THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 JULY 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976887
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: July 19, 1969

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
The President's Daily Brief
19 july 1969
9 50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27: CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MAJOR PROBLEMS
VIETNAM
The Chinese Communist Deputy Prime Minister, who headed
his country delegation to the French National Day reception
Monday, told French Ambassador Manac'h that Peking was con-
vinced the US was sincere about withdrawing troops from Viet-
nam, that the pull-out would be rapid, and that in return for
this the North Vietnamese would make concessions Making it
impossible for them to get the kind of settlement for which.
they have been fighting.
There continue to be indications that the Communists
plan to cap their "July action phase" with a final round of
offensive actions which could begin over the weekend.
EUROPE
Italian Prime Minister Rumor is still trying to recon-
stitute the center-left coalition, but there is no immediate
1
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
prospect of success. The Unitary Socialists are insisting on
a "guarantee" that the government will not cooperate with the
Communists. While their brethren to the left, the orthodox
Socialists, do not want a coalition with the Communists either,
they refuse to commit themselves to vote against all Communist-
sponsored legislation. Rumor is seeking a formula to paper
over the Socialist differences and says he plans to wait until
after the moon landing before making his next move.
Meanwhile the Communists are obviously disturbed by the
.prospect of an immediate re-formation of the old coalition be-
fore they have had an opportunity to take full advantage of
the current crisis.
SOVIET AFFAIRS
The increase noted in Warsaw Pact military activity this
week is probably in preparation for normal seasonal training
exercises. Naval craft assembling off the East German and
Polish coasts are expected to conduct an amphibious exercise.
Soviet, Bulgarian, and Romanian
air and air defense units conducted a.small exercise on Thurs-
day.
There is nothing significant to report on the Middle East.
2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27: CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
LAOS
There are signs that Communist forces are moving to expand
their holdings in the Plaine des Jarres area. Over the past
few days Communist forces have unsuccessfully tried to overrun
a number of progovernment guerrilla outposts south of the Plaine
They also appear to be moving to clear the remaining government
elements which threaten their supply lines south of Muong Soui.
Although there has been no new fighting west of Muong Soul,
there is increasing evidence of an enemy troop build-up along
Route 7.
Meanwhile, King Savang, with unwonted forcefulness, has
tried to bolster the depressed Lao military leadership. React-
ing sharply against the government's alarmist views of the mili-
tary situation, the King urged the military to stop sulking and
move to strengthen the defenses of the Route 7/13 road junction
at Phou Khoun. (Loss of the road junction would deny the gov-
ernment overland access to the royal capital of Luang Prabang
via.:Route 13.)
INDIA
Reaction to the forced resignation of Mrs. Gandhi's deputy,
Morarji Desai, has snowballed within the Congress Party over
the past two days. Her volte face in backing the party's choice
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
for president, after earlier opposition failed to salve the
feelings of Desai 's supporters, and Desai himself :says he is
willing to fight- Congress Party_members_of parliament are
meeting in New Delhi on Sunday and, if peacemaking efforts
fail, may take a vote of confidence on Mrs. Gandhi's leader-
ship.
The outcome of such a vote is difficult to forecast at
present. Even if Mrs. Gandhi survives, however, her position
will have been severely weakened by her defeat in the party's
presidential nomination and her petulant reaction. She will
no longer have someone in the presidency as responsive to her
cues on such matters as formation of a new government or a
call for new elections.. In the past, her enemies have recog-
nized this influence as a crucial weapon.in.her personal ar-
senal against any. concerted attempt to oust her. Her popular
image as.a broadminded, all-India leader until now one of her
more important assets, also has been damaged.
EL SALVADOR 7 'HONDURAS
A cease-fire was agreed on to begin at midnight last
night and both sides said they had ordered their troops to
implement it fully. It is uncertain, however, whether El Sal-
vador will keep its side of the bargain. President Sanchez'
speech to the nation last night sounded no note of compromise
and will add to Honduran skepticism of Salvadoran intentions.
The Guatemalan ambassador in San Salvador believes El Salva-
dor has no Intention of withdrawing and that inter-American
sanctions will be necessary to force compliance. Honduran
4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
President Lopez made an urgent call to President Somoza of
Nicaragua for materiel assistance, which Somoza says he will
give if the cease-fire agreement is not still being implemented
today. ?
THAILAND
With the insurgency, now well into its fifth year, the
Communists face a long, uphill fight, but testimony from de-
fectors and captured documents suggests they are slowly Moving
to correct their mistakes. At annex we discuss the insurgency
problem in some detail.
5
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
THAILAND: AREAS OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY
3:3
)
???
'1?A"..?
r ool,a,g/
( Pa,
? ? ?
18
BURMA ??
14 -
o '1??
Phitsanulo
?
'^
?
A
?Luang Prabang
LAOS
? \
?VtirZi
?)
NORTH
VIETNAM
1 L.
J ' , arI o
Nakhon
?L?
. -. ..? Ratchasima
l ? 4.
"..foi:?,-...., t i
fr?T -,
BANGKOK
* r,
.i?
t -?..
TrV\44
0
A NDA
SEA
A
e'I
;
4.11 G
ULF
ochurnphon
? ? A
(.7 je
417,j),
,44
/
Nakhon S Thammarat
Phuket?
,...SUMAtRA
.\48
Pattan
Satun .1!
1,1
PENANG,
MALAYSIA
0 100 \
F
!S IA M
)tNakhon
Phanom
Uc htnhe
R a t n
ci.?,
,4.
SOUTo.
VIETNAM
CAMBODIA
PHNOM PENH*
C SOUTH
VIETNAM
-.10
Miles
95629 7-69 CIA
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
1-VK 11-1h PKESIDLIV1 ONLY
THE INSURGENCY IN THAILAND
There are two principal areas of.insurgent.activity in
Thailand:
--The northeast, a large, economically depressed area,
where the insurgency first got rolling in remote villages
among Thai farmers scratching out a precarious living on arid
land ill suited for rice culture.
--The north where rough terrain and prOximity to Commu-
nist-controlled areas in Laos have thus far made it fairly
easy for Communist agents to incite insurgency among primitive
mountain tribal groups.
After a slow start, the government has brought the in-
surgency in the northeast under control--at least temporarily.
Insurgent incidents have been at low levels since early 1967,
when a record number of clashes, government casualties, and
acts of terrorism were being reported. The guerrillas, num-
bering between 1,500 and 2,000, are on the defensive. Short
of food and other supplies, led by quarreling and ill-moti-
vated cadre, and pressed by government troops, the insurgents
have grown fainthearted and irresolute. Defections have been
common. The heart of the problem is that the Communists
badly overestimated their political appeal and have been un-
able to build a sound village-based apparatus. Without the
basic machinery of a guerrilla organization, the insurgency
virtually collapsed when government troops moved into the
countryside three years ago.
Al
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
At the same time, however, the government_has not been
able to capitalize fully on the insurgents' woes and elimin-
ate the threat. Insurgent bands remain .largely intact and are
laboring to correct their mistakes and strengthen their vil-
lage organization.
North Vietnamese -
northeast and that
been in surprising
put the insurgency
There are recent reports that additional
trained insurgents are being moved into the
arms, ammunition, and funds, which have
short supply, will soon be brought in to
on a better footin
It is probably no coincidence that at the same time the
insurgents fell on evil days in the northeast, the Communists
began to step up their activities in the mountainous northern
and north central provinces adjacent to Laos. In so doing,
the Communists have taken advantage of favorable geography
and the long-standing animosity felt by the tribal people to-
ward the government and the lowland Thai. The struggle in the
north is now almost two years old, but despite various meas-
ures to beef up its forces in the area and strengthen its hold
over the tribal people, the government is far from getting on
top of the situation. The Communists appear to be well on the
way to developing their first secure base area within Thai-
land's borders.
The Communists must know that to win they must develop a
viable insurgency that goes well beyond the tribal people.
But at the moment they appear to calculate that dramatic prog-
ress in the tribal areas will provide a needed sense of momen-
tum for their over-all effort. It is a dangerous gamble, for
in turning to the tribal people, the Communists run the risk
A2
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
of having their movement identified with a.people who are dis-
trusted and disliked by. the overwhelming majority Of Thailand's
? population.
Although government leaders do not like to admit it, the
insurgency is fundamentally a home-grown movement that depends
for the most part on local manpower and supplies. The leader-
ship is ethnic Thai and Sino-Thai, and the movement, in all
areas of the country, is under the direction of the Thai Com-
munist Party (TCP). There is little question, however, that
still in its formative stages, the Thai insurgency is heavily
dependent on outside guidance and inspiration. The TCP itself
appears to be Under the Strong influence., if not the control,
of Communist China. .This is revealed in TCP propaganda, which
is straight Maoist liturgy; in the fact that the party's front
organizations are based in Peking; and the long association
between party leaders and their counterparts in China.
The mechanics through which Communist China exercises its
influence over the TCP is not clear nor is_itabsolutely cer-
tain that the Chinese provide much more than general guidance
and a certain amount .of tangible assistance in the form of fi-
nancial backing and training. In recent years, however, insur-
gent prisoners and defectors have painted ?a, coMpelling picture
of North Vietnamese support for the.Thai_insurgency. North
Vietnam has trained at least 500 rank-and-file insurgents at
a training camp near Hanoi since the early 1960s. Hanoi has
also provided material support to the insurgent bands in the
northeast; and the large Vietnamese community there, over which
Hanoi exerts considerable influence, has also been helping out.
A3
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Even in north Thailand, whose proximity to China might have
enabled Peking to assist the insurgents directly, North Viet-
namese cadre; with the support of their Lao Communist friends,
have been setting up bases and otherwise assisting the Thai
insurgents from Communist-controlled areas of Laos.
The government, meanwhile, continues to take piecemeal
efforts to overcome the bureaucratic jealousies that have im-
paired its effort to crush the insurgency. Much progress has
been made in this area over the past several years. But or-
ganizational troubles are not the heart of the problem. The
most important factor bearing on the Thai counterinsurgency
effort, and its inability to root out a weak and divided enemy,
is that the top Thai leaders are not convinced that the insur-
gency is sufficiently serious to warrant the financial and
other sacrifices that would be necessary to bring the insur-
gency under full control.
Confident that the Communists will never make 'a go of it
in Thailand, and apparently lulled by their partial success
in the northeast? the leaders in Bangkok appear willing to
let the situation drift.
A4
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007300170001-8