THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 5 AUGUST 1968

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1961-1969
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976287
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 16, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2015
• Publication Date: August 5, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
-Top-Se?zet_ 5 August 1968
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
5 AUGUST 1968
1. Israel-Jordan
2. Czechoslovakia-
Soviet Union
Jordan is calling for an emergency
meeting of the UN Security Council to
take up yesterday's Israeli attack.
The Jordanians will ask for "coercive
measures" against Israel. Last night,
when Jordanian Foreign Minister Rifai
told ambassadors of Security Council
states about the planned UN appeal, he
said 32 Jordanians had been killed in
the raid.
The Israelis have officially
stated that the air and artillery
strikes were in retaliation for recent
acts by the Arab terrorists. The Tel
Aviv announcement said the attacks were
launched against bases used by these
terrorists.
From the things Dubcek said--and
left unsaid--in his speech to the
nation last night, it appears he has
bought the right to continue his domes-
tic reforms. The price, however, looks
high and includes giving up thoughts of
independent economic, defense, and for-
eign policies. Furthermore, the word-
ing of the Bratislava declaration indi-
cates that Dubcek's Soviet and East Eu-
ropean colleagues will be keeping a
close watch on developments in Czecho-
slovakia.
No participant at Bratislava came
away completely satisfied. Hungarian
party boss Kadar has been quoted say-
ing "differences" still remain. The
fact that Dubcek came off with his do-
mestic program reasonably intact is cer-
tainly one of those differences and one
that is likely to be felt in other East
European countries where liberalism is
considered an infectious disease.
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3. South Vietnam
4. Brazil
5. Canada
There is increasing evidence in
all four corps areas that the Commu-
nists are nearly ready to attack.
Prisoners report as many as eight bat-
talions moving on Saigon. Pleiku and
Da Nang may also be targets. Exact
timing is not certain, although some
Viet Cong units have been alerted for
a "third round" offensive to begin
within the next two weeks.
Vacation is over, Brazilian stu-
dents are returning to class, and the
government has failed to do anything
about the badly needed educational re-
forms. The prospects for a new round
of riots are excellent. This time some
labor unions may join the students.
Costa e Silva seems unwilling to
take any decisive action that would
help solve Brazil's growing problems.
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6. Soviet Union
Moscow is trying to put together
a new organization that would be open
competition for the International
Telecommunications Satellite Consor-
tium (INTELSAT). The Russians 50X1
claim they 5UAl
are making their proposal to most United
Nations members. Many of the 62 nations
belonging to INTELSAT would be included.
The Soviet plan does not look as
if it would cause defections from IN-
TELSAT, but it does have some provi-
sions that INTELSAT members would like
to have in their contracts. In this
respect, the existence of the Soviet
plan as a second option will complicate
negotiations for long-term INTELSAT
agreements next year.
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ToL Secret
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
Top Secret
16
5 August 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
5 August 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Shipping Report: Foreign flag merchant shipping
to North Vietnam during July declined from the pre-
ceding record-breaking month. In July, 39 arrivals
were recorded in North Vietnamese ports, including six
tankers and three cargo ships. This is the lowest num-
ber of foreign flag arrivals since February 1968 when
there were 29 arrivals.
? Dry cargo deliveries to North Vietnam during
July totaled about 148,000 tons. This compares closely
with the average monthly figure for dry cargo deliver-
ies noted thus far in 1968. It is a significant de-
crease, however, when compared with the months of May
and June.
* * *
Hanoi Hints at Further Pilot Releases: During
their conversations with Ambassador Sullivan in Vien-
tiane, the three recently released US pilots stated
that their decision to return home by commercial air
rather than military resulted from several broad
statements made to them by the North Vietnamese sug-
gesting that three more pilots might be released if
the present group's return was "satisfactory." The
pilots got the impression, Although the North Viet-
namese did not spell it out, that returning home com-
mercially would be one of the conditions for a "satis-
factory" rating.
Hanoi has never set out any specific conditions
for releasing pilots, but the North Vietnamese have
muttered unpleasantly in the past over the use of
government aircraft for returnees.
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Still No Evidence of North Vietnamese Involve-
ment in Udorn Attack: Ambassador Unger has poured
cold water on Thai allegations that Hanoi was re-
sponsible for the 26 July attack. He states that,
contrary to Deputy Prime Minister Praphat's claims,
there were no documents that proved Hanoi's involve-
ment found on the bodies of the two terrorists killed
in the attack. While the attack on the air base
would have Hanoi's blessing, local Communists seem
to have been the ones who carried it out.
* * *
Hanoi Calls on Population for Further Efforts:
In an editorial on 3 August, Nan Danh quotes an appeal
from President Ho for "our 31 million compatriots" to
overcome all hardships and sacrifices and for the
Northern compatriots to heighten their vigilance
against "espionage and psychological war tricks" of
the US "aggressor." By strengthening local and na-
tional security, by "developing production," and by
wholeheartedly helping the kith and kin in the
South, the Northern compatriots and combatants will
fulfill the "great rear's duties toward the great
front line."
* * *
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
.ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report today.
-2-
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