ALBANIA'S GREEK MINORITY: POTENTIAL FOR TROUBLE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: EASTERN EUROPE
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005657435
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2011
• Case Number: F-2011-01070
• Publication Date: June 30, 1994

Intelligence Memorandum
Relations between Albania and Greece have deteriorated sharply
following a violent border attack in April, the latest incident in three years of
strained bilateral ties. Greece has stepped up accusations of Albanian "repression"
of its ethnic-Greek minority, while Tirana fears Athens has designs on the Greek
Greek allegations that Tirana is systematically violating the rights of the
ethnic-Greek minority with the aim of driving it out of Albania appear to lack
Some complaints about Tirana's treatment of the Greek minority are
legitimate.
Albanian President Berisha has indicated, however, that he will focus on
legislation to guarantee ethnic rights and improve his government's
communication with the minority.
Albania's fear of Greek irredentism has been fueled mainly by Athens'
failure to rein in extreme nationalists who seek to stir up the Greek minority.
This has reinforced Albanian suspicions that the main ethnic-Greek political
A bilateral crisis over the minority issue that resulted in Greek reprisals
could destabilize Tirana's pro-US government to the advantage of the former
Communists and have regional repercussions.
Greece's Papandreou government) iews the issue of Albania's
Greek minority as potentially the most explosive issue in Greek politics.
Rapprochement is unlikely without support from the Wes; to
misinformation and deep-seated suspicions on both sides.om~
2-
 Relations between Albania and Greece recently have taken a marked turn for
the worse following a border incident on 10 April in which two Albanian military
officers were killed. The attack--which followed a brief thaw in relations since
Greek Prime Minister Papandreou's return to power--sparked renewed Albanian
allegations of Greek irredentism and Greek complaints about Albanian mistreatment
of its ethnic-Greek minority.
distributing Irredentist literature.
Tension has been a regular feature in Albanian-Greek relations in recent
years. Last summer, for example, Athens expelled 25,000-30,000 largely
undocumented Albanian workers after Tirana expelled a Greek cleric for allegedly
Albanian authorities claim the attackers escaped across the Greek border. A
little-known terrorist organization, the Northern Epirus Liberation Front
(MAUI), claimed responsibility for the attack, according to Greek press
reports.
Albanian President Berisha publicly accused the Greek Government of
abetting the perpetrators, but Athens has denied any involvement. Tirana's
subsequent arrest of six ethnic-Greek leaders on charges of promoting Greek
separatism and ties to the Greek intelligence service has further heightened tensions.
Berisha has assured at the trials of the six Greeks--four of
whom hold offices in Omonia, the largest ethnic-Greek political organization'
in Albania--will be public arid the evidence made available for
international examination.
The Greek Government--which claims to have been surprised by Berisha's
initial allegations of official Greek complicity--accused Tirana of persecuting the
This memorandum was prepared by with a contribution fro
"Office of European ysis. Comments an queries are welcome F
 Greek minority. Athens twice cancelled planned bilateral meetings aimed at
improving relations, block and lode several
international organizations,
? Under increasing domestic criticism for being too soft, the Greek
Government has also increased diplomatic pressure on Albania and publicly
discussed sealing the border or stepping up expulsions of illegal Albanians.
The police investigation of the border incident also prompted a further war
of words following the questioning of some thirty ethnic-Greek witnesses in late
May. Athens accused Tirana of initiating a new wave of arrests aimed at driving
ethnic Greeks out of Albania.
We have found no evidence that Tirana is pursuing a policy of systematic
intimidation of its Greek minority or attempting to drive the ethnic Greeks out.
Indeed, information available to us suggests that Athens' charges of human rights
violations against Tirana are, in fact, more extreme than the complaints made by
Albania's Greek minority. CSCE High Commissioner for Minorities Max Van der
Stoel visited Albania twice last year and concluded that the ethnic-Greek minority's
treatment conformed to CSCE guidelines. Van der Stoel personally investigated
several specific Greek allegations and later told Athens that they were
Better economic opportunities in southern Albania are encouraging
migration from north to south, but there is no indication of a government-
backed program to relocate ethnic Albanians into ethnic-Greek areas.
The land is mainly in central Albania, however, and the minority areas will
be largely unaffected.
 Greeks travel to Greece to pursue economic opportunities rather than to escape
discrimination.
The current bickering between Tirana and Athens, however, is creating
some fear among ethnic Greeks that the Albanian Government will begin to
The downturn in relations with Greece has also heightened Tirana's
suspicions about ties between the Omonia organization and Athens. Founded in
1991 with support and funds from several Greek organizations, Omonia also
maintains ties to several radical Greek organizations which open] advocate the
union of "Northern Epirus" with Greece,
Omonia leaders often travel to Greece and have been received officially in
Athens.
Although most Omonia leaders are moderate and willing to work within
the Albanian system, some--including one of the six ethnic Greeks arrested in
April--openly call for southern Albania's union with Greece. Several others of
those arrested appear to have conducted irredentist activities,F
however, and recently stressed at a press conference that they are independent
from "outside" forces and loyal to the Albanian Government.
Some ethnic-Greek complaints against Tirana are legitimate, however,
particularly those that relate to education and underrepresentation of ethnic Greeks
in the police and military. Ethnic Greeks have also complained about the
government's refusal to return large tracts of land previously owned by the
Orthodox Church. Some complaints--such as lack of control over education
decisions and local police--stem from the centralization of administrative power that
Level of Public Employment. Although there are no reliable statistics,
based on the March 1992 voter registration, ethnic Greeks are Albania's largest
minority and probably comprise some 3 to 5 percent of the population, or about
100,000-150,000 people. As many as half of the community currently works in
Greece. I
'The size of Albania's Greek minority is a matter of contention between Tirana and Athens. Albanian
authorities claim there are approximately 60,000-80,000 ethnic Greeks in Albania, while Athens Says there are
between 300,000 and 500,000. Greek estimates usually include all Orthodox believers, although
thnic Greeks make up only fifteen percent of the Albanian Orthodox pop tion.
 Saranda and Gjirokaster, there is only a token ethnic Greek presence in the
police and military. and virtually no Greeks are in positions of authority,
While Greek underrepresentation is partly due to the extensive purges of ex-
Communists carried out in 1992, it probably also reflects a general distrust
Access to Greek-Language Education. Ethnic Greeks currently are denied
government-funded Greek-language education outside the "minority zones" in the
south where the majority of ethnic Greeks reside. In addition, Greek language
classes are offered for only a set percentage of the school day, depending on the
grade.2 A long-delayed education law currently being drafted is expected to abolish
the minority zones and substitute a system that will permit funding of Greek-
language classes wherever sufficient students are available. The legislation,
however, is not likely to be ready for fall classes.
Albanian authorities are planning to issue interim regulations with more
flexible percentages and abolish the "minority zones" in time for the new
There currently are some 73 primary schools offering Greek language
education in Albania, In addition, there
are two Greek-language high schools and a university program to train
Greek language instructors. 0
Return of Church Property. Most Albanian Orthodox Church buildings
have been returned to the Church and operate freely. Surrounding land, however,
is subject to the land restitution law, which allows the return of only 5 hectares to a
single individual or entity. Former landholders receive monetary compensation for
land in excess of that amount. In addition, some previously Church-owned land is
heavily populated.
The restitution law also applies to properties belonging to the Catholic and
Muslim religious communities.
Enacting special legislation for Church properties would almost certainly
lead to a political backlash against the Albanian Government by other
2Under the current education law, all instruction is in Greek for the first four years of school. After grade
four. both Greek and Albanian are used, but the ratio of Greek to Albanian declines in proportion from 60/40
in grade five to 38/62 by grade eight.
 Claims to "Northern Epirus"
The area of southern Albania--called Northern Epirus by the Greeks--has
been a source of tension between the two countries for decades. Part of the
Ottoman Empire from the 15th until the 20th centuries, Albania was recognized
as an independent country by the London Conference of Ambassadors in 1912.
The northern boundary was designated by the Conference in March 1913, giving
Kosovo and Metihija to Serbia, but Greece laid claim to the southern part of the
country. The southern boundary remained in dispute until it was delineated in
1925 by the Protocol of Florence, drafted by the West European owers. The
Protocol was not ratified by the Greek parliament, however.
Albania's independence was placed in grave jeopardy during World War 1,
when it was occupied by Allied armies--mostly French and Italian. The secret
Treaty of London, concluded in 1915 and published by the Russian Bolsheviks
after the October 1917 revolution, provided for partition of Albania between
Greece, Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro. At the 1919-1920 Paris Peace
Conference, Greece again laid claim to.southern Albania, while Serbia and
Montenegro claimed the northern part, and Italy the port of Vlora. However,
US President Wilson insisted that an inde endent Albania must be restored under
the principle of self-determination.
Greece again occupied southern Albania in 1940 after defeating Italian
forces which had invaded Greek territory through Albania, and called for uniting
it with the "motherland." The Paris Peace Conference of 1946 rejected the
Greek claim, however, and confirmed Albanian sovereignty. In 1971, Athens
established diplomatic relations with Tirana, implying recognition of the existing
Greek-Albanian tensions appear driven mainly by Tirana's fear that Greece
harbors irredentist claims toward the Greek minority areas of southern Albania, and
Athens' refusal over the past two years to conclude a formal bilateral
agreement on the Greek-Albanian border--even though Greece has implicitly
recognized it by signing the CSCE Accords and publicly affirming its commitment
to the inviolability of borders in the region--has reinforced Tirana's suspicions of
Greek designs on southern Albania.
Albanian leaders believe that provocative claims by representatives of the
Greek Orthodox Church of mistreatment of Albania's Greek minority are at
least tacitly approved by Athens, A
radio station run by a Greek Orthodox Church bishop broadcasts irredentist
 Athens believes it has a special responsibility to protect the rights of its
ethnic kin abroad, and the issue is a strong rallying point in Greek domestic
politics.
Greek concern has been heightened further by the Papandreou government's
alarm over Albania's growing ties to Turkey. Athens fears that Ankara sees
Albania as a conduit for expanding Muslim influence in the region.
Athens also has come under increased pressure from elements of the Greek
Orthodox Church and nationalist fringe groups that are aggressively
promoting the Greek minority issue. In recent months they appear to have
become more active.
The influx of an estimated 150,000-200,000 Albanian economic migrants--
mostly illegal--into Greece has reinforced negative attitudes toward Albania.
Potential for Instability
Unless Athens and Tirana manage to put relations back on an even keel,
Albania's ethnic-Greek population could become the focal point of a serious--and
destabilizing--crisis between the two countries.
President Berisha has indicated he will make an effort to reassure the
minority that Tirana is committed to ethnic rights by focusing on minority
legislation and by increasing the number of high-level visits to the minority
area. Such measures would be well-received by both ethnic Greeks and
Albanians, who are increasingly concerned that tensions between Tirana and
Athens will spark ethnic problems in Albania.
Tirana's anxieties over perceived Greek irredentism, however, could tempt
Albanian authorities to restrict ethnic-Greek political activities, which
probably would prompt reprisals by Athens, including the expulsion of a
large number of Albanian workers in Greece.
Continued tension with Greece would have a negative domestic impact in
Albania.
As much as ten percent of the Albanian labor force currently is seeking
work in Greece, and Albania's economy relies heavily on their earnings.
The loss of these remittances and the repatriation of workers would sharply
 reduce family incomes and boost unemployment--already estimated to be
eighteen percent.
Continued Greek blocking of EU and other European aid would complicate
Tirana's stabilization program. Albania defaulted on its commercial debt in
1990 and depends on international and bilateral aid-of which the EU
accounts for over 50 percent--to finance critical imports.
A significant downturn in Albania's struggling economy could result in a
backlash against the ruling Democratic Party by Albanians weary from
implementation of the Albanian Government's "shock therapy" program of
Athens wants to prevent current tensions from snowballing into a full-blown
confrontation and is more likely to step up the
economic and diplomatic pressure on Albania than to resort to military action.
Greece sees itself in the long run as Albania's most important economic partner and
recognizes that isolating Tirana would damage Athens' influence on behalf of the
Greek minority.
In May, Papandreou ruled out military action. Athens probably would
contemplate refugee expulsions or military intervention, however, if it
believed the Greek minority were threatened by an influx of Albanians
fleeing violence in Kosovo.
If tensions persist and ethnic Greeks in Albania were seen to be targets of
forced "ethnic cleansing," Athens would come under intense public pressure
Misinformation is likely to continue to feed distrust on both sides without
sustained help from stronger democracies in the West.
In the long term, mutual hostility--despite efforts on both sides to patch up
their differences--will undermine Greek ambitions to assume a political and
economic leadership role in the region. At the same time, Greek
intransigence in the Balkans will further distance the Greeks from their
 Extent of'Northem
Epirus" claimed
by Greek extremists