COMBATANT FORCES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: BOSNIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005621706
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Case Number: F-2010-00294
• Publication Date: July 1, 1993

Director of
Central
Intelligence
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
National Intelligence Estimate
Combatant Forces in the
Former Yugoslavia
APPROVED FOR RELEASES
DATE: 01-31-2011
Volume II-Supporting Analysis
3-4
D! 7
This National Intelligence Estimate represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
NIE 93-23/II
July 1993
Copy 3 4 2
 Director of
Central
Intelligence
NIE 93-23/11
Combatant Forces in the
Former Yugoslavia
Volume II-Supporting Analysis
 Figure 1
Military Terrain of Former Yugoslavia
province
Lake
Prespa
Feet
16,000
Dubrovnik
Plains
0 to 500 feet above valley bottoms;
less than 10% slope
Hills
500 to 2,000 feet above adjacent
valley bottoms; 10% to 30% slope
Mountains
Crests greater than 2,000 feet above
adjacent valley bottoms; greater than
30% slope
150 200 250 300
Approximate vertical exaggeration 30:1
Vojvodina,
(autonomous
province)
bertha and Montenegro haw asserted
hie foe adpn of a joint irndependent p
state, out INS eanty has not been
formaly resognioed as a state by the
United states.
Macedonia has pmdaimad erdepandent
statehood, N,t has not been formally
recognized as a state by the
United states.
Kosovo
(aitor?otnous
0
Kilometers B
Source: DMA ONC
Rom ni
OPJE'
 Key Judgments
Motivated by irreconcilable territorial goals and ethnic rivalries, the
belligerents in the former Yugoslavia are capable of continuing the
fighting for at least another year.
The offensive capabilities of the Yugoslav 'Armed Forces are superior
to those of its neighbors:
? The capabilities of Yugoslav armored and mechanized forces surpass
those of neighboring republics; Belgrade would enjoy air supremacy
in renewed fighting.
? Except against Macedonia, limited logistic capabilities would con-
strain Yugoslav ground force operations beyond border area
Despite substantial improvements, Croatian Ground Forces lack heavy
weapons and suffer from training and leadership weaknesses; Croatia
has virtually no air force:
? The Croatian Armed Forces can retake portions of Serb-held terri-
tory but cannot completely defeat Serb forces.
? Croatian forces would have difficulty resisting Yugoslav airstrikes or
federal attempts to seize additional territory.
The Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) can hold virtually all its gains in Bosnia
against local forces. It can take all remaining Muslim-held areas, but
only at significant military and political costs it prefers not to incur.
Croatian Defense Forces (HVO) can, with the help of the Croatian
army, hold current gains and take additional territory from the
Bosnian Government
The Bosnian Army can neither hold its territory against determined
offensives nor permanently retake lost ground; without substantial
external support, it will slowly deteriorate.
' "Yugoslavia" and "Yugoslav" refer to the rump federal state comprising Serbia and Montenegro.
iii Sew
NIE 93-23/II
July 1993
 Western Intervention
Western intervention to enforce an agreed peace plan, to create and
protect safehavens, or to enforce a partition of Bosnia could require
military action to roll back territorial gains and/or disarm combatant
forces. These roles would require a large-scale deployment of ground
forces.F__1
The BSA would resist a Western intervention to roll back Serb
territorial gains or disarm the BSA but would quickly disintegrate;
some of its forces would begin sustained guerrilla action against
Western forces:
? The BSA would harass but tolerate an intervention that left its forces
in place. F__]
The Bosnian Army views Western intervention as its best hope for
survival; under some circumstances local Bosnian forces could clash
with Western forces, but they would be quickly overwhelmed.F_
Croatian and HVO forces would avoid confronting Western forces, but
local clashes could occur as they exploited outside intervention for local
advantage. F_
In the event of Western military intervention in Bosnia, Belgrade
would engage Western forces directly only if they attacked Yugoslav
territory or forces.F-
 Contents
Page
Key Judgments
iii
Supporting Analysis
1
Introduction
1
The Yugoslav Armed Forces: Adapting to New Realities
1
The Yugoslav Ground Forces
2
The Yugoslav Navy
7
The Yugoslav Air and Air Defense Forces
8
Yugoslav Combat Capabilities
9
The Croatian Armed Forces: Building on Modest Foundations
14
The Croatian Ground Forces
14
The Croatian Navy and Air and Air Defense Forces
17
Croatian Combat Capabilities
18
Krajina Serb Forces
19
Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina
21
The Bosnian Serb Army: Dominating the War
21
Bosnian Serb Combat Capabilities
24
The Bosnian Army: Outgunned But Hanging On
25
Bosnian Army Combat Capabilities
27
Croatian Defense Forces
28
Annex A: Force Structure of the Yugoslav Ground Forces
33
Annex B: Force Structure of the Yugoslav Navy
37
Annex C: Force Structure of the Yugoslav Air and Air Defense Forces
39
Annex D: Force Structure of the Croatian Ground Forces, Navy, and
Air and Air Defense Forces
41
Annex E: Force Structure of the Bosnian Serb Army
43
Annex F: Force Structure of the Bosnian Army
45
Annex G: Force Structure of the Croatian Defense Forces
47
Annex H: Chemical Warfare Capabilities
49
Annex I: Terrorism-A Nonconventional Response to Intervention?
51
 Annex J: Paramilitary Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia
53
Annex K: Impact of Terrain and Weather on Military Operations
55
Annex L: Transportation, Energy, and Communications
Infrastructure
57
 Supporting Analysis
Motivated by irreconcilable territorial goals
and ethnic rivalries, the belligerents in the
former Yugoslavia can continue fighting for
at least a year. The capabilities of their
forces, however, vary greatly. Even within
individual armies some units may consist of
well-trained, professional soldiers, while oth-
ers are poorly trained militias that depend on
reservists and irregulars. Moreover, neither
the warring republics nor factional leaders
within Bosnia have firm political or opera-
tional control over these armed groups.
The Yugoslav Armed Forces: Adapting
to New Realities
The Yugoslav military's capabilities are
superior to those of the armed forces of any
other former Yugoslav republic, as well as its
neighbors, in large part because the federal
military has more. men and equipment and
the only effective air force. Dissatisfied with
the military's inept performance in 1991-92,
senior Yugoslav officers have undertaken
reforms intended to improve combat effec-
tiveness. Ethnic splits and the poor perfor-
mance of reservists demonstrated that reli-
ance on citizen-soldiers was impractical and
that Belgrade needed to expand the capabili-
ties of its standing army. Territorial losses
and economic constraints made cuts in the
military imperative. The reforms have
included:
? Modifying doctrine. The General Staff no
longer looks to the populace as a whole to
conduct a long-term partisan war. It has
given the army responsibility for conduct-
ing long-term light infantry and unconven-
tional operations against an invading force
and has bolstered the ability of the Ground
Forces to fulfill these roles.
? Restructuring forces. Reflecting the loss of
60 percent of Yugoslavia's territory and
population, the three services are reorga-
nizing. Chains of command in each service
have been altered. The army has cut man-
power and completed the transition to a
combined-arms structure to cut costs and
boost the ground forces' effectiveness. The
ground and air forces have more evenly
distributed their most capable weapons.
Efforts are also under way to establish air
defenses and devise an appropriate role for
a smaller navy with a much smaller coast-
line to protect.
? Military professionalization. The armed
forces seek to retain experienced troops
and increase training to maximize the
capability of existing military assets.
Senior officers publicly state that a trained
force composed of 50 percent regular
troops will have the discipline, mobility,
and proficiency required to inflict unac-
ceptable losses on an invader. F__-]
These efforts have had mixed results. In our
judgment the Ground Forces represent a
more cohesive and unified Serb force whose
units are better organized and equipped than
in 1991. The Air and Air Defense Forces
have reorganized and redistributed their
most capable equipment, but their operations
 Following the 1968 Warsaw Pact inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia, Belgrade for-
mulated an "All Peoples Defense" doc-
trine rooted in Tito's partisan war
against the Germans and Italians dur-
ing World War II. Federal armored
forces would blunt any invasion by a
superior military force and buy time for
lightly armed Territorial Defense
Forces under republic control to mobi-
lize to conduct small-unit operations in
Yugoslavia's rugged interior. Key parts
of the doctrine included universal mili-
tary training, mass mobilization, and
widely distributed weapons stocks.
When civil war erupted in June 1991,
the infrastructure for republic armies
was already in place.
The wartime experiences of 1991 and
1992 led the Yugoslav General Staff to
modify its territorial defense concept.
The constitution prohibits surrender;
Yugoslavia's deterrent rests on the
threat of protracted war. The military,
however, has taken responsibility for
long-term command and almost cer-
tainly looks to mobilized light motor-
ized and infantry brigades to fight the
war. The armed services believe that
unifying command under the General
Staff and employing regulars instead of
partisans will better enable Yugoslavia
to resist an invasion. The push for
military professionalization, the relega-
tion of reserve units to a rear-area
security role, and efforts to sharpen
combat effectiveness all aim at improv-
ing the military's capability of fulfilling
its expanded role.n
would still be hampered by inadequate num-
bers of trained and specialized personnel.
Belgrade's Air Force is superior to that of
any of the other republics but could not hold
out against a Western air offensive. The
Navy, although deprived of most of its facili-
ties and half of its personnel, has resumed
training and increased its readiness, but its
offensive capabilities remain limited
The Yugoslav Ground Forces
Manpower. The Ground Forces have shrunk
from approximately 140,000 men to 100,000.
According to an untested source, the Ground
Forces currently suffer from a shortage of
technical specialists-up to 50 percent of
some skill categories, such as radar techni-
cians. Politically motivated policies have
deprived the Ground Forces of needed pro-
fessional officers. In late-January 1993, all
ethnic Serb officers of the rank of major or
below born in Bosnia and Herzegovina or the
Krajina were ordered to report to the ethnic
Serb forces in their home regions. Further-
more, in early March non-Serb officers were
ordered to leave the army by 1 April; this
order reportedly was rescinded, but many
officers had already left the army. Reducing
the size of the Ground Forces somewhat
reduces the impact of these cuts, but their
arbitrary nature has caused shortages in
technical skills and small-unit leadership
that will persist for several years.
Equipment. The Yugoslav Ground Forces
are not equipped to conduct sustained, effec-
tive, mobile warfare by heavy forces against
a force with modern equipment. Although
satellite photography shows the Ground
Forces have more items of major equipment
 Yugoslav Armed Forces Command and
Control
Belgrade overhauled the command struc-
tures of all three armed services in 1992
to strengthen political control and
professionalism:
? About 70 senior Ground Forces officers
were dismissed, and the General Staff's
role in formulating national security
policy was sharply limited; most officers
welcomed the end of the overt politiciza-
tion of the Ground Forces. Operational
command extends from the General
Staff through the three armies, to the
various corps, to maneuver units.
? Belgrade streamlined the Navy's com-
mand structure. Ten of 13 admirals
were dismissed in mid-1992, reducing
the span of control and eliminating
superfluous posts. The chain of com-
mand now runs from the Navy com-
mander to subordinate sector and fleet
commanders. Three tactical groups have
been created to operate in the area from
Kotor Bay to the Strait of Otranto,
than they can use, the bulk of these weap-
ons-T-54/55 tanks, M-60 armored person-
nel carriers, and most of the artillery-
embody technology from the 1950s and
1960s. The Yugoslavs are retiring many of
their oldest systems, such as World
War II-era T-34 tanks and A-19 artillery,
although some of this equipment would be
put back in service in an emergency. Bel-
grade's forces can field limited numbers of
T-72 and M-84 tanks, M-80 and BOV
armored vehicles, as well as modern multiple
rocket launchers and artillery pieces, but
and tactical commanders have substan-
tial authority to conduct small-scale
operations.
? Belgrade trimmed senior officer ranks
and shortened command lines in the Air
and Air Defense Forces. The General
Staff controls both forces through a
headquarters in Belgrade that com-
mands air force, air defense, and logistic
support corps. Reduced air defense ca-
pabilities have probably led Belgrade to
accord local commanders substantial
freedom of action.)
Belgrade appears to use the former
Yugoslavia's nationwide command and
control system for communicating with
Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Croatia. Belgrade has invested
heavily in redundant, secure communica-
tions, a capability that only a sustained
Western attack could degrade.F I
they lack such complementary systems as
modern antitank missiles, targeting radars,
and fire-control systems necessary for effec-
tively coping with attacks by Western forces.
Training. Training is mediocre by Western
standards. Attache reporting indicates that
some units, either elites or those with consci-
entious commanders, are well trained. Until
late 199.2, however, field exercises lacked
realism and equipment inspections were su-
perficial. Since then the army reportedly has
 Figure 2
Yugoslav Armed Forces Headquarters, Corps, and
Areas of Responsibility in Serbia and Montenegro
Hungar
Croatia
Irterzegovma::
Vojvodina
(autonomous
province)
i.Novi Sad
1st Army
;- . Air and Air
Defense Forces
headquarters
(2(
BELGRADE'---'-
1t . Uzice
Serbia
2nd Army
Montenegro
Boka
Croa cotorskzPODCORICA
iva~ }
Previaka/ Peninsula Peninsula headquarters:"
Lake-
~~ ` Scutan
Adriatic Rar! -Shkoder,
Albania'
Macedonia
Bulgaria
SOFIA"
r? Kragu)
3rd Army
I16. Nis
Li. Army headquarters
ii Corps headquarters
- Army boundary
R o'm'a n i .a'
A.Leskovac
Kosovo ' ,- -
Pristina
(autonomous
province)
?Prizren
 Table 1
Estimated Yugoslav Ground Forces
Manpower and Major Equipment
Holdings a
1991
1993
Percent
Change
Total manpower
140,000
100,000
-29
Tanks (M-84, T-72,
2,000
1,300-
-10 to
T-54/55, T-34)
1,800
-35
Armored vehicles
1,400
700-
-29 to
(BRDM, BTR 50/60,
1,000
-50
M-60, M-80, M-980,
TAB-72)
Artillery (155-mm gun
3,600
1,200-
-44 to
M-2, M-64; 152-mm gun
2,000
-67
D-20, M-84, ML-20,
M-1943; 130-mm field
gun M-46; 128-mm multi-
ple rocket launcher; 122-
mm howitzer D-30,
M-1938, A-19, 2S1; 105-mm
howitzer M-1, M-56)
a Because of additional work by the Interagency Order-of-
Battle Working Group since the publication of Volume I,
some figures in the tables in Volume II may differ margin-
ally from those given in Volume I.
This table is-sl
been making a concerted effort to improve
training standards and the realism of its field
exercises. Recent imagery shows an increase
in exercise frequency. For the most part, the
Yugoslavs have not emphasized high stan-
dards or uniformity of training for enlisted
personnel, and it will take another six
months to a year for the army to complete its
retraining program. Moreover, because the
Yugoslav Ground Forces are not known to
exercise above the battalion level or to con-
duct more than minimal combined-arms
training, their ability to carry out complex or
large-unit tactical maneuvers would be very
limited.
Logistics. Yugoslav Ground Forces logistics
are fairly well organized, but they have
suffered from the country's breakup. Army
corps operate as a logistic base, and units
down to the company level acquire, store,
and distribute supplies; a network of depots
provides maintenance services. Ammuni-
tion-stored in numerous facilities above and
below ground-appears to be in ample sup-
ply, but many factories that supplied parts
and services are no longer under Belgrade's
control. Yugoslavia's prewar position as a
major arms producer, its continuing oil
imports, reporting on munitions retrieved
from the republics in 1991, and the Ground
Forces' currently low operational require-
ments suggest that it has adequate stockpiles
of weapons, munitions, and fuel for several
months of combat.
Ground Forces' logistics are not designed to
support highly mobile operations. Recent
logistic experience-in Slavonia in 1991 and
in Bosnia in 1992-has been in support of
slow-moving infantry campaigns or static
sieges. These campaigns have been fought
along major highway networks. Fragmentary
reports from operations in 1991 and 1992
indicate that frontline units track their sup-
ply levels, order replenishments, and arrange
deliveries. While the Yugoslav Ground
Forces have sufficient transportation assets
to support its internal security mission, large-
scale, mobile operations would require the
requisition of civilian vehicles. Because the
army has not practiced large-scale, mobile
operations, the General Staff probably has
little idea of the fuel, ammunition, and spare
parts requirements or the difficulty of keep-
ing up with rapidly moving forces.
Morale. Yugoslav Ground Forces morale
currently is poor. Some unit desertion rates
reportedly reached 40 percent during the
1991 war. Officer morale is fragile. While
most junior and midlevel officers appear
 Yugoslav Defense Industries
Yugoslavia's breakup splintered the
defense industry, which had deliberately
been scattered among the different repub-
lics of the former Yugoslavia. Component
supply networks have been thoroughly
disrupted by the war. Production has been
sharply curtailed, particularly for large
systems such as tanks, armored personnel
carriers (APCs), and aircraft. Ammuni-
tion and small-arms plants continue to
operate, but resumption of large-scale
manufacture of arms and munitions
remains unlikely until hostilities end.
Approximately half of prewar defense pro-
duction, including combat aircraft, light
armored vehicles, and heavy artillery was
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serb efforts to
transfer key assets from Bosnia to Serbia
achieved limited success. Most remaining
facilities are in areas now controlled by
Croatian Defense Forces or Bosnian Army
troops. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croats
confident and anxious to demonstrate
professional competence, the reduction of
army strength, uncertain career prospects,
and, for those evacuated from Slovenia,
Croatia, and Bosnia, the loss of homes have
damaged morale. Staff officers assigned to
Belgrade reportedly try to avoid field
assignments to protect personal privileges;
others allegedly supplement their incomes
through bribes and kickbacks. To some
degree, these problems have been countered
by creation of a totally Serb army.
and government forces have produced
limited quantities of small arms and
ammunition, but supply problems have
severely limited the scope of
manufacturing activity.
Defense production elsewhere in the
former Yugoslavia has plummeted.
Slovenian manufacture of APCs, tank
parts, and electronics has been
undermined by the conversion of trade to
a hard currency basis and the collapse of
Yugoslav tank production. Croatia
modified some civilian production sites
to turn out infantry weapons and
rudimentary APCs, but Zagreb remains
almost totally dependent on imported
arms. Military production in Serbia
and Montenegro, chiefly small-caliber
weapons, ammunition, and some
components for larger systems, continues
although supply problems limit output.
In the event of Western intervention, these
problems would also be countered by the
unifying effects of a foreign attack and the
need to defend the homeland. Press reports
indicate the army is trying to improve morale
by stressing Serb military tradition,
patriotism, and threats to Serbia; by
improving living conditions; and by
improving military capabilities. However,
these efforts are likely to have only limited
short-term impact, and, barring outside
attack, morale will improve significantly
Secr 6
 only after cuts in the Ground Forces' size are
completed and senior officers adhere to high
standards of professionalism.
Leadership. Although the Yugoslav federal
constitution asserts civilian control of the
military, the armed forces remain an inde-
pendent center of power. Currently, the
senior leaders of the Yugoslav Armed Forces
are loyal and generally capable. Strongly
nationalistic and loyal to Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic's government, Chief of
Staff Zivota Panic is a career soldier who has
reportedly worked to increase the army's
professionalism and avoid involvement in
politics. Training for junior and midlevel
officers is probably still mediocre, however,
and local commanders almost certainly await
instructions rather than take the initiative.
The near-complete Serbianization of the
army, the dismissal of about 70 senior offi-
cers in May 1992, and the continuing retire-
ment of over-age officers and NCOs in favor
of younger, nationalistic Serbs have further
solidified the army leadership's loyalty to the
regime and made the army more cohesive.
The Yugoslav Navy
Manpower and Equipment. Despite signifi-
cant personnel and logistic problems, the
Yugoslav Navy poses a moderate mine, anti-
ship missile, and submarine threat to surface
forces operating within 50 nautical miles of
the Montenegrin coast. Its overall warfare
capabilities-especially in antisubmarine
warfare-are limited. It cannot defend
Yugoslavia's coast against its most likely
(Western) opponent, and it is now highly
vulnerable to attack within its remaining
facilities.)
Table 2
Estimated Yugoslav Navy Manpower
and Major Equipment Holdings a
1991 1993 Percent
Change
Total manpower 16,000 7,500 -53
Frigates (equipped with 4 4 0
SS-N-2C Styx antiship
missiles, SA-N-4 SAMs,
76-mm guns)
Missile boats (five 15 13-14 -7 to
equipped with -13
SS-N-2C, remainder
with SS-N-2A/B, 57-
mm guns, SA-7 SAMs)
Torpedo boats (SA-7 14 10-11 -21 to
SAMs) - 28
a Because of additional work by the Interagency Order-of-
Battle Working Group since the publication of Volume I,
some figures in the tables in Volume II may differ margin-
" '
ally from those give
This table is Se
Navy personnel strength-at some 7,500
men-is about one-half its prewar total, and
conscripts now make up 75 percent of a force
that was more than 60 percent regular. Liai-
son services report critical personnel short-
ages, particularly of operators for sophisti-
cated electronic gear and weapons. Primary
navy assets include five coastal submarines
(with two to three operational), five minisub-
marines, 17 to 18 missile-capable ships or
craft (including four frigates), about a dozen
other patrol craft, coastal artillery, mobile
antiship cruise missiles, and a large naval
mine inventory.F_~
Yugoslavia has lost over 90 percent of its
coastline, including virtually all of its ship-
building facilities, and the Chief of the Navy
7 Secret
 has announced plans to scrap or sell much of
the fleet'. Senior officers plan to build new
coastal facilities and to modernize antiship
missiles. However, there is no evidence that
any of this is happening. No further ship
acquisition or construction is expected in the
near future, and the Yugoslav Navy proba-
bly will decline due to a lack of maintenance
capability.
Training and Logistics. Although inactive
for the first nine months of 1992, the Navy
has since resumed training and limited
patrols. The relocation of virtually the entire
fleet at two bases in Boka Kotorska (Bay of
Kotor)-neither of which has adequate sup-
port facilities-created serious logistic prob-
lems during 1992, leaving many combatants
nonoperational. In its recent exercises, the
Navy has been able to sortie most of its ships
simultaneously. Beginning in April 1993, the
Yugoslav Navy began short deployments of
small surface action groups to Bar port
facility, 30 nautical miles south of Kotor
Bay. These deployments reflect a decision to
disperse forces outside Kotor Bay-reducing
vulnerability to a surprise attack-while
building up Bar as a limited logistic base.
Morale and Leadership. The Navy was
hardest hit by the breakup of the country.
Croats dominated the naval officer corps,
and most deserted at the outset of the war.
Deprived of its senior leaders, the Navy
almost certainly suffers from shortages of
experienced junior officers and NCOs. A
much reduced role for the Navy and limited
promotion prospects have further under-
mined morale.)
The Yugoslav Air and Air Defense Forces
Equipment and Logistics. Almost all of the
former Yugoslav Air and Air Defense Forces
Table 3
Estimated Yugoslav Air and Air Defense Forces
Manpower and Major Equipment Holdings
1991
1993
Percent
Change
Total manpower
34,000
20,000
-41
Fixed-wing aircraft
MiG-29 A, B
12
12
0
MiG-21 A, B,
D, F, J, L, N
153
111
-27
Galeb-Jastreb
168
167
1
Orao
105
45
-57
Super Galeb
55
53
-4
Helicopters
Mi-8 Hip C
75
55-61
-18 to
-27
Surface-to-air missile
launchers a
SA-2
30
SA-3
68
SA-6
120
a Figures for surface-to-air missile launchers for 1991 are
not available. Another 84 SA-9 launchers and four SA-13
launchers are under the control of the Yugoslav Ground
Forces, ag well as an undetermined number of shoulder-
fired SAMs-including SA-7s, SA-14s, and possibly
SA-16s.
This table is Se
equipment is under the control of Belgrade.
This includes 12 MiG-29 Fulcrums and 500
other fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft (of
which some 100 are in storage). The country
can tap into large stores of fuel, supplies, and
spare parts. F-7
Ground-based air defense assets consist of
SA-2 and SA-3 strategic and SA-6 tactical
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and a wide
variety of antiaircraft artillery (AAA) sys-
tems. Yugoslov Ground Forces control SA-9
and SA-13 tactical SAMs, as well as SA-7,
SA-14, and probably SA-16 man-portable
SAMs. The former Yugoslavia produced the
 SA-7, was self-sufficient in ammunition pro-
duction, and produced several types of AAA
pieces. Yugoslavia is likely to have stockpiles
of spares and supplies for this equipment.
Although spare parts for Soviet-built SAM
equipment had to be imported, Yugoslavia
probably has a stockpile of SAM equipment
sufficient to maintain its current inventory
for the foreseeable future.
Manpower and Training. The Yugoslav Air
and Air Defense Forces are recovering from
severe manpower shortages resulting from
the breakup of the country. Training is at a
normal pace, although at a more basic level,
reflecting the need to train new personnel.
Emphasis on NCO and training schools,
coupled with special pay and allowance, has
increased the number of qualified personnel
in the Air Force. The Yugoslav Air Force
Academy, basic and advanced flight train-
ing, and professional military education
schools are now relocated and graduating
new classes. Pilot training is up from fewer
than 60 hours a year to over 100 hours, and
simulator time is now available for up to 120
hours a year. Yugoslav pilots are generally
capable and well versed in the simple tactical
employment of their weapon systems. How-
ever, they do not fly complex maneuvers, use
multiship formations, or employ advanced
combat tactics.
Ground-based air defense training has been
limited primarily to SA-6 units, which gener-
ally train on a bimonthly basis. The SA-2s
and SA-3s in the Belgrade area and in
central Serbia have been active only sporadi-
cally.
Leadership and Morale. The Yugoslav Air
Force is the most stridently nationalistic
service, and Belgrade purged few of its offi-
cers in 1992. Its leaders are capable profes-
sionals whose hardline views underlie the Air
Force's increasingly independent stance in
internal political affairs. Senior Air Force
officers apparently have widespread support
within their service, and their influence is
growing within the military as a whole,
according to several sources. Press reports
suggest that, while senior officers recognize
the vulnerabilities of the air force and realize
that Western air forces could quickly over-
whelm it, they are determined to resist any
attack on Yugoslavia as best they can.
Yugoslav Combat Capabilities
Threat Perceptions. Yugoslav military lead-
ers share the civilian leaders' view that their
nation is besieged by internal and external
foes bent on thwarting Serb aspirations for a
larger, unified Serb nation. They view the
current conflict as a struggle for ethnic
survival that Yugoslavia was forced to fight:
? Military leaders have publicly asserted
that the West is trying to dominate the
post-Cold War world. The United, States
and Germany, in their view, are using low-
intensity conflict, political destabilization,
support for secessionist movements in
Kosovo and the Sandzak, and the threat of
invasion to dismember and subdue the
Serb nation.
? Yugoslav military leaders realize that none
of the neighboring states poses a military
threat to Serbia and Montenegro, but they
see continuing threats to ethnic Serbs liv-
ing in the former Yugoslav republics and
expect renewed hostilities with Croatia.
 ? The leaders are also concerned about the
rise of radical political Islam, which they
believe could draw support from the
Islamic world. They see little direct mili-
tary threat from Turkey or other Muslim
countries, however.
The Yugoslav Armed Forces will respond
forcefully to attacks on key Serb-occupied
territory around Knin or in eastern Slavonia.
They prefer to provide aid to Bosnian
Serb forces, however, rather than intervene
directly in Bosnia
The military regards Albanian nationalism
and Muslim unrest as the principal domestic
threats. Approximately 12,000 army troops
and 25,000 militiamen are deployed in
Kosovo to cow the ethnic Albanian majority.
Recently, officers have voiced concern over
Muslim unrest in the Sandzak and suggested
that foreigners may be encouraging armed
rebellion there. The army also fears that
domestic violence between extreme national-
ists and moderate Serbs could fracture the
armed forces. Chief of Staff Panic has stated
he will at all costs avoid conflict with nation-
alist paramilitary groups and Serb Interior
Ministry forces. F_-]
The Military's Self-Perception. Confident
of their capabilities against internal oppo-
nents or neighboring states, military leaders
know they could not defeat a concerted
Western attack. Although they believe that
the armed forces are improving, military
leaders understand the strengths, weakness-
es, and limitations of their services. High-
ranking officers have publicly commented on
the threat technologically sophisticated
weapons pose to Yugoslav forces. Further-
more, they have openly discussed shortages
of recruits and noted problems in morale,
training, and logistics. However, drawing on
Serb historical experience, senior officers
repeatedly have expressed confidence that
any foreign attack will stiffen military
morale and public resolve, enabling Yugosla-
via to outlast an opponent not prepared to
fight a prolonged war.F__-]
determined resistance.
Operational Capabilities. The army's intel-
ligence, air-ground coordination, transport,
and logistic capabilities are adequate against
current foes, as are its redundant, secure
communications. The Air and Air Defense
Forces would face no serious challenges from
Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, or Albania. The Yugoslav Navy
would play little or no role in operations
against these countries, although it could
support operations along the Croatian and
Albanian coast. Belgrade probably can con-
duct simultaneous offensive military opera-
tions in eastern Slavonia and limited action
in Kosovo or on the Prevlaka Peninsula.
Should the conflict spread or become more
difficult and complex, Yugoslav capabilities
would soon be stretched to their limits. Its
shortcomings would become more apparent
as the army operated farther from its bases,
over increasingly rugged terrain, and against
Direct Intervention in Neighboring States.
If they intervened in a neighboring state, the
Yugoslavs probably would perform best in
eastern Slavonia, near their home bases. The
region's relatively flat terrain and well-
developed road network would enable Bel-
grade to employ its armored and motorized
forces to their best advantage. The Novi Sad
Corps, which operated in Slavonia in the fall
of 1991, is headquartered less than 20 miles
 combat for about three months. However,
the pace of an advance could be slowed
dramatically by confusion and inadequate
logistics.)
from the Croatian border, and the Mecha-
nized Corps could travel from Belgrade
along modern highways. During the 1991
campaign, the Yugoslavs demonstrated the
capability to use the region's roads and rivers
to support approximately 30,000 troops in
could easily occupy the country
The Yugoslav Armed Forces would also be
able to intervene effectively in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and in Macedonia. The Yugo-
slavs could quickly move the Novi Sad or
Uzice corps into the northern and eastern
areas of Bosnia held by the Bosnian Serbs.
Superior training, equipment, and firepower
would give the Yugoslav forces an over-
whelming advantage against the Muslims.
As the army moved more deeply into Bosnia,
increasingly rugged terrain would confine its
heavy forces to the relatively few roads,
slowing resupply and making them more
vulnerable to Muslim and Croat guerrilla
attacks. Casualties from heavy fighting in
non-Serb areas, moreover, could undermine
popular support at home and affect army
morale. Macedonia lacks an effective army.
The Yugoslav army's Leskovac or Nis corps
The Yugoslav Armed Forces have only a
modest capability for direct intervention in
the Krajina region of Croatia. Belgrade has
contingency plans for moving its forces and
Bosnian Serb troops to the Knin area in case
of a major Croatian offensive, but plans for
the Bosnian Serbs to do most of the fighting.
Even this approach likely underestimates the
difficulties the Yugoslavs will encounter.
Deploying the Uzice, Mechanized, or Novi
Sad Corps to Knin would require moving
forces across more than 500 kilometers of
rugged terrain on a small number of roads
vulnerable to Muslim and Croat attacks.
Because deploying and supporting heavy
forces would be slow and difficult, Belgrade
4et
 may try to use paramilitary forces or air-
strikes, instead of conventional ground forces
against a Croatian offensive. The Yugoslav
army would be unlikely to undertake large-
scale ground operations in the Krajina unless
local Serb forces were on the verge of col-
lapse.)
Yugoslav forces could invade. Albania but
would have difficulty operating deep inside
the country because of rugged terrain on
both sides of the border. Moreover, Yugoslav
roads in the region are mostly secondary, and
only three cross the border from Montenegro
and Kosovo. The Yugoslavs could deploy the
Pristina or Podgorica Corps to the border
fairly rapidly, but the terrain and lack of
roads on the Albanian side would restrict
any invasion to infantry operations and puni-
tive airstrikes. Delivery of supplies would be
slow and probably inadequate to support
sustained combat or penetrations far beyond
the Shkoder-Prizen highway crossing north-
ern Albania.)
The Yugoslav military is much more capable
than the armed forces of Hungary, Romania,
or Bulgaria. Yugoslavia has the military
capability to disrupt commercial traffic on
the Danube River, deliver airstrikes on key
economic targets, and launch cross-border
attacks against its neighbors. Although
Belgrade is unlikely to attack any of these
neighbors, the threat of attack, particularly
from the air, has made them cautious in their
support of UN sanctions and other
initiatives.
Supporting Local Serb Forces. Yugoslavia is
capable of rapidly assisting local Serb forces
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Krajina:
in
March 1993 that about 200 men of the
elite 63rd Airborne Brigade, based at Nis,
as well as Yugoslav tank and infantry
reconnaissance platoons had been sent to
eastern Bosnia to aid the Serb offensive
around Muslim-held Srebrenica. Well-
disciplined and organized, these troops
played a significant role in Bosnian Serb
operations against Muslim forces.
? An array of sources report that Belgrade
has provided the Bosnian Serbs with fuel,
transportation, munitions, and other mili-
tary assistance since the spring of 1992.
The fuel has been especially important to
the Bosnian Serb war effort.
? In response to Croatia's late-January 1993
offensive near Zadar, Belgrade sent 500
Yugoslav army "specialists"-probably
special forces troops-to the Krajina.
Because of the small scale of operations,
relatively small numbers of men or quantities
of supply can tip the balance.
Responding to Western Intervention. Any
large-scale Western intervention in the for-
mer Yugoslavia would radically change
Belgrade's strategic situation. Its reaction,
however, would depend on the circumstances
surrounding the insertion of Western forces.
Should Western forces arrive in Bosnia and
Herzegovina with the consent of all parties to
enforce a peace agreement, for example,
Belgrade would take quiet steps to improve
the defensive position of its forces. We judge
Belgrade would step up recruitment and
training, disperse its forces and supplies-
including naval elements from Kotor Bay-
and occupy alternate command sites.
We judge Belgrade would not respond
directly to Western intervention to impose an
end to the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na. The Yugoslavs realize that sending their
 army into Bosnia and committing the air
force would quickly bring the war to Serbia.
Belgrade would instead seek to escalate the
costs of intervention to Western forces. Yu-
goslavia would covertly provide military sup-
plies to the Bosnian Serbs to support a
protracted guerrilla war but would adopt a
neutral position publicly. The Yugoslavs
would also provide safehavens in Serbia and
"volunteer" fighters as well as increase the
readiness of its forces. Belgrade would cali-
brate its assistance to maximize Western
losses while avoiding steps that could lead to
military action against Serbia.
Belgrade would resist any Western attempt
to intervene in Kosovo. The army's Pristina
Corps, with up to 12,000 men, is based in
Kosovo, and 30,000 men in three other
corps-the Podgorica, Nis, and Leskovac-
are in nearby Montenegro and southern
Serbia. army
units in Kosovo have supplies for 20 days of
combat. Serb civilians in Kosovo are also
well equipped with small arms. Ethnic Alba-
nians in Kosovo, although lacking arms,
would try to use any Western intervention to
achieve their independence. Infantry battles
in rough terrain would dominate a conflict in
Kosovo; guerrilla operations involving all
parties would continue after Yugoslav regu-
lar forces in Kosovo were defeated through
Western intervention.
Capability To Defend Serbia and
Montenegro. While initially capable of early
warning, Yugoslav air defenses would be
able to inflict only marginal losses on a
concerted Western air offensive and could
not stop the rapid destruction of fixed tar-
gets. The loss of skilled technicians has
greatly reduced the readiness and combat
sustainability of the air defenses. Belgrade's
radars and early warning systems would be
susceptible to Western electronic counter-
measures and standoff weapons; its Soviet
surface-to-air missile systems are vulnerable
to Western countermeasures, tactics, and
weapons. The rapid degradation or destruc-
tion of these systems would leave antiaircraft
artillery and shoulder-fired missiles as the
major threat to Western aircraft. Yugoslav
pilots would be unlikely to down more than a
few Western aircraft.)
If hostilities appeared imminent, the
Yugoslav Navy probably would mine the
Montenegrin coastline and defend these
minefields. Once hostilities commenced, the
vulnerability of the Yugoslav Navy's base
structure and its inability to defend the coast
suggest that surface and submarine force
might attack Western naval forces in the
Adriatic, although the probability of a suc-
cessful attack would be low. F - - - I
Likely Military Strategy. Yugoslav military
leaders neither expect nor desire a war with
the United States or a Western coalition but
are prepared to fight if they have to. While
many senior officers claim that the United
States is trying to encircle and subdue
Serbia, they are also convinced that it will
try to do so without resorting to force. Even
if the West uses force, they believe the
United States and its allies lack the political
will to undertake a protracted guerrilla war
and the long-term occupation of Yugoslavia.
Therefore, we judge that the leadership
believes war would come only after a
prolonged crisis and with ample warning.
Belgrade would use such a period to mobilize
and disperse its forces; hide key assets; shift
S\Cret
 units to deceive US intelligence and mini-
mize the damage from initial enemy air-
strikes; and prepare highways, railroads, and
bridges for demolition.
Yugoslav strategy has long assumed an
attack from the north across open plains, but
Belgrade could meet attacks from other
directions. A ground approach by Western
forces through Bosnia and Herzegovina, a
third country, or from the coast of Montene-
gro would provide ample warning to the
Yugoslavs
The Yugoslavs believe that the West would
inflict heavy losses on their forces in war.
Public statements of military leaders suggest
that they would expect a devastating, coordi-
nated, all-out attack on the navy, air force,
air defenses, and command and control
structure, similar to Western operations in
the 1991 Persian Gulf war. These leaders
realize they cannot match the mobility and
firepower of Western forces. Nevertheless,
the Ground Forces would fight tenaciously.
Instead of trying to hold land and fight a
conventional battle, they would seek to buy
time for light infantry units to retreat to the
hills of southern Serbia and northern Monte-
negro. There, they would rely on civilian
support and weapons caches to support con-
tinued operations aimed at driving up the
costs of Western intervention. Although less
disciplined reservists and some conscripts are
likely to desert or.perform poorly, the army
almost certainly believes that military disci-
pline and intense nationalism will drive most
of its forces to fight on in small groups,
making use of broken terrain for conducting
hit-and-run attacks. The Yugoslavs almost
certainly believe that a moderate but steady
number of casualties would cause the West
eventually to leave Yugoslavia. F___]
Effectiveness Over the Long Term. Should
the Yugoslavs implement their defensive
strategy, their forces would break down into
smaller, independent units. Western fixed-
wing aircraft, helicopters, and artillery
would make coordinated movements by
Yugoslav forces difficult, and Western forces
would probably dominate urban areas and
major roads within a few weeks. In the
meantime, local Yugoslav commanders
would assume control over available military
resources, such as ammunition stockpiles.
Coordination among units would decline.
Some regular units would probably continue
to fight; other units would desert. Over time,
some units would become personal armies for
local leaders or bandit gangs. Under these
conditions, a national army would no longer
exist, but some of its elements would pose
significant local threats.
The Croatian Armed Forces: Building on
Modest Foundations
Croatia's Armed Forces have improved sub-
stantially since 1991. Croatia quickly
created a general staff and rudimentary
national guard in mid-1991. Improvements
in command structure and training, as well
as the organization of regular units, have
increased the Croatian army's local combat
capability. According to several sources,
President Tudjman, an ex-army general, and
his advisers now believe the army can eject
local Serb forces from selected areas of Serb-
occupied Croatia.
The Croatian Ground Forces
Manpower and Organization. The Ground
Forces have expanded and reorganized to
improve their effectiveness. Croatian Ground
Forces consist of an estimated 60,000 to
 Figure 3
Croatian Armed Forces Headquarters and Operational Zones in Croatia
Slovenia
LJUBLJANA
Gospic
2 Zone
Adriatic
Sea
Operational zone
headquarters
Operational zone
boundary
Austria
UN
Southern
Zone
Serbia and Montenegro have asserted
we formation of a joint independent
Hate, but Ihis entity Has not been
turn a y remgnaed as a slate by the
. umtea stated
Hunar.
Bosnia and r
Herze ovina'
 80,000 men deployed in six operational
zones-the equivalent of regional military
commands-and organized into 40 brigades,
and 17 Home Guard regiments. The army
has a core of 20,000 regulars augmented by
conscripts and reservists on active duty and a
ready reserve of some 100,000. Seven
Guards Mobile brigades, professionally
manned formations with armor, artillery,
and air defense assets, are the most capable
units.)
The Ground Forces' ability to organize task
forces enhances the flexibility of Croatian
forces. Operational zone commanders con-
trol all maneuver and support units within a
region and can tailor task forces for specific
missions. In 1992, President Franjo Tudjman
ordered the streamlining of the Defense
Ministry and General Staff. These changes
improved Zagreb's ability to plan operations
and shift forces. Experienced commanders,
fully effective battlefield command and con-
trol structures, and an efficient administra-
tive system are still lacking, however.
Equipment. The Croatian Ground Forces
lack combat power. Zagreb captured approx-
imately 250 tanks, 150 to 250 armored vehi-
cles, and 200 to 300 artillery pieces from
federal forces in 1991. While fielded systems
include modern M-84 tanks, multiple rocket
launchers, and SA-9 air defense systems, the
Ground Forces have too few tanks and infan-
try fighting vehicles to engage in large-scale
armored combat or to defend against a major
armored attack. The Croatians are also short
of spare parts and qualified maintenance
personnel. The General Staff has subordi-
nated artillery and combined-arms battalions
or companies to infantry brigades to support
infantry operations. F__]
Training. Efforts to improve the level of
Ground Forces training have had mixed
results. Created in the midst of combat, the
Ground Forces have not had time to institu-
tionalize the professionalism required to
manage and employ armed forces effectively.
The army has officer training schools and
courses for noncommissioned officers. The
Croatian Chief of Staff has publicly assert-
ed, however, that both the quality and length
of training are inadequate and companies
and battalions reportedly are short of trained
officers. In these circumstances, the Ground
Forces continue to rely on reservists who
received minimal training under the former
Yugoslav. army. Five military education cen-
ters provide two months of basic training for
conscripts, who then are supposed to undergo
additional months of specialized training.
Training appears to be concentrated at the
small-unit level, and deficiencies in basic
combat skills and small-unit tactics will con-
tinue to hamper operations.F_~
Logistics. While adequate for defensive or
limited offensive operations, Croatian logis-
tics could not support multiple offensives on
a broad front. Early in 1992, Zagreb placed
support services under the General Staff to
 bring order and direction to the haphazard
supply system. Spot shortages of ammunition
continue to occur, but troops are generally
well provisioned. Medical services and sup-
plies, moreover, appear fairly well organized
and plentiful. The static, small-scale nature
of the combat enables the army to stockpile
munitions and materiel before offensives;
Guards Mobile brigades that spearhead
offensives have logistic priority. Transport
shortages, inexperience with mobile support
operations, and limited maintenance capabil-
ities would undermine the army's ability to
support either large-scale or mobile
operations
Morale. Croatian morale varies but is gener-
ally good. Motivation is highest in elite units,
and most regular troops believe they are
embarked on a crusade to save Croatia.
While the majority of the army is reliable,
inadequately trained reserve brigades and
Home Guard regiments have dissolved in the
face of Serb attacks. The army almost cer-
tainly would use them only for local opera-
tions or to provide rear-area security. Never-
theless, Chief of Staff Janko Bobetko
recently expressed confidence in the army's
motivation, and senior officers claim that
superior Croatian morale would be a signifi-
cant advantage in renewed conflict with
Yugoslav forces
Leadership. Leadership shortcomings limit
Croatian tactical effectiveness. Senior offi-
cers are capable professionals, and most field
commanders are experienced combat veter-
ans; the growing ability to plan military
operations and the smooth functioning of the
General Staff testify to their skill. However,
the Croatian army generally lacks trained
and capable junior officers and NCOs.
Small-unit operations are poorly coordinated
and slapdash in execution, weaknesses that
Croatian Civil-Military Relations
The Croatian Armed Forces are highly
responsive to the orders of Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman. A former
major general, Tudjman is the armed
forces' Commander in Chief and per-
sonally directs their activities. Tudj-
man heads the Council of Defense and
National Security, which consists of the
Defense and Foreign Ministers, the
Chief of Staff, and other senior deci-
sionmakers. While command ostensibly
runs from the president through the
Defense Minister to the General Staff,
Tudjman, in fact, exercises his author-
ity directly through the General Staff.
The Chief of Staff, Gen. Bobetko, is a
Tudjman loyalist who takes his orders
directly from the President. Bobetko, in
turn, has operational control of the
military through the service chiefs and
operational zone commanders.
will remain until Zagreb raises the level of
training and professional education of its
junior leaders.
The Croatian Navy and Air and
Air Defense Forces
Zagreb's naval, air, and air defense forces
cannot damage an adversary's forces signifi-
cantly. The 5,000-man strong Navy has
some four to six combatants, only three or
four of which may be equipped with antiship
missiles, leaving the force largely dependent
on guns and torpedoes. With virtually no
capability for extensive offensive operations,
Zagreb undoubtedly will meet any naval
threat chiefly with mines and coastal artil-
lery. Zagreb has been able to establish only
 minimal air and air defense forces. The
4,000-man Air and Air Defense Forces hus-
band their two to five MiG-21s and use
modified crop dusters for rudimentary
ground strikes. Transport capabilities have
improved with the March 1993 acquisition of
four MI-8 helicopters, bringing the total
inventory to 17. Zagreb remains vulnerable
to air attack, although Croatia, which has
some 100 SA-7 missiles and 15 to 21 SA-9
launchers, is seeking additional air defense
missiles.
Croatian Combat Capabilities
Ejecting Serb Forces From Croatia. Zagreb
can retake portions of Serb-held territory but
cannot completely expel local Serb troops
from Croatia. Croat military operations
would be most successful in western
Slavonia, where local Serb forces are demor-
alized and relatively weak. Croatian offen-
sives spearheaded by Guards Mobile bri-
gades are likely to achieve limited territorial
objectives, but the Krajina Serbs' over-
whelming advantage in heavy weapons prob-
ably would soon halt any Croatian advance.
Zagreb's forces lack the heavy weapons,
command experience, and logistic capabili-
ties needed to mount a major campaign to
retake the entire region.)
Capability To Defend Croatia From Serb
Attack. Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces are
too stretched to threaten Croatia, but the
Croatian Armed Forces would have diffi-
culty coping with Yugoslav attacks intended
to punish Croatia or seize additional terri-
tory. Croatia could not defend against puni-
tive Yugoslav airstrikes and lacks the air
defenses and heavy forces needed to defeat
an armored attack in eastern Slavonia. The
Croatian Defense Forces (HVO) and
Croatian Armed Forces probably could not
defend the Neretva River valley and lower
Dalmatian coast against a determined attack
by Yugoslav armor, artillery, infantry, and
airpower. F__-]
Ability To Hold Territory in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Zagreb probably will retain
control over the bulk of the territory
Croatian forces currently control in Bosnia
 and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs occupy
most of the territory to which they have laid
claim and are uninterested in seizing the
Croat-majority regions under Zagreb's con-
trol. Moreover, the Bosnian Serbs cannot
mount the multibrigade combined-arms
offensive needed to dislodge the HVO and
Croatian Armed Forces from the rugged
terrain they hold in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnian government forces are likely to seize
some additional territory in central Bosnia,
where they have been able to concentrate
sufficient manpower to outweigh scattered,
lightly armed HVO units. Zagreb almost
certainly will bolster the HVO with man-
power and heavy weapons from the Croatian
army to limit the Bosnian government's ter-
ritorial gains. Zagreb would carefully weigh
the political consequences of such interven-
tion.
Effectiveness Over the Long Term. Croatian
ground forces are unlikely to match the
federal army's manpower, equipment, and
mobility, although barring renewed hostil-
ities against Belgrade, they will slowly
improve. The international arms embargo
will make it difficult for Zagreb to acquire
heavy weapons and air defense missiles.
Improved Croatian combat effectiveness,
however, largely depends on enhancing com-
bat and leadership skills and strengthening
the army's organization. With adequate
funding and a respite from the fighting for
six to 12 months, Zagreb should be able to
bolster its defensive strengths and offensive
capabilities. On the other hand, heavy fight-
ing with Yugoslav forces would slow and
perhaps reverse the process
Likely Croatian Army Response to Western
Intervention. The Croatian army could con-
tinue to improve its capabilities and maintain
limited pressure on Serb-occupied areas in
Croatia if the West were to intervene to
support a negotiated settlement in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, but a Western attack on
Serb forces would tempt Zagreb to retake
lost ground. Zagreb would probably be reluc-
tant to incur Western ire by attempting the
wholesale expulsion of Serb forces from
Croatia after a diplomatic solution in Bosnia.
Instead, the Croatian army probably would
maintain pressure and launch local offen-
sives along the borders of Serb-held territory,
while Zagreb pressed for a diplomatic solu-
tion. Zagreb would view a Western attack on
the Serbs, either in Bosnia or in Yugoslavia,
as an opportunity to seize the Krajina and
retake all of Slavonia. Unless restrained by
the West, Croatia almost certainly would
attempt to do so.F_~
Krajina Serb Forces
The self-proclaimed "Republic of Serb
Krajina" created a semiautonomous military
in the spring of 1992. Headquartered in
Knin, Krajina Serb forces consist of an
estimated 40,000 ex-Yugoslav Peoples
Army, ex-Territorial Defense Forces, police,
and volunteers organized into six corps, with
26 brigades. The Krajina Serb Army fields
numerous heavy weapons, including 300
tanks, 80 armored fighting vehicles, and 430
artillery pieces, along with dozens of heavy
mortars, antitank guns, and light air defense
artillery. Most of this equipment is currently
operational, but the Krajina Serbs probably
cannot maintain it over the long term with-
out external assistance. Three FROG
surface-to-surface missile launchers were
seen in convoy in the possession of Krajina
Serb forces in mid-July. These may have
been provided by either Yugoslav or Bosnian
Serb forces.F---]
 Figure 4
Krajina Serb Forces Corps Headquarters in Croatia
(XXXIX) Western
Banja Corps Slavonia
Army headquarters
Corps headquarters
0 50 Hilometers
0 50 Miles
dI.Okucani
Serbia and Montenegro have asserted
the formation of a joint independent
state, but this entity has not been
formally recognized as a state by the
United States.
 Heavy weapons provide the Krajina Serb
Army an advantage over Croatian ground
forces, but command, discipline, and organi-
zational problems constrain its effectiveness.
Political turmoil within the Serb community
reportedly has prompted dissent within the
officer corps and disorganization at the tacti-
cal level. The Krajina Serbs have little
ability to shift forces among widely sep-
arated areas. Largely mobilized reservists,
these troops reportedly are ill disciplined and
fight poorly. Krajina Serb authorities will
continue to depend on the Bosnian Serb
Army for supplies and reinforcements. Act-
ing in concert, the Krajina Serb forces and
Bosnian Serb Army or Yugoslav Armed
Forces would pose a significant threat to the
Croatian Armed Forces.
Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Bosnian Serb Army: Dominating
the War
Origins and Manpower. Formed in the
spring of 1992 from Yugoslav Armed Forces
units based in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) is commanded by
a former Yugoslav general, Ratko Mladic. It
has approximately 60,000 to 80,000 men
organized into six corps and 58 brigades; 10
artillery and antiaircraft regiments, one
FROG surface-to-surface rocket battalion,
and two antitank regiments to supply heavy
firepower. Some 30,000 Serb irregulars sup-
plement the BSA. Since the beginning of
1993, the BSA has been making a systematic
effort to standardize its brigades and inte-
grate Territorial Defense Force fighters.
Although its regular units are responsive to
Mladic's authority, many irregulars and
part-time fighters continue to conduct opera-
tions on their own. The Bosnian Serbs also
have the only fixed-wing combat capability
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before the
implementation of the "no-fly zone," they
employed their air force primarily in support
of their sieges.
Equipment and Training. In March 1992,
apparently on orders from Belgrade, the
Yugoslav army turned over most of its arms'
and munitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina to
the Bosnian Serbs. The BSA received
approximately 400 to 750 tanks, approxi-
mately 200 other armored vehicles, 700 to
800 artillery pieces, and 450 heavy mortars,
as well as about 30 helicopters and 21 fixed-
wing combat aircraft. Because almost all
BSA troops were in the former Yugoslav
army, they have little difficulty operating
their equipment, and their interoperability
with Yugoslav forces would be high. None-
theless, BSA overall training levels appear
low. Centers for basic and advanced training
have been reported at Manjaca and Bijeljina,
but the BSA apparently remains short of
adequately trained troops. Serb
combat operations suggests that BSA troops
use simple but effective tactics and proce-
dures appropriate for undertrained
personnel. F__1
Logistics. The BSA is largely self-sufficient
in ammunition and most military consum-
ables, but relies on Yugoslavia for fuel,
transportation, spare parts, and maintenance
support. There is some evidence of ammuni-
tion deliveries from Yugoslavia, but the
quantities are insufficient to support the level
of fighting in the region. Storage facilities at
Banja Luka and Han Pijesak reportedly hold
large quantities of ammunition and are sup-
plemented by storage facilities scattered
 Figure 5
Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) Headquarters, Corps, and
Areas of Responsibilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina
R,
r'o a ti a
Banja? I
Luka Krajina
Corps
Ruingg._ a
,ry
~~Vo)vod-nai
(autonomous
province) ~n
corps boundary; ; Gradacac
determined 0
Dobbj~(
Bijeljinalll stern`;
osnia:
r1 tCorpsti;
Maglaj ,
Kiseljak?
Vlasenica fl
? Drina
Corps ?
Han Pijesak Srebrenica
N Romanija Zepa E` T
* Corps
\ SARAJEVO
Mostar?
7~ Army headquarters
ii Corps headquarters
- Corps boundary
0 40 Kilometers
0 40 Miles
Adriatic
Sea
Herzegovina
Corps go
Bileca'
Montene ro
POD;GORICA
Serbia and Montenegro have asserted
the formation of a joint independent
state, but this entity has not been
formally recognized as a state by ..:.
the United States.
Serbia
4lba' a,,
 parts and support from Belgrade. These
problems have sometimes caused local short-
ages and make it difficult for the BSA to
shift or concentrate forces rapidly. If
Belgrade followed through with its promise
to cut off aid to the Bosnian Serbs, the BSA
would gradually lose its mobility and units
would be left to live off local stockpiles.
Medical support appears adequate. The BSA
has at least one depot repair base, southwest
of Sarajevo at Hadzici
Morale. Morale varies greatly among BSA
units and appears fair but fragile. Better
trained units, such as engineers, appear to
have the best morale. Many Serb fighters are
not professionals and have never faced a
well-armed or highly capable enemy. Deser-
tions are common, particularly among troops
serving away from their homes. Morale
among Serb troops in eastern Bosnia fell
sharply when they faced determined Muslim
attacks in January 1993. Most BSA units
would fall apart under a sustained Western
combined-arms attack.)
Leadership. BSA leaders are capable but
cautious and unwilling to risk their forces.
Many officers are veterans of the former
Yugoslav army. They have a clear under-
standing of their forces' capabilities and
limitations and gear their operations accord-
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conse- ingly. As a result, the Serbs avoid directly
quently, we believe that the BSA has ample attacking Bosnian army positions-which
reserves of ammunition for current levels of would risk heavy casualties and strain the
combat. logistic system. They prefer to surround
Muslim-held areas and use their advantage
The BSA has received regular truck ship- in heavy weapons to shell them into submis-
ments of fuel from Yugoslavia, which we sion. Coupled with their territorial objec-
believe indicates it may have little in storage. tives, this approach gives the war a slow-
The BSA's truck fleet is stretched thin, is moving, siege-prone character.0
short of fuel tanker trucks, and requires
 Bosnian Serb Civil-Military Relations
Nominally controlled by the civilian
government of the Serb Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the BSA is
largely an independent institution under
General Mladic's control. President
Radovan Karadzic has complained
that:
? The BSA does not follow his orders
and has told him that he does not
command the army.
? The army does not provide him with
full information about its own plans
and activities and withholds intelli-
gence information from him.
? The BSA dismisses officers appointed
by him whom it does not find
acceptable.
Vice President Nikola Koljevic consid-
ers Mladic dangerous.
Mladic appears to have established an
effective command and control system.
Information flows reasonably smoothly,
and the BSA has demonstrated the
capability to plan and execute opera-
tions effectively. The Serb command
system's greatest weakness is logistics.
Local commanders sometimes have to
go outside BSA channels to overcome
temporary supply shortages.F_~
Bosnian Serb Combat Capabilities
Forcing a Military Decision in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The BSA can conquer most
remaining Muslim-held areas of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but only at a political and
military price it is unwilling to pay. Because
the Serbs control much of the flow of civilian
supplies into Muslim areas they could starve
both residents and defenders. The Serbs can
concentrate their forces and firepower and
reduce Muslim pockets one at a time, as they
have been doing in eastern Bosnia since early
February 1993. They. could follow this strat-
egy until only Tuzla, Bihac, and Sarajevo are
left. The Serbs would then be capable of
taking these towns one at a time by siege.
This approach would take many months,
involve a level of casualties greater than the
BSA has been willing to accept, and incur a
high risk of Western intervention. Conse-
quently, the Serbs probably will not try to
take by force all of Muslim-held Bosnia and
Herzegovina but will maintain pressure on
them.F__~
Ability To Hold Territory. The BSA can
hold virtually all its territory against attacks
by any local opponent. Muslim attacks have
pushed back Serb forces and taken Serb-held
land, but these gains have been marginal or
temporary. The BSA is the most mobile
force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its capabil-
ity to shift and reinforce units-albeit
slowly-and call on Belgrade for emergency
aid, as it did to repel Muslim attacks along
the Drina River in early 1993, gives it a
virtually unmatchable operational
advantage.
Likely Response to Western Intervention.
The BSA would resist Western intervention
in Bosnia and Herzegovina charged with
rolling back Serb territorial gains or disarm-
ing the BSA but would quickly disintegrate
in the face of a determined Western opera-
tion. Limited mobility would make it diffi-
cult for units to avoid coordinated air and
 ground attacks by Western forces, and units
attempting to resist would be overwhelmed
quickly. Inadequate intelligence and commu-
nications would make it almost impossible
for BSA units to support one another. Real-
izing they were no match for Western forces,
large numbers of BSA soldiers would surren-
der, desert, or flee to Yugoslavia, in our
judgment. Similarly, the Bosnian Serb air
force would be easily overwhelmed by West-
ern airpower. Thousands of other Bosnian
Serbs would, however, conduct guerrilla war-
fare against Western occupation forces,
probably with support from Belgrade.
Effectiveness Over the Long Term. If a politi-
cal settlement ends the fighting in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and sets territorial bound-
aries, the BSA will gradually decline into a
small militia. Whether it formally annexes
the Bosnian Serb areas or not, Belgrade is
likely to view them as Yugoslav territory.
The Yugoslav army probably would absorb
the BSA's best units and weapons, discharge
the irregulars, and convert many of the
remaining troops into reservists. The former
BSA units would still be stationed in Bosnia
to guard the frontiers
The Bosnian Army: Outgunned But
Hanging On
Origins and Numbers. The Bosnian Army
was formed in the spring of 1992 when the
government in Sarajevo took control of the
various militia, reserve, and paramilitary
units in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although
mostly Muslim, the Army also includes
Croat and Serb personnel. With the addition
of volunteers and a small number of foreign
Islamic fighters, the Bosnian Army now has
perhaps 100,000 to 120,000 2 men, organized
2 This figure includes personnel previously considered as irregu-
lars outside the Army's formal structure
in six corps and over 70 brigades. Almost
entirely infantry, its units vary widely in
manpower, organization, and military capa-
bility. Despite the title-The Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina-units are-not
firmly controlled by Sarajevo. Because units
are cut off from one another and fighting in
isolated pockets, local commanders are virtu-
ally autonomous. As a result, the Bosnian
Army is essentially a local defense force,
with most units incapable of shifting areas of
operation or undertaking coordinated tacti-
cal maneuvers.F__~
Equipment and Training. Bosnian forces are
poorly trained and have little equipment. In
the spring of 1993, the entire Army had only
25 tanks and fewer than 200 artillery pieces
and heavy mortars; there is a continuing
shortage of rifles. The government forces
lack a formal training system; troops appear
to rely on skills learned in the former
Yugoslav army or practical experience.
Logistics. Government forces are short of
vital military supplies and are unable to
distribute adequately items needed for
combat:
? The most critical shortage is of ammuni-
tion. In March 1993 the defenders of
Srebrenica reported grave shortages of all
types of ammunition, but especially artil-
lery rounds. In one brigade, according to a
military debriefing, each soldier was
limited to 70 rounds of rifle ammunition
per week during the fall of 1992.
? Medical supplies are scarce. Medical items
sought in late 1992 included sterile gloves,
thermometers, and bandages, as well as
antibiotics and other medications.
25 Secret
 Figure 6
Bosnian Army Headquarters, Corps, and
Areas of Responsibility in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Slovenia
.Cy-, .41J.-
nggary-
Vo vodina`
(autonomous "-
province)
Maglaj ?
li?Tuzla
Jajce. /III II _
Zenica
Travnik' . Srebrenica, S2rfJld
Vitez X
I ~Kis Ijak i
VI SARAJEVO
i . Gorazde
Konj is r-1
Mostar
AI V
Adriatic
Sea
Army headquarters
II Corps headquarters
- Corps boundary
0 40 Kilometers
0 40 Miles
 rounds of rifle ammunition, but production is
reportedly slowing as stocks of parts and
This table is Secr
Serb blockades make regular resupply of
isolated units extremely difficult; in eastern
Bosnia, supplies are often delivered by mule
convoys.
Sarajevo has sought both to buy weapons
and ammunition abroad and to make them in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. All imported arms
enter Bosnia and Herzegovina through
Croatian-held territory, and Zagreb halted
these shipments in the spring of 1993. By its
own count, as of February 1993 Sarajevo
had imported some 25,000 rifles, about 100
mortars, 15 million rounds of rifle ammuni-
tion, and 47,000 mortar rounds. Given the
scope of the fighting and shortages, these
supplies have been inadequate. In January
1993 the Bosnian Government still sought
another 100,000 assault rifles with 750 mil-
lion rounds of ammunition, as well as mor-
tars and artillery pieces, on the international
arms market. Factories in government-held
areas, particularly around Sarajevo, have
produced some weapons and several million
explosives are exhausted.
to the last man.
Morale. Bosnian Army morale appears to be
good. Government forces fight tenaciously on
the defensive and have frequently attacked
superior Serb forces; desertions do not
appear to be ,a serious problem. They are
motivated by the knowledge that they are
defending their homes and families and by
the desperation of their position. Because
they know the consequences of losing, gov-
ernment forces will retain their cohesion and
continue fighting stubbornly. In some bat-
tles, such as the one around Jajce in the fall
of 1992, trapped army units stood and fought
Leadership. The Bosnian Army is command-
ed by officers of the former Yugoslav
Peoples Army, and additional leaders have
emerged during the war, partially compen-
sating for the Army's lack of professional
officers and NCOs. Fragmentary evidence
indicates that these leaders have emerged by
combining combat performance, bravery,
and charisma. Although this process has
given the government forces a cadre of effec-
tive local leaders whom troops will follow,
the Army'has been unable to develop system-
atic procedures for identifying and training
professional officers. The local nature of
leadership and troop loyalties hinders efforts
to coordinate actions, makes replacing unit
leaders difficult, and makes enforcing cease-
fire agreements difficult.
Bosnian Army Combat Capabilities
Ability To Hold or Retake Territory. The
Army cannot hold territory against deter-
mined Serb offensives. Because many
 government units are either trapped in Serb-
surrounded areas or lack mobility, Sarajevo
is unable to shift its forces to counter a Serb
advance. Because they are outgunned and
low on ammunition, government forces can
rarely reply to Serb artillery, counter Serb
armor, or stop Serb infantry attacks with
massed firepower. Except in cities like
Sarajevo, where the prospect of street fight-
ing deters an all-out Serb attack, the BSA
can continue to take government-held areas
one at a time. The government forces have
seized terrain from HVO forces that lack
Croatian army support.F__1
Similarly, the Bosnian Army cannot perma-
nently retake ground from the Serbs. Local
government units have frequently attacked
Serb-held areas near Sarajevo and in eastern
Bosnia, taking and holding ground for short
periods. Invariably, however, the Serbs
regroup, counterattack, and eject the
Bosnian forces. Bosnian units have frequently
attacked to cut Serb supply lines, especially
those in northern Bosnia and near Sarajevo,
but they have been unable to hold their
ground for more than a few days. F - ]
Likely Response to Western Intervention.
The Bosnian Army would welcome Western
intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Sarajevo undoubtedly views Western action
as its best chance for survival. Intervention
and an end to Serb attacks would greatly
reduce pressure on the Army, which would
almost certainly use the breathing room to
rest, train, and rearm. The Bosnian Army
would also try to occupy areas vacated by
retreating BSA units and would probably
step up guerrilla attacks on Serb forces.
Should Western peacekeepers try to stop
these actions, the government forces proba-
bly would respond violently, while trying to
make their acts appear to be the work of
E ectiveness Over the Long Term. If the
West does not intervene, the Bosnian Army's
capabilities will steadily deteriorate. As the
Serbs continue to take government-held
areas, centralized command and control will
be lost, and the Bosnian Army probably will
become a series of locally controlled com-
mands. In such a situation these forces will
turn increasingly to uncoordinated small-
unit operations. Determined ethnic cleansing
by the Serbs, however, would reduce the
Muslim population and make operations
steadily more difficult. F__-]
Croatian Defense Forces
Origins and Numbers. Aided by Zagreb,
Bosnian Croats organized the HVO in the
spring of 1992. Originally a loose collection
of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) activ-
ists, local citizens, and ex-Territorial
Defense Forces personnel, HVO unit organi-
zation grew stronger with the influx of for-
mer Yugoslav Peoples Army officers and
troops, as well as Croatian army officers and
personnel. Croatian Defense Forces now con-
sist of an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 men
divided among four operational zones and
organized in 28 brigades. Locally recruited
HVO units rely on the Croatian Armed
Forces for support and assistance and gener-
ally coordinate their activities with Zagreb,
but they retain substantial operational inde-
pendence.F__-]
Equipment and Training. The HVO is a
light infantry force whose equipment and
training are inadequate for offensive opera-
tions without major reinforcements. Senior
Croatian officials have acknowledged arm-
ing the HVO, and reports indicate the HVO
has enough small arms. An HVO brigade
may have as many as four to five tanks or
armored vehicles and eight to 12 artillery
Serbs.
 Figure 7
Croatian Defense Forces (HVO) Headquarters and
Operational Zones in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Slovenia
Lid Army headquarters
ifi Zone headquarters
ii Group headquarters
- Zone boundary
0 40 Kilometers
0 40 Miles
Hur'gary
?Tolisa
Posavina
Gradacac
Doboj
.Maglaj
Z
Northwest KiseIjek
Herzegovina
t Duvno .. C.
? onlic
16
osta
Serbia and Montenegro have asserted
the formation of a joint independent
state, but this entity has not been
formally recognized as a state by
the United States.
Qrasje
uzla
Albania'
Vojvodina
',',(autonomous';
G orazde
Montene =r'o';;
 pieces or heavy mortars, but most units have
fewer.
the HVO recently established a basic train-
ing course, but most training is provided in
individual units with widely varying quality.
Logistics. HVO logistics are makeshift but
reasonably effective. Spot munitions short-
ages have been reported, and food distribu-
tion reportedly is a continuing problem.
Units are generally well equipped with small
arms, ammunition, and equipment, due to
Zagreb's direct support for the HVO. HVO
activities are coordinated with the Croatian
General Staff, and the Croatian army trucks
supplies directly to HVO units. Adequate for
operations close to support bases, the current
level of logistic capability would not permit
HVO forces to undertake mobile or extended
operations.
Morale and Leadership. Morale in HVO
units appears to be uniformly good because
the troops are defending their homes, fam-
ilies, and property. This strong commitment
enables Croatian troops to overcome some of
the deficiencies in their training. Despite
some problems, especially in central Bosnia,
HVO forces appear relatively disciplined and
reasonably effective. Some brigades proba-
bly are led by Croatian Armed Forces offi-
cers.' Like the Croatian Armed Forces, the
HVO almost certainly has an inadequate
number of trained, effective junior officers
and NCOs-shortages that will continue to
limit its tactical operations.F__-]
' The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research believes that, while some HVO brigades may be led
by Croatian Armed Forces officers, there is no specific evidence
to support this.
HVO Combat Capabilities. Supported by
the Croatian Armed Forces, HVO forces can
hold most of the land they currently occupy
against the Bosnian Serb Army or Bosnian
forces. Rough terrain, fluid and discontinu-
ous frontlines, and the small-scale, relatively
static nature of most combat enable the
HVO both to harass Serb forces and to
secure communications lines with scattered
artillery outposts. In the unlikely event that
BSA or Bosnian operations. endangered
Croatian control of occupied portions of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian army
regulars would immediately reinforce threat-
ened sectors. In early May 1993, for exam-
ple, after heavy fighting broke out between
the HVO and Bosnian units around Mostar,
Croatian President Tudjman ordered
approximately 3,000 regular Croatian army
troops sent to Bosnia to reinforce the HVO,
according to a generally reliable source.
Acting alone, the HVO cannot take addi-
tional territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Croatian Defense Forces lack the transport,
communications, logistic support, and com-
mand structure needed to undertake mobile
operations across a broad front. HVO units
reportedly are also reluctant to engage
enemy forces beyond their home regions. In
addition, they are no match for better armed
Bosnian Serb Army units and probably inca-
pable of withstanding heavy attack by Serb
armor or artillery. The HVO's manpower,
mobility, and heavy weapons would be inade-
quate to overcome Bosnian forces, should the
HVO attempt a large-scale offensive. F__1
 F, ectiveness Over the Long Term. The mili-
tary capabilities of the HVO will improve
modestly over time. Zagreb aims to hold
portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina princi-
pally with HVO troops and probably will
take small steps to bolster their capabilities.
Combat skills will improve if the HVO insti-
tutionalizes basic training, and the shortage
of junior officers and NCOs can be redressed
if the Croatian army increases professional
training. Acquisition of substantial amounts
of armor and artillery is unlikely, but Zagreb
might provide the HVO with more light
antitank weapons and mortars. In the event
of heavy Serb-Croat fighting in Bosnia, the
Bosnian Croats will mobilize additional man-
power but would still rely on the Croatian
army to hold off the Serbs or Bosnian Gov-
ernment forces)
Likely Response to Western Intervention.
Croatian Defense Forces would exploit the
presence of Western combat forces to solidi-
fy their control of territory in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Croatian Defense Forces are
likely to view foreign intervention against the
Serbs as disabling their strongest enemy.
They almost certainly would take advantage
of the likely disintegration of the Bosnian
 Serb Army to assert control over the remain-
ing contested portions of western Herze-
govina, to retake territory around Jajce and
Kupres, and to improve defensive positions
astride Serb supply lines in northern Bosnia.
They will not surrender their weapons and
are likely to resist Western efforts to disarm
the HVO or reintroduce Sarajevo's authority
in areas they currently occupy
 Annex A
Force Structure of the
Yugoslav Ground Forces
Yugoslavia's most capable ground forces are
deployed opposite Croatia and in areas of
potential domestic unrest. The bulk of the
Ground Forces' striking power-tanks, fight-
ing vehicles, and heavy artillery-resides in
65 maneuver brigades. The 11 armored and
mechanized brigades are its most capable
units. Eight are in northern Serbia for possi-
ble use against Croatia or to contain conflict
in Vojvodina or the Sandzak; two more are
in Kosovo. According to an untested source,
the government recently created a special
corps to control a military police brigade and
commando troops in Belgrade, whose mission
we judge to be regime security.
The Ground Forces are striving to extract
maximum combat power from existing
forces. Yugoslav army corps do not have
command and control structures intended to
control mobile operations. The corps are
static area defense commands assigned
armored, mechanized, infantry, and artillery
brigades consonant with their missions.F_
Ground Forces are
retiring World War II-era equipment-for
example, T-34 tanks, M-46 tank destroyers,
and A-19 artillery-and are redistributing
hundreds of newer heavy weapons withdrawn
from Slovenia and Croatia. The Ground
Forces have taken control of the Territorial
Defense Forces and assigned to rear area and
local defense missions their estimated
400,000 personnel who would be available in
wartime.
Yugoslavia's Ground Forces could not sur-
vive a Western attack as a conventional
armored force, but we judge Belgrade would
be able to mobilize and disperse a guerrilla
army. The General Staff has transferred 24
cadre light infantry brigades from the Terri-
torial Defense Forces and created motorized
brigades equipped with small arms and mor-
tars for extended combat. Multiple garrisons
and depots, decentralized mobilization
points, and extensive munitions stockpiles
would present foreign forces with few
concentrated targets. Centralized conscrip-
tion and recruiting will enable authorities to
 call up additional manpower with warning of
war. In our judgment, reservists would gen-
erally report in response to a direct threat to
Yugoslavia, and the army's field forces could
swell to well over 200,000, augmented by
thousands of reservists or local defense
forces. Fragmentary evidence indicates
recent mobilization drills have been well
organized and effective.
 77E-AJ -n a ,M I-
L/
 Annex B
Force Structure of the
Yugoslav Navy
Belgrade is struggling to align the Navy into
an effective force, but the Navy has little
offensive capability. Only four frigates, eight
to nine patrol boats, and two to three opera-
tional submarines possess modern weapons
for use against Western forces. Although
these forces are designed for offshore raid-
ing, the Navy has lost the tunnels, ports, and,
other safehavens upon which its former doc-
trine of hit-and-run attacks rested. The Navy
also lacks the sensors, weapons, and plat-
forms for over-the-horizon attacks. In our
judgment, in operations short of war, the
Navy will restrict its operations to the
Montenegrin coast-mining those waters if
the West intervened against the Bosnian
Serbs. If the West attacked Yugoslavia, the
Navy would attempt to attack Western naval
forces in the Adriatic with submarine and
surface forces.F___1
Yugoslav authorities control over 4,800 oper-
ational naval mines, including acoustic, bot-
tom influence, and moored contact mines.
According to attache reporting, plans call for
laying 3,000 mines off the Montenegrin
coast.
The Ground Forces' Maritime Command
possesses artillery and antiship missiles for
coastal defense. the
missile regiment, equipped with an estimated
12 SS-C-3 launchers and 48 missiles, is
located near the Tivat naval base, the princi-
pal facility near Kotor Bay
some missiles may also be
deployed in the vicinity of the port at Bar.
The Ground Forces also have two regiments
of 36 to 40 M-46 130-mm field guns for
coastal defense, and imagery shows half of
these guns are at Tivat. The remainder,
along with a substantial but unknown num-
ber of World War II-era 88-mm, 90-mm,
and 94-mm antiaircraft guns deployed as
coastal artillery, are scattered in other
coastal positions
Yugoslavia's naval aviation capabilities are
limited. The prewar air force had three
squadrons trained for antiship operations.
These units probably are deployed at
Ivangrad and Podgorica, but there is little
continuing training in an antiship role.
Although the Air Force has early versions of
the TV-guided Maverick missile and report-
edly has Soviet-made AS-7 Kerry air-to-
ground missiles, it would depend primarily
on gravity bombs and unguided rockets to
attack foreign shipping.F--]
Sedret
 Lei Lt7~1
7-7
/n/
 Annex C
Force Structure of the Yugoslav
Air and Air Defense Forces
Belgrade is restructuring the Air Force to
boost the capabilities of a shrunken force.
The service reportedly now comprises a sin-
gle air corps with subordinate brigades at
Batajnica, Kraljevo, Podgorica, and Pristina.
Its inventory includes:
? Five fighter-bomber squadrons.
? Six fighter squadrons.
? Two reconnaissance squadrons.
Five attack helicopter squadrons.
? Three transport/utility squadrons
The Air Force inventory remains a genera-
tion or more behind that of Western forces.
Its most effective platforms are the 12 high-
performance, all-weather MiG-29s equipped
with older AA-8 and more recent AA-10 and
AA-11 missiles. the Air
Force has stored more than 100 outdated
Galeb-Jastreb fighter-bombers. The primary
air-to-air platforms are the 111 MiG-21
fighters equipped with AA-2 and AA-8
missiles.)
Air Force operations have not significantly
affected the military situation on the ground.
Commanders have been reluctant to expose
Gazelle and Hip C attack helicopters to
ground fire and relied on MiG-21s, Oraos,
and Super-Galebs for close air support in
earlier fighting. Croat and Muslim troops
have openly acknowledged the psychological
effect of attacks to which they could not
respond. Their military impact has been
undermined, however, by the small scale of
most ground combat, the proximity of the
engaged forces to each other, and the cover
afforded by difficult terrain. The effective-
ness of airstrikes has been reduced by limited
supplies of smart munitions and the propen-
sity to attack from high altitude.F-7
The limited number of modern combat air-
craft and dated air-to-air weapons would not
allow the Yugoslav Air and Air Defense
Forces to withstand a Western coalition air
campaign. However, they would be quite
capable against neighboring air forces. Their
pilots are proficient at simple intercepts and
night operations but lack the training and
equipment to conduct effective operations
against NATO air forces. In our judgment,
air combat would reveal widespread short-
comings in defensive maneuvering, the use of
countermeasures, and beyond-visual opera-
tions. The Yugoslav Air and Air Defense
Forces do, however, enjoy the advantages of
simple operating systems, dispersal in rugged
terrain, stockpiles of war material, and a
legacy of self-sufficiency. The General Staff
is competent and has completed an overhaul
of its air defense doctrine.
The Air Defense Forces field a range of
strategic and tactical surface-to-air missiles.
 five SA-2 and seven
SA-3 battalions defend Belgrade and air-
bases and defense industries south of the
city. Four additional SA-3 battalions protect
key airfields elsewhere in Yugoslavia. The
Yugoslav Air and Air Defense. Forces control
five deployed SA-6 regiments, and the
Ground Forces control 84 rs ~qA 9 and four SA-13 launchers.
 Annex D
Force Structure of the Croatian Ground Forces,
Navy, and Air and Air Defense Forces
Although Zagreb is attempting to increase
mobility and firepower, the Croatian Ground
Forces generally remain a territorial defense
force. Despite the creation of Guards Mobile
brigades, most of the force consists of rela-
tively immobile, lightly armed infantry bri-
gades and Home Guard regiments suited
principally for local defense. Insufficient
weapons, as well as the limited training, poor
discipline, and the frequent morale problems
among mobilized reservists, will continue to
constrain the Ground Forces' capacity to
undertake multibrigade offensive operations.
Croatian brigades, the basic combat unit,
vary in strength and capability. Units range
in size from 1,000 to 3,000 men. Guards
Mobile brigades, the most standardized and
capable units, have the greatest firepower-
four infantry battalions, a tank company or
battalion, and organic air defense-and a
reduced logistic structure to heighten mobil-
ity. Two brigades are opposite Serb forces in
western Slavonia, and the remainder shift
across operational zones as needed. Infantry
brigades, the Ground Forces' backbone, have
different amounts of armor, artillery, and
air defense weapons and probably are task
organized. Home Guard regiments, designed
for static defense, are equipped with small
arms, light artillery, and mortars.
The Croatian Ground Forces are attempting,
with mixed success, to extract maximum
combat power from available resources. The
General Staff has created a core of reliable,
effective, and better armed troops in the
Guards Mobile brigades. Moreover, an
influx of former Yugoslav Peoples Army
officers and the overhaul of the General
Staff have strengthened planning. Recent
operations show improvements in the Ground
Forces' use of terrain and fire support. Its
capabilities as a maneuver force are unlikely
to show substantial improvement, however,
until Zagreb successfully addresses short-
comings in small-unit leadership and a con-
tinuing inability to coordinate operations
effectively
The Croatian Navy is the smallest fleet in
the Adriatic and will continue to maintain a
low operational profile. The fleet is divided
into operational sectors headquartered at
Pula, Sibenik, and Kardeljevo (Ploce). Key
combatants (Koncar- and Osa-class guided
missile boats) probably are sailing from Split.
Stet
 Operational readiness has improved, but pa-
trols remain short and close to shore and
shortages of parts and technicians continue
to undermine weapons effectiveness. Croatia
probably intends in the future to patrol the
southern Adriatic from refurbished naval
bases at Vis and Lastovo Islands. Its current
orientation is defensive, however, and evi-
dence exists that Zagreb plans to mine key
sections of its coastline if the federal navy
attacks.
The Croatian Air Force and Air Defense
Forces operate almost as a "flying club" of
little military utility. No strategic air defense
exists, and most air defense weapons are
integrated within Ground Forces units.
 Annex E
Force Structure of the
Bosnian Serb Army
The Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) is organized
the same way as the former Yugoslav
Peoples Army (JNA), from which it inherited
most of its units and equipment. The BSA
has six corps-Sarajevo-Romanija, I
Krajina, II Krajina, Herzegovina, Eastern
Bosnia, and Drina-five of which are
renamed JNA corps. Each corps is based on
two to four motorized brigades, usually sup-
plemented by light infantry, an antitank
brigade, and an artillery brigade; there are
only two armored brigades attached to the
BSA corps. Motorized, armored, and light
infantry brigades usually have three
maneuver battalions; a mortar platoon; and
engineering, signal, medical, and service pla-
toons. The army's surface-to-surface FROG
rocket battalion and four SA-2 battalions, all
located around Banja Luka, are not attached
to any of the corps.F__7
The BSA has not undertaken a reform pro-
gram similar to the Yugoslav army's, largely
because its structure is adequate for immedi-
ate goals. Bosnia's rugged terrain and poor
road network put armored forces at a disad-
vantage; consequently, the BSA's corps
structure provides sufficient resources for
moving and concentrating forces without
sacrificing the infantry component essential
for success in the Bosnian hills. In addition,
continuing combat operations and a shortage
of manpower preclude the BSA from with-
drawing frontline units for reorganizing and
retraining.F--]
 P6~_C- - J/-~
IT'
A/ 7-Z---W7-7 y
 Annex F
Force Structure of the
Bosnian Army
Bosnian Army organization reflects its hasty
formation in the spring of 1992. Formally,
the army is organized into six corps: I
(Sarajevo), II (Tuzla), III (Zenica), IV
(Mostar), V (Bihac), and VI (Konjic), with a
total of more than 70 brigades. Unlike the
BSA, however, neither corps nor brigades
have a standard organization. Some brigades
reportedly have as many as 4,000 to 5,000
men, while others have fewer than 1,000.
Because the corps operate in isolated pock-
ets, they have become largely independent of
one another. Each corps consists mostly of
men from a particular geographic area, mak-
ing it dedicated to local defense but reluctant
to help units only a few miles away. More-
over, the Bosnian government has little more
than nominal control over the corps, making
it difficult to order and carry out coordinated
operations. This has worked to the Serbs'
advantage, enabling them to defeat Bosnian
Army strongholds one by one, while mini-
mizing the risk of surprise attack in the rear.
 P&&c- Y-6
7-7 6 A101-
 Annex G
Force Structure of the Croatian
Defense Forces
The Croatian Defense Forces (HVO) has few
standardized units, and most of its combat
formations are incompletely equipped. Bri-
gades, consisting of three to six infantry
battalions, an antitank battery, a mortar
battery, and support platoons, are the basic
maneuver unit. Brigade size varies from a
few hundred to several thousand men, and
few have the complete table of organization
and equipment. The average brigade proba-
bly has 2,000 to 3,000 men, equipped with
light artillery, various mortars, and antitank
weapons. Some units probably have a hand-
ful of T-54/55 tanks and/or armored vehi-
cles, but antitank weapons are generally in.
short supply, and none of the HVO brigades
zones-comparable to corps-brigades are
subordinate to operational groups. Echelons
above brigade, however, are not mobile com-
mand and control structures and appear to
be principally static area defense commands.
Most units take orders from Croatian Demo-
cratic Union (HDZ) leader and HVO chief
Mate Boban, but the Bosnian government
has operational control over four to seven
HVO brigades. Press eporting
indicate joint HVO-Bosnian Army local
commands have been formed in Bihac and
along the northern corridor, and other
reporting indicates that the two forces con-
tinue to plan joint operations.
has organic air defense.
HVO lines of command vary, and brigade
commanders almost certainly have broad
independence within their area of responsi-
bility. In one of four HVO operational
47 Se
 ,6L,fj-AJI