THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 25 MARCH 1966

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005968223
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: March 25, 1966

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
25 MARCH 1966
23
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
:AJA1
DAILY BRIEF
25 MARCH 1966
1. South Vietnam
2. Pakistan
Both Hue and Da Nang regained a
semblance of normality, today. The strike
at Da Nang has ended and there were no
mass meetings reported in either city.
Hue radio, however, continued to pour
out inflammatory propaganda. There are
also reports that a five-day strike may
be launched again in Da Nang beginning
tomorrow.
General Thi is still in Hue. He
is staying: quiet, but shows no intention
of returning to Saigon.
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
,/l//? I
3. Indonesia
4. Soviet Union
5. Soviet Union
General Suharto's effort to main-
tain some show of deference to Sukarno
seems the main reason for delay in the
announcement of a cabinet to replace the
present interim regime. The lingering
aura around Sukarno, as the "George Wash-
ington of Indonesia," is still a factor,
and the generals are hoping for Sukarno's
formal approval of the new cabinet list.
Sukarno's temporary emergence from
?
wraps the other night at a dazzling Paki-
stani reception in Djakarta dramatized
the extent of his decline. He appeared
in his brilliant bemedaled uniform, car-
rying his magic baton, and tried hard
to appear his old self. But his speech
was ignored 50X1
by many guests.
Moscow is buzzing with rumors that
the Soviet party congress which opens
on Tuesday will announce an unusually
large number of high-level personnel
shifts. Today's Annex discusses this
question as well as a number of the
other problems which will be aired at
the congress.
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
o0X1
6. Rhodesia
7. Turkey
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
:.)0X1
8. France
5
OX1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
:AJA1
ANNEX
The Soviet Party Congress
A Soviet party congress is remindful of an old-
time vaudeville show. Before it starts the audience
is never quite sure whether the thing will really
produce something new and exciting or merely turn
out to be a warmed-over variation of an old routine.
With Stalin, the congress became a rather dull af-
fair, but Khrushchev changed all that with his se-
cret speech at the congress in 1956 and again at
the 1961 congress with his decision to flaunt the
fight with China.
The congress opening on Tuesday will probably
fall somewhere between the two extremes. Brezhnev,
the man in charge of the show, not only lacks Khrush-
chev's dramatic bent, but*he also seems in no mood
for unnecessary trouble. Still there are a number
of sensitive issues which he must discuss and there
is no guarantee that he can completely control the
repercussions.
Brezhnev will set the tone for the congress in
his "accountability report" to the party--a speech
which sometimes goes on for as long as eight hours.
Its purpose is to defend the party's record in re-
cent years and to outline its plans for the future.
Brezhnev's foreign policy statement is likely
to focus mostly on past successes. His line on Viet-
nam will probably contain nothing new. His stand on
the Chinese problem is not clear, but the indications
are that he will not elect to carry the fight into
the congress. Overall, Brezhnev's aim will be to
serve up a convincing resume of Soviet efforts to
justify its claim of being the leading Communist
power.
In internal affairs, Brezhnev's touchiest task
will be to define the line on Khrushchev's ouster.
It is an open question just how far the criticisms
and charges will go, but they must go far enough to
justify the lambasting Khrushchev has already taken.
(Cont' d)
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
,/l//? I
ANNEX (Cont'd)
There is currently a great deal of talk in Mos-
cow that the congress will add to Khrushchev's sins
by blaming him for blackening Stalin unnecessarily.
In the process, it is expected that Brezhnev will
come out with a new formulation on Stalin--one that
recognizes his "achievements" as well as his "faults."
The problem here is that the party is not interested
in a rehabilitation of Stalin per se, but finds it-
self under considerable pressure to set the record
straight by acknowledging the achievements of the
Stalin era.
? This kind of tinkering is bound to be danger-
ous even if it is handled cautiously. It can only
encourage the conservative elements in the Soviet
Union and put a new scare into the "liberals." In
time, this could even lead to factional fighting not
only in the Soviet party but also in the parties of
Eastern Europe and the free world. In all likeli-
hood, Brezhnev will try to get by with a minimum
statement.
A number of other subjects will be taken up.
Kosygin will speak at length on the new five-year
plan, but we expect nothing new because most of the
decisions were published last month. There will
also be an attempt to clarify the role of the party
in relation to the economic leadership--the problem
of how to lead without meddling. This has always
been a nasty issue. We also expect to hear a great
deal of talk about the indifference of Soviet youth
to ideology.
If there are any dramatic moments at the con-
gress they might come during the discussions follow-
ing the presentation of the formal reports. The
well-prepared scenario could break down if some of
the foreign party delegations try to debate the Chi-
nese problem. There is also a chance of some fire-
works resulting from the new words on Stalin.
The final order of business will be the "elec-
tion" of a new Central Committee, which in turn will
"elect" the real leadership--the members of the party
-2-
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7 ?
ANNEX (Cont'd)
presidium. We anticipate a sizable turnover in both
groups, but not among the individuals who really
count.
It will be interesting to see who gets
passed over, but much more instructive to find out
the kind of younger men who are about to enter the
inner circle.
-3-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004400100001-7