COMMENTS ON NAVY REVIEW OF REVISED OSR SLOC PAPER*

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005533608
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: January 25, 1979

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?1"Yr?S-Lz412.F.:.1
MEMORANDUM
25 January 1979
Comments on Navy Review
Of Revised OSR SLOC Paper*
. What is the basis for our assumption that the
level. of economic shipping would continue at essen-
tially peacetime levels during the first months of
Tar? (Navy para. 1)
US planning appears to assume that economic ship-
ping would continue in wartime, but at a reduced level
(see fn., p. 22, Secret version of SLOC paper). Sec-
retary Claytor has estimated that "it could take 6,000
ships, each making a round trip every 30 days,.. .in
order to carry out the resupply of forces in Europe."**
Present planning in DoD appears to call for monthly
sailings of no more than about 1,000 ships with mili-
tary cargoes. We presume that the remainder of the
ships would be loaded with economic cargoes. Because
of such statements by authoritative Navy spokesmen
and studies, such as one by in 1973,*** we
thought everyone believed that a significant level of
**
* * *
Our comments on the Navy review are at the
level because we wanted to be quite specifsc
citing the sources for our interpretation of Soviet
naval doctrine and practice. Nonetheless, the secret
classification on the revised version of the study is
both accurate and appropriate.
See the Secretary's Dearborn address of 12 September
1978. Other information, informally received from
Adm. Kidd's staff, indicates that 3,000 shipments
might be closer to the mark. We used the smaller
figure in 2ur paper.
SACLANT 22 Aug 73.
This study estimates that the essential quantity of
economical shipping was at 54 percent of peacetime
levels. The study further identified 11,000 ships
as suitable for sealift.
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economic shipping would be maintained throughout
a conflict. Navy studies
assumed the continuation and
nomic shipping.
destruction ot eco-
l'2. Why did we use Lloyd's Register of Shipping as
! our source of information on the total number of
NATO-flag ships over 6,000 tons? (para. 2)
There is a disagreement on the number of ships
that would be available (see fn, p. 21). We used
the Lloyd's figure because it is a documentary
source of information on real ships. In any event,
whpthpr ATIP 11CPC the. Tl oyd's data or those of JCS
seems immaterial; all the
figures show that NATO has a large pool of merchant
ships with which to replace shipping losses. What
could not be replaced as easily would be military
cargoes.
3. , What are the assumptions underlying the 800 figure
in the JCS plan? Are they especially earmarked? Is
the figure current? (para. 2)
According to OSD/PME, JCS, we have
more lift capability than we can use. As of last
fall, a pool consisting of 400 US and 600 European
NATO ships had been established, and arrangements
were being made for them to begin carrying military
supplies and equipment within a week or so of M-day.
These ships, in. any case, would be a small portion
of those available. The JCS Posture Statement for
FY 1979 (p. 100), for example, states that "...NATO
merchant shipping is expected to meet anticipated
requirements." It identifies 4,000 NATO-flag ships
of the dry bulk type that could be used for rein-
fOrcement and indicates that selected US-controlled
ilag of convenience ships also would be used if needed.
)dm. Kidd has stated that, including some flag of
Convenience ships, NATO has 10,000 merchantmen of
1,600 tons or more. Of these he estimated that some
6,000 would be needed.*
4 See, for example, New York Times, 6 June 1978.
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4. Are we aware of any of these "detailed analyses"
done by Navy indicating that all US ASW resources are
needed to keep US military ship losses at "acceptable
levels?" If so, what appears to account for the dif-
ferent results? Area of conflict? Definition of
Soviet air and subsurface forces? Assumptions about
weapon loading and tactics? (para. 3)
Navy-commissioned St dies
are flawed, in our view
ot their analysis ot protective requirements, because
they generally have assumed that:
Nearly all of the USSR's general
purpose submarine force would be
committed against merchant ship-
ping, ignoring NATO naval forces,
and the likelihood that a large
number of submarines would not
be deployable because of range
constraints, their repair status,
or basing in inland seas.
Soviet submarines would be re-
supplied out of area.
Torpedo loadings on Soviet sub-
marines were overall exaggerated
by some 40 percent.
A more recent Navy study uses the
revised torpedo capacities and is therefore more
consistent with our own findings.
5. What is the source of our assumption about the
make-up of convoys carrying military cargoes? If
convoys carrying military cargoes had exclusively
military content, could they be continuously tracked
and distinguished from non-military convoys through
the use of RORSAT and EORSAT? (para. 5)
US strategic mobility studies appear to assume
that some economic support shipping would take place
concurrently with the more important military ship-
ments. Running military convoys exclusively would,
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of course, simplify the discrimination nroblem for
the Soviets. 7
To reduce convoy vulnerability, the United States,
it seems to us, has several options, including mixing
economic cargoes within ships and within convoys and
sending some high-value cargoes independently in fast
ships at maximum speed. Our study did not examine US
options but merely assumed that the US randomized (or
better) losses of military cargoes.
6. What are our "assumptions" about the torpedo Loads
Soviet Long-range attack submarines? To what extent
poutd we expect them to be different if SLOC interdic-
tion were a principal objective? (paras. 6 and 7)
There
is good evidence
that carrying mixed torpedo loads is
standard practice on Soviet attack submarines. They
could, however, optimize their loadings for specific
missions. We assumed they did in our use of the
model.
We strongly disagree with Navy's comment that
torpedo loadings would not constrain the Soviets'
anti-SLOC capabilities. The submarine classes
cited, plus the Z-class, constitute less than half
of the USSR's active inventory of general purpose
submarines. The new loadings indicate that Soviet
cruise missile submarines, such as the J-class,
have little capability for interdiction as a second-
ary mission. The net effect for the entire long-
range attack submarine force is by itself a reduction
in capability by some 40 percent from that used in
all but one of the Navy studies we are aware of, and
that, we believe is significant.
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Although it seems irrelevant to compare US and
Soviet torpedo loadings in an analysis of Soviet
anti-SLOC capability, we note that the loaaings
attributed to US submarines appear to be incorrect.
7. What information do we have about Soviet doctrine
and/or capabilities to depart from the practice of
carrying mixed loads of torpedoes? (paras. 6 and 7)
We have no information that the Soviets plan to
change their practice of mixing torpedo loads--ASW
and anti-shipping weapons--but they have the capa-
bility to switch most of their capacity to antiship
torpedoes.
8. What comments do you have on the comparison of
Soviet attack submarines today with German submarines
of World War 11? (paras. 6 and 7)
Modern submarines obviously would be much more
capable than the common German Type VIIc U-boat of
World War II would be now, but the comparison is
unfair and may be irrelevant. In the early and
successful years of World War II, the Germans oper-
ated almost entirely on the surface, were fairly
close to the target areas, or were able to replenish
out of area. Moreover, they generally had a speed
advantage over the targets of that day. Soviet
diesel submarines have none of these advantages. It
is instructive to note that with improvements in
Allied radar technology, the development of the Leigh
light, and nearly continuous air cover, German effec-
tiveness plummeted after July 1942 to only 1.7 merchant
ships destroyed per submarine lost
*NAVSH1PS, 0900-0574010(Change 52), May 1974.
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9. What is your view of the Navy's interpretation
of Soviet writings concerning interdiction of SLOCs?
In their review, the Navy singled out five Soviets
whose writings, they believe, affirm the importance
of SLOC interdiction. We agree that three of these
men--Gorshkov, Stalbo, and V'yunenko--are authorita-
tive spokesmen for Soviet naval policy, but we dis-
agree that their writings indicate that the Soviets
plan on conducting a major at-sea interdiction cam-
paign in a war with NATO.
It seems to us that a study of Rear Adm. (he has
been promoted) V'yunenko's writings leads to the
opposite conclusion. His writings consistently
stress the primacy of destroying Western submarines .
and aircraft carriers as soon as possible after war
begins. If unable to do so before these forces
launch their weapons, they still must be destroyed
in order to forestall subsequent attacks.
According to Wyunenko, during a conventional war,
"each side will try to weaken as much as possible
enemy forces carrying nuclear weapons, especially
strategic ones." He characterized SSBNs as the "most
important objective that navies must defend" and urged
that
Anything capable of waging direct
combat against enemy submarine
missile carriers must be dispatched
into the areas of their combat patrol
in order to destroy these extremely
important nuclear means of the enemy.
...[SSBNs] constitute the main nuclear
threat from naval axes...[and require]
that the basic naval effort be concen-
trated against them.
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In sum, Wyunenko believes that the anti-SSBN mission
"has today become the most important in naval warfare
....[and] predetermines the course of future naval war-
fare and naval research and development." It tran-
scends navies'capabilities.* As part of their anti-
SSBN effort, the Soviets would destroy the shore
navigation and communication facilities that support
Western SSBNs and would combat NATO ships that were
preventing Soviet ASW forces from searching for enemy
submarines.**
While seeking out Western SSBNs, the Soviets
must also protect their own, both in transit and in
their "waiting areas." Soviet operations in support
of their own SSBNs also would require that they combat
Western ASW forces, described as "a most important"
class of targets which pose a serious threat to Soviet
SSBNs and against which the Soviets would expend a
"maximum effort." Concern for the security of Soviet
SSBNs probably contributed to Wyunenkois statement in
1975 that destruction of Western SSNs is second in
priority only to countering enemy SSBNs.***
"Simultaneously" with these priority tasks that
must be performed in the conventional phase, the
Soviet Navy also would have to fulfill others, such
as troop protection, interdiction, and conducting
amphibious landings. The purpose of these interdic-
tion operations mainly would be "to break up enemy
troop movements" rather than to stem the flow of
materiel across the Atlantic.
V'yunenko's approach to interdiction is similar
to that of Gorshkov; it is subsumed in the navy's
growing strategic strike capability.
* Military Thought, No.1, 1975, C/NFD. A month earlier
Gorshkov had written in Morskoy Sbornik that the ever-
growing scope of war at sea required additional involve-
ment of other services in naval missions.
44* Military Tho4ght, No. 1, 1975,
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All technical policy of.. .major sea
powers and the direction of the
development of the art of naval war-
fare today are subordinated to the
goal of increasing capabilities
against the shore'...In the recent
past [anti-SLOC] activities consti-
tuted navies' principal business,
while today they have become only
one component, and far from the
most important one, or the mission
of damaging tEe military economic
potentia ber of naval
powers.'
Viyunenko probably also would approve the navy's
conducting other types of interdiction as well, if
these operations did not compete with strategic ones.
His historical writings, like those of Gorshkov, have
emphasized the value of attacking merchant ships on
the high seas as a means of tying down a disproportion-
ate number of enemy naval forces.** He regards in-area
interdiction of NATO's sea communications as an integral
part of the navy's traditional--and formerly most impor-
tant--role of supporting the ground forces.*** And in
an interdiction context, he indicates that action "against
new potential sources of military might...[to disrupt] gas
and oil production on the continental shelf" could become
increasingly important.****
But the Soviets could not simultaneously accomplish
--any more than we could--all of the tasks deemed impor-
tant, and V'yunenko's priorities are clear
1,
1977,
4
Military Thoupht, No.
Morskoy Sbornik, No.
1,
1975,
***
Military Thouzht, No.
7,
1963;
-Ibid., No. 3, 1978,
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Emphasis not in origina
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Stalbo's writings also fail to support the Navy's
contention that interdiction is an important mission
of the Soviet Navy. Like V'yunenko, he stresses the
importance of destroying the enemy nuclear fleet before
weapon launch and considers destruction of "even a few
[SSBNs] an event of strategic importance."* Foreshadow-
ing Gorshkov, in a journal article in 1969 he wrote that
the development of nuclear weapons had led to changes
in traditional naval missions, with the result that
p,odern navies have been "transformed into strike forces,
Ipriented primarily against land targets."** One of the
affected "traditional missions" was interdiction at sea:
"Oceans aave lost some of their former importance," he
rote in 1971, "as an arena for battle along sea commu-
nications."*" .And in the final chapter of the book,
1iistory of Naval Art (1969), Stan? explained why inter-
diction at sea was no longer so relevant:
A diminution in the importance of
combat on ocean lines of communication
is one of the natural developments of
nuclear-missile war. As a result of
the use of nuclear weapons against
ground targets, enemy losses can turn
out to be several times larger than
losses from the most successful opera-
tions.against his shipping. ,In addition,
the pace at which events unfold during
the interdiction of communications does
not at all correspond to the pace at
which events unfold during an exchange
of nuclear strikes against territories
for the purpose of destroying his mili-
tary-economic potential. Finally, the
devastation that will be caused by mass
use of nuclear weapons...will sharply
reduce all spheres of consumption....****
A Military Thought,
AA Morskoy Sbornik,
AAA MI.litary Thought,
No.
4,
1977,
No.
No.
12,
3,
1969,
1971,
S.Ye. Zakharov (ed.), History of Naval Art (Moscow:
Voyenizdat, 1969), p. 540. Stalbo wrote the last
two chapters.
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Gorshkov has written extensively on interdiction,
but nowhere, to our knowledge, has he indicated that
interdiction at sea is as important as the navy's
strategic Offensive and defensive tasks. Many of
these writings have appeared in a historical context.
They indict Germany in World War II for not supporting
its U-boats with other forces, "especially aviation
which could have Operated not only against ships but
also against ports, industry, and accumulated stores";
for not "conducting a single operation" against
Tiestern ASW forces; and for being ill-prepared (the
Soviets estimate that the Germans would have needed
at least 1,000 submarines). He concludes that under
Conditions of continental warfare "operations against
ocean communications...were only of secondary, local
significance for the opposing sides."* Because of the
disparity in effort required for the Allies to counter
the U-boats, however, he probably would regard the
German campai n as having been at least partially
successful.
When he has listed the missions of the modern
Soviet Navy, Gorshkov has placed interdiction in
last place twice** and on one occasion third, behind
strategic offensive and anti-fleet operations, but
ahead of support for the ground forces, conducting
amphibious operations and other traditional naval
tasks.*** Even this latter appearance of upgrading
the interdiction mission is doubtful because, in
discussing the tasks to be performed by specific
* See Morskoy Sbornik, No. 11, 1972, U. US success
against Japanese maritime communications, were
discounted because of the "ineptitude"
of the Japanese and further were characterized as
indecisive.
** See Large Soviet Encyclopedia (1971) and the pamphlet
Navy (Moscow: Znaniye Publishing House, 1977). Navy
was written to mark the 60th anniversary of the Soviet
Armed Forces.
*** Soviet Military Encyclopedia (1976). This article also
lists surface ships first among the branches of the
Soviet Navy and then, two sentences later, states that
the "main branches" are submarines and naval aviation.
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iplatforms, he listed interdiction as the last task
Lto be performed by aircraft and "modern" submarines
and made no mention of it for surface ships. (The
missions of older diesel-powered submarines, which
.might be expected to have aiaarei1nportant anti-SLOC
role, were not mentioned.)*
The Soviets are well aware of NATO's concern for
the security of its shipping, and Gorshkov, particu-
larly in his early statements on interdiction, has ?
sought to exploit that concern. Writing in Pravda
on 29 July 1961, for example, he warned the West "to
stop and think of [its]...c,ireatly extended communi-
cations lines..." before undertaking new military
"adventures." In 1967 he explained to readers of
Morskoy Sbornik that exploiting Soviet capability
to disrupt Western shipping was necessary "to curb
the aggressive nature of the imperialists." He
followed this up by writing in a historical context
that the threat of interdiction is a peacetime use
of naval power.**
GOrslikov's subsequent writings indicate that he
believes a shift has occurred in the manner in which
future SLOC campaigns would be conducted and suggests
that sinking merchant Shi s at sea is not a major task
of the Soviet Navy today.
In the 28 July 1974 issue of Pravda, Gorshkov wrote
that "the navy always has had two main tasks...combat
against the enemy fleet and operations against the
shore." He separated out strategic defense from anti-
fleet operations as, apparently, the obverse of attack-
ing shore targets. Defense against seaward attack, he
wrote, is growing increasingly important because the
main task of navies now is to attack land targets. And,
with the development of nuclear weapons, such attacks
4ie growing in importance.
* Ibid.
** Morskoy Sbornik, No.
1972; U.
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Gorshkov considerably expanded his treatment of
naval missions in his book, Sea Power of the State,
published in 1976. He wrote thaL:
-- The introduction of nuclear
weapons has expanded the scope
of employing naval operations
against the shore.
-- Anti-shore operations now dom-
inate naval warfare and naval
research.
-- As confirmation of this trend,
he observed that SSBNs alone
among US naval forces are
designated "strategic."
The navy's new [nuclear strike]
capability against the shore and
the "enormous threat from seaward"
determine the character of modern
naval operations, the most impor-
tant of which is strategic defense.
(Indeed, strategic ASW is defined
as now being a national, rather
than merely a naval mission.)
Under the new conditions of
nuclear weapons, the navy's
battle against the enemy's
[general purpose] fleet has
become secondary to o erations
against the shore.
Gorshkov summarized his discussion of the impact
of the development of nuclear weapons by saying:
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Operations entailing the disruption
...of the enemy's sea shipping, which
formerly were directly related to the
sOlere of employing a fleet against
the enemy's fleet, today are taking a
new direction. By being included in
the overall system of naval operations
against the shore, they are strength-
ening the attributes of the Navy which
it has acquired due to its modern hard-
ware--the capability to carry out stra-
tegic missions of an offensive nature
through direct action against the source
of the military strength of the enemy.*
Thus, Gorshkov clearly believes that the "traditional"
method of interdicting seaborne commerce by torpedoing
Merchant ships at sea has changed in favor of "modern"
SLBM strikes against the ports and other sources of
supply.
Marshal Sokolovskiy, on the other hand, believed
that interdiction and other tasks conducted in support
of the ground forces were among the most important that
the navy must fulfill. But even for Sokolovskiy, attack-
ing ships at sea was secondary to attacking ground
targets:
Operations against enemy communi-
cations should be conducted on a
large scale from the very begin-
ning of war. This can be accom-
plished by delivery of strikes by
the Strategic Rocket Forces and
nuclear submarines against naval
bases, canals, narrow straits,
and ship building and ship repair
yards, and also by destruction
of:convoys and transports at sea
by submarines and aircraft.*
* Emphasis not in original.
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Moreover, the efficacy of Sokolovskiy as a spokes-
man on naval policy is questionable. Military Strategy,
a book published in three editions during the 1960s by
a collegium of ground force officers led by Sokolovskiy,
angered Soviet naval officers by snubbing the navy's
role in World Wars I and II; by insisting that, in
future wars, naval operations--while geographically
extensive--would not be decisive; and by denigrating
the navy's ability to perform its missions independently.
Particularly troublesome to naval officers was the first
edition's downgrading of the Soviet Navy's role in con-
ducting ASW and strategic strikes CR enemy territory.
Sokolovskiy's views on the "proper" role of the
navy were well known even before publication of Mili-
tary Strategy, and Gorshkov's references to authori-
tative persons who failed to understand the need for a
navy in the late 19S0s probably refer to Sokolovskiy,
who was then chief of the General Staff, as well as to
Zhukov and Khrushchev.* Indeed, while still chief of
staff, Sokolovskiy reportedly asked Gorshkov how it
felt to command an obsolete service.
Subsequently, in face of naval opposition, Sokolov-
skiy and his colleagues conceded that support of the
ground forces no longer was a main naval task (but
added that considerable effort still needed to be
expended in this area) and acknowledged ASW as the
primary determinant of Soviet naval policy.
Further, the relevance of Military Strategy to
contemporary militar doctrine is open to doubt.
Two years before the appearance of the first edition,
Sokolovskiy--who had been a close associate and war-
time chief of staff of Marshal Zhukov--was replaced
as chief of the General Staff. His successor was
* "We had among us, unfortunately, some extremeZy
influential 'authorities' who felt that with the
appearance of nuclear weapons the Navy had com-
pletely lost its importance as branch of the Armed
Forces." Morskou Sbornik, No. 2, 1967, U. See also
Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy, for a discussion of
naval reaction to Military Strategy.
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M. V. V. Zakharov, a close associate of Marshals Malin-
ovskiy, Grechko and Krylov who dominated the Soviet.
defense establishment into the 1970s. In the late
1960s, Zakharov's deputy for operations, Col. Gen.
M. I. Povaliy, told a US military attache that
Military Strategy was out of date. Since then, he
and Zakharov have both written detailed classified
articles to publicize the changes in Soviet doctrine.
These articles treat interdiction primarilyas a
residual mission which could become imoortant late
in a war--after the nuclear exchange.
Finally; the inclusion of Defense Minister Ustinov
is puzzling. We know of only one pertinent reference
by him to interdiction, made in a very large (and par-
ticularly sensitive) document. This appeared in a
listing of NATO's strengths and weaknesses and merely
observed--as have many Soviets--that NATO's dependence
on long sea lines of communication is an area in which
the West is vulnerable.*
Our View
Taken together, the statements by five officers
selected by the Navy indicate that interdiction at sea
is a secondary aspect of SLOC interdiction in general,
which itself is secondary to the performance of strate-
gic tasks. The evidence is buttressed by statements
by other officers and by SaftiaTshipbuilding programs,
weapons loadings, and exercises, all of which point to
the priority of countering Western naval strike forces.
(See the original SLOC paper for details.) Soviet
writings indicate that we should ex ect some attacks
on ports, docks, and staging areas.
This does not mean that the Soviets in wartime
would not conduct some attacks on NATO shipping. It
does reflect the predominance of tasks of direct signi-
ficance to their combat operations in Soviet war
planning.
4 Ustinov also was chairman of the collegium that wrote
volume nine of the Soviets' Eistor.y
1939-1945, as was Marshal Grechko for earlier volumes.
Volume nine contains two chapters on interdiction oper-
ations in 1944, from which one can conclude that the
Soviets regard their operations on the sea Lanes as
then hivins been successful.
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10. What is our view of the Navy statement that in a
protracted conflict the Soviets would expect a concen-
trated interdiction effort to force NATO naval forces,
including carriers, to protect the sea lanes? (para. 8)
' We believe that they would hope that a minor inter-
diction effort would accomplish the same ends, while
leaving the Northern Fleet's air- and submarine-based
defenses of the USSR intact. We do not believe that
they would give up those defenses in order to draw
,IATO's naval strike forces away from the approaches
to the USSR.
111. What is the basis for our assumption that the
VSSR could not pose a substantial threat to NATO
shipping through air attacks? (para. 9)
The original SLOC paper contains a discussion of
this issue, and it will be treated in-depth in a
forthcoming OSR study. Navy has misrepresented our
position somewhat in its review, however. We are
not saying that NATO land-based air defenses would
eliminate the threat to the SLOCs posed by the navy's
strike aircraft; rather, we believe that the existence
of these defenses would force Soviet aircraft to fly
less-than-optimum flight profiles, thereby restricting
their range capability and preventing them from reach-
ing most of the SLOCs. Further, we assumed that the
Soviets would flyover water in order to minimize
exposure of their aircraft to land-based air defenses
but this, too, would reduce their combat radius.
/2. What is our view on the likelihood of Soviets
obtaining overseas bases for submarine replenishment?
Of the vulnerability of such bases in the event of
hostilities? (para. 10)
Soviet acquisition of bases in Africa)in countries
where they now seem to have enough influence, and in
the Indian Ocean area would offer little improvement
over Northern Fleet bases in supporting a campaign to
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!interdict the military resupply of Europe because of
;their distance from the sea lanes. Moreover, a study
of Soviet support ships attempting to operate from
equatorial Africa would almost certainly conclude
.that they would be critically vulnerable to attack.
13. What advantage would the Soviets gain by using
cruise missiles vice torpedoes against NATO shipping?
(para. 10)
Using cruise missiles in addition to torpedoes
would increase the number of weapons the Soviets could
expend against merchant ships. Submarines equipped
with standoff missiles also could attack from outside
a convoy's defenses. We postulated, as did most Navy
campaign analyses that we have seen, that the rela-
tively scarce cruise missiles would not be used against
merchant shipping.
With regard to nuclear weapons, Soviet sources
generally indicate that they would be reserved for
major.waxships.
14. What differences would result in our analysis
from assuming that a protracted conventional conflict
rather than a nuclear war occurred? (para. 11)
Our model assumed a protracted (4-month) conventional
conflict.
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MEMORANDUM 25 January 1979
SUBJECT: Comments on Navy Review of Revised OSR
SLOC Paper
Distribution:
Copy No. 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - Exec Registry
4 - D/NFAC
NFAC Registry
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
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