THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 NOVEMBER 1966
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005968611
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
September 16, 2015
Document Release Date:
September 16, 2015
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 3, 1966
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800140001-9
The President's Daily Brief
"Thp--Seelaa___ 3 November 1966
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DAILY BRIEF
3 NOVEMBER 1966
1. North Vietnam
2. North Vietnam
3. South Vietnam
For the second day in a row North
Vietnamese MIG-21 fighters tried to
down a US electronics reconnaissance
plane near Yen Bai. There were no losses
either to the enemy or to the US escort
planes but in today's action the North
Vietnamese pilots were unusually aggres-
sive and, contrary to their usual prac-
tice, were willing to carry on the fight
beyond the initial intercept.
This kind of activity could well
mean that a new period of aggressive-
ness by enemy fighters is about to set
in. It may also indicate that they are
mounting a special effort against our
electronics missions.
US Marines have captured a docu-
ment that throws some new light on meas-
ures taken by Hanoi to counter increased
participation in the war by US forces
in 1965. This find is summarized at
Annex.
The Saigon embassy reports that
consumer prices, which had risen by five
percent during the week ending 24 Octo-
ber, climbed another five percent be-
tween the 24th and 28th. This marks a
sharp reverse to the downward trend of
the past several weeks.
One of the factors at work here is
nervousness on the part of the merchants
because of the resignation of Economy
Minister Thanh and Thanh's warnings of
impending economic trouble. Another fac-
tor is the continuing upward trend in
rice prices caused by the Mekong flood.
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4. Communist China
5. Arab World
6. West Germany
The massive Red Guard rally in
Peking today points to continuation of
the deadlock between opposing groups
inside the top leadership.
Two million people turned out to
hear a short speech by Lin Piao. Lin
repeated his usual slogans, but sounded
more defensive than previously. At some
points he seemed to be appealing for
broader support from outside the party
and for backing from uncommitted ele-
ments within the party.
Syrian and Jordanian forces are
alert for Israeli raids which both ex-
pect to be launched against them momen-
tarily. The Syrians are also issuing
strident new blasts against the "impe-
rialists," particularly the US. Neither
the alerts nor Syrian threats are likely
to deter the raiders, however.
Erhard conceded last night that
he may have to step down. At the same
time, however, he insisted that he will
go on trying to put together a majority
government.
He seems to be hoping that the two
state elections later this month might
demonstrate anew his one-time popular
appeal. This is a thin reed; his party
is generally expected to suffer further
losses. The first of the two state
elections is on Sunday in Hesse--a So-
cialist stronghold--and may give Erhard's
party colleagues an opportunity for the
next move against him.
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7. Nigeria
8. Dominican Republic
9. Guatemala
Tensions are rising again as the
interregional talks on a constitutional
settlement remain stalemated. There is
good evidence that the secession-minded
Eastern region is trying to arrange
clandestine arms deliveries from Europe.
Elements of the Nigerian military
are aware of this and are now pressing
for pre-emptive military action against
the East.
President Balaguer is being urged
to adopt more authori-
tarian tactics. This is one reaction
in his administration to the gains made
last weekend by militant radicals in
the biggest opposition party.(
The president is basically a mod-
erate, but right-wing pressures may
well become more and more difficult for
him to resist.
After a series of setbacks in the
field at the hands of the military,
the Communists have now resumed their
campaign of urban terrorism. The gov-
ernment declared a state of siege this
morning in the wake of a major robbery
and sabotage of a power station yester-
day near Guatemala City.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800140001-9
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ANNEX
A View of the War from Hanoi
A document captured by US Marines fighting North
Vietnamese forces just below the Demilitarized Zone
provides some new insights into Hanoi's response to
the enlarged role of the United States in the war in
1965. It discusses resolutions approved by two secret
meetings of the central committee of North Vietnam's
Communist Party.
In June of 1965, the central committee ordered
a massive mobilization of North Vietnamese manpower
to expand the regular army and provide for increased
infiltration into ?South Vietnam. This meeting also
ordered the organization of large construction crews
for the repair of bomb damage and issued instructions
for the establishment of "combat villages" along the
coast of North Vietnam and in the military region
along the Demilitarized Zone.
A more important meeting occurred in the autumn
of 1965. The resolution produced by this meeting
redefined the war as a single war with three theaters--
North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos. The principal
responsibility for all three theaters was placed on
the North Vietnamese Army. The resolution also re-
arranged Hanoi's long-standing national objectives
to give first priority to the war effort. This de-
cision has never been publicized since that would be
an admission that "building socialism"--previously
the number one objective--had been subordinated to
the successful prosecution of the war.
Communist concern over the disclosure of impor-
tant information through capture of documents by
allied forces is reflected in another document from
a Viet Cong - controlled area near Saigon. This
document refers to the loss of a "historic resolution"
to the enemy--probably the directive captured by the
Marines.
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A004800140001-9