SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY: CONCEPTS AND FORCES FOR THEATER WAR AGAINST NATO

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0005584947
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June 19, 2017
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June 19, 2017
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SC-2007-00006
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January 1, 1975
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL RELEASE PROGRAM JUNE 2017 Ab- Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Intelligence Report Soviet Naval Strategy: Concepts and Forces for Theater War Against NATO Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 AR 70-14 -Tap-Secret Copy Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 "Trirr-Ser.,r4L Soviet Naval Strategy: Concepts and Forces for Theater War Against NATO Principal Conclusions During the past decade, Soviet naval strategists have become more flexible in their view of the possible course of development of a theater war with NATO. They now see naval operations in such a war as evolving in up to five stages: ? a period of rising tensions during which surveillance operations would begin - a possible period of conventional (nonnuclear) hostilities - possibly a period of limited nuclear operations in Europe, which probably would be accompanied by widespread nuclear operations at sea (Nuclear war at sea during a conventional conflict in Europe is not currently an element of Soviet strategy.) - theater-wide nuclear war - a concluding phase during which the winning side would consolidate its gains. Soviet and other Warsaw Pact naval forces are organized into several theater commands for war with NATO. Each theater naval command has several wartime missions to which forces must be allocated. Soviet planners probably believe that the forces currently earmarked for each theater are adequate to defend Pact territory against seaborne attack and to limit damage from carrier-based aircraft strikes. They probably consider their antisubmarine and interdiction forces inadequate to carry out their missions in all theaters. Likely future developments in Soviet naval strategy for theater war against NATO include: greater emphasis on open-ocean antisubmarine warfare OM* greater use of submarine-launched ballistic missiles in theater war - development of increased capabilities for conventional war at sea. The Soviets might also adopt a doctrine permitting nuclear operations at sea during conventional hostilities on land in Europe. This could be done in reaction to Western discussions of such a strategy or in realization of the advantages that selected nuclear strikes at sea would have over limited nuclear attacks on land?for example, the absence of a collateral damage problem. These considerations probably will stimulate Soviet production of attack sub- marines, high-endurance surface ships, and strike and antisubmarine aircraft, as well as provisions for logistic support. To ret Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 January 1975 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence January 1975 INTELLIGENCE REPORT Soviet Naval Strategy: Concepts and Forces for Theater War Against NATO Preface Since the mid-sixties, Soviet strategy for em- ploying naval forces in a NATO - Warsaw Pact theater war has undergone important changes. These changes were discussed in classified Soviet and Warsaw Pact documents written in the late sixties. The documents, acquired recently by CIA, have provided important in- sights into Soviet plans for wartime naval operations and form the basis for the major judgments of this study. This report discusses the evolution of Soviet naval strategy in the post-Khrushchev era, the Soviet scenario for naval actions in a NATO - Warsaw Pact war, and the likely Soviet view of the adequacy of naval resources for wartime operations. It provides an estimate--consistent with Soviet documents --of the types and numbers of Warsaw Pact naval forces which might be assigned to various wartime tasks in the open ocean and in coastal areas. The study concludes with a discussion of likely de- velopments in Soviet naval strategy in the next five years and their implications for Soviet naval procure- ment programs. It does not discuss Soviet employment of naval forces in an intercontinental nuclear war arising out of a NATO - Warsaw Pact theater conflict. Note: This report was prepared in the Office of Strategic Research in consultation with analysts or e Defense Intelligence Agency and the Office of Naval Intel- ligence, but without formal concurrence by intelligence offices outside CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to '-r-0113"-SEC.,111.ELL Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 TOP CR- ET- \ Contents Evolution of Soviet Naval Strategy The Post-Ehrushchev Period The Mid-Sixties--Reaction to "Flexible Response" Page 5 5 5 Recent Changes in Soviet Concepts of Naval Warfare . ... 6 .Force Development ... 0 0 0 0 ? 9 Naval Strategy for War in Europe: Current Soviet Concepts 9 Overall Scenario ....... . . . . ? ? . 9 Naval Operations in a Theater War With NATO ...... . . . . . . .. 11 Theaters of Operations 13 Ocean Theaters 14 Continental Theaters . . . . . ? . . . . 24 Distant Areas . ........ . . . . 28 Disposition of Forces 28 Allocation of Combat Forces to Theaters 28 Allocation of Forces to Missions 32 Soviet Perceptions of Force Level Constraints ........ . 33 Outlook 36 Antisubmarine Warfare and the Strategic Balance 36 Naval Forces in Theater Nuclear War . ? ? 37 Nuclear War at Sea 38 Force Implications 38 Summary 41 -3 ".-1737-SECRJE:12 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 TOP LCRET Page Maps Chart Warsaw Pact Naval Command Relationships for Theater War Against NATO Photographs Recent Additions to the Soviet Navy 15 8 -4 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Evolution of Soviet Naval Strategy The Post-Khrushchev Period In the early sixties, Soviet naval strategy for war against NATO was predicated on a short, decisive nuclear conflict. This doctrine called for the early, massive use of nuclear weapons to forestall enemy nu- clear attacks from the sea. The principal forces to be employed were cruise missile and torpedo attack submarines and missile-equipped strike aircraft. These were to establish a defense in depth against Western carrier task forces attempting to penetrate to within striking range of the USSR. Defense against Western ballistic missile submarines was to be ac- complished by a combination of antisubmarine barriers and area searches by submarines and aircraft. Major surface ships were to play a secondary role in anti- submarine searches and anticarrier defense. Inter- diction of NATO's sea lines of communications was accorded a low priority since Soviet strategists be- lieved that the war would be concluded successfully before seaborne reinforcement of Europe could begin to have an impact. The Mid-Sixties--Reaction to "Flexible Response" By the mid-sixties, Soviet views on the nature and course of a NATO - Warsaw Pact war had begun to change. A major factor for change was the strategy of "flexible response" which had been introduced into US and NATO plans and exercises. In response to this shift in Western strategy, Soviet military theorists gave increased attention to the importance of armed forces equipped and trained for conventional as well as nuclear operations. classified documents, including lectures on strategy delivered at courses for non-Soviet Pact military officers, indicate that in the mid-sixties the plans for war in Europe in- cluded a possible brief period of conventional hostil- - 5 - TOP S CRET Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 ities preceding theater-wide nuclear war. The entire campaign was still envisaged as short, however, with most of the action completed within a few weeks. Naval strategists shared the views of other Soviet military analysts. In a classified document written in 1966, Rear Admiral Kruchenykh, an instructor at the General Staff Academy, argued that NATO's flexible response doctrine obliged the Soviet Navy to be ready for both conventional and nuclear war at sea. A particular problem for naval strategists was the determination of the proper mix of nuclear and conven- tional weapons for deployed naval forces. Kruchenykh recommended that most units carry both types of weapons; he noted, however, that submarines equipped with anti- ship missiles but having only a few missile tithes might be armed only with nuclear weapons. He probably was referring to the J class (four launchers) and the modi- fied W classes (two or four launchers). Recent Changes in Soviet Concepts of Naval Warfare Soviet naval strategy continued to evolve through the late sixties, and Soviet naval writings of that period emphasized flexibility in employment of naval forces. the The missions of Soviet naval forces--except some ballistic missile submarines--were reexamined in the context of conventional, limited nuclear, and theater- wide nuclear war. Several naval authors emphasized the need to attack Polaris submarines during a pos- sible conventional phase. This view was also re- flected in classified Warsaw Pact strategy lectures of the late sixties (see box). In 1969 Marshal Zakharov, then chief of the Gen- eral Staff, discussed in a classified article the possibility of a war which would include conventional, tactical nuclear, and large-scale nuclear phases. The concept of limited nuclear operations in Europe may have been evaluated but limited nuclear operations 6 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 TO'XVCRET Antisubmarine and Antioarrier Missions in Conventional Operations Excerpts from Warsaw Pact lectures on strategy for war in Europe delivered in 1969-1970: The enemy, under conditions of a critical situation, may go over to the employment of nuclear weapons.... Therefore, it is necessary to use all means [during a possible conventional phase to destroy his launchers and nuclear delivery aircraft... Peculiarities in the conduct of an offensive operation with conventional weapons [include the need toj ...engage in joint operations of naval and long-range aircraft to destroy the main forces of the enemy fleet, especially missile submarines. Features of the conduct of operations with employment of conventional means of destruction [include] ...at sea, a joint operation of fleets and Long Range Aviation to destroy enemy naval forces?aircraft carriers and missile submarines. at sea have not been discussed explicitly in avail- able Soviet writings A classified article, written in 1968 by Captain First Rank Vyunenko and Rear Admiral Tuz, discussed the possibility of a period of limited nuclear hos- tilities in a NATO - Warsaw Pact war, in which there would be widespread use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea. They advocated that Soviet naval forces use all the nuclear means at their disposal during limited nuclear operations in Europe, with the exception of some submarine-launched ballistic missiles earmarked for use against strategic land targets. Other sub- marine-launched ballistic missiles--those with lower yields--were to be used as tactical weapons against targets in the European theater--enemy troop concen- trations, ports, naval bases, airfields, shore-based antisubmarine detection systems, and navigation and communications stations supporting missile submarines. The changing concepts brought renewed interest in the interdiction of NATO sea lines of communications. Zakharov noted in his 1969 article that interdiction could become important in the closing stages of a NATO - Warsaw Pact war, to prevent seaborne reinforce- - 7 - TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 TOP CRET Recent Additions to the Soviet Navy 10.142 BEAR AntIsubm' AinEAR _ KARA Class GuitltdMisst, Cruistr - AtIvl BORIS CHILIKIA ReAllAIsImeAt ORAf KRIVAK CI113 flestroyr. ? 8 ? uPSECPRT Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 TOP EGRET ment of NATO's ground forces. A 1974 article noted the importance to NATO of sea lines of communications for both military and economic support of Europe. Attacking NATO shipping still had a lower priority than antisubmarine or anticarrier warfare, however, and Soviet strategists still stressed a relatively short war--one that probably would be essentially over before NATO could mount a major reinforcement from the sea. Force Development The new Soviet naval systems which became opera- tional during the early seventies reflected the strategic concepts developed in the sixties. Newer classes of combatants were built with better living conditions and greater endurance than earlier classes, enabling the ships to stay at sea for longer periods of time. They were equipped with improved air defense systems to enhance combat effectiveness in areas beyond the cover of land-based aviation. Naval logistic support also received increased attention; two new auxiliary ship classes were introduced, though only a few of these ships were built, suggesting that Soviet planners saw little urgency in providing logis- tic support for extended combat operations. A new long-range antisubmarine aircraft--the TU-142, a modi- fication of the TU-95 Bear heavy bomber--was developed and deployed in small numbers in recognition of the need to conduct antisubmarine operations in the open ocean. Naval Strategy for War in Europe: Current Soviet Concepts Overall Scenario Classified Soviet documents reflect a flexible scenario for a NATO - Warsaw Pact war. Zakharov's - 9 - Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 --17013--3EQ-REI 1969 article described five possible stages in such a war: IOW* A period of warning, with rising tensions and deteriorating political relations, during which both sides would make preparations for conflict. A phase of conventional o?erations. The pri- mary focus of Pact operations in this phase is on breaking through NATO's forward defenses and disrupting its theater nuclear strike capability, including that of naval forces. .A possible period of limited nuclear opera- tions. The scale of nuclear activity in this phase is not well defined. Limited use of nuclear weapons in Europe may have been evaluated 4 but there is no evidence that limited nuclear operations at sea have been dealt with in exercises. Some Soviet naval strategists have contended that limited nuclear opera- tions in Europe would signal widespread nu- clear waxfare at sea. Theater-wide nuclear war, regarded as a period of "decisive nuclear action." During this phase, massive nuclear strikes would be conducted. The scenario most often discussed and practiced involves a preemptive nuclear strike delivered on receiving warning of an imminent large-scale NATO nuclear attack. This phase may coincide with the start of intercon- tinental nuclear warfare but the Soviets may no longer see a necessary connection between the two as they did in the early sixties. A concluding phase during which Pact forces would consolidate their territorial gains, eliminate pockets of enemy resistance, and assess requirements for further operations. Soviet writers point out that this progression is not inevitable and that a war in Europe could begin - 10 - -"TOP-SECILEI Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 1---TYP-SEGREZ not only with conventional operations but also with limited nuclear warfare or a large-scale nuclear exchange. They nonetheless continue to stress the likelihood of escalation to widespread nuclear war. Naval Operations in a Theater War With NATO Over the last decade, the Soviet Navy has prac- ticed all of the combat tasks ap- plicaLe to a NATO - warsaw Pact theater war, but it has rehearsed them in fragments--never integrated into a complete war scenario. Classified writings, and especially classified lectures on strategy for war in Europe given to Warsaw Pact officers in the late sixties, provide a framework to Soviet war plans. According to these sources, naval actions in a NATO - Warsaw Pact war would follow the basic scenario for war in Europe and the escalation of the naval conflict would be keyed to the course of operations on the continent. The documentary evidence indicate that the Soviets expect naval actions to untold as out- lined below. Warning Period. During the period of warning, the Soviets would increase the readiness of Pact naval forces and' deploy naval units to combat sta- tions both near Soviet shores and in the open ocean to begin surveillance operations, concentrating on enemy aircraft carriers and ballistic missile sub- marines. The forces normally deployed during peace- time would be sufficient to carry out surveillance in Warsaw Pact home waters and in the Black and Baltic Seas. The Soviet naval squadron in the Med- iterranean has sufficient strength to conduct routine surveillance of NATO surface ships, but its-antisub- marine forces would require reinforcement even for limited operations. Augmentation of the Mediterranean squadron to full wartime levels probably would re- quire about two weeks. Naval forces deployed routinely in the Atlantic and Pacific are only a fraction of ,, estimated wartime requirements; reinforcement in these areas probably would require a week to ten days. ---TOP--sEcaEz Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 X , -TOP -- CRET Conventional Phase. The Soviets think it likely that a NATO - Warsaw Pact war would soon become nuclear and therefore plan conventional operations to weaken the enemy's nuclear capability. Pact naval forces (in- cluding naval air elements), assisted by some bombers of Long Range Aviation, probably would attempt to de- stroy enemy naval units at sea and at their bases in Europe early in the conventional phase, again concen- trating on aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines.* these attacks would be coor inate with the "Air Operation" conducted by Pact tactical air forces and elements of Long Range Aviation against NATO's European-based nuclear delivery systems According to Warsaw Pact strategy lectures, amphibious assaults would begin in the opening days of the con- flict and efforts would be made to control the Baltic and Black Seas. NATO ASW forces would be attacked in an effort to facilitate Soviet submarine deployment. Limited Nuclear Operations. There is no direct evidence in writings to indicate that the Soviet Navy plans to conduct limited nuclear operations at sea, even though its forces have the capability to do so. According to one Soviet classi- fied article, limited nuclear operations on the European continent might trigger widespread nuclear warfare at * It is possible, if the Soviets saw the opportunity to contain the conflict at a conventional level and given the very low probability that they could actually destroy an enemy ballistic missile submarine, that the Soviet leadership would refrain from attacking SSBNs in order to reduce the chances of escalation. A policy of prohibiting attacks on SSBNs would pose problems for the Soviet Navy since its forces would be unable to dis- tinguish enemy ballistic missile submarines in the open ocean from attack submarines which would pose a threat to Soviet sub- marines and surface ships. - 12 - TOSERJET Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 '17317-5-1EGR-El. sea, but other articles do not reflect such a concept. Nor does Soviet doctrine appear to sanction nuclear warfare at sea while the war in Europe remains conventional. If the Soviets were to employ nuclear weapons at sea during a limited nuclear phase, they probably would allocate some Long Range Aviation heavy bombers to augment naval anticarrier attacks using nuclpar mi1a There has been limited discus- sion in Soviet military writings of the use of land- based ballistic missiles a ainst naval shi s It is possible --but unlikely--that some ballistic missile submarines would make selective nuclear strikes against theater land targets. Theater-Wide Nuclear War. With a transition to theater-wide nuclear war, Soviet naval forces would begin an almost unlimited use of tactical nuclear weapons, if they had not done so earlier. Some older G and H class ballistic missile submarines probably would deliver nuclear strikes against European tar- gets. Pact lecture notes indicate that their targets would be naval facilities, troop concentrations, and airfields. Strategic missiles carried by Y and D class submarines probably would be withheld as a strategic deterrent as long as the conflict remained confined to Europe and the surrounding seas and oceans. Concluding Phase. Elements of the Soviet sub- marine force probably would attempt to interdict NATO seaborne reinforcements during the concluding phase of a NATO - Warsaw Pact theater war. As this phase progressed--assuming an outcome favorable to the Pact--naval forces would assist the ground forces in establishing control over occupied territory and would eliminate resistance by enemy naval units. Theaters of Operations A classified article written in 1970 by the Soviet Navy commander in chief, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, in- - 13 - TOPFSCRET reinforced by the requirement--probably recognized by Soviet planners--to replace many of the ships, sub- marines, and aircraft which were procured in the fifties and which still comprise a major portion of the Soviet naval force. The difficulties of the ASW mission probably will require increased production of nuclear-powered attack submarines. If the Vladivostok strategic arms limitation accord is implemented successfully, some reductions in the size and possibly changes in the mix of Soviet strategic forces would be required. It is not clear how this would affect the submarine force, but one Soviet option would be to maintain a ballistic missile submarine force at or below the level of 62 units permitted under the Interim Agree-? ment and shift more shipyard resources to attack sub- marine programs. Faced with a renewed interest in sea lane inter- diction, the Soviets might also step up production of diesel-powered submarines. These submarines would be effective against lightly defended Western convoys and would be much less expensive than nuclear-powered submarines. Conventional war requirements probably will result in increased interest in flexible, high- endurance surface ships, such as the Kara class cruiser and the Kiev class ASW aircraft carrier now under construction; in logistic support ships, such as the Boris Chilikin class replenishment oiler; and in access to overseas base facilities. Greater flexibility, in land-based naval air power probably will be sought with the deployment of the Backfire bomber to Soviet naval air units. The Backfire will improve the Navy's capability to strike naval targets at great distances from land and to penetrate NATO defenses in attacking both sea targets and naval-related land targets. More atten- tion probably also will be given to the development and production of long-range antisubmarine aircraft --far more than the dozen or so currently in the inventory. - 40 - 1.---7315"-SSCRZL Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 TOP CRET Summary During the early sixties, Soviet naval strategy for a possible war.against NATO was predicated on the likelihood that the war would be a short, decisive nuclear conflict. By the mid-sixties this view had changed and the Soviet Navy was planning and develop- ing forces for both conventional and nuclear war. In the late sixties and early seventies selective use of tactical nuclear weapons in naval warfare probably was considered by Soviet strategists. The Soviets continued to believe, however, that a war with NATO would be brief, with the main campaign not exceeding several weeks, and that there was a high probability of escalation to theater-wide nuclear war. In the current Soviet view, Warsaw Pact naval operations against NATO would be keyed to hostili- ties in Europe and their duration would depend on the course of the ground war. Naval operations could develop in several stages: -- A period of rising tensions and deteriorating political relations, during which naval forces would deploy to combat stations and begin surveillance operations. -- A possible period of conventional hostilities in which the Warsaw Pact navies would attempt to es- tablish control over the Baltic and Black Seas, con- duct amphibious landings in the Turkish and Danish Straits and possibly northern Norway, and attempt to destroy NATO naval forces--especially nuclear delivery systems such as aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines--using conventional weapons.* -- Possibly a period of widespread nuclear oper- ations at sea, triggered by limited nuclear operations * Conventional attacks on aircraft carriers and missile subma- rines are justified in Soviet doctrine as necessary to improve the Pact's position for the probable nuclear phase. It is possible that, if the Soviet leaders thought they could successfully con- tain the conflict at the conventional level, they would refrain from attacking enemy ballistic missile submarines in order to reduce the chances of escalation. - 41 - Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 in Europe. Current Soviet doctrine does not appear to support a nuclear war at sea while the war in Europe remains conventional. -- Theater-wide nuclear war, including unlimited use of nuclear weapons at sea and probably strikes against NATO targets in Europe by older Soviet bal- listic missile submarines. -- A final phase of theater war during which the Warsaw Pact navies would assist the ground forces in establishing control over occupied territory and at- tempt to interdict NATO reinforcement of Europe by sea. To carry out these tasks, the Warsaw Pact navies would be organized into regional commands called "theaters of military operations." The tasks of de- stroying NATO's nuclear-capable naval forces and pre- venting seaborne reinforcement of Europe would fall primarily on forces in the ocean theaters--the Atlantic, the Pacific, and probably the Mediterranean. Naval forces assigned to the three continental theaters of military operations in Europe--the northern Euro- pean, central European, and southern European--would have the tasks of controlling closed seas, conducting amphibious assaults, and supporting Warsaw Pact ground forces. Pact naval forces probably would require from one to two weeks to bring naval forces in all theaters up to wartime strength, although limited combat operations in some areas probably could begin almost immediately. Because of the great variety of wartime naval tasks, the geographic separation of the Warsaw Pact fleets, and the growing requirement to prepare for both conventional and nuclear war, Soviet planners have had to establish priorities in allocating forces to wartime missions. They probably are confident that current coastal defense and anticarrier forces-- either conventional or nuclear--can prevent a NATO seaborne invasion of Pact territory and signifi- cantly limit damage from carrier-based air strikes. They almost certainly consider their antisubmarine force level inadequate, however, and believe that - 42 - TOP ECRET Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947 their antisubmarine warfare requirements limit se- verely their ability to assign forces to lower priority missions such as interdiction of NATO's sea communications. The next five years probably will see a continua- tion of recent trends in Soviet naval strategy. Em- phasis on open-ocean antisubmarine warfare probably will increase, but there is no evidence that the Soviets will be able to solve the critical open-ocean submarine detection and identification problems in the next decade Ballistic missile submarines may gain a greater role in theater nuclear war, and Soviet strategists might consider the possibility of a nu- clear war at sea while hostilities in Europe remain conventional. The Soviets probably will attempt to increase the Navy's firepower, endurance, and sur- vivability in conventional war. These considerations, as well as the need to modernize their force, prob- ably will stimulate increased production of attack submarines, high-endurance surface ships, logistic support ships, and strike and antisubmarine aircraft. They probably also will induce the USSR to attempt to acquire greater access for its naval forces to overseas ports and airfields. - 43 - TOP CRET Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05584947