SINO-SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITY IN TURKEY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005757344
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2011
• Case Number: F-2011-02059
• Publication Date: May 2, 1960

APPROVED FOR
(b)(1)
RELEASEL DATE:
ET (b)(3)
03-Oct-201 1.
MPAMIRW CO SrAlf
EO 11156. Soc. I.) l)
May 2, 1960
(Prepared by CIA without inter-agency coordination as an informal
document for use by the OCB Working Group and as background for
the information of the OCB)
60. General. Continuing pressure from the USSR for closer
contacts has resulted in agreement that Turkish Premier Menderes
will visit Moscow in July and that Khrushchev will return his visit
at a later date. While the USSR probably continues to regard Turkey
as a major obstacle to the spread of "coexistence" in the Middle East,
Moscow will probably seek to exploit Turkeyts acceptance to persuade
Turkey=s allies, especially Greece and Iran, to moderate their anti-
Soviet policies. Turkey maintains diplomatic relations with the USSR
and all the Eastern European satellites except East Germany.
61. Economic. In 1959 there was a sharp drop in Turkey=s
trade with the bloc accounted for largely by increased purchases in
the West following large credits made available to Turkey in 1958.
In the first eleven months of 1959 bloc trade dropped to about
$74, 000, 000 compared with total 1958 trade of $120, 000, 000. This
eleven month total represented 12. 5 percent of Turkey's total exports
and 9.6 percent of total imports, compared with 23. 7 percent of
exports and 18. 2 percent of imports during calendar 1958. While
Turkish consumers prefer Western goods, the bloc is willing to buy
marginal agricultural commodities such as low grade tobacco. No
new credits were extended by the bloc. All of the $17, 100, 000 in
bloc credits has been obligated and $8, 500, 000 drawn.
62. Subversive. There is little known Communist organization
in Turkey, and Turkish Communists remain virtually neutralized by
the security forces. The small flow of foreign propaganda is believed
to be effectively blocked. Bloc broadcasters have been unsuccessfully
trying to exploit Turkey=s chronic economic difficulties. Moscow does
not appear to be carrying on an active subversive campaign among
Turkey's Kurds.
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 63. Turkish Reaction. Ankara's agreement to the Khrushchev-
Menderes visits was apparently intended as a defensive move against
what it regards as a Western trend toward detente with the USSR,
and the government probably hopes that it will place Turkey in a
favorable position to take advantage of any post- summit improvement
in East-West relations. Ankara has emphasized that Turkey will
continue to base its foreign policy on its military pacts with the
West and that its strong pro-Western. orientation will not be affected
by the visits. Both the government party and the opposition
Republican People's Party are strongly anti-Communist. In
connection with the visits, however, Turkish officials have indicated
a readiness to conclude cultural and health agreements and possibly
an economic agreement with the USSR.
64. The Outlook. Any significant extension of bloc political
or economic influence will be to a great extent thwarted by ingrained
Turkish suspicion of and hostility toward Russia and toward Commu-
nism. No basic change in Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy is
anticipated, although.durther increases in bloc cultural contacts and
possibly economic contacts seem likely. Turkey is unlikely to accept
large amounts of bloc aid in the foreseeable future. Moscow's long
range prospects for establishing closer -economic ties probably
depend to a considerable degree on Ankara's success in coping
with its internal economic problems. with the help of the West.
ET
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