicated that while wars might be
fought with only conventional or tactical nuclear
weapons, they doubted that a war with NATO
could be limited for long. The losing side, they
said, would escalate to restore the situation.
According to these articles, in the conventional
and limited nuclear phases of war the main
Soviet effort would be against the enemy's nu-
clear strike forces. The Navy, with help from
Long Range Aviation, would concentrate its
efforts against enemy submarines and aircraft
carriers. The brief opening phase would be im-
portant because it would help "set the stage" for
the use of strategic nuclear' weapons later in the
war.
These authors believed that the concluding
period of warfare after a nuclear exchange could
be protracted, unlike the earlier, decisive stages;
that military operations during this mopping-up
period would be conducted mainly by surviving
general purpose forces; that naval forces, because
they can be dispersed, would survive in signifi-
Note: The conclusions in this annex are based on a
much larger volume of material than the articles
referred to herein. We quote these articles because,
although dated, they are the most authoritative and
detailed available discussions of interdiction within the
phased development of a general war (beginning with
conventional hostilities and progressing through a
limited nuclear period to full nuclear war). The more
recent relevant writings available to us are few but are
consistent with the principles expressed earlier.
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-1740-6ecco.it
cant numbers; and that they would therefore play
an important role in this period.
According to more recent information on So-
viet strategy for war in Europe, residual naval
forces in the final stage of war would:
? Deliver strikes against coastal and theater
targets.
? Complete the destruction of enemy fleet
strike forces.
? Interdict enemy sea communications.
? Render aid to ground forces by conducting
amphibious landings, seizing straits, and pro-
tecting their own shipping.
Other classified Warsaw Pact and Soviet writ-
ings have provided varying views on how a
NATO-Pact war might develop. They differ
mainly over whether a limited nuclear phase
would occur at all and?less frequently?over
whether a conventional phase can be lengthy.
The authors assume that war could begin either
with a surprise attack, using nuclear or conven-
tional weapons, or after a period of rising tension.
All of the writings emphasize that the major
objective of the conventional phase would be to
destroy the enemy's nuclear-capable forces?
SSBNs, carriers, forward-deployed tactical nu-
clear weapons and storage areas, and shore-based
facilities which support enemy SSBN and ASW
operations.
In a limited nuclear phase (should it occur), the
tactical forces should immediately launch all of
their nuclear weapons?including SLBMs with
yields of less than one megaton?against high-
priority enemy naval targets and some land
targets. Among land targets the naval authors
include airfields, tactical nuclear weapons sites,
storage facilties, naval bases, and harbors; they
exclude population centers and strategic shore
installations.
Clearly believing that the first strategic nuclear
strike would be the decisive act of the war, the
Soviets indicate that during any conventional or
limited nuclear phases they would conduct oper-
ations as if the transition to all-out nuclear war
20
could occur at any time. They acknowledge that
preparation for both kinds of war involves com-
promises that reduce the effectiveness of general
purpose naval forces for either kind of war.
Internal Debate on Interdiction
Since the early 1960s, the naval command has
been accused by some Soviet writers of paying
too little attention to interdiction?and by others,
too much. Briefly, writers who believe that open-
ocean interdiction is not important have stressed
that:
? Shipping can be disrupted by attacks on
land targets. Admiral Gorshkov has reaf-
firmed this view, asserting in his book Sea
Power of the State (1976) that the character
of interdiction operations has changed and
that interdiction is now subsumed in the
-overall system of naval operations against
the shore.
? The Navy should concentrate on strategic
missions. Most Soviet writers appear to be-
lieve that in a general war oceans should be
viewed not as an arena of action against
shipping but as a vast battlefield for sea-
based nuclear strike forces.
? The power of nuclear strikes and the fast
pace of modern war reduce NATO's need
for large-scale shipments of materiel.
? NATO's military strength does not depend
on the sea lanes. Some of the authors argue
that NATO stockpiling of supplies and
equipment in Europe and the ability to
airlift -minimum consumables- have re-
duced the value of interdiction at sea.
? The sheer devastation of nuclear war would
make interdiction irrelevant. In this view,
millions of people and thousands of indus-
trial enterprises as well as military forces?
all consumers of finished products and raw
materials?would disappear, and so would
any reason for resupply.
? Modern submarines are capable of perform-
ing more important missions. In the past, 0
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?
their slowness and limited endurance made
them comparatively ineffective against war-
ships, according to some writers, who argue
that today's submarines are -totally ade-
quate- for attacking the main battle forces
of enemy navies.
? Interdiction is indecisive. Almost all naval
officers who have written about interdiction,
including Gorshkov, consider that it alone
could not determine the outcome of a war.
Other authors have stressed the importance of
interdiction?which they do not limit (as our
definition of the word does) to at-sea operations.
They use the more general Soviet concept, which
would include blockade by mining and destruc-
tion of ports and could include damage to land
transportation, storage facilities, and defense in-
dustries. Briefly, these arguments emphasize that:
? The logistic requirements of fighting a
modern war with conventional arms are
enormous.
? Interdiction can facilitate the attainment
of other war objectives. Several authors
write that interdiction, although not "deci-
sive" in itself, contributes to victory by
-undermining a country's military-economic
potential ... [by] depriving the enemy of
freedom of operation in specific areas of the
? c-rirr-Ser.r.e...
ocean,- and by forcing a diversion of enemy
naval resources.
? Soviet ability to disrupt Western shipping
has improved. Technical improvements to
submarines, submarine armament, and
ocean surveillance systems would make in-
terdiction more effective now than in the
past. Convoying would no longer protect
merchant ships, according to some naval
officers, because modern submarine-
launched torpedoes and cruise missiles can
be fired from outside a convoy's defense
perimeter.
? A conventional war could be protracted.
One writer has observed that a conventional
NATO - Warsaw Pact war might not neces-
sarily become nuclear, inasmuch as chemical
and biological weapons were available in
World War II, but neither side used them on
a mass scale.
? Even a nuclear war could be protracted; and
if it were, it would require additional mer-
chant shipping to offset large-scale losses in
Europe.
We believe that the authoritative writings sum-
marized here show that interdiction is a mission
of the Soviet Navy?but that it is less critical
than defeat of enemy nuclear strike forces, par-
ticularly in the opening phases of war.
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?
ANNEX B
INTERPRETATIONS OF SOVIET NAVAL EXERCISES
Soviet naval exercises involving merchant ships
and convoy types of activity have been rare, but
some recent occurrences have evoked consider-
able interest and debate among intelligence ana-
lysts. Interest focused especially on the activity in
Okean-75, a major exercise in April 1975 that
involved air, submarine, surface, and reconnais-
sance forces of all four Soviet fleets. Annual
exercises involving amphibious forces have also
provided information.
Okea n-75
Okean-75 was the first major Soviet naval
exercise that involved merchant ships, and some
analysts in both the United States and Western
Europe have seen it as a demonstration of Soviet
intent to interdict Western maritime communica-
tions in wartime; others disagree. This annex
summarizes the arguments of both groups.
Some 200 surface ships, divided into 11 task
forces, took part in the exercise. The activity of
four of the task forces was sufficiently ambiguous
to raise concern that some or all of them repre-
sented targets for other forces practicing attacks
against merchant shipping. Two of the task
forces?one in the North Pacific and one in the
Barents Sea?included merchant ships, a factor
that reinforced that point of view.
Merchant Ship Participation. The task force in
the North Pacific consisted of four naval ships
and four cargo ships. An intelligence ship, the
Izmeritel', trailed the group as it moved from an
area east of Japan northward toward Kamchatka.
Some observers have assessed this formation as a
simulated Western carrier task force, others as a
merchant ship convoy. The formation was sup-
ecerfte...
ported by ASW aircraft and was stalked by a
submarine, which was not precisely identified. If
it was a C-class nuclear-powered cruise missile
unit, its presence would tend to support the
carrier task force hypothesis. If it was a V-class
submarine, its presence continues to be am-
biguous; this modern torpedo attack class is
thought to be primarily assigned ASW missions
but could also be used against carriers or mer-
chant convoys.
The second task force operated primarily in
the Barents Sea and was composed of seven
merchant ships and four naval ships. One of the
latter was a tank landing ship, suggesting that the
11 ships represented a hostile amphibious task
force. This role would be consistent with past
exercise activity in this area, and the steaming
formation?with the combatants traveling in a
forward screen, and the LST given special protec-
tion?supports this conclusion. Moreover, the
ships in this group were attacked repeatedly by
waves of aircraft equipped with air-to-surface
missiles but apparently attracted little attention
from submarines.
The actual role played by the merchant ships is
unclear. Table 5 lists the arguments that can be
made for and against the thesis that the involve-
ment of merchant ships in Okean-75 demon-
strated that Moscow gives high priority to the
interdiction of Western shipping.
Operations Off Africa. During Okean-75, the
Soviets also operated in the merchant shipping
lanes between the Indian Ocean and Western
Europe. At least two submarines were deployed
from the Mediterranean to an area west of Africa
near the Canary Islands, where they may have
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Table 5
Merchant Ship Participation in Okean-75: Two Views
Interdiction Was Given
High Priority
Merchant ships participated in convoy exercises.
The intelligence collection ship Izmeritel' may
have been a member of the convoy in the North-
ern Pacific for at least part of the exercise.'
Convoys moved at slow speeds more typical of
merchant ships than of naval task forces.
Convoy maneuvers were more typical of merchant
ships seeking to evade attack by submarines than
of a naval task force.
Since only a few (for example, 12 percent in the
Northern Fleet) of the available naval surface ships
participated in Okean-75, it seems unlikely that
the Soviets would have had to divert cargo ships, as
they did, simply to provide additonal targets for
surveillance systems and aircraft.
Interdiction Was Given
Little Priority
Merchant ships may have represented warships or
troop ships.
In trailing the Northern Pacific group, the Iz-
meritel' was probably acting as a "tattletale"; in
this common Soviet tactic a ship shadows a carrier
task force and provides targeting information for
strike aircraft and cruise missile submarines and
surface ships.'
The Barents Sea group apparently simulated pas-
sage through a minefield, which would have
slowed its progress.
The exercises both in the Barents Sea and in the
North Pacific took place relatively close to the
USSR rather than in major sea lanes between the
US and its NATO allies and Japan.
Both groups were subjected to repeated simulated
attacks by ASM-equipped aircraft, primarily
TU-I6 Badgers. With one refueling, these aircraft
would barely have the range to reach the sea lanes
between the US and Europe. The intensity of the
ASM attacks exceeded what probably would be
necessary to interdict merchant ships. The ASM
strikes against the North Pacific group took place
at the same time as strikes against other groups
that were more obviously simulating carrier task
forces.
No attempt was made to protect the merchant
ships by placing them in the center of the convoys,
as would have been expected if the ships were
simulating wartime convoys to provide realistic ,
targets for interdiction.
Alternatively, the Izmeritel' may have functioned as an exercise referee.
established a barrier patrol. At about the same
time a destroyer and an oceanographic ship,
which had been located west of Africa, began
moving northward. The roles played by these
ships are unclear. One interpretation is that they
simulated oil tankers en route to Western Europe,
24
and another is that they joined a tank landing
ship operating in the same area and simulated an
amphibious task force. The ships eventually
reached the area where the submarines were
located, but we do not know whether the subma-
rines simulated attacks against them. Soviet
--far_secztAil
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reconnaissance aircraft using Guinean airfields
frequently flew over the ships and could have
updated their positions for the submarines
?
Also unclear was the role of a group of surface
ships consisting of about four major combatants
and seven hydrographic ships, which operated
together northeast of the Azores. The presence of
Soviet submarines nearby and the group's steam-
ing formation?in four rows, with the hydro-
graphic ships in the center two?suggest that the
group may have portrayed a US convoy or
amphibious task group en route to Europe. This
group probably was subjected to regular recon-
naissance by Soviet aircraft and satellites and to
simulated air and submarine attacks. The lack of
positive movement toward Western Europe could
argue against the group's simulating a convoy.
This example is the least ambiguous, and the
ships may indeed have reflected Soviet practice
of anticonvoy tactics. However, the group could
also have represented a troop transfer move-
ment?a target which the Soviets have clearly
indicated has high priority for interdiction and
which probably falls within the category "some
attacks on shipping- that Soviet authors list
among Navy duties.
Interpretation of Okean
On balance, we believe that the two formations
involving merchant ships probably simulated na-
val task forces. In the early stages of the exercise,
the merchant ships in the Barents group most
likely represented coastal shipping or their own
amphibious task groups, to give the Soviet Navy
practice in protecting them. In the later stages
they probably represented a Western amphibious
landing force attacking the homeland. The group
---f-0"-Secrott,
in the North Pacific probably simulated an at-
tacking Western force of naval combatants.
The activity west of Africa and north of the
Azores is more difficult to interpret. Either
group, or both, could have served as a merchant
convoy as well as a target for ocean surveillance.
Whatever they were, the submarines apparently
targeted against them?at least four diesels?
were about 10 percent of all the attack subma-
rines deployed for Okean.
Most of the events in Okean-75 could have
been a simple exercise of fundamental naval
skills: reconnaissance, intercept and attack by the
offensive forces, and escort and evasion tactics by
the defenders. On the offensive side, interdiction
of the sea lanes is a mission of the Soviet Navy,
and we would expect to see some antishipping
activity in such a large-scale multifleet exercise.
Indeed, if interdiction were a major mission, we
would expect to see considerably more evidence
of it in exercises than we have, since Soviet
officers have written that it is a complex and
difficult task?the kind that needs practice.
On the defensive side, as their merchant fleet
expands its operations, the Soviets have an in-
creasing need to defend it. Shipping is extensive
between Soviet ports (78 million tons of cargo in
1975) and with East European ports, and in
wartime it would require naval escort. The So-
viets routinely co-opt merchant ships for naval
operations and would certainly do so in a war.
Together with amphibious ships, merchant ships
also are used often to carry equipment for the
ground forces. The Soviets consider it important
to protect their own sea lines of communication,
particularly in the northern and far eastern areas
of the USSR, where roads are bad or nonexistent.
In the Far East, where their military operations
would depend heavily on easily interdicted rail
lines, the Soviets could believe that moving mili-
tary supplies by ship would be important for
supporting sustained combat against the Chinese.
Thus, the participation of merchant ships in
Okean-75 need not indicate a change in the
priority of Soviet naval missions. Protection of the
USSR's coastal sea lanes is a mission of the Soviet
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-16rs-6ecr.ct
Navy (although of lower priority than ASW and
anticarrier warfare), and it would be normal to
see some evidence in exercises of this mission.
Amphibious Landing Exercises
Since 1965, the Soviets have conducted
amphibious landing exercises in the Northern
Fleet area every year. The groups involved meet
some of the US criteria for a convoy: a number of
merchant ships or naval auxiliaries, or both,
usually escorted by warships and/or aircraft or a
single merchant ship or naval auxiliary under
surface escort, assembled and organized for pur-
pose of passage together.26 The main body of the
task forces in the exercises usually has consisted of
relatively defenseless ships, often including mer-
chant ships and (about half of the time) a major
surface combatant that probably simulates an
aircraft carrier. They are defended by a screen of
warships and are subjected to simulated missile
and torpedo attack.
These amphibious landing exercises provide a
limited opportunity for practicing convoy tech-
niques and anticonvoy tactics; but since they
usually take place in local Soviet waters, they
would be of limited value as training for interdic-
tion in the open ocean. The composition of the
screening forces would further reduce the realism
of the exercises as training for interdiction. They
are mostly coastal patrol and destroyer escorts,
minesweepers, old destroyers, and small frig-
ates?ships that would have virtually no ASW
capability until after enemy submarines disclosed
their locations by attacking the convoy.
The tactics employed in these near-shore exer-
cises may show how the Soviets would plan to
attack convoys anywhere. As the amphibious
groups move toward shore to land their naval
infantry (and sometimes troops from the ground
forces), they typically are subjected to prestrike
surveillance and then to simulated ASM, torpedo,
and occasionally submarine-launched cruise mis-
sile attacks. Air defense interceptors sometimes
"Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of US Military Terms for
Joint Usage, 1974.
26
oppose the attacking strike aircraft. Surface com-
batants rarely play any role in the attacks except
in coastal areas.
Large numbers of TU-16 Badgers armed with
ASMs typically simulate strikes against the invad-
ing group. They usually are accompanied for part
of the flight by tanker aircraft for aerial refueling
and are preceded by other aircraft which drop
chaff and conduct electronic jamming to confuse
the groups' defenses.
Information on the submarines' activity in
these exercises, though sparse, supports several
generalizations. The number and types of partici-
pating submarines have varied widely, but the
exercises have often included nearly as many
submarines as there were surface ships under
attack?indicating a preference for group subma-
rine operations against amphibious task forces. In
an exercise for example, the
task force may have been opposed by as many as
18 submarines. Eleven carried cruise missiles as
their primary armament, but most of them used
only torpedoes during the exercise. A Y-class
SSBN also took part, probably to update its crew's
torpedo training.
On the whole, it appears that the classes most
likely to be given interdiction assignments?such
as the F-class?do not participate more than
other classes in practicing torpedo attacks against
surface ships. In landing exercises held during
the period 1967-76, missile-armed submarines?
primarily the J- and C-classes?conducted more
antiship attacks than did submarines that had
torpedoes as their primary armament.
Another interesting feature of these exercises is
that attack submarines have operated in direct
support of the amphibious task forces. This may
represent Soviet policy?a policy that could fur-
ther decrease the number of submarines available
for interdiction. On the other hand, the Soviets
may occasionally assign submarines to their "US
task forces" for realism, because they know that
the US Navy sometimes uses attack submarines in
a direct support role.
iTrr?coecrAL
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Other Convoy Types of Operations
In Soviet naval exercises, the total amount of
effort devoted to anticonvoy training is small.
Much of it appears to be peripheral to other
training goals, but exercises involving convoys
occasionally occur apart from landing operations
or the simulation of anticarrier warfare. In April
1977, as part of the spring exercise held annually
by the Northern Fleet, a convoy consisting of
three merchant ships, an oiler, and two warships
operated off North Cape. Its purpose is unknown
but possibly was to provide targets for ASM
aircraft.
More is known about Val-74, a Warsaw Pact
command staff exercise enacted with skeleton
naval forces from East .Germany, Poland, and the
USSR. This exercise reflected the Soviet Baltic
Fleet preoccupation with close-in sea lanes and
indicated that the Pact would probably try to
control the Baltic and North Seas in wartime.
According to the exercise scenario, the Pact first
fill-seized- the Danish Straits and then conducted a
variety of naval operations, including convoying
their own merchant ships and interdicting West-
ern support shipping in both seas. They also
operated in the North Sea against "Western"
amphibious forces and performed tactical ASW.
These actions were intended to control the ap-
proaches to the Baltic, to assist Pact ground forces
advancing along the coast of the Baltic and North
Seas, and to protect the Pact's coastal shipping.
Some of the strikes in the North Sea were made
against -troop convoys.-
Studied in conjunction with recent classified
writings, Val-74 indicates that:
? The Soviets regard interdiction in selected
offshore waters as fairly important when it is
,
tied to other objectives like supporting
ground troops operating on a coastal front.
? Some Soviet references to "attacking con-
voys- and some appearance of convoys in
exercises probably have to do with counter-
ing landing ships rather than interdicting
merchant ships.
? Some activity of the convoy type seen in
Soviet exercises probably is training to pro-
tect Soviet shipping.
Soviet writings indicate an intent to secure Pact
shipping?particularly in coastal waters?
through a combination of sea control measures
and convoying. According to classified writings,
the Pact nations plan to establish a centralized
board to coordinate convoy operations and expect
that the convoys will need 25 to 30 percent more
escorts than there are noncombatant ships. In
Soviet exercises, however, the escorts have usually
been fewer?only about 75 percent as many as
the noncombatants.
In addition to convoying its merchant ships,
the Pact would seek to control its local waters and
the especially important sectors of sea lanes. It
also would conduct "special operations"?which
include preemptive strikes against enemy air-
fields and naval bases?as a means of protecting
its own shipping.
Thus, what appears to be a growing involve-
ment of commercial ships in Soviet naval opera-
tions may reflect concern for naval protection of
these assets rather than increased attention to
interdiction of Western sea lines of com-
munications.
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ANNEX C
WEAPONS CARRIED BY SOVIET ATTACK SUBMARINES
evidence generally is consistent with recommen-
dations for weapon loads contained in the classi-
fied writings of the middle to late 1960s, when
the Soviets began to grapple with problems raised
by the modification of their strategic doctrine to
include the possibility that war with the West
might be fought (in all or in part) without the use
of nuclear weapons. In their military literature
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they note the difficulty of being prepared for
both nuclear and nonnuclear contingencies, and
they emphasize the importance of keeping their
operational submarines in sea-ready condition
and loaded with authorized levels of both nuclear
and conventional armaments.
Doctrine
The need to prepare simultaneously for both
conventional and nuclear war?after it was offi-
cially acknowledged in the Soviet Union in the
mid-1960s--prompted several articles in classi-
fied Soviet journals on how the naval forces
should respond. These articles made the follow-
ing recommendations on submarine armament:
? At least half of all the cruise missiles carried
by Soviet submarines should be nuclear.
? If a cruise missile submarine has a limited
number of, launchers and has an assignment
in which group operations are impossible, all
the missiles should be nuclear.
? ASW submarines should carry rocket-
boosted antisubmarine weapons and two to
four nuclear torpedoes. All these weapons
should be launched against .Western SSBNs
as soon as nuclear war begins.
? For self-defense, submarines need only con-
ventional torpedoes.
? On torpedo attack submarines assigned to
anticarrier operations, as many as one-third
of the torpedoes should be nuclear. This
would permit them to launch against an
aircraft carrier two salvos with conventional
torpedoes and one with nuclear torpedoes.
(We do not know how many weapons would
constitute a salvo.)
30
Implications of the Cruise Missile Loads
The high ratio of nuclear to conventional
warheads on cruise missiles carried by the subma-
rines confirms other evidence that the Soviets
believe that war at sea would not remain conven-
tional for long. After expending their few non-
nuclear missiles in a conventional conflict, the
cruise missile submarines could be relegated to
the sidelines as a contingency force in case of
escalation or could brave the Western antisub-
marine barriers to replenish their supply.
To compensate for the small number of con-
ventional weapons carried by each unit, the
Soviets probably would try to concentrate their
forces against major targets. Group operations
would offset weapons limitations but would re--
quire large forces and would decrease the num-
ber of units available for other tasks.
The weapon loads reflected in doctrinal writ-
ings
indicate a strong soviet commitment
to tne use of tactical nuclear weapons in nay
engagements. In a nuclear environment, fewe
weapons are required?a single nuclear hit prob-
ably would sink any target at sea.
Implications of the Torpedo Loads
There seems to be a requirement that frontline
Soviet submarines, regardless of class, be armed
with at least two nuclear torpedoes?a small
fraction of nuclear to conventional weapons com-
pared to the cruise missile loads. One reason for
this dissimilarity may ,be that all of the cruise
missiles are offensive weapons intended for strik-
ing high-value surface ships, while some of the
torpedoes are earmarked for defense against
Western ASW ships and submarines. In self-
defense, and in close engagements generally, the
Soviets probably would use conventional weapons
to avoid damage to the firing submarine.
"Tap?fiecrt.....
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46'
ANNEX D
HOW THE SOVIETS WOULD CARRY OUT INTERDICTION OPERATIONS
The Soviets write that in wartime they would
attempt to cut Western sea lines of communica-
tion by conducting ?missile and airstrikes against
ports, by sinking merchant and troop transport
ships on the high seas, and by sowing mines in
heavily traveled waters.
Soviet emphasis on all three of these funda-
mental methods is based, in part, on a critical
study of interdiction campaigns in recent history.
Soviet authors, for example, have stressed that a
amajor flaw in German planning during World
War II was the failure to mount "massed and
ystematic" attacks on cargo ports. The tone of
Soviet discussion of German mistakes suggests
that during a war NATO should expect attacks on
European ports with conventional weapons if the
fighting had not yet escalated into a nuclear
conflict. Soviet theorists note that once that
threshold is crossed, nuclear strikes against land
targets are the most efficient means of disrupting
ocean shipping.
Similarly, the Soviets have stated that mining
has been underestimated as a means of disrupting
shipping. They consider mine warfare useful
because it strains enemy naval resources and
extends the amount of time that merchant ships
must remain at sea, increasing their vulnerability
to other forms of attack.
Focusing on the military aspects of interdic-
tion, Warsaw Pact authors distinguish between
ocean" communications and "close sea lines of
communication." Disruption of the latter can
become an "urgent task," .the outcome of which
can impact directly' on the land campaign. This
emphasis is consistent with Soviet planning guid-
1107.irr-Secrat,
ance for use of submarines, aircraft, and surface
ships in interdiction operations. Experience indi-
cates, according to a classified Pact document,
that shipping in offshore waters is most effec-
tively destroyed by a combination of aircraft and
surface ships.
In open-ocean interdiction, submarines would
be the primary strike force. Aviation would locate
targets and also take part in antishipping strikes.
Surface ships, in the Soviet view, would be
needed to support the submarines and protect
them during their transits to and from the sea
lanes. The Soviets probably would deploy their
surface ships only within effective range of their
land-based aircraft, The Soviet emphasis on co-
ordinated operations, coupled with the lack of air
cover, might dictate the concentration of forces
within a few hundred miles of Europe, with only
a few submarines operating alone in distant
waters.
If enough forces were available, the Soviets
probably would seek to create a submarine threat
within an entire naval theater because they also
view interdiction as a useful diversionary tactic.
They know that it is much easier to attack a
merchant ship than to defend it and that, conse-
quently, a few submarines can tie up a dispropor-
tionate number of enemy forces. In 1972 and
again in 1976, Adm. Gorshkov wrote that, for
each German U-boat in World War II, the Allies
were obliged to deploy 25 ASW ships and 100
aircraft.
In a long war, moreover, attacks against sea
communications are useful because they impose
great stress" on defending naval forces. One
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-74r-Sectett,\
Soviet officer argued that scattered attacks world-
wide could force the enemy to monitor the entire
ocean. If these views were implemented, the
Soviets might try to conduct strikes in unexpected
areas?as well as against the main North Atlantic
shipping lanes?in order to force as large a
dispersion of Western naval resources as possible.
Other Soviets argue, however, that antiship-
ping forces should be concentrated on "decisive
axes"?probably close to shore?where they
could produce quick results. There is no evidence
to suggest which course the Soviets might take,
but it seems most likely that they would hedge
their bets and use both diversionary and concen-
tration operations.
General Staff Planning
Classified Soviet documents, written in the
mid-1960s but apparently still in use by the
General Staff for planning all types of naval
operations, describe in some detail the factors in
Soviet planning for interdiction. These docu-
ments do not indicate how the Soviets would
divide their forces between interdiction and other
missions in wartime, but they describe the way an
interdiction campaign should be conducted.
The Soviets believe they would need:
? To collect advance intelligence on the na-
ture, the importance, and the defenses of
enemy shipments.
? To reconnoiter the entirety of the enemy's
sea communications.
? To relieve submarines that have expended
their weapons or to resupply them at sea.
? To deploy interdiction forces covertly along
the expected routes of enemy convoys.
? To be able to shift forces promptly to new
areas if the enemy engages in evasive convoy
routing.
? To solve the problem of hydrometeorological
forecasting in distant areas.
These documents state that interdiction forces
should be divided into three groups, consisting of:
32
? Strike forces, primarily submarines, allo-
cated to sinking convoys and disrupting port
operations.
? Surface ships, to safeguard the submarines as
they deploy to and from their patrol areas.
? A reserve of naval aircraft.27
The Soviets expect to begin an interdiction
campaign by striking ports while ships are being
loaded and convoys formed.28 Later, submarines
and aircraft would strike convoys en route. If a
diesel submarine detected a convoy, the subma-
rine would trail it and report to the "fleet
command post," which would order faster nu--
clear-powered submarines to join and then re--
main in contact with the convoy, presumably
until enough forces were available for a coordi-
nated attack. As they approached their destina-
tion, surviving merchant ships would encounter
successive minefields, which would be systemati-
cally replenished. Finally, as they came within
range, the remaining merchant ships would be
attacked by the aircraft and missile troops o
coastal forces.
Weapons Employed
The Soviets have the option of employing a
variety of weapons against merchant ships at
sea?torpedoes, air- and submarine-launched
cruise missiles, and mines laid by aircraft and
submarines. Because of range constraints on So-
viet naval aircraft and their heavy commitment
early in war against carrier task forces, we be-
lieve it unlikely that many aircraft would be used
against merchant shipping. The Soviets could
have difficulty laying and replenishing mines in
areas of Western air superiority.
With regard to submarine-launched cruise mis-
siles, Soviet opinion has probably not changed
" In a more recent Warsaw Pact discussion of the three groups
necessary to conduct interdiction operations, an air group dedicated
to "reconnaissance" was substituted for the "reserve" of naval
aircraft.
" The Soviets have indicated that they believe it would take the
United States between two and three weeks to organize convoys and
that they would attempt to deliver strikes (presumably with nuclear
weapons) against the ports toward the end of this period, when the
concentration of ships would be highest.
-rarr4er.r..?411
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since the early 1960s, when one admiral wrote
that "there is no need to expend [cruise] missiles
against transports, since one or two torpedoes are
sufficient to sink a merchant vessel." If the
convoys are well protected and are of high value,
however, or if success against aircraft carriers
permits the reassignment of cruise missile subma-
rines, the Soviets probably would allocate some of
them against convoys.
Whether the Soviets would use submarine-
launched cruise missiles or torpedoes with nu-
clear Warheads against merchant convoys prob-
ably would depend on the status of NATO
carriers, on how well convoys were escorted, and
on the importance of the convoys. Soviet sources,
in general, indicate that they expect a shortage of
tactical nuclear weapons to develop as the war
progresses and, consequently, that these weapons
would be reserved for use against capital ships.
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ANNEX E
METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING SOVIET INTERDICTION CAPABILITIES
This annex describes an analysis of the ability
of Soviet submarines to deliver torpedoes against
US convoys in the North Atlantic. A model
employing several sets of assumptions provided a
range of outcomes." The analysis focuses on three
scenarios, which represent commitments of at-
tack submarines to interdiction at three different
levels. The assumptions built into the model
deliberately tend to "worst case- the situation for
NATO and result in optimistic exchange ratios
for the USSR.
Key assumptions used in the model were:
? Submarines spend 15 days on station.
? Each submarine withholds two torpedoes for
self-defense and fires all its other torpedoes
against merchant ships in a target-rich
environment.
? Most merchant ships are using the southern
shippinglanes of the North Atlantic in order
to stay beyond range of Soviet ASM aircraft
for most of the voyage; this also extends
transit times for Soviet submarines.
Turnaround time between patrols is 25 days.
? Submarines suffer 20 percent attrition-10
percent each time they pass through the
G-I-UK gap; no attrition on station was
included.
? No torpedoes with nuclear warheads and no
cruise missiles are expended against mer-
chant ships.
" The Model, which is 'called Firearm and is unclassified, was
deyeloped by Science Applications Incorporated of Englewood,
Colorado. It is described in a draft User's Manual, SAI-77-I43-
DEN, 26 August 1977. Copies of the manual Can be obtained from
SAL
iIll--fart_secktt?
? Nuclear submarines transit at 12 knots, die-
sels at 5; this is consistent with Soviet prac-
tice. (Higher speeds of 15 knots for nuclear
submarines and 8 for diesels would not cause
a militarily significant change in the results.)
? The Soviets maintain a continuous subma-
rine presence in the shipping lanes.
? Northern Fleet bases are undamaged and
continue to support submarine operations.
? Submarines must return to those bases for
replenishment. (NATO air superiority pre-
vents the Soviets from replenishing subma-
rines from captured territory.)
? The Soviets achieve a hit rate of about .25
for each torpedo fired (.85 technical reliabil-
ity multiplied by a deliberately optimistic
probability of .3 for accuracy).
? A single hit disables or sinks a merchant ship.
In all three scenarios, Soviet submarines fail to
sink ships at a level that would seriously affect the
resupply of Europe. The results of the model are
summarized in table 7.
Scenario 1 (Secondary-Priority Level of Effort)
This scenario assumes that the Soviets are
interested in attacking merchant ships in the
open ocean mainly in order to create a diver-
sion?to force NATO to disperse its forces over
the sea lanes. It represents the level of effort
likely in the. early phases of war while Western
aircraft carriers and SSBNs still pose a threat to
the Soviet Union.
In 120 days the submarines in this scenario
could, under favorable operating conditions, sink
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Table 7
Western Merchant Ship Losses to Soviet Submarines in a
120-Day Open-Ocean Interdiction Campaign in the North Atlantic
Scenarios
Level
of Effort
Zeit,
1 NW of available
long-range torpe-
do attack subma-
rines
2 All available long-
range torpedo at-
tack submarines
except V-class
3 Maximum: All avail-
able torpedo and
cruise missile at-
tack submarines '
Participating
Submarines
Ships Sunk
or Disabled
5 F-class SS' 36
2 N-class SSN
Percentage of
NATO-Flag
Ships
.6
12 F-class SS' 107 1.8
2 T-class SS
5 N-class SSN
2 Z-class SS
6 C-class SSGN 274 4,7
8 E-II-class SSGN
7 J-class SSG
5 N-class SSN
12 V-class SSN
22 F-class SS
2 T-class SS
2 Z-class SS
'These numbers assume a Soviet hit probability of about 25 percent and that a single hit disables a
target.
Our calculations included NATO-flag ships of 6,000 gross register tons or more. They excluded
more than 3,000 Liberian. and Panamanian-flag ships, some of which probably also would be used for
sealift if needed.
3 F-class submarines deployed to the Mediterranean are excluded from the strike forces in Scenarios
1 and 2.
4 The Northern Fleet normally supplies about 10 attack submarines for the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron. Scenario 3 assumes that these forces would be available for operations in the North
Atlantic, although it is unlikely.
or disable some 36 ships?or less than 1 percent
of the sealift resources available to NATO in that
period."
Scenario 2 (All Available Long-Range Torpedo Attack
Submarines Except V-Class)
This scenario assumes that NATO armies have
fought Pact forces to a standstill on the Rhine;
that the Soviets have preempted at sea, using
conventional weapons to destroy some Western
SSBNs at their bases and some carriers; and that
this partial success, plus a continuation of the
conventional phase, has persuaded Soviet leaders
to risk sending all available long-range torpedo
attack submarines in the Northern Fleet, except
the V-class, against merchant ships. This level of
" Figure 4 shows the effect on ship losses of varying the number
of submarines committed to interdiction.
36
effort by Northern Fleet submarines against ship-
ping would be approximately the same as that
expended against Western SSBNs and carriers.
Under favorable operating circumstances these
submarines could destroy or disable 107 mer-
chant ships, constituting 1.8 percent of the
NATO-flag ships of over 6,000 gross register tons.
Scenario 3 (Maximum Effort)
All available long-range general purpose sub-
marines in the Northern Fleet and Mediterranean
Squadron are sent against merchant ships in the
North Atlantic. This force could sink some 274
merchant ships?a level of attrition that .would
represent about 5 percent of the inventory of
NATO-flag Ships. of 6,000 gross register tons or
greater. Even if all of the sinkings in Scenario 3
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300
200
100
0
12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120
Days
Figure 4.
Cumulative Western Ship Losses
Scenario 3
Scenario 2
......... ??
.......
,
Scenario 1
500
400
300
200
100
Cumulative Losses in Scenario 3 Using Different Modes
of Deployment
Figure 5
Predeployment
.--------
. .
/
/
.
---
/-
"?Staggered Deployment
Surge Deployment
/
. . .
/
I
I
I I I
I
12 24 36 48 60
Days
72 84 96 108 120
41/-T4r-Socat. 37
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Tor-Secr.
were of ships carrying military cargoes, they
would represent less than 15 percent of those
programed to carry military loads in the first 120
days of war.
The Soviets could achieve this latter level of
success only if they had perfect intelligence on
those particular ships from the time they sailed
until the time of attack. It is likely that some ships
carrying military cargoes would be sunk, of
course; however, we do not believe that the
Soviets could generally convert dockside intelli-
gence into locating information suitable for at-
tacks against specific ships by submarines at sea.
Identifying high-value ships in convoys con-
taining many ships of low value would be diffi-
cult for the attacking submarine. Given convoy
defenses and tactics and normal visibility prob-
lems in the North Atlantic, successful identifica-
tion and attack are likely to be the exception
rather than the rule. The model, in assuming
randomness, may tend to understate the likely
success of Soviet submarines against high-value
merchant ships, but it almost certainly compen-
sates for the effects of that assumption by not
including any adverse effects as functions of
attacking defended convoys or selecting and
chasing fast ships. These adverse effects would
almost certainly include additional attrition of
submarines as they attacked convoys, the expen-
diture of more torpedoes per kill, and a loss of
time in target selection. The net result of chang-
ing the randomness assumption would likely be
that the submarines would have to spend more
than 15 days on station to expend all their
torpedoes and that there would be fewer subma-
rines making subsequent patrols?because of the
higher attrition?and fewer kills per patrol.
This analysis assumes that the Soviets would
stagger their submarine departures in order to
maintain an approximately continuous presence
in the sea lanes.3'
In an alternative deployment within Scenario
3, before war begins the Soviets could send all
their available submarines to positions in the sea
"Figure 5 shows the effect of varying the mode of deployment
on ship losses.
38
lanes so as to interdict shipping at the outset of
hostilities. Predeploying would eliminate wartime
attrition on the submarines' first outbound trip,
increase the total amount of time on station, and
increase Western losses by about 50 percent in
the first 120 days. It would have little impact
over the longer term, however, and the extra
NATO losses early in the war would include
relatively few ships carrying military cargo (be-
cause of the time required to prepare the military
shipments). Moreover, Soviet capabilities would
drop rapidly; they could not maintain so large a
presence in the sea lanes for long.
In any case, we believe that the Soviets would
not predeploy large numbers of attack subma-
rines in a period of rising tension because such an
action, in their view, could trigger an unac-
ceptable NATO response.
A third Scenario 3 alternative would be to
deploy all of the available submarines promptly
when war begins. Over time, this -surge" deploy-
ment would yield about the same attrition o
Western shipping as would staggered deploy-,.
ments. Such a -surge" strategy, however, would
leave periods when virtually all the submarines
were in transit or undergoing replenishment,
leaving the sea lanes safe for shipping, as shown
in figure 5.
To some extent, the Firearm model is sensitive
to changes in transit speeds of the submarines.
Increasing transit speeds to 15 knots for nuclear
submarines and 8 for diesels would increase losses
to shipping by some 25 percent, but would make
the submarines more subject to detection. In
Scenario 3, increasing the transit speeds would
result in 70 more ships lost in a 120-day cam-
paign?a total of 344, which would still be less
than 6 percent of NATO-flag shipping.
In this scenario, the submarines could sink
additional ships if they used conventionally
armed cruise missiles as well as torpedoes. If half
the missiles carried by C-, E-II-, and j-class
submarines had high-explosive warheads, this
would provide about 100 more weapons for use
against merchant shipping in Scenario S.
?AD
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?
We do not assume the above use of cruise
missiles in our calculation of losses in Scenario 3;
on the other hand, we do assume that the subma-
rines have more effective antiship torpedo load-
ings than the evidence would indicate. There is
good evidence that "alert" submarines in peace-
time carry mixed weapons loads, including ASW
and nuclear torpedoes. If this practice were car-
ried over into wartime?as seems likely?fewer
torpedoes could be expended against merchant
ships, and fewer ships would be lost than the 274
postulated.
Other, more realistic, operating conditions likely
to prevail in wartime probably would make ship
losses lower than those attained in this analysis. If
the Soviets persisted, for example, in their peace-
time practice of firing at long range from outside
escort screens, their accuracy probably would be
less than that we have assumed. In actual warfare,
moreover, a single hit might not disable or sink a
ship.
Realistically, submarines would be subject to
attrition during their entire patrols, not merely
during transits. If submarine attrition were .3 to
1111 01-r-r-Sefiel....
.5 per patrol (instead of .2, as assumed in this
analysis), the Soviets, after 120 days of war, could
sink 200 to 250 merchant ships in Scenario 3
(instead of 274), and their ability to continue an
at-sea interdiction campaign would be sharply
reduced.
If the higher attrition rates were used in
Scenario 3, submarine losses in 120 days would
rise to 35 or even 50 percent of all long-range
general purpose submarines maintained in the
Northern Fleet (as opposed to 25 percent at .2).
Given the basic assumptions of this model, we
can find no reasonable scenario that would appre-
ciably increase the number of merchant ships
sunk in any of the variations examined. All three
scenarios were constructed to the Soviets' advan-
tage. Even if we were to further increase that
advantage by assuming that the convoys were
undefended?thus allowing about a .43 hit rate
(.5 accuracy times .85 technical reliability)?in
Scenario 3, Ehe Soviets could still sink only about
8 percent of NATO-flag shipping in a 120-day
interdiction campaign.
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