THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 23 SEPTEMBER 1967
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0005974028
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
September 16, 2015
Document Release Date:
September 16, 2015
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 23, 1967
File:
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The President's Daily Brief
--ralr--St2c-r-et_ 23 September 1967
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DAILY BRIEF
23 SEPTEMBER 1967
1. South Vietnam
2 Greece
3. France
It was more than just flimsy
charges that led :to the arrest yester-
day of former economy minister Thanh.
The US Embassy feels that the accusa-
tion that Thanh had been involved in
pro-Communist activities merits careful
investigation. It is based on informa-
tion from a high-ranking Viet Cong
officer captured last May.
Even so, an investigation into
Thanh's past has now become immeasur-
ably more difficult because of the
storm that has blown up over the heavy-
handed police action against him yes-
terday.
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SAKHALIN
SEA OF
OKHOTSK
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['Rona shiri
Vflabomai
SEA OF JAPAN
APAN
15 140 145
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PACIFIC
--
QCEAN
STATUTE MILES 370
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4. Soviet Union
5. Soviet Union
6. Soviet Union
Yesterday Moscow made its first
(and so far only) comment on Secretary
McNamara's antiballistic missile an-
nouncement. Tass quoted a Soviet
weekly which merely said that "this
step promises huge profits for US cor-
porations." This spare comment could
mean that the Soviet leadership is
still wrestling with how to react to
the US announcement.
There has been strikingly little
official reaction from the East Euro-
peans, who appear to,be,awaiting their
cue from Moscow.
Moscow's offer to discuss with
Japan the return of four islands seized
at the end of World War II is a double-
edged ploy. It is probably designed to
embarrass the US while complicating
life for Sato.
The Soviets presumably calculate
that a hint of flexibility on a long
dormant issue might encourage Sato to
stiffen his position on the status of
Okinawa during his Washington visit.
For his part, Sato has no illusions that
the Soviets will really concede any-
thing but may see the talks as a way
of deflecting domestic attention from
the Okinawa issue.
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Top Secret
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TOP SECRET
SPECIAL DAILY REPORT ON NORTH VIETNAM
FOR THE PRES I DENT'S EYES ONLY
TOP SECRET
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
23 September 1967
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* * *
Status of the Hanoi powerplant: Damage in-
flicted by air strikes against the Hanoi powerplant
limits current operation to about one-half of
installed capacity. This is in line with previous
forecasts which predicted restoration to full capa-
city by no sooner than the end of the year.
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* * *
Giap's Analysis of the War--Continued: The
last portion of the defense minister's analysis of
the war is now in hand. It contains nothing
startling and continues to profess confidence in
ultimate victory.
Giap reaffirms that, although the Vietnamese
Communists'cannot hope to match the number of US -
and allied troops in the south, they can nonethe-
less wage the war successfully--by maintaining a
"stalemate" until the US tires. He argues that
this can be done by improving the quality of the
Communist forces and by using superior tactics.
The North Vietnamese leader says he expects
the US soon to increase its troop strength in the
south by 50,000 and eventually by as many as
another 100,000 to 200,000. This does not matter,
he says. The Communists can counter this by giv-
ing a greater role to the irregulars and by in-
creasing irregular strength. This is a subject
that has been a controversial one in Hanoi. Giap
has long argued that the guerrillas have a very
important role to play, in conjunction with regular
forces. His opponents have argued that the guer-
rilla role should be subordinate to that of the
regulars.
Giap dismisses the concept of a "barrier"
across the northern portion of South Vietnam in a
few sentences, stating that it would be ineffective.
The problem of how best to defend North Viet-
nam also gets some attention. Giap refers both to
air defense and to ground invasion, which he
mentions as a possibility. He admits that some air
defense units have performed poorly and calls for
disciplinary measures against those whose "negli-
gence" has caused avoidable damage.
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