THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 29 SEPTEMBER 1967

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005974038
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: September 29, 1967

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The President's Daily Brief
7-)Slcr.e,t 29 September 1967
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DAILY BRIEF
29 SEPTEMBER 1967
1. Soviet Union
The latest National Intelligence
Estimate on Soviet foreign policy was
formally approved yesterday. Its prin-
cipal conclusions are:
--Soviet leaders have not outgrown
a dogmatic attitude that the world
should conform to their image of it.
Their foreign policies, nevertheless,
often reflect an understanding that
there are definite limits to Moscow's
ability to shape and exploit world
events. ?This ambivalence will probably
persist for some time.
--For instance, Soviet anxiety, to
avoid crises that could lead to .a con-
frontation will probably. continue to
govern Moscow's policy toward the US.
But at the same time, Moscow will be
disinclined to seek a significant im-
provement in relations. The Soviets
will remain reluctant to accept exten-
sive arms control and disarmament meas-
ures and will probably continue to re-
ject proposals to put real pressure on
Hanoi for a settlement in Vietnam.
--Elsewhere, the Soviets are likely
to take a prudent approach to China,
follow ambiguous policies in the Arab
States, and wage an active though wary
campaign to expand Soviet influence in
the Third World.
--There are apparently persistent
disagreements within the Soviet leader-
ship, some of which bear on foreign
policy. Among them are the problems of
resource allocation and of relations be-
tween the political and military hier-
archies. There are no signs, however,
of an early return to one-man rule.
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2. South Vietnam
3. Communist China
4. Arab States
Ky seems finally to have swung
into action to make sure the assembly
validates the election. On Wednesday
he met with the principal opponents of
validation and plans another meeting
with them today
King Husayn is going to Cairo to-
morrow in hopes of getting Nasir's
agreement on a plan for breaking the
Middle East deadlock. The King will
urge Nasir to accept the compromise US-
Soviet resolution which all the Arabs
opposed at the special United Nations
General Assembly last summer. If he is
successful, he intends to press for So-
viet backing during his trip to Moscow
next week.
Egyptian officials have already
said they could buy a resolution "along
the lines of" the US-Soviet resolution.
The Soviets, for their part, will want
assurances of broader Arab support be-
fore they take up the issue again. They
have said they will not try to browbeat
the wildmen in Syria and Algeria, who
presumably still oppose the resolution.
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5. Peru
6. Hong Kong
President Belaunde has some diffi-
cult days ahead of him. Prospects for
economic improvement have not risen ap-
preciably since devaluation early ?this
month and government leaders are afraid
the rising cost of living will lead to
disorders. Wrangling has intensified
within the President's own party, fur-
ther eroding public confidence in the
administration.
Relatively moderate Communist
leaders seem to be gradually getting
the upper hand over the militants who
favor continued violence. Terrorism
has been kept at a minimum for, the past
week. Moderate leaders still feel
obliged, however, to stress that they
favor efforts to erode British authority
and to imply that limited terrorism is
justified.
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