THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW 25-28 JULY 1964

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005959325
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: July 28, 1964

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THE PRESIDENT'S
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25 - 28 JULY 1964 50X1
2,6
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1. South Vietnam: The past few days have
been filled with conflicting reports that a
major governmental change is brewing.
They suggest that Khanh is under pressure
to step aside, and there has even been talk
of a coup. Nevertheless, there has not been
sufficient substance in all this to prove that
Khanh is losing control. He has indicated to
Ambassador Taylor, however, that he may have
some kind of showdown with General Minh, who
has opposed his recent "march north" theme.
On the military front, there has been no
large-scale attack since last Thursday. Ter-
rorist activity in the countryside, however,
remains quite high. During July there have
been 25 rural officials murdered by the Com-
munists and more than 70 kidnapped, the worst
monthly record this year.
A survey of the opinions of local com-
manders suggests that the morale of the South
Vietnamese soldiers is in general holding up
well, despite recent losses.
most commanders are confident
the pacification program will work, although
some feel there are too few forces available
for the total task in South Vietnam.
2. Laos: Preparations for "Operation Triangle"
have continued during the last few days, but
we still have no clear indication it is fully
under way.
(Cont'd)
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Rightist and neutralist forces have been
positioned in the areas around Pathet Lao
strongpoints at Phou Khoun and Muong Kassy.
In the Plaine des Jarres area, the rival
forces are still taking turns occupying Phou
Kout
Diplomatic interest is now centered on
Moscow, where Foreign Secretary Butler arrived
on the 27th. We expect the Soviets to repeat
to him their desire for a new 14-member con-
ference, claiming the US has made the work of
the co-chairmen impossible.
The Soviets may well intend to disengage
themselves as much as possible from a situation
where their ability to influence events has
steadily declined.
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3. Congo: Tshombe, back in Leopoldville
after his brief trip to the dissident areas
in the east, called the situation in Kivu
Province much worse than he had imagined.
Despite Tshombe's efforts to stiffen
resistance, the rebels continue to make ad-
vances. Following their takeover of Kindu,
they have occupied several towns in the
vicinity and small rebel bands apparently are
on the move toward Stanleyville. The US con-
sul in Stanleyville thinks it may be necessary
to evacuate dependents and unessential con-
sular personnel.
In Katanga, the government drive to re-
take Baudoinville appears to have petered
out.
4. Cyprus: Makarios is in Athens, where
Papandreou will probably urge him not to pro-
voke any new crisis on the island while talks
continue in Geneva.
Cont'd)
For The President Only - Top Secret
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The archbishop has taken an extremely
hard line lately, publicly declaring that he
intends to make no concessions. When he left
Nicosia Monday, he said he intended to restore
the "common line." Taken in the context of
his previous statements, he must have meant
that it is Athens that is out of step.
Papandreou has indicated he is now hope-
ful the Geneva talks will provide a way out
of the crisis. Besides the problem of Makarios,
however, there is still the extremely sticky
question of Turkish demands for a sovereign
area on Cyprus.
On the island, the Greek Cypriots are
continuing their economic and psychological
campaign against the Turkish Cypriots. They
have tightened the blockade of Turkish vil-
lages, stepped up harassment by small arms
fire, and are dropping propaganda leaflets
encouraging the Turkish Cypriots to desert
their leaders and make peace.
5. Cuba-USSR: Since the beginning of May
at least 5,000 Soviet military personnel have
left Cuba.
(Cont 'd)
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We believe only about 2,000 Soviet tech-
nicians and advisers remain on the island.
No Soviet operational or combat units are
known to be in Cuba.
One Soviet passenger ship is en route
to Cuba. There are indications that it will
take Cubans to the USSR for military training.
6. Haiti: Duvalier's brutality has encour-
aged renewed military plotting for his over-
throw.
The Haitian Chief of Staff, General
Constant, is said to be ready to move, but we
are as yet uncertain of both his ability and
his determination. Members of the plotting
group are seeking--
--to arrange a meeting with Ambassador
The ambassador, however, is waiting to
more on their organization and plans.
Timmons.
hear
Meanwhile, the handful of rebels that
landed last month has returned to the Domini-
can Republic. Their losses were reported to
be two dead, both by drowning. Other small
groups still may be operating in southeastern
Haiti.
7. Maphilindo: The Filipinos are going to
try again to arrange a tripartite foreign
ministers' meeting.
(Cont'd)
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8. Malaysia: The Singapore riots have
worsened already tricky relations between the
Chinese-dominated government there and the
Malay-controlled central government in Kuala
Lumpur.
The Singapore leaders believe Kuala Lumpur
was too slow in moving against the Malay ex-
tremists, who seem to have touched off the
rioting. They also fear they have lost support
among Singapore Chinese, and may now feel they
must stand up to the Tunku or lose out com-
pletely.
9. Portugal
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10. Tanganyika - Communist China: The Tangan-
yikans,having had no success with Western
sources, may be turning to Peiping for arms
11.
Lebanon: President Shihab is reported
giving in .to military pressure to run for a
second term.
12. India: Demonstrations over the shortage
and rising prices of food grains are becoming
widespread throughout India. A threatened
strike by port workers in Bombay--which would
tie up unloading of PL-480 supplies--may make
the situation worse.
State governments are trying to force
speculators to sell their hoarded supplies,
and the Shastri government is under growing
pressure to alleviate the situation.
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13. Iraq: Public opposition to the recent
nationalization decrees have the Arif regime
worried. Security forces were alerted last
weekend and a number of arrests were made.
The regime continues to be generally un-
popular and its control is shaky at best, but
we still have no clear evidence of the kind
of organized resistance needed to remove it.
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