THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 9 MARCH 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005977338
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 9, 1970

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The President's Daily Brief
9 March 1970
46
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
9 March 1970
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
In a backgrounder for Gus Hall, a Soviet briefer
describes a number of problems. (Page 1)
In Laos, the military situation remains static, and
Communist leaders are still offering political set-
tlement only on their own terms. (Page 3)
Pravda has printed the most authoritative commentary
on SALT since the talks began. (Page 4)
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USSR
According to an FBI report, Soviet party offi-
cials have told Gus Hall, the head of the US Commu-
nist Party, that political maneuvering within the
Soviet leadership may cause changes "at a very high
level" in the Soviet hierarchy. These changes may
take place at the next party congress, which will
probably be held before the end of this year.
The Soviet leaders are said to be concerned
that the Soviet Union and its allies are not keeping
pace with the scientific and technological revolu-
tion., They feel that unless drastic steps are taken,
the USSR will not catch up with the US. Some Soviet
leaders reportedly fear that if the trend is not re-
versed soon, the USSR's political and military influ-
ence will suffer.
According to Hall's information, Brezhnev sharply
criticized party and government officials by name at
a party meeting in December. Some Soviet officials
believe that h9,will attempt to find "scapegoats at
a very high level." As additional divisive issues
troubling the leadership, the report also cites some
unspecified ideological problems at the prestigious
Institute of Marxism-Leninism and also a continuing
fight between factions within the Soviet party. over
Stalin's role in history. Despite policy rifts
within the hierarchy, the "Brezhnev group" is de-
scribed as "in firm command" and determined to per-
mit no compromise of Communist principles.
We have had other indications of trouble
in the leadership, brought to a head by
the USSR's disappointing economic perform-
ance last year. The treatment of Brezhnev
in this report has a partisan ring to it,
however, and we suspect that it came from
one of his Soviet supporters whose own
hopes have colored the estimate of Brezh-
nev's political strength. We think it
very likely that Brezhnev does hope to
find "scapegoats" for the problems con-
fronting the leadership, but we are not
yet confident that he will succeed. Nei-
ther Brezhnev nor his possible challengers
appear to have gained the upper hand in the
three months since Brezhnev's December
speech before the party, and the political
jockeying probably will continue.
(continued)
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The report also carries some remarks about for-
eign policy. Hall's Soviet sources claim that So-
viet analysis of President Nixon's "State of the
World" message has led Soviet leaders to fear a re-
vival of US "cold war" policies. The Soviet Union
is preparing for "negative relations" with the US,
believing that the US will attempt to prolong nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union while NATO becomes an
armed camp. Soviet analysts believe that the US is
allowing West Germany to seek detente with East Ger-
many as a tactic to recoup influence lost in Eastern
Europe with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Soviet officials also believe that the US is trying
to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift and to use Communist
China against the Soviet Union, despite US assurances
to the contrary.
The report does not treat these as views
on issues over which the Soviet leadership
is divided. Nevertheless, we believe that
they belong in that category along with
the scientific-technological gap, "ideo-
logical problems," and Stalin's role in
history. Given the pro-Brezhnev bias in
the earlier part of the report, we suspect
that these are Brezhnev's views, which are
not necessarily shared by all the other
Soviet leaders. In the past, both "ideo-
logical" discussions at the Institute of
Marxism-Leninism and quarrels over Stalin's
role in history have had important impli-
cations for Soviet foreign policy. Weare:
confident that this is true today as well.
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Communists Strengthening Hold Over Plaine Des Jarres
AREA OF
MAIN MAP
Two NVA battalions Mu
move into area
Sanist
Luang-
_
Pathet Lao taking up positions
71
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Ban
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Nong41,16
JAR R
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10 20 Kilometers
97819 3-70 CIA
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O Government-held location
? Communist-held location
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LAOS
In the north, Communist forces are continuing
to consolidate their hold over the Plaine des Jarres.
The North Vietnamese are placing antiaircraft artil-
lery. atop mountains surrounding the Plaine, accord-
ing to intercepted messages. The enemy also is look-
ing fpr locations north of the Plaine to emplace two
of the 122-Mm. field guns recently introduced from
North Vietnam. The positioning of these artillery
pieces in this relatively,remote'area suggests that
at least some of these' guns are meant to play a de-
fensive rather than ofOnsive role.
On the western side of the Plaine, the Pathet
Lao are taking up positions on Phou Rout, the domi-
nant terrain feature in this area. According to
enemy communications, this will permit the North
Vietnamese troOps currently on the mountain to pro-
ceed farther west to Muong Soul.
As a' result of the movement of as many as two
North Vietnamese battalions into the Muong Soul area
in recent days, the small :number of government troops
nearby have pulled back to the more strongly defended
government outpost at San Luang.
To the east, intercepts
indicate that a North Vietnamese battalion may soon
attack the government base at Ban Na.
On the political front, Communist reaction to
President Nixon's statement on Laos has followed a
standard line. Hanoi has emphasized those portions
of the statement dealing with US activities in Laos.
In addition, as a basis for a settlement, Hanoi cited
the Lao Communists' statement of 6 March, which set
forth their terms for ending the war. North Vietnam
did not directly comment on President Nixon's state-
ment regarding consultation among the signers of the
1962 !Geneva accords on Laos. There has been, no offi-
cial Soviet reaction to President Nixon's statement,
nor any public mention of his plea to the USSR to
help restore peace in Laos. The unofficial commen-
tary thus far available has, however, been negative.
Early this morning, the clandestine Pathet Lao
News Agency released the text of a letter Prince
Souphanouvong sent to Souvanna Phouma on Sunday sug-
gesting an exchange of views between the Laotian
leaders. Souphanouvong seems to intend an exchange
of letters rather than a meeting, and, like Hanoi's
spokesman, he wants to base a move toward peace on
the Lao Communists' statement.
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USSR-SALT
A Pravda editorial of 7 March marked the most
-authoritative soviet commentary on SALT since the
talks:began on 17 November. It was designed, in
part atleast, to build a case against the US if
the talks should fail or become bogged down. It
warned, for example, that the US should not revive
its old concept of negotiating from a,"position of
strength," and stated that neither side should use
the talks as a screen to cover up a new round in
the arms race. However, the editorial concludes on
a note of optimism, claiming an, agreement can be
reached in spite of difficulties if both, sides con-
duct "honest" negotiations.
The editorial is consistent
Soviet statements
which imply that Moscow's position
in Vienna will be influenced by US actions
between the talks. A major partY of the
Soviet propaganda effort has been a heavy
dose of commentary inveighing against US
plans for expanded deployment of an ABM
system. This editorial is another yard-
stick by which to measure Moscow's concern
about ABM plans in the US. It is also an
attempt to refute US justification for an
antimissile system.
with recent
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FRANCE
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NOTES
Egypt-Israel:
USSR:
Cyprus: Security forces continue to round up
suspects connected with the attempted assassination
of President Makarios. The ultraconservative, pro-
Enosis national front will come under suspicion be-
cause of its terrorist acts over the past several
months, but any of several other extremist Geek-
Cypriot groups could have been, responsible. There
appears to be no link with the Turkish-Cypriot com-
munity. Makarios may now be prompted to revive the
energetic antiterrorist campaign that was begun last
January by acting president derides while Makarios
was away on an African tour.
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Top Secret
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