THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 FEBRUARY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976614
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 12, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
12 February 1969
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13 February 1969
LATE NOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF OF
12 FEBRUARY 1969
I. MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
Yasir Arafat, the leader of Fatah and newly elected
head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, will visit
Beirut soon, and the Lebanese hope they can persuade him
to cooperate with their efforts to limit terrorist opera-
tions based in Lebanon. They regard Arafat as a poten-
tially moderate leader who does not want serious trouble
along the Lebanon-Israel border. They are unwilling to
push him too hard on the issue, however, for fear of
undermining his position among his fellow Palestinians.
EUROPE
SOVIET AFFAIRS
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VIETNAM
II,OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
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MAJOR PROBLEMS
MIDDLE EAST
Lebanon is trying hard to control terrorists oper-
ating within its borders.
These attempts are not likely to have much success.
The emotional hold the terrorists have in the Arab world is
so strong that most governments fear the domestic political
consequences of any action against them. The Lebanese in
fact are probably well aware of this, but they may hope that
a well publicized effort to control the terrorists will help
stay Israel's retaliatory hand.
Fatah, the biggest and most active of the Palestinian
terrorist groups, has begun to widen its horizons. Last
month Fatah picked up 31 seats on the national council of
the Palestine Liberation Organization, which since its es-
tablishment in 1964 has been viewed by Arab states as the
most legitimate vehicle for Palestinian nationalism. Using
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this platform, Fatah then managed to place three of its men
on the 11-man executive committee. Fatah's principal spokes-
man, Yasir Arafat, was elected chairman.
EUROPE
There is nothing of significance to report.
SOVIET AFFAIRS'
VIETNAM
Vietnamese Communist propaganda in the past two days
provides a preview of the line Hanoi and the Front are likely
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to take in tomorrow's session in Paris. The Communists have
focused squarely on the issue of US troop withdrawal as the
first order of business in the talks. While not abandoning
the priority they put on political issues, the Communists
are now saying that "unconditional" withdrawal of US forces
is the "key" issue in a settlement, implying that they hope
to get into broader questions via this one. They also in-
sist,as they have been doing for several weeks, that this
question must be resolved by the negotiators in Paris. They
seem genuinely concerned that a gradual US withdrawal worked
out between Saigon and Washington, and based essentially on
a strong allied military position, might significantly re-
duce pressure on the US to make political concessions to the
Communists.
The Communist view of the withdrawal issue was put most
authoritatively in a Nhan Dan commentary on 12 February de-
manding an immediate and '"unconditiOnal"*WithdraWal Of US
forces. This presumably means that for a while at least the
Communists will not discuss "mutual withdrawals." The Front's
Liberation Radio, taking its usual harder-than-Hanoi approach,
makes. this point explicitly by saying that only the US has
"external forces" in Vietnam and that there is "no question
of mutual withdrawal."
Despite the propaganda format of the current withdrawal
theme, there is good reason to believe that whenever private
substantive discussions begin, the Communists would like to
make this issue the first item on the agenda.
3
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Hanoi's propaganda position that "unconditional" withdrawal
is a nonnegotiable demand is simple bombast designed for
openers in any future private talks.
The Communists are well aware, however, that the US
withdrawal they seek will only come about as a result of
negotiations, and that eventually they will have to recipro-
cate by pulling out forces of their own. They doubtless
would prefer that their reciprocity on this issue take place
on an undeclared basis, much as it did on the bombing halt.
They may even try eventually to use unacknowledged, uni-
lateral withdrawals of selected NVA units as incentive for
US concessions.
Reports from all four Corps areas of South Vietnam
indicate extensive Communist preparations for attacks prior
to, during, and just after the Tet holidays. No major
enemy offensive activity was reported during the past 24
hours, however.
While a great deal of attention quite properly has been
focused on indications of impending Communist military ac-
tion during the Tet period, it should also be noted that
the Communists apparently hope to inspire popular antigov-
ernment demonstrations in urban areas as part of their offen-
sive. /
Preparations for
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demonstrations have become fairly widespread in the last two
months, especially in villages close to district and provin-
cial capitals.
The impact of any demonstrations will depend in large
measure on the degree of success achieved in coordinated
enemy military actions. The demonstrators would have diffi-
culty drawing sustained support and would be dangerously ex-
posed unless the government were distracted by significant
enemy operations.
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II, OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
PERU
Prime Minister Montagne tried to play down the
seriousness of the International Petroleum Company dis-
pute in his talk with the US charge this morning, but
he was notably unforthcoming when the charge pressed
him on specifics. He did nothing to dispel the im-
pression that the government intends to push ahead
on all three of the issues in dispute--the value of
the company's expropriated property, the $15 million
bill for petroleum acquired by the company since last
October, and the $690 million claim for the company's
"unjust profits" since the oil field was opened up in
the 1920s.
To us, this seems to be further confirmation that,
however much Montagne may want President Velasco's
job, there is no significant difference between them
where the IPC is concerned.
LATIN AMERICA
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Thailand: Areas of Tribal Insurgency
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THAILAND
The government position in the north continues
to deteriorate. Thai. troops in the northern tri-bor-
der area have been unable to drive Communist-led guer-
rillas from fortified villages and have now virtually
given up patrolling.
The insurgents, in addition to inflicting heavy
casualties on government troops, are also making further
efforts to destroy the government's severely disrupted
tribal development program. Recently they have for the
first time attacked civilian development teams working
among tribal groups and are making sporadic raids on
heretofore secure main roads.
Farther north, in Nan- and Chiang Rai provinces,
where armed insurgent activity by Meo hill tribesmen
is entering its third year, there is:increasing evi-
dence that the Communists are attempting to extend
their influence into adjacent lowland areas. The re-
cent capture of a group, of ethnic Thai insurgents sug-
gests the Communists are making some headway in re-
cruiting lowland villagers.
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In the face of these developments, the army has
decided to concentrate its activities in the lowlands.
Citing the heavy expense of maintaining troops in the
field, as well as a desire to re-establish a "reserve"
force, the 3rd Army has withdrawn a third of its troops
committed to the security operation and has deactivated
its forward operations headquarters. The immediate ef-
fect will be to enable the insurgents to establish a
secure base area in the north.
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SIGNIFICANCE:
SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE OPTIONS
Soviet strategic policy in recent years has
been aimed at harrowing and eventually overcoming the United
States lead in capabilities for intercontinental attack. The
.primary objective of the Soviets has been to achieve a more
meaningful deterrent. They set the goals for achieving this
at a time when the US enjoyed a superiority in strategic de-
livery systems which put the Soviet Union at a political and
psychological disadvantage. To this end, the Soviets have
built strategic forces which give them a large assured-destruc-
tion capability, as well as important capabilities for limit-
ing damage to themselves. Although the Soviets have only be-
gun to narrow the gap in submarine-launched ballistic mis-
siles and retain inferior in heavy bombers, they will draw
even with the US later this year in the number of operational
ICBM launchers. Current programs will bring further improve-
ments in their strategic position over the next year or so.
The Soviets, nonetheless, are well aware that the United
States is moving toward a number of significant improvements
in strategic capabilities. The improved deterrent posture
which the Soviets are now achieving could be seriously under-
cut by the US deployment of Poseidon, Minuteman III, Sentinel,
and other new strategic systems. Faced with these US develop-
tents, we believe that Soviet military planners have a limited
set of options available to them for the near term.
Options for Strategic Defense
Strategic defense continues to be a focus of major Soviet
efforts, but offers the least possibilities for success in the
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foreseeable future.
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