THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 1 OCTOBER 1965

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005967920
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: October 1, 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
1 OCTOBER 1965
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DAILY BRIEF
1 OCTOBER 1965
1. Indonesia
. 2. South Vietnam
The power play against anti-Commu-
nist army leaders this morning has been
followed by a countercoup attempt. The
situation is thoroughly confused and the
outcome is very much in doubt.
Sukarno's role if any in today's ac-
tivities is still one of the major unan-
swered questions. Both sides claim that
they are loyal to the President and both
say they are protecting him. '
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Six generals, including army commander
Yani, were apparently kidnapped by the
original plotters. At least two of these
Officers are said to have been killed and
others, including Yani and Defense Min-
ister Nasution, were wounded.
Major General Suharto led the coun-
tercoup a few hours later. He took over
the Djakarta radio/
It is not clear how the Indonesian
Communists will react. One report says
that the party is preparing for a clash
with the army in the next few days. The
army may also seek to reduce Communist
power while it has the chance.
Much depends on Sukarno's condition.
If he is dead or seriously disabled, a
bloody civil war could result. Another
possibility is a renewed effort by the
outer islands, particularly Sumatra, to
break loose from Javanese domination.
US military authorities have increased
their estimate of total enemy strength in
South Vietnam by 5,500.
This brings total estimated enemy
main force strength in South Vietnam to
76,100.
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3 . Dominican Republic
4. Cuba
5. Brazil
There may be trouble at the Univer-
sity of Santo Domingo tomorrow.
The university's governing body is
scheduled to meet,and a fight for control
of the school could result. A Communist-
backed insurgent group still has posses-
sion of the campus and continues to make
staff appointments.
Both sides claim to have Garcia Go-
doy's support. The President, however,
will probably not take sides tomorrow
but merely stand aside and accept the
outcome.
Sunday's gubernatorial elections
are likely to be very close in the two
states where the results will have an
important effect on future national po-
litical developments.
These two contests will affect the
fortunes of two aspirants for the presi-
dency in next year's elections. They
are also likely to influence the strat-
egy by which President Castello Branco
hopes to assure the continuity of his
democratic revolution. At Annex is a
more detailed assessment of the situa-
tion.
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6. France
7. Egypt
8. Greece
Nasir has changed prime ministers
and has shaken up the cabinet.
The new prime minister, former vice
president Zakariya Muhieddin, is more
of a moderate than his left-leaning
predecessor, Ali Sabri. In addition,
the cabinet now seems better equipped
to cope with Egypt's mounting internal
problems.
Nasir may have made these moves in
hopes of improving his chances for US
aid.
Stephanopoulos has no illusions
about the weakness of his newly formed
government.
The premier complained to the US
charg?ecently that he finds himself
in the middle with Papandreou's"gang-
sters" on one side and the "blackmailers"--
members of his government jockeying for
position--on the other. Stephanopoulos
also said that, unless his majority in
parliament increases from two to about
ten, he will not present himself before
parliament when it reconvenes next month.
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9. India-Pakistan
10. USSR
11. Congo
The Pakistanis are complaining of
"heavy" Indian attacks in the Chhamb
area There is as yet no
confirmation of the charge from UN ob-
servers, although the UN has reported
scattered shooting elsewhere in Kashmir.
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the Pakistani gerieral staff feels
that a cease-fire no longer exists. The
general staff sees a United Nations oc-
cupation of Kashmir as the alternative
to renewed warfare.
In New Delhi, Prime Minister Shastri
has also referred to the possibility of
fighting breaking out again "because of
the way Pakistan is behaving."
A Pakistani "friendship delegation"
is in Peking to attend Communist China's
anniversary celebrations today. The
delegation, headed by Minister of Com-
merce Ghulan Faraque, who is also a de-
fense adviser to Ayub, will very likely
sound the Chinese out on prospects for
help in rebuilding Pakistan's armed
forces.
The Soviets announced today that the
party's Twenty-Third Congress will take
place in late March 1966. Brezhnev and
Kosygin are scheduled to be the main
speakers. This is the best indication
to date that, despite numerous rumors to
the contrary, neither is slated for early
removal.
The political crisis may be coming
to a head. Former security chief Nendaka
has announced the formation of a new po-
litical alliance which will call for
Tshombe's resignation. There is little
doubt that President Kasavubu is behind
these maneuvers, or that Tshombe will
take his removal sitting down.
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ANNEX
The 3 October Elections in Brazil
The first direct gubernatorial elections to be
held since President Castello Branco assumed power
after Goulart's ouster in April 1964 are to take
place 3 October in half of Brazil's 22 states. The
contests in the states of Guanabara (the city of Rio
de Janeiro) and Minas Gerais are the only ones with
important national political implications.
In Guanabara, outgoing Governor Carlos Lacerda's
hand-picked man Flexa Ribeiro, is strongly challenged
by Francisco Negrao de Lima, joint candidate of the
two leading opposition forces. Negrao de Lima has
also received the endorsement of the Brazilian Com-
munist Party.
A victory for Ribeiro would boost Lacerda's
overriding ambition to become Brazil's next presi-
dent. The volatile Lacerda has bitterly opposed
many of the government's policies and Castello Branco
has deep misgivings over Lacerda's presidential as-
pirations. A victory by Negrao de Lima, on the other
hand, would to some extent be a popular rejection
of the revolution that brought Castello Branco to
power.
The race in Minas Gerais is also important.
Another outgoing governor, Magalhaes Pinto, is pin-
ning his hopes for the presidency on the victory of
his candidate in this election. The governor's can-
didate, his nephew Roberto Resende, is running a
close race with Israel Pinheiro. The latter is as-
sociated with the political machine of ex-President
Kubitschek and represents the free and easy style
of politics which Brazil's present leaders are de-
termined to eradicate.
Indications at the close of formal campaign-
ing last night were that the races are so close in
both Guanabara and Minas Gerais that no candidate
may receive a majority. If this happens the con-
tests will be thrown to the state legislatures for
decision.
(Cont'd)
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ANNEX (Cont'd)
Castello Branco will be under pressure from his
hard-line colleagues in the military to find a way
to prevent the installation of the Communist-supported
Negrao de Lima if he should win in Guanabara. The
President is expected, however, to abide by his ear-
lier public statement that the winners will be per-
mitted to take office.
The election outcome may well lead Castello
Branco toward the formulation of a strategy aimed
at assuring the continuation of his democratic and
revolutionary policies beyond his own presidential
term, which ends in March 1967. Determined to pre-
vent national leadership from again falling into
the hands of political extremists or corrupt poli-
ticians, he has been giving some thought to a con-
stitutional change that would have the next presi-
dent elected indirectly.
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