THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 FEBRUARY 1965 SPECIAL ISSUE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005967512
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: February 9, 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
SPECIAL ISSUE
9 FEBRUARY 1965
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DAILY BRIEF
9 FEBRUARY 1965
Vietnam
Communist Military Activity: Discerni-
ble Communist military reaction to the
US and South-Vietnamese air strikes on
Dong Hoi and Chap Le remains minimal.
North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist
aircrait apparently were not sent up al-
though radars were tracking the raids.
The North Vietnamese Navy, at least, is
still on alert,and units are under or-
ders to resist further attacks.
Since about the time of the US air
strike at Dong Hoi on 7 February, radio
silence has been maintained on certain
North Vietnamese ground force communica-
tions nets: those in southern North
Vietnam, some in Laos, that of the pos-
sible North Vietnamese headquarters ele-
ment recently located in South Vietnam,
and those serving the Viet Cong infil-
tration routes. It is difficult now to ?
determine whether this constitutes a de-
fensive measure or reflects preparations
for future actions. In. any case, we have
never before seen anything on this scale
in North Vietnamese communications.
Viet Cong Activity: Within South Vietnam,
other Viet Cong attacks occurring almost
simultaneously with the Pleiku attack
on 7 February suggest a general intensi-
fication of Viet Cong activity follow-
ing the end of the New Year cease-fire.
In Quang Tin Province, an estimated
Viet Cong battalion lost 220 men in an
attack on a government post. There are
also preliminary reports of two battalion-
sized attacks in the Binh Dinh Province.
On 8 February, the Viet Cong's Libera-
tion Armed Forces Command broadcast a
call to "strike strongly" to "protect
the north and liberate the south."
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Communist China: Peiping is develop-
ing a major propaganda campaign. How-
ever, the Chinese, even in a strong
government statement of 9 January which
repeats earlier warnings that the.Chi-
nese people will "not stand idly by,"
avoid any additional public commitment
of support for Hanoi. Peiping reiterates
its claim that the US attacks give the
Chinese and others the "right" to assist
Hanoi but is vague concerning the re-
sponse should the US "insist on expand-
ing the war."
The USSR: Demonstrations against the
'US Embassy in Moscow have begun.
Soviet statements thus far suggest
that the USSR will go ahead in supply-
ing further military materiel to the
North Vietnamese. However, they ,also
show marked caution in making any far-
reaching commitment to Hanoi. An an-
alysis of the most recent Soviet state-
ments is at Annex.
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ANNEX
Soviet Reaction
Soviet reaction to. US air reprisals against
North Vietnam has reflected the difficulties con-
fronting Soviet leaders in their relations both
with the Asian Communist gbvernments and the US.
An 8 February Soviet Government statement--the first
authoritative comment from the USSR--was brief and
generally cautious. Although it condemned the US
reprisals and warned against any "illusion" that
such "aggression" can be carried out with impunity,
the statement did not advance the Soviet commitment
beyond earlier pledges of "necessary assistance" to
Hanoi.
Moscow declared that it "will be forced" to
join its allies in "further measures to safeguard
the security and to strengthen the defensive capa-
bility" of North VietdaM. Although this reaffirms
the USSR's readiness to provide a substantial in-
crease in military assistance, it does not appear
to signal any significant increase ?in the level of
aid envisaged prior to Kosygin's departure for Hanoi.
Soviet Premier Kosygin's 8 February speech in
Hanoi also carried no indication that the USSR in-
tends to undertake any far-reaching commitment in
North Vietnam in the aftermath of the US strikes on
the DRV. Kosygin couched the USSR's pledge of sup-
port for the Hanoi regime in rather general terms.
He asserted that ?"our internationalist duty is to
increase and consolidate the strength and national
defense potential of the socialist community." He
declared that "neither the DRV, nor the Soviet
Union, nor the CPR wanted war."
The Soviets also tried to influence US policy
by injecting a cautious warning that, although the
USSR favors further improvement in bilateral rela-
tions, "aggressive manifestations" might cancel out
steps already taken to improve relations:
(Continued)
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The trend of Soviet reaction thus far suggests
that the USSR will'continue to avoid military guar-
antees or specific commitments to defend North Viet-
nam. However, the Soviet Government statement is
considerably stronger than Khrushchev's reaction to
the Tonkin Gulf incidents last August. This attempt
to demonstrate support for North Vietnam reflects
the intention of the new Soviet leaders to regain
influence in Hanoi and to compete more effectively
with the Chinese Communists.
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