CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005672248
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
June 24, 2015
Document Release Date:
September 16, 2011
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2010-01522
Publication Date:
April 22, 1961
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
DOC_0005672248.pdf | 90.49 KB |
Body:
22 April. 1961
No /
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9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE[]
DATE: 12-Sep-2011 TOP REY
TOP RET
TO T
LATE ITEM
The situation in Algeria as of 0630 EST remains unclear
beyond the fact that a military revolt against De Gaulle's liberal
Algerian policy was launched in Algiers last night. The Paris
government admits the insurrection, but insists this morning
tionists, in a communique signed by four well-known French
generals, claim they control all Algeria and the Sahara. How-
ever, the only military units:Tublicly. Identified as supporting
the revolt are the First Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment
and the predominently Moslem Seventh Regiment
partisans of "French Algeria" is connected with the widespread
belief that a negotiated settlement Involving Algerian independence
was about to be achieved. Although the rebel Provisional Algerian
Government (PAG) refused'to initiate public negotiations with the
French government as scheduled at Evian on 7 April--because of De
Gaulle'.s refusal to recognize the PAG's claim to represent all
Algeria--the fact that behind-the-scenes PAG-French talks have
continued has been an open secret. Moreover, De Gaulle's li.April
press conference--in which he emphasized more clearly than ever
before his intention to negotiate Algerian independence--appeared
to have dispelled PAG doubts as to his intentions and it was expected
that negotiations would soon be announced. The PAG has not yet
commented on the situation, and will probably take a cautious at-
titude until the picture becomes clearei-)
ll The outcome of the insurrection will depend largely on the re-
actioh of the European settlers, Moslems, and other military units
in Algeria, but also on the reactions in France Itself. The settlers
and their rightist sympathizers in France are expected to welcome
the coup as a blow to the "abandonment" of Algeria by De Gaulle.
The Moslem population of Algeria, which was reportedly discouraged
by De Gaulle's 11 April press conference because of fear that it
had reduced chances for an early end of hostilities, could react
violently--with or without PAG incitement--to any indications that
the ,_French army intends to prolong the war.
De Gaulle's skillful management of military sensibilities and
his firm stand during the January 1960 insurrection in Algiers
S*E~ T
/ i which some army paratroop units wavered in their loyalty,
ad for some time app.rently discouraged active military
plotting against him. The four generals heading the new in-
surrection- -retired Army generals Henri Zeller and Raoul
Salan (a former French commander in Algeria), retired
Air Force General Edmond Jouhaud? end Air.:Force General
MauriceCChalle (who resigned early this year from the position
as NATO--commander for Central Europe)--are prominent
largely because of their anti-Gaullist sentiments and activities.
They are not believed to enjoy widespread support in the armed
services, although much of the French military have sympathized
with their "French Algeria" views. The current insurrection
appears more serious than the settlers' revolt of 1960 in that
thistime'some army units are overtly opposed to the government,
and thus openly pose,the problem of "unity of the army." The
new French Chief of Staff of National Defense, General Jean
Olie, who took office on 1 March, lacks the prestige of his
predecessor, General Paul Ely, who had played a major role
in maintaining the armed services' loyalty to De Gaulle.
SE ET