THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 1 MARCH 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976642
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 1, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
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1 March 1969
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32
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
I. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
MIDDLE EAST
The Dayan forces are wasting no time pressing their
man's case. A Tel Aviv broadcast the day before Eshkol!s
funeral cites their claims that a petition campaign for
"Moshe Dayan as premier within or outside the Labor Party"
has already come up with 47,000 signatures. Mrs. Meir
and Pinhas Sapir, the Labor Party secretary general, have
both attacked the petition drive. Mrs. Meir said it was
"undemocratic"--"the party and not the street will decide
who will be the candidate for prime minister."
We are not sure Dayan himself is behind this activ-
ity. Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv in fact reported
yesterday that there was a good deal of talk about Dayan's
not being "in fighting spirit" at this stage.
EUROPE
As the press has reported, things in Rome are sim-
mering down. The Italian police arrested 194 people in
connection with Thursday night's demonstrations; eight of
these were ultimately placed under arrest. Fourteen civ-
ilians were injured, five of them seriously enough to be
hospitalized. The only word on the student who died
is that he fell from the roof of the Rome Teaching Fac-
ulty building. This part of the building is still oc-
cupied by the students, however, and the police have not
been able to verify the report.
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
SOVIET AFFAIRS
The Soviet note delivered to the East German Government
yesterday can be construed as giving Ulbricht a virtual free
hand in hampering West German traffic to and from Berlin.
The note raised the familiar claim that Bonn was illegally
recruiting soldiers and manufacturing military and strategic
goods in West Berlin and secretly transferring them to West
Germany.
The East Germans almost immediately ordered their check-
point officials to begin applying an already-existing decree
which bans the transport of goods, used "for military purposes"
across their territory. This decree is deliberately worded
so that the East Germans can ban the transport of most of the
goods manufactured in West Berlin as well as materials sent to
the city for use in their manufacture. The reference to the
alleged recruitment of West Berliners for service in the West
German armed forces moreover, provides Pankow still another
rationale for at least slowing down all passenger traffic.
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov and Marshal Yaku-
bovsky, commander of the Warsaw Pact, arrived in East Berlin
from Moscow yesterday and met with Ulbricht and other East
German political and military officials. Moscow had announced
on 20 February that Yakubovsky would direct a joint Soviet -
East German exercise early. in March.
Meanwhile, units from at least two, and perhaps as many
as four, of the five Soviet armies in East Germany. appear to
2
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be preparing for the exercise. They are located in a train-
ing area between Berlin and the West German border, along
with units from an East German division. Soviet tactical
aircraft have not yet moved to alternate bases near Berlin
and its air corridors to the West.
? Chancellor Kiesinger, Foreign Minister Brandt, and Mayor
Schuetz had earlier publicly aired their views that the presi-
dential election will take place in Berlin next Wednesday, as
scheduled. Implicit in their statements, however, was the
thought that a last-minute deal tould not be entirely ruled
out. According to Kiesinger's press secretary, Sunday is the
last day on which a change of venue can be arranged. There-
after, he implied, technical arrangements would have to go ,
forward.
VIETNAM
The scope and intensity of enemy activity through-
out South Vietnam slackened considerably on 28 February,
for the second consecutive day, suggesting the opening
phase of the Communist's offensive may be drawing to a
close as they regroup, refit and assess the results of
their initial round of attacks. It is not clear how
long this lull will last. There is strong evidence,
however, that the offensive will be resumed, probably
on a countrywide basis, and quite possibly featuring
operations by at least some of the large numbers of
main force units which have not yet been committed.
3
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93465 1-69
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Except for sporadic fire fights in Saigon's out-
lying districts and one isolated terrorist incident
downtown, Saigon remained free of enemy activity yester-
day. Hue, so far unscathed during the offensive, also
was quiet. There has been no significant enemy activ-
ity at Da Nang since the heavy explosions in the dock
area of 27-28 February that caused numerous US casual-
ties and destroyed nearly 350 tons of ammunition.
In I Corps, little significant ground fighting
developed in any of the northern provinces or in the
area of the Demilitarized Zone. Allied forces on
sweep operations in the northern A Shau Valley uncov-
ered more than 100 tons of enemy arms and munitions.
No enemy actions of significance occurred in the II
Corps area. Although no major actions were reported
in III Corps, large numbers of enemy troops continued
to be noted along the approach routes to the allied
military complex at Bien Hoa - Long Binh and in the
vicinity of the provincial capitals of Song Be and
An Loc in the northern sector. Viet Cong activ-
ity in the Mekong Delta was generally light and scat-
tered.
Thieu and Ky are edging closer to opening direct
contact with the Liberation Front in Paris. Ky told
Ambassador Lodge on 26 February that he is "available"
to talk to the Viet Cong in Paris and that Thieu has
4
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authorized him to offer a deal. In exchange for the
withdrawal of all North Vietnamese north of the 17th
Parallel, the GVN would allow all Viet Cong to be eligi-
ble to vote and to run as candidates in elections for
the senate, the assembly, local offices, and even the
presidency in 1971.
This approach is a major step forward on the part
of Thieu and Ky and indicates that they are now more
confident of their strength in South Vietnam. It is
clear from Ky's remarks to Ambassador Lodge, however,
that he and Thieu want the US not only to tell them
whether they ought to continue down this path but also
to hold their hands while they travel it. The degree
to which Ky and Thieu are counting on continuing US
help was revealed in Ky's comment to Ambassador Lodge
that the US could dissuade various nationalist candi-
dates from running for the presidency, thereby avoid-
ing a split in the anti-Communist vote.
The Communists would be intrigued and enticed by
any discreet approach from Ky to open talks, despite
their frequent assertions that they will not deal with
the present GVN leadership. If the Communists were con-
vinced that Ky genuinely wants discussions involving
the political future of South Vietnam, they would prob-
ably agree to meet with him. They might, however, seek
to establish through an intermediary beforehand pre-
cisely what Ky has to offer. Thieu has previously sug-
gested that the Soviets or. the US might have to play
5
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the role of intermediary in establishing contact between
the Front and the GVN.
At present, however, the Communists are trying to
encourage the US to open direct talks with the Libera-
tion Front and they might regard an approach by Ky as
nothing more than a US counter to their own strategy.
On the issue of mutual de-escalation, it is possi-
ble that the Communists may soon become more active.
In response to allied protests about the current Com-
munist offensive, both Hanoi and the Front have repeat-
edly taken the line that US "intensification" of the
war has made this necessary and that the first require-
ment for progress in Paris is cessation of US "aggres-
sion." Justifying Communist military activity on
, grounds of "self-defense" is nothing new, but perhaps
something more is involved in this current emphasis,
and it is conceivable- that the Communists may try to
bring about some mutual reduction in hostilities be-
fore long.
6
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The main argument against the Communists pushing for a
cease-fire, or even for significant de-escalation, is that
one of their main forms of pressure on the Allies would be
reduced. The Communists generally have been negative about
the idea of an early cease-fire or de-escalation, calling
them inappropriate until the shape of a settlement is clear,
or arguing that the US only wants to use a cease-fire as a
device to tie the hands of Communist forces while the Allies
continue to build a "position of strength."
We doubt very much that the Communists want or will
press for a formal cease-fire until they have a settlement
pretty well nailed down. It is conceivable, however, that
the current offensive might be capped by an attempt by the
Communists to bring about some kind of tacit reduction in
the level of fighting in South Vietnam. In a post-offensive
period when their forces presumably would be resting and re-
grouping anyway, the Communists might see some advantage in
trying to curb US military activities.
The Communists clearly have an elaborate political sce-
nario devised to accompany the current military offensive.
There are many indications that the Communist political of-
fensive this time is to center on agitation of the peace is-
sue in support of their call for a "peace cabinet" in Saigon.
If after widespread, intensive fighting there appeared
to be no end of the fighting in sight, a peace campaign might
have considerable appeal both in South Vietnam and elsewhere,
particularly if it were coupled with suggestions that a re-
duction in the fighting could be prolonged if the Allies
were willing to curb their military operations.
7
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A successful Communist effort to take advantage of wide-
spread sentiment for peace is one of the few ways they might
be able to muster any real popular response in South Vietnam
and to bring about activities such as demonstrations and
strikes which would serve their ends. There is a good chance
such an effort is going to be mounted before long.
II, OTHER MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
SPAIN
Madrid has just given a sign of flexibility over the 26
March deadline for concluding the negotiations on the base
renewal agreement. A high Foreign Ministry official told
the US Embassy that if no agreement is reached by then, ne-
gotiations could still continue. He said that in this event
the one-year phase-out period for dismantling the bases--
which technically starts on the deadline date--could perhaps
be deferred in return for an interim military assistance
package.
8
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