THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF (AFTERNOON) 27 JANUARY 1969

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0005976585
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
18
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 24, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 27, 1969
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon DOC_0005976585.pdf425.42 KB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 The President's Daily Brief 50X1 27 January 1969 (Afternoon) 7f 19 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 32 CYPRUS *Nicosia( FT Israeli-controlled areas following June 1967 hostilities ?32? Ale62a.r4ria ?28? Mediterranean Sea Port Said Ismailia Suez Canal Cairo UNITED R AB REPUBLIC (E e Y P T) 50 100 MILES -24- 32 Suez 36 Latakia' I Beirut Half ISRAEL / .Hamah SYRIA LEBANON *Damascus GOLAN HEIGHTS Tel Aviv) / WEST z Yafo* \ BANK .(.d * Amman L q ?Jeru alem I' Dead GAZA STRIP /f' y) Sea VI ( \ . ? \ / JORDAN \ / \ / \ \ ) ?\ \// ., ric Ela/ Aqaba Yarmuk R. SINAI PENINSULA Hurghada Qina ASWAN HIGH DAM 36 o Sharm ash- Shaykh Red Sea SAUDI ?32- -28 ARABIA -24- 93478 1-69 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 FOR TIRE PRE,S1DEN4 ()NLY MAJOR PROBLEMS MIDDLE EAST Baghdad radio has announced that 15 "Israeli spies," including nine Iraqi Jews, were-hanged this morning. The embassy in Tel Aviv thinks the Israelis, however outraged, will find it hard to find a way to retaliate which would not further endanger the lives. of the some 5,000 Jews in Iraq. Prime Minister Eshkol's first reaction was to note in a speech before the Knesset today that the executions showed what fate would be in store for Jews if the Arab gov- ernments "could do as they pleased." The Israelis will cer- tainly play on this theme of Arab treatment of subject Jew- ish minorities to parry Arab complaints about their refugee policies. They may also hit the some 20,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan especially hard if and when they carry out an- other retaliatory raid against Jordan. EUROPE 50X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SOVIET AFFAIRS Seven Soviet TU-95 long-range bombers carried out re- connaissance flights against the west coast of Alaska on Sat- urday. None of the aircraft in this well-coordinated mission 50X1 50X1 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY entered US airspace, but two of them approached to about 30 miles from the northwest coast of Alaska. These flights may signal the resumption of simulated strike missions against the northern coast of North America, similar to missions flown early last year by Soviet long-rangeaircraft. Czechoslovakia has been quiet throughout the day. VIETNAM Communist presentations at Saturday's meeting provide no clues to Hanoi's negotiating tactics or the positions it eventually will take on substantive matters. The only "sub- stance" in the Communist statements was in the repetition of broad propaganda statements which are intended to cover a. wide range of negotiating procedures and which do not commit the Communists to any specific course. The DRV and Libera- tion Front rejection of the US proposal on the DMZ is only another indication that the Communists are not receptive to separate handling of military and political issues. We cannot say how. the Communists will attempt to get into substantive matters in Paris but we think they are un-- likely to show their cards in the formal sessions. Long be- fore that happens, they will try to get some idea of what political arrangements the US is willing to consider for South Vietnam. We believe this is their major objective at. this stage. They may simply wait for some US initiative but it seems likely they will also make some efforts in FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY private or through third parties to find out which way the new US administration is headed. The French views about Hanoi's thinking are almost certainly Vietnamese officials and may have been in part a reflection of such an approach. based on recent conversations with North There has been substantial movement during the last year in the climate of South Vietnamese opinion regarding negotiation with the National Liberation Front. Before the Tet offensive, most nationalists assumed that the NLF would eventually be destroyed. In April 1968, when the former peace candidate for the presidency, Truong Dinh Dzu, told newsmen that he favored talking to the Front, most nation- alists felt that he richly deserved to be arrested. This strongly anti-Front climate was partly responsible for the dismissal of the government of Prime Minister Loc in May and for the quick adoption of a harder anti-Front line by Prime Minister Huong. Since the initial Shock that followed the 31 October announcement that the US would sit down with the NLF, Viet- namese nationalists have gradually come to accept the idea that some kind of a deal will have to be made with it. Al- though Ky's-December remarks about. dealing with the Front as a "reality" but not as an "entity" have.never appeared' in the Vietnamese press, they have been widely discussed without causing much adverse reaction.. 4 FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006700210001-0 CHINA 22- BURMA 20- 18- 16- 14- BANGKOK 12- 10- 192 104 106 BaciLac? ?\,? .? ? k c-144 NI. ? , ? ?-idY:d;-":1Ye'n tiai ? ?.? . td? s'4 -1 id Hoa Binh' .? /1 Nam Dinh? ?,? .;I?Th.anh Hoa?{1 4*k?,,I,11, NORTH (Prg.A-,16; VIETNAM , Vinh t s'lHaTinh 14:::' ? .Udon Thani7 THAILAND 0 GULF OF SIAM Battam bang VIETNAM 0 25 50 75 WO 125 MILES 102 .Ning-ming ? . ? Thai j'Lang Son Nguyen ? ? ? I .Kep '4411 ?- ,Hon Car ? $ila'Phong ? ? HANOI? 108 .Nan-ning CHINA --\CAMBODIA PHNOM PENH 104 Can Tho. GULF OF TONKIX' Hoi - ?Vinh Linh ot??,-,c.4\ ?1,)emarcation Line .Quang In -22 Loc Ninh jay Ninh III CORPS IV IGON " )11."-sEle Nan tAd?-?`,& ? ? g .7tirtpRPS 4414 -18 -16 SOUTH VIETNAM Quang Ngai Va. 41 Pleiku, . 4\ -14 'CI t :IL; e'A A r,1 ui hon ? - i r '. II '1/ Cd PS ,- Ile9 A , ' ' \44: 4A'4 ? ?Vkti/ ? Biahn.',0Mte O.' ? 4,,,, ..--.., ...... k..... '7.-$:-Nha Trang ? .t.?. ., is- 7/ , ? r -12 d'il Sili? ' ... 1r C. fi pm Ranh Phan Rang ...., .,. Orihnr..r- ,f , ..; 644i:7,0_1v --rri My Tho. IV CORPS .Ca Mau, 106 \ Vung Tau