THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 NOVEMBER 1965

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005968023
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: November 30, 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
30 NOVEMBER 1965
"TOP-S-EGRE---1_
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DAILY BRIEF
30 NOVEMBER 1965
1. Communist China Chinese units along the Indian bor-
der continue on a modified alert status.
2. North Vietnam
Intercepted Chinese Air Force mes-
sages indicate that Peking may for the
first time have deployed a few bomber
aircraft to Tibet.
Concurrent with these developments
are continuing minor border clashes and
numerous protests and counterprotests
over alleged Indian and Chinese border
incursions. Both sides continue to
make use of the excellent weather for
aggressive forward patrolling. More
clashes are likely, but there is no evi-
dence suggesting a major Chinese assault
on India in the near future.
Hanoi is sending one of its Polit-
buro members, along with a group of eco-
nomic experts, on another trip in search
of aid. The group is now in Peking, and
will go on from there to the Soviet Union
and North Korea. Peking's attitude to-
ward the delegation so far has been cor-
rect but not particularly enthusiastic.
The same emissary from Hanoi made
a similar trip less than six months ago.
This could mean that the North Vietnam-
ese have run into trouble getting earlier
agreements carried out or that their situ-
ation has deteriorated enough recently
to require more help.
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3. Indonesia
4. Soviet Union
5. France
6. France
The army is continuing to make gains
against the Communist Party and some of
its allies. Almost the entire top leader-
ship of the party has now been captured.
A ranking US Embassy officer gathered
the impression during a recent interview
with Sukarno that he is now reconciled to
the elimination of the Communist Party
itself as a political force.
Sukarno nevertheless retains consid-
erable room for maneuver. There is no
reason to believe that he has gone back
on his conviction that Communist elements
must be preserved in some form as a bal-
ance against the army in the national
government.
The Soviets may be preparing for an-
other attempt to make a soft landing on
the moon. Two of their space event sup-
port ships are in place and the moon will
be in optimum position between 2 and 6
December. Their most recent effort,
launched on 4 October, crashed on the
moon's surface.
De Gaulle's followers are becoming
concerned over the president's prospects
in Sunday's election. They had hoped he
would win at least 60% ,of the vote, but
the latest polls show a sharp drop in
his popularity and some Gaullist leaders
now concede that he may not even receive
an absolute majority.
De Gaulle would undoubtedly win a
runoff election, but this would diminish
his personal prestige.
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7. Brazil
8. Ecuador
9. Communist China
The military hard-liners are threat-
ening to get out of hand again.
One of their popular leaders was
arrested early this week. He had pub-
licly protested President Castello
Branco's pledge to permit the inaugura-
tion on Sunday of Negrao de Lima, re-
cently elected governor of Guanabara
State. Negrao de Lima is anathema to
the hard-liners.
The situation is discussed
further at Annex.
The ouster of Colonel Freile from
the ruling junta yesterday is a reflec-
tion of the continuing rivalries within
the Ecuadorean military establishment.
Several air force commanders, known to
be Freile supporters, have also been re-
moved.
Freile is now said to be under de-
tention, but will almost certainly be
heard from further. He has an overrid-
ing ambition to be president.
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ANNEX
The Political Situation in Brazil
Current developments in Brazil reveal a num-
ber of trends that are disturbing. Most serious is
President Castello Branco's inability to head off
pressure from the hard-line army officers. These
officers periodically raise protests against the
government, protests which are now becoming more
vocal and more serious.
At the moment, the President is under heavy
criticism for refusing to prohibit the newly elected
governor of Guanabara, Negrao de Lima, from taking
office on 5 December. Ne-
grao de Lima's close association with former presi-
dent Kubitschek and his public acceptance of Commu-
nist Party support during the campaign make him the
symbol of the corruption and softness toward Commu-
nism that the military revolt of early 1964 hoped
to eliminate./
Castello Branco realizes that he must check the
erosion of discipline within the army. He is moving
to place his supporters in key posts, particularly
in the First Army, which is headquartered in Rio de
Janeiro where hard-line strength is centered. The
President's prospects for regaining full control
over the military have been hurt, however, by what
seems to be the beginning of a serious split between
him and War Minister Costa e Silva, a powerful figure
in the armed forces. Differences between Castello
Branco and the war minister are likely to grow be-
cause of the president's unwillingness to_support
Costa e Silva's presidential ambitions.
Complicating the situation are opposition po-
litical leaders, such as Carlos Lacerda, who are
working on the sidelines to exploit the unsettled
conditions by goading the hard-liners into open con-
flict with the regime.
(Cont' d)
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ANNEX (Cont'd)
Thus, Castello Branco's authority is in jeopardy
despite the vast powers that he received under the
Second Institutional Act of 27 October. Part of the
problem, of course, is that he is basically a moderate
and does not want to impose a dictatorship. The
danger is that, should another crisis develop, he
may feel forced either to wield fully the unlimited
authority open to him under the Institutional Act or
resign out of helplessness.
Unless the pressures from the hard-liners are
contained, Brazil may fall under a full military dic-
tatorship. Were Castello Branco to win out in a con-
frontation with the officers the dictatorship would
be relatively benign and cordial to US interests.
Should the hard-line win out, the resulting regime
would be ultranationalist, repressive, and might
well ultimately result in widespread domestic dis-
orders. In either case, the inevitable worsening
of relations between Brazil and the majority of
Latin American states would seriously complicate
US diplomacy in the hemisphere.
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