THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 OCTOBER 1966

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005968570
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: October 11, 1966

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
11 OCTOBER 1966
23
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DAILY BRIEF
11 OCTOBER 1966
1. North Vietnam
2. Israel
the atmosphere in Hanoi as un-
compromising.
The Hanoi leadership
committed to a long war
which would require further sacrifices
by the population, but confident the
country could withstand any US attacks.
Hanoi plans to fight, however, with
its own forces, calling on the Commu-
nist countries only for material aid.
the
Vietnamese wished to avoid Chinese in-
tervention.
the
Vietnamese were "more inflexible than
ever" in insisting on their four points
as a basis for a political settlement.
Since the death of four Israeli
policemen from a landmine set by Syrian
infiltrators last Saturday, the Israeli
Government has been under pressure to
strike back. By appealing to the US and
the UN Security Council for pressure on
Syria to stop infiltration, Israel may be
attempting to provide justification for
vigorous retaliation.
The Syrians are likely to provide
a pretext for Israeli military action.
In an interview broadcast today in Damas-
cus, Syrian Prime Minister Zuayyin charged
that Israel was engaged in a conspiracy
to bring down the Syrian Government. He
declared that in response to any Israeli
move, Syria will "inflame the area" and
make Israel a "graveyard."
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3. Soviet Union
4. Laos
The Laotian political picture was
even more complicated than usual when
Premier Souvanna Phouma left on his
current visit to Washington and New
York. The situation he left behind is
briefly discussed at Annex.
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ANNEX
A Prince in Politics
Souvanna Phouma has sur-
vived innumerable crises in
his four tours as premier of
Laos during the past fifteen
years, and he is now facing
another with full confidence
in his ability to surmount
it. In fact, Souvanna
brought on the current crisis
deliberately when it became
apparent that the National
Assembly was not going to
submit meekly to his guid-
ance.
The present Assembly,
which includes many quite
young deputies, has been
feuding with Souvanna since
it came into being last year.
Souvanna has shown little
inclination to compromise,
and his inflexibility and arrogance in dealing with
the Assembly has sharpened differences. Finally,
last month the Assembly refused to approve Souvanna's
budget, and Souvanna--choosing to regard this as a
vote of no confidence--urged the King to dissolve
the Assembly and call a general election.
SOUVANNA PHOUMA
The King, who is considerably more than a figure-
head, was reluctant to dissolve the Assembly since he
recognized that Souvanna himself was at least equally
to blame for the wrangling. The King's council fi-
nally decided on dissolution by a narrow margin, how-
ever, thereby enabling Souvanna to set off on his
trip to the US. Dissolution is an unprecedented step
in Laotian politics and nobody is quite sure when or
how elections will be held or what the outcome is
likely to be.
The prospect of a change in the Laotian Goyern-
ment raises the question of the fate of the triPar-
tite principle that has nominally prevailed since
(Cont' d)
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ANNEX (Cont'd)
mid-1962 when Souvanna began his present term as
premier. The Geneva conference of that year had
attempted to resolve the Laotian tangle by appor-
tioning government posts among the leftists, right-
ists, and neutralists. During the past few years
the Communists have refused to participate in the
coalition government, but they have maintained an
uneasy recognition of the legality of the govern-
ment--punctuated by frequent loud accusations.that
it has sold out to the imperialists.
Souvanna, both politically and personally,
embodies the principal elements in the Laotian po-
litical scene. He is related to the royal family,
is a half-brother of the Laotian Communist leader,
and has chosen a politically neutral role for him-
self. Educated in France, his combination of old-
fashioned French civility and oriental arrogance
has served him well in the Laotian political jungle.
He is almost sure to continue as premier since no
other political figure in Laos offers such a range
of qualifications.
Both Souvanna and the King fancy themselves
experts on Soviet policy toward Laos. They are
now arguing that tripartitism can be abandoned
without seriously offending the Russians because
the Laotian Communist movement is now irrevocably
in the Chinese camp. This is a dubious proposi-
tion, and Souvanna and the King are probably trying
it out on various people to see what reactions
they can elicit. The government that eventually
emerges in Laos is likely to retain at least ves-
tiges of the tripartite framework.
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