THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 6 FEBRUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976604
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 6, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
6 February 1969
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TOP SECRET
LATE NOES EOR THE PRESIDENT DAWZ BRIEF OF
6 FEBRUARY 1969
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7 February 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
6 FEBRUARY 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
General Bull, the chief of the UN observer force,
has gone to Cairo with an Israeli complaint about
Egyptian sniper fire across the Suez Canal. The Is-
raelis also asked him to inform the Egyptian Govern-
ment that their boats will be patrolling the eastern
half of the Gulf of Suez from now on. Cairo is sure
to consider this an encroachment on its domain.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
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TASS last night reported President Nixon's news
conference, highlighting the announcement of the trip
to Europe. It made no editorial comment. (FBIS 57,
6 Feb 69)
EUROPE
VIETNAM
There is nothing significant to report.
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
PERU
Velasco yesterday told the Peruvians at large
what his government had told the International Petro-
leum Company a few hours earlier--that Peru is claiming
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over $690 million from the company for "unjust enrich-
ment." This is more than five times what Peruvian
officials were earlier claiming the company owes on
this score. Velasco once again affirmed Peru's friend-
ship toward the US, but he did take a swipe at
the Hickenlooper amendment, asserting that it must
(FBIS 46-48,
be abolished "and never again mentioned."
The Peruvian press has noted that the deadline
for the payment of another bill--the $15 million the
Peruvians are claiming for the products processed by
the company since 9 October--has passed, and that the
petroleum agency in Lima has initiated proceedings to
sell the company properties involved. The head of the
agency has said, however, that it will take a week or
more to arrange the sale and the company can pay the
bill at any time until the sale is actually consum-
mated.
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TIM .11-IL IRESIDLIVI UNLY
MIDDLE EAST
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The Egyptians were premature in their claim in the
Cairo press about two weeks ago that the Soviets had
agreed to include 500,000 tons of wheat in the annual
2
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trade agreement. The press leaks may in facthave been
a tactic, to force the Soviets' hand.
Before the break in relations, the US under PL-480
supplied about one half of Egypt's annual import needs
of two million tons.
Cairo would expect Moscow to pick up this bur-
den. The Soviets have been extremely reluctant to do
so. In. 1967 they finally agreed to send 1.1 million tons
but only after much stalling. Last year no new contracts
were signed, although some of the 1967 wheat was not-
actually shipped until then.
EUROPE
There is nothing of significance to report.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
Kosygin apparently was back on the job today. He
and Brezhnev were among those at the railroad station
greeting Hungarian-party boss Kadar today, according
to a TASS dispatCh. The Soviet news agency, however,
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has recently issued conflicting reports concerning Kosy-
gin.'s whereabouts, so we are trying to confirm this one.
Czechoslovak party leader Dubcek has bounded back
from a brief illness
In a fighting speech yesterday, he took on
both extreme hardliners and ultraliberals in and out
of the party, and struck hard at Slovak party boss Husak,
who is attempting to negotiate a takeover of the party
central committee.
Dubcek's forceful appearance may give heart to pro-
gressives and moderates who were beginning to waver in their
loyalty, and may encourage them to go ahead with plans to
force an early party congress while they still have con-
trol of the leadership.
For this reason, the Soviets are opposed to a party
congress in the near future. They want to finish under-
mining Dubcek and his colleagues first.
VIETNAM
In their private meeting on 5 February, Ha Van Lau
strongly rejected Ambassador Vance's protest about Com-
munist shelling of Hue and firing from the DMZ. The line
he took was familiar and is likely to be heard many times
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PUK 11-1h kWh)IDLIN 1 (JINLY
in future sessions with Communist negotiators in Paris.
There is virtually no chance of any early change in Ha-
noi's fundamental position that matters south of the
17th Parallel must be discussed with the National Lib-
eration Front.
Ha Van-Lauls pointed reminder at the outset of the
meeting that the talks area "four-way conference" could
be taken as an. invitation to private discussions in which
both Saigon and the Front take part. We suspect, however,
that the Communists would consider the idea of four-way
private meetings of dubious value until after Ambassador
Lodge has- had a few private sessions with Le DuC Tho.
The North Vietnamese doubtless would beg off commenting
on South Vietnamese matters at such sessions by claiming
that only the Front iscompetent to discuss them. This
would not stop them from probing seriously for indications
of the new US administration's intentions, however.
It remains to be seen what effect, if any, the US
protest will have on Communist military activity in South
Vietnam. We doubt that it will deter them from any plans
already in train for selective attacks on urban centers.
While much of the evidence we have received on Commu-
nist plans point to renewed attacks in the III Corps - Sai-
gon area, there are signs of battle preparations in other
parts of the country as well. These preparations apparently
are proceeding at a slower pace, and evidence on timing is
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CHINA
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
not as explicit. In I Corps, captured documents reflect'
enemy intentions to attack Da Nang this month, as well as
plans for a "general attack" against a provincial capital
south of that city. The central highlands have also seen an
enemy buildup, probably to counter increased pacification ef-
forts there.
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Military action remained light. Communist sappers struck
another Civil Self-Defense office in downtown Saigon today,
wounding several guards and damaging the building. At least
seven other attacks have been staged in recent days against
Civil Self-Defense offices in Saigon. The Civilian Self-De-
fense forces are groups of citizens who have been partially
armed and trained to bolster local security. The Communists
hope through these attacks to disrupt government defense of
Saigon and to intimidate the civilians involved.
Thieu's government is worried that the US may use the
An Quang Buddhist peace campaign to pressure the government
into moving more rapidly in Paris. Minister of State Thuc
sought out a US Embassy officer in Saigon on 5 February and
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PUK "HE 1KESIDE1N1 VINLY
said that President Thieu has been "very worried" that the
US may be exhibiting "tolerance" of the Buddhists' activities.
Thuc said that Thieu and other high officials think the
US has already determined its peace policy and that if Sai-
gon does not go along, the US will seek Major changes in the
government leadership. Thuc's comments probably represent
widespread fears among many Vietnamese in and out of govern-
ment that the US will eventually support a "peace government"
in South Vietnam in order to end the war. The Thuc approach
represents an effort to gain reassurance that the US supports
the Thieu government.
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1-11K 11-1h FKL)11)hN 1 UN LY
I I OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
PHI LI PP I NES-MALAYSIA
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PUK .11-1E ?KEMPEN" UNLY
THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON
SIGNIFICANCE: The Soviet Mediterranean squadron, a few sur-
face ships and submarines in 1964, has grown to become the
largest naval force which the Soviets have regularly de-
ployed outside their own fleet operating areas. The squad-
ron swelled to more than forty ships during the Arab-Israeli
war in 1967 and has since leveled off at about thirty ships.
The effectiveness of the squadron as an instrument of policy
has grown as its combat capabilities have increased. The
image of the USSR as defender of Arab interests is being
conveyed more convincingly now than when the squadron was
first established, and the increased capabilities of the
squadron are intended to serve as a reminder to the US and
others that Soviet interests must be reckoned with in any
military moves in the Middle East.
Currently the Mediterranean squadron consists of 9 sur-
face combat ships, five submarines, and 11 auxiliaries. The
surface force normally includes a cruiser, two missile equipped
destroyers, several conventional destroyers and minesweepers,
and two amphibious landing ships. The surface ships spend
most of their time at anchorages or in port.
The squadron serves Soviet political as well as military
interests in the Mediterranean basin. It has extended Soviet
influence in the area, Strengthened the image of the USSR as
defender of Arab interests, and helped convey the impression
that the Mediterranean is not an -American lake."
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PUK 1 tIL FKL)11)1IN 1 UNLY
The effectiveness of the squadron as an instrument of
policy has risen as its combat capabilities have improved.
In this connection, the increased capabilities of the squad-
ron against aircraft carriers are particularly relevant.
The carriers of the US Sixth Fleet have in the past provided
the defensive shield for US military moves in the Middle East,
and the Soviets probably have come to regard US attack car-
riers more as an instrument of local or limited warfare than
as a strategic threat. They may believe that the presence
of an anticarrier force in the Mediterranean would cause the
US to pause before intervening militarily in future crises
in the area, and might, in turn, enable the Soviets to inter-
vene in some fashion themselves should the need arise.
Prior to the June War the threat to US carriers was
not impressive. There were few cruise missile launchers in
the force,-and.the-squadron as a whole was too small to pose
a convincing threat to the US Sixth Fleet. Although intelli-
gence collection ships were available, air reconnaissance
was not. Many of the ships in the squadron were older ves-
sels suitable for operating under cover of land-based fighter
aircraft but ill equipped for long-range, long-duration oper-
ations.
Since the June War, however, the capability of the squad-
ron against carriers has increased substantially. Most of
the time at least two cruise missile ships and a nuclear-
powered cruise missile submarine--mounting among them at
least 12 cruise missile launchers--operate with the squadron.
Reconnaissance aircraft are available, and the squadron's
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NM 1I-L1 l'i(131.1).LIN 1 (JINL, Y
air defenses have been improved by the deployment of more
SAM-equipped ships. The new types of ships now being as-
signed to the squadron are better equipped for long-range
operations, and the size and posture of the force have been
increased to the point that it has become a credible threat
to the Sixth Fleet.
In addition, frequent and extended calls in Arab ports--
most notably in Egypt--serve as a reminder of Soviet will-
ingness to back Arab interests. The assignment of a few
amphibious ships to the squadron adds to the impression that
the Soviets might be willing to intervene in behalf of Arab
interests. Actually, however, an amphibious force of some
400 troops has only symbolic military value.
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The Soviets normally, operate six to ten diesel sub-
marines and at least one nuclear unit in the Mediterranean.
The diesel submarines are now staying for about six months
before returning to Soviet waters and spend some of this
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PUK 1 tih FK1)11.)11N 1 U1NL Y
time in port. The nuclear units usually require no special
support and are generally not observed during their stay in
the Mediterranean. One of these units spent several days
in Alexandria last Month--the first visit to a nonbloc port
by a Soviet nuclear submarine. The submarines appear to be
in the Mediterranean to act as a counter to the more power-
ful Sixth Fleet
\and to gain real- 50X1
istic training in an area of potential conflict.
The squadron probably will not be enlarged much beyond
its present size. Its capabilities will continue to be im-
proved, however, by the regular deployment of newer and more
effective ships and submarines. The logistics burden of the
squadron may be reduced by the expanded use of Mediterranean
ports and by increasing the proportion of nuclear-powered
units in the squadron's submarine force.
The USSR has been granted the use of a naval oil storage
facility in Port Said has assigned a repair ship to Alex-
andria on a continuing basis, and may have assumed managerial
control of a ship construction and repair facility at Alex-
andria. We do not believe that the Soviets intend to estab-
lish military bases--in the sense of areas over which they
exercise sovereignty--in the Middle East, however. They
probably do not wish to risk involving themselves in this
way in future crises of peripheral consequence to Soviet in-
terests and beyond the ability of Moscow to control. Moreover,
they would not wish to tarnish their image by seeking for them-
selves the military bases which they have encouraged the Arabs
to deny to the "imperialists."
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Top Secret
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